

Bitcoin

- Decentralized (No governments) peer-to-peer
- Virtual
- Deflating (limited supply) 21 mil
- Universal

↓ illegality?
time lag

Hash

$x \rightarrow h(x)$ fixed size
256

Collision free $x \neq y \Rightarrow h(x) \neq h(y)$ $x \neq y$

hiding: given $h(x)$, can't find x

puzzle friendly

Message digest

$h(r || x)$

Hashing to a range
is infeasible
(truly random)


App: Commitment


Seal $h(\text{msg} || \text{key})$

give msg, seal with key in
env

given $h(m)$, can't find
msg || key = hide

no 2 msgs. : Commit / Bind

Hash pointers

Merkle treeSignatures

RSA, DSS

gen: (sk, pk)

Secret

Signing key

→ public key (Identity)

sig: $\text{sign}(sk, msg)$
 is valid: $\text{Verify}(pk, msg, sig)$

- given pk, cant find sk = unforgeability
- consistent i.e. vfy

you are making statements on behalf of pk through sk.

$\text{Verify}(pk, msg, \text{sign}(sk, msg)) = \text{true}$

P_{KB}

- pk goofy
goofy lovin

PS

- PKralice
pay check

pk
key to

1. private (5)
 2. pay to B.B (H.C) 5

PR_A
pay to Alice (ch())

Signed by
PR Murphy
GCL (7D)

Double Spend

Scrooge

Savage signs the
Hashes and publishes

A hand-drawn diagram of a tape with three segments. The segments are labeled 'problem', 'Trans 10', and 'Trans'. A line labeled '2' points to the 'Trans' segment.

2 Feb 5
Crate

add	amp

from (H)
hard ID
trans.

pay

consumed	
karsh	pay

signs


Decentralization

- Maintaining the ledger.
- Validity
- Location

Distributed consensus.

Read all or none : Posts on FB going to 30 users

peer to peer.



Nodes reach consensus on transactions and agree on blocks of transactions.

How? Implicit


Each node collects broadcasts
Each round, random node proposes block.

Other nodes accept if transactions are valid.
i.e. Signatures, hash, unique txns.

Accept by mining on block

why does it work?

- Stealing : transfer requires signatures (unforgeable)
- DDOS : wait till next block.



How to extend longest chain

Rounds : Mining

~~Waste~~ coin waste to yourself.
Incentive for honesty? Block has to end up on long term chain.

transaction fee.

Rounds : who proposes? Voting ^{/ competing} based on computing power (PoW)

$H(\text{nonce} \parallel \text{prev hash} \parallel \text{tx} \parallel \text{tx} \parallel \dots)$
↑
break force

← target →

SUR

Date

