

CNIT 58100 CFM: CYBERFORENSICS OF MALWARE – LAB 2 & 3 (PART 1)

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Lab 2 & 3 – Part 1

Due on: September 10th, 2014 (Week 2)

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2014

## Abstract

This lab covers the skills discussed in chapter 2 and 3 of the text. The practice covered in these labs is all based on malware analysis. The malware files used are provided as an extension of the text for practical purposes.

Each of the labs consists of multiple questions that require short answers. Depending on the question, certain special tools might be required to fully analyze the malware and find answers to the question.

This paper provides answers to Chapter 2 and 3 labs. The lab uses 4 different files which are: *Lab03-01.exe*, *Lab03-02.dll*, *Lab03-03.exe*, and *Lab03-04.exe*. These files are malwares and therefore could be harmful if used for non-training purposes.

The tools used to analyze the files used in this lab are: Virustools, PEview, Resource Hacker, Wireshark, Procmon, ApateDNS, and Regshot. The results collected after analyzing the files includes: malware's imports and strings, processes under which the malware is running, malware indicators, network-based signatures for the malware, malware behavior etc.

### Lab 3-1

Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-01.exe using basic dynamic analysis tools.

#### Questions:

- Q1: What are this malware's imports and strings?
- Q2: What are the malware's host-based indicators?
- Q3: Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware? If so, what are they?

#### Answers:

- 1: First, the malware is packed. And it only has one import *ExitProcess*. However the strings are clear.

Analyzing the malware using basic analysis technique and looking at the malware's PView file structure and strings. Proves that only *kernel32.dll* is imported.

Figure 1 and 2 below shows the basic analysis of the malware using PView and virustotal.




Figure 1: Lab03-01.exe Import analysis using PView

PE sections					
Name	Virtual address	Virtual size	Raw size	Entropy	MD5
.text	512	104	512	0.82	9e5912d9f35aa91102fcd5f4740ef0a
.data	1024	5775	6144	6.40	8dc0f10f42077eede7aaef5e35b338cc
PE imports					
[+] kernel32.dll					
ExitProcess					
ExifTool file metadata					
MIMEType	application/octet-stream				
Subsystem	Windows GUI				
MachineType	Intel 386 or later, and compatibles				
TimeStamp	2008:01:06 15:51:31+01:00				
FileType	Win32 EXE				
PE Type	PE32				
CodeSize	512				
LinkerVersion	5.12				
FileAccessDate	2014:08:18 23:54:16+01:00				

Figure 2: Lab03-01.exe Import analysis using virustotal

Considering the file is packed, we wouldn't expect to see strings; however there are some interesting strings such as *WinVMX32*, *VideoDriver* etc. Figure 3 below shows the strings captured using process explorer.




Figure 3: Lab03-01.exe strings captured using Process Explorer

2. One of the host-based indicators is a mutex created by the malware. As seen in the strings in figure 3 above. The mutex *WinVMX32* is created by the malware. Before running the malware, we run **Procmon** and clear all the events. Using **ApateDNS** and **Wireshark** as shown in figure 4 and 5 below:




Figure 4: ApateDNS





Figure 5: Wireshark.

After setting up a virtual network using **ApateDNS** and **Wireshark**. We then begin examine the **Process Explorer**. As shown in Figure 6 and 7 below, we view the handles by clicking *Lab03-01.exe* in the process listing and select **View** then **Lower Pane View** and then **Handles**. In other to view the DLLs we select **View, Lower Pane View** and then **DLLs**. Viewing the DLL shows us that the malware has dynamic loaded DLLs which means that it has networking functionality.




Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [WIN-3AG4EK56JLV\Windows]

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name
System Idle Process	93.05	0 K	24 K	0		
System	0.21	148 K	596 K	4		
csrss.exe		1,932 K	3,040 K	332	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
csrss.exe	0.36	6,108 K	7,944 K	384	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
wininit.exe		1,288 K	496 K	392	Windows Start-Up Application	Microsoft Corporation
winlogon.exe		2,424 K	1,652 K	424	Windows Logon Application	Microsoft Corporation
explorer.exe	0.07	67,216 K	75,472 K	1504	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
procexp.exe		2,104 K	7,084 K	3500	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...
PROCEXP64.exe	2.24	16,632 K	33,588 K	1476	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...
Lab03-01.exe		312 K	796 K	3552		

Type	Name
Directory	\KnownDlls
Directory	\KnownDlls32
File	C:\Windows
Key	HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\Image File Execution Options
Key	HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\Image File Execution Options

Figure 6: Lab03-01.exe handles using Process Explorer



Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [WIN-3AG4EK56JLV\Windows]

Process	CPU	Private Bytes	Working Set	PID	Description	Company Name
System Idle Process	91.37	0 K	24 K	0		
System	0.36	148 K	596 K	4		
csrss.exe	< 0.01	1,932 K	3,040 K	332	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
csrss.exe	0.21	6,108 K	7,944 K	384	Client Server Runtime Process	Microsoft Corporation
wininit.exe		1,288 K	496 K	392	Windows Start-Up Application	Microsoft Corporation
winlogon.exe		2,424 K	1,652 K	424	Windows Logon Application	Microsoft Corporation
explorer.exe	0.21	67,492 K	76,128 K	1504	Windows Explorer	Microsoft Corporation
procexp.exe		2,104 K	7,084 K	3500	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...
PROCEXP64.exe	1.61	16,624 K	33,588 K	1476	Sysinternals Process Explorer	Sysinternals - www.sysinter...
Lab03-01.exe		312 K	796 K	3552		

Name	Description	Company Name	Path
apisetschema.dll	ApiSet Schema DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\apisetschema.dll
Lab03-01.exe			C:\Users\Windows\Desktop\Labs\Malware\PracticalMalw...
ntdll.dll	NT Layer DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
ntdll.dll	NT Layer DLL	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll
wow64.dll	Win32 Emulation on NT64	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\wow64.dll
wow64cpu.dll	AMD64 Wow64 CPU	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu.dll
wow64win.dll	Wow64 Console and Win32 API L...	Microsoft Corporation	C:\Windows\System32\wow64win.dll

Figure 7: Lab03-01.exe DLL's using Process Explorer

3. Some network-based signatures for this malware can be viewed by filtering using **Procmon**.

The figures below show a filter process of *Lab03-01.exe* using **Procmon**. To filter, we bring the filter dialog by selecting **Filter→Filter** and then set the 3 filters we need. The filters are one on the **Process Name** and two on the **Operation**.

Figure 8 and 9 shows the filters on Operation which are *RegSetValue* and *WriteFile*.




Figure 8: lab03-01.exe *RegSetValue* filter using **Procmon**




Figure 9: Lab03-01.exe *WriteFile* filter using **Procmon**

Figure 10 below shows the results of the **Procmon** filters:

Time ...	Process Name	PID	Operation	Path	Result	Detail
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	Thread Exit		SUCCESS	Thread ID: 764, Us...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	QueryNameInformationFile	C:\Windows\System32\apisetschema.dll	SUCCESS	Name: \Windows\...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	QueryNameInformationFile	C:\Users\Windows\Desktop\Labs\Mal...	SUCCESS	Name: \Users\Win...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	QueryNameInformationFile	C:\Windows\System32\wow64cpu.dll	SUCCESS	Name: \Windows\...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	QueryNameInformationFile	C:\Windows\System32\wow64.dll	SUCCESS	Name: \Windows\...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	QueryNameInformationFile	C:\Windows\System32\wow64win.dll	SUCCESS	Name: \Windows\...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	QueryNameInformationFile	C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Name: \Windows\...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	QueryNameInformationFile	C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ntdll.dll	SUCCESS	Name: \Windows\...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	Process Exit		SUCCESS	Exit Status: -10737...
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WIN...	SUCCESS	
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	CloseFile	C:\Windows	SUCCESS	
12:24:...	Lab03-01.exe	3968	RegCloseKey	HKLM\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WIN...	SUCCESS	

Showing 12 of 1,572,583 events (0.00076%)      Backed by virtual memory

Figure 10: **Procmon** Filtered result with 3 filter sets.

### Lab 3-2

Analyze the malware found in the file Lab03-02.dll using dynamic analysis tools.

#### Questions:

- Q1: How can you get this malware to install itself?
- Q2: How could you get this malware to run after installation?
- Q3: How can you find the process under which this malware is running?
- Q4: Which filters could you set in order to use procmon to glean information?
- Q5: What are the malware's host-based indicators?
- Q6: Are there any useful network-based signatures for this malware?

#### Solutions:

1. To install the malware we begin by analyzing the malware. Running the malware in PEvent shows that the file has 5 exports: *Install*, *ServiceMain*, *UninstallService*, *installA* and *uninstallA*. Figure 11 shows Lab03-02.dll exports using PEvent:






Figure 11: Lab03-02.dll exports using PVIEW

We also view the imports of the file using PVIEW asw shown in Figure 12, 13 and 14. Below:




Figure 12: Lab03-02.dll imports using PVIEW

Viewing IMPORT Address Table

pFile	Data	Description	Value
00004484	00000000	End of Imports	KERNEL32.dll
00004488	000058E4	Hint/Name RVA	00AC _chdir
0000448C	000058D8	Hint/Name RVA	01C5 _stricmp
00004490	000058C8	Hint/Name RVA	009D _adjust_fdiv
00004494	000058BE	Hint/Name RVA	0291 _malloc
00004498	000058B2	Hint/Name RVA	010F _initterm
0000449C	000058AA	Hint/Name RVA	025E _free
000044A0	00005892	Hint/Name RVA	000E _?ttype_info@@@UAE@XZ
000044A4	00005872	Hint/Name RVA	00CA _except_handler3
000044A8	0000585C	Hint/Name RVA	0041 _CxxThrowException
000044AC	000058EE	Hint/Name RVA	01C1 _stricmp
000044B0	0000584E	Hint/Name RVA	0042 _EH_prolog
000044B4	0000583A	Hint/Name RVA	0049 _CxxFrameHandler
000044B8	00005830	Hint/Name RVA	02B7 _strchr
000044BC	00005828	Hint/Name RVA	0134 _itoa
000044C0	0000581E	Hint/Name RVA	02C5 _strstr
000044C4	00005814	Hint/Name RVA	02BF _strcat
000044C8	0000580A	Hint/Name RVA	02BE _strlen
000044CC	00005800	Hint/Name RVA	02B5 _sscanf
000044D0	000057F8	Hint/Name RVA	023E _atoi
000044D4	000057E8	Hint/Name RVA	000F _?2@YAPAXI@Z
000044D8	0000576C	Hint/Name RVA	0299 _memset
000044DC	00005776	Hint/Name RVA	02F1 _wcstombs
000044E0	00005782	Hint/Name RVA	02C1 _strncpy
000044E4	0000578C	Hint/Name RVA	02B6 _strcat
000044E8	00005796	Hint/Name RVA	02BA _strcpy
000044EC	000057A0	Hint/Name RVA	023D _atoi
000044F0	000057A8	Hint/Name RVA	024C _fclose
000044F4	000057B2	Hint/Name RVA	024F _flush
000044F8	000057BC	Hint/Name RVA	0010 _?3@YAXPAX@Z
000044FC	000057CC	Hint/Name RVA	0266 _fwrite
00004500	000057D6	Hint/Name RVA	0257 _fopen
00004504	000057DE	Hint/Name RVA	02C3 _strchr
00004508	00000000	End of Imports	MSVCRT.dll

Figure 13: Lab03-02.dll imports using PView

Viewing IMPORT Address Table

pFile	Data	Description	Value
000044E0	00005782	Hint/Name RVA	02C1 _strncpy
000044E4	0000578C	Hint/Name RVA	02B6 _strcat
000044E8	00005796	Hint/Name RVA	02BA _strcpy
000044EC	000057A0	Hint/Name RVA	023D _atoi
000044F0	000057A8	Hint/Name RVA	024C _fclose
000044F4	000057B2	Hint/Name RVA	024F _flush
000044F8	000057BC	Hint/Name RVA	0010 _?3@YAXPAX@Z
000044FC	000057CC	Hint/Name RVA	0266 _fwrite
00004500	000057D6	Hint/Name RVA	0257 _fopen
00004504	000057DE	Hint/Name RVA	02C3 _strchr
00004508	00000000	End of Imports	MSVCRT.dll
0000450C	0000574A	Hint/Name RVA	0056 _InternetCloseHandle
00004510	0000573A	Hint/Name RVA	006F _InternetOpenA
00004514	00005726	Hint/Name RVA	005A _InternetConnectA
00004518	00005712	Hint/Name RVA	0045 _HttpOpenRequestA
0000451C	000056FE	Hint/Name RVA	0049 _HttpSendRequestA
00004520	000056EC	Hint/Name RVA	0047 _HttpQueryInfoA
00004524	000056D8	Hint/Name RVA	0077 _InternetReadFile
00004528	00000000	End of Imports	WININET.dll
0000452C	8000000B	Ordinal	000B
00004530	000056BE	Hint/Name RVA	003D _WSocketA
00004534	80000003	Ordinal	0003
00004538	80000004	Ordinal	0004
0000453C	8000000A	Ordinal	000A
00004540	80000013	Ordinal	0013
00004544	80000012	Ordinal	0012
00004548	80000097	Ordinal	0097
0000454C	80000010	Ordinal	0010
00004550	80000016	Ordinal	0016
00004554	80000073	Ordinal	0073
00004558	80000039	Ordinal	0039
0000455C	80000074	Ordinal	0074
00004560	80000009	Ordinal	0009
00004564	00000000	End of Imports	WS2_32.dll

Figure 14: Lab03-02.dll imports using PView

After examining the exports files, the malware can be installed using the rundll32.exe function with rundll32.exe Lab03-02.dll, installA. As shown in Fig 15 below:

```
C:\Users\Windows\Desktop\Labs\Malware\Chapter_3L>rundll32.exe lab03-02.dll, installA
```

Figure 15: rundll32.exe Lab03-02.dll, installA.

2. To run the malware, start the service it installs using the net command net start IPRIP. This is done using the cmd.
3. Using the Process Explorer and hovering over the svchost.exe files. We can find the process under which the malware is running.

As shown in Fig 16 below: The process under which the malware is running is svchost.exe




Figure 16: Examining Service Malware in Process Explorer.

4. The PID we found in the process explorer which is 388 can be used as a filter in **Procmon**. To filter in **Procmon** it follows the same method we used in Figure 8 and 9 above. Figure 17 shows **Procmon** filtered using PID.




Figure 17: PID 388 Filtered using **Procmon**.

5. After examining the malware in Process Explorer, the malware installs a service IPRIP with a display name Internet Network Awareness (INA+). That indicates that the malware is a host-based indicator.
6. After thorough analysis. We couldn't find any useful signatures for the malware.

### Lab 3-3

Execute the malware found in the file Lab03-03.exe while monitoring it using basic dynamic analysis tools in a safe environment.

#### Questions:

- Q1: What do you notice when monitoring this malware with Process Explorer?
- Q2: Can you identify any live memory modifications?
- Q3: What are the malware's host-based indicators?
- Q4: What is the purpose of this program?

#### Solutions:

1. We begin by analyzing the malware using **Process Explorer** and **Procmon**. Because **Procmon** events stream by quickly, so we use **File, Capture Events** to turn off event

capture. When we run *Lab03-03.exe* by double clicking the file, it becomes visible inside **Process Explorer**. As shown in figure below. The *svchost.exe* is created and run as an orphaned process. The fact that *svchost.exe* is orphaned is highly unusual and highly suspicious.




Figure 18: Process Explorer view of orphaned svchost.exe

2. Viewing the strings of the *svchost.exe* in the **Process Explorer**, and toggling between Image & Memory will show the difference or identify any live memory modification. However we can view the strings in Image and not that of the Memory. Shown in Figure 19 below is the string of the *svchost.exe* file viewed under the image.




Figure 19: svchost.exe strings

3. The malware creates the log file `practicalmalwareanalysis.log`. This can be viewed by viewing the strings of the `svchost.exe` file
4. Carefully analyzing the strings, one can conclude that the file is a Keylogger. The program performs process replacement on `svchost.exe` to launch the Keylogger.

### Lab 3-4

Analyze the malware found in the file `Lab03-04.exe` using basic dynamic analysis tools.

#### Questions:

- Q1: What happens when you run this file?
- Q2: What is causing the roadblock in dynamic analysis?
- Q3: Are there other ways to run this program?

#### Solutions:

When you try to run this malware, it automatically deletes itself and therefore cannot be analyzed.

### Conclusion

This lab aims to provide a dynamic analysis of a malware. Also a part of the basic analysis is used to properly analyze these malwares. However advanced and more sophisticated tools are used, such as Wireshark and ApateDNS which aims at controlling the network. The lab provides answers to what malware imports and strings are, host and network based indicators of a malware. Network based signatures of malware are also found.

Lastly the lab provide answers to malware behaviours such as how it operates and install itself. This lab provides an indepth knowledge of malware monitoring process.