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References

Cohen: Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences **Cohen-1988**

Jacob Cohen. *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences*. 2nd ed. Routledge, 1988. ISBN: 9780203771587. DOI: [10.4324/9780203771587](https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203771587).

Abstract: Statistical Power Analysis is a nontechnical guide to power analysis in research planning that provides users of applied statistics with the tools they need for more effective analysis. The Second Edition includes:

- a chapter covering power analysis in set correlation and multivariate methods;
- a chapter considering effect size, psychometric reliability, and the efficacy of “qualifying” dependent variables and;
- expanded power and sample size tables for multiple regression/correlation.

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Library: HA29 .C66 1988.

National Research Council: An assessment of research-doctorate programs in the United States: Social and behavioral sciences **NationalResearchCouncil-1982**

National Research Council. *An assessment of research-doctorate programs in the United States: Social and behavioral sciences*. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, Jan. 1982. DOI: [10.17226/9781](https://doi.org/10.17226/9781).

Donald B. Rubin. *Multiple imputation for nonresponse in surveys*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., June 1987. ISBN: 9780470316696. DOI: [10.1002/9780470316696](https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316696).

Abstract: Demonstrates how nonresponse in sample surveys and censuses can be handled by replacing each missing value with two or more multiple imputations. Clearly illustrates the advantages of modern computing to such handle surveys, and demonstrates the benefit of this statistical technique for researchers who must analyze them. Also presents the background for Bayesian and frequentist theory. After establishing that only standard complete-data methods are needed to analyze a multiply-imputed set, the text evaluates procedures in general circumstances, outlining specific procedures for creating imputations in both the ignorable and nonignorable cases. Examples and exercises reinforce ideas, and the interplay of Bayesian and frequentist ideas presents a unified picture of modern statistics.

Library: HA31.2 .R83 1987.

Serlin et al.: Rationality in psychological research: The good-enough principle**Serlin-Lapsley-1985**

Ronald C. Serlin and Daniel K. Lapsley. "Rationality in psychological research: The good-enough principle". In: *American Psychologist* 40.1 (1985), pp. 73–83. DOI: [10.1037/0003-066x.40.1.73](https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.40.1.73).

Abstract: Reexamines methodological and procedural issues raised by P. Meehl (1967; see also PA, Vol 62:5042) that question the rationality of psychological inquiry. Issues concern the asymmetry in theory testing between psychology and physics and the slow progress observed in psychological research. A good-enough principle is proposed to resolve Meehl's methodological paradox, and a more powerful reconstruction of science developed by I. Lakatos (1978) is suggested to account for the actual practice of psychological researchers.