
Experimental double auctions with private information

Data overview



	Treatment		Experimental data					
Market structure	Feedback	Price rule	treatment	Subjects (markets)	Observations			
Regular								
	Full OB	First price	Full	73 (4)	4810			
	Other-side OB	First price	Other	70 (5)	4238			
	Same-side OB	First price Matchmaker keeps	Same SameMMK	71 (5) 64 (4)	4069 4605			
	Black Box	First price Random price Matchmaker keeps	BB BBRandom BBMMK	84 (5) 78 (5) 88 (5)	4495 4249 5334			
Restricted asks	Full OB Black Box	First price	FullLimS BBLimS	76 (5) 71 (5)	2802 2446			
Asymmetric								
More buyers	Full OB Black Box	First price	FullMoreB BBMoreB	130 (5) 113 (5)	5683 4792			
More sellers	Full OB Black Box	First price	FullMoreS BBMoreS	140 (5) 124 (5)	8012 5236			
Large								
More rounds	Black Box	First price	BBMoreRounds	77 (5)	7392			
Large CE	Full OB Black Box	First price	FullLargeCE BBLargeCE	183 (13) 74 (8)	6999 3259			
Seller shift From buyers to sellers From sellers to buyers	Full OB	First price	FullSShift FullFromBtoS FullFromStoB	80 (5) 74 (5) 81 (5)	2467 2380 3118			
			Total	1'751 (104)	86'386			

The final number of subjects active in an experimental market may differ from the number of subjects initially recruited for it either due to inactivity of the subjects or due to technical disconnections before trading began. See also our OSF registry under osf.io/gu62n.

Data structure

Parameter	Description
treatment game round time id side	configuration of the experimental market sequence number of the experimental market under treatment treatment index $T \in \mathbb{N}$ of the trading round in the experimental market a measure $t_T \in \mathbb{N}$ of time within trading round T ID of the player (unique within the dataset) market side of the player (Buyer or Seller)
valuation bid price match_id match_time	valuation (reservation price) of player $i, \overline{\beta}_i$ (if i is a buyer) or $\underline{\sigma}_i$ (if i is a seller) current value of player i 's bid β_i (if i is a buyer) or ask σ_i (if i is a seller) deal price if player i 's bid/ask resulted in a match ID of the player with whom player i was matched (in the case of a match) time when the match was formed (in the case of a match)
type	Manual if the player manually entered the bid/ask Auto if the player clicked on the button to accept the best offer on the other side of the market
status	Expired if the bid/ask expired (after 10 seconds) Replaced if the player replaced the bid/ask before it expired Accepted if the bid/ask resulted in a deal


	treatment	game	round	time	id	side	valuation	bid	price	match_id	match_time	type	status
700	FullMoreS	1	4	95	1330	Seller	83	90				Manual	Replaced
701	FullMoreS	1	4	95	1338	Buyer	118	85				Manual	Expired
702	FullMoreS	1	4	96	1337	Seller	103	104				Manual	Expired
703	FullMoreS	1	4	97	1344	Buyer	103	85				Manual	Replaced
704	FullMoreS	1	4	97	1330	Seller	83	89	89.0	1331.0	98.0	Manual	Accepted
705	FullMoreS	1	4	97	1343	Seller	118	500				Manual	Expired
706	FullMoreS	1	4	98	1332	Seller	88	90	90.0	1344.0	100.0	Manual	Accepted
707	FullMoreS	1	4	98	1331	Buyer	138	89	89.0	1330.0	98.0	Auto	Accepted
708	FullMoreS	1	4	100	1344	Buyer	103	90	90.0	1332.0	100.0	Auto	Accepted
709	FullMoreS	1	4	104	1334	Seller	93	100				Manual	Expired
710	FullMoreS	1	4	104	1348	Seller	88	97				Manual	Expired

Treatment overview

1 Regular markets

1.1 Full feedback (baseline)


Full Regular, Full OB, First price (October 2016)



- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

1.2 Other-side feedback

Other Regular, Other-side OB, First price (October 2016)




Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

1.3 Same-side feedback


Same Regular, Same-side OB, First price (October 2016)



Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

SameMMK Regular, Same-side OB, Matchmaker keeps (October 2016)




Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

1.4 Black Box feedback


BB Regular, Black Box, First price (November 2016)



- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- $\bullet~$ CE range: [108,113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

BBRandom

Regular, Black Box, Random price (November 2016)




Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

BBMMK

Regular, Black Box, Matchmaker keeps (November 2016)




Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

1.5 Regular with restricted asks

FullLimS

Regular with restricted asks, Full OB, First price (November 2020)




Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103, 98, 93]
- **Seller valuations**: [1, 1, 63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98]
- CE range: [93, 98], gains of trade: 514, equilibrium quantity: 9

BBLimS

Regular with restricted asks, Black Box, First price (November 2020)




- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations:** [138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103, 98, 93]
- **Seller valuations**: [1, 1, 63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98]
- CE range: [93, 98], gains of trade: 514, equilibrium quantity: 9

2 Asymmetric markets

2.1 More buyers


FullMoreB More buyers, Full OB, First price (May 2018)



Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 20 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 148, 143, 143, 138, 138, 133, 133, 128, 128, 123, 123, 118, 118, 113, 113, 108, 108, 103, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [123, 128], gains of trade: 425, equilibrium quantity: 10

BBMoreB More buyers, Black Box, First price (May 2018)




Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 20 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 148, 143, 143, 138, 138, 133, 133, 128, 128, 123, 123, 118, 118, 113, 113, 108, 108, 103, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [123, 128], gains of trade: 425, equilibrium quantity: 10

2.2 More sellers


FullMoreS | More sellers, Full OB, First price (May 2018)



Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 20 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- Seller valuations: [73, 73, 78, 78, 83, 83, 88, 88, 93, 93, 98, 98, 103, 103, 108, 108, 113, 113, 118, 118]
- CE range: [93, 98], gains of trade: 425, equilibrium quantity: 10

BBMoreS More sellers, Black Box, First price (May 2018)




- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 20 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- Seller valuations: [73, 73, 78, 78, 83, 83, 88, 88, 93, 93, 98, 98, 103, 103, 108, 108, 113, 113, 118, 118]
- CE range: [93, 98], gains of trade: 425, equilibrium quantity: 10

3 Large markets

3.1 More rounds

BBMoreRounds More rounds, Black Box, First price (May 2018)



Proposed experimental scheme:


- 50 rounds (30 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8

3.2 Large CE range

FullLargeCE

Large CE, Full OB, First price


Games 1-8 (May 2018):



Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [158, 153, 148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 113, 118]
- CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 480, equilibrium quantity: 8


Games 9–13 (November 2020):



Proposed experimental scheme:

- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [168, 163, 158, 153, 148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123]
- **Seller valuations**: [63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108]
- CE range: [108, 123], gains of trade: 600, equilibrium quantity: 10


BBLargeCE | Large CE, Black Box, First price (May 2018)



- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [158, 153, 148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 108, 103]
- **Seller valuations**: [63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 113, 118]
- \bullet CE range: [108,113], gains of trade: 480, equilibrium quantity: 8

3.3 Dynamic markets


FullSShift Seller shift, Full OB, First price (May 2018)



Proposed experimental scheme:


- 10 rounds (120 seconds each), 10 buyers, 10 sellers
- **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
- Rounds 1-5:
 - **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
 - CE range: [108, 113], gains of trade: 320, equilibrium quantity: 8
- Rounds 6-10:
 - **Seller valuations**: [63, 68, 73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108]
 - CE range: [103, 108], gains of trade: 405, equilibrium quantity: 9

FullFromBtoS From buyers to sellers, Full OB, First price (May 2018)



- **10 rounds** (120 seconds each)
- Rounds 1-5:
 - 10 buyers, 8 sellers
 - **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
 - **Seller valuations**: [83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
 - CE range: [113, 118], gains of trade: 245, equilibrium quantity: 7
- Rounds 6-10:
 - 8 buyers, 10 sellers
 - **Buyer valuations**: [138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
 - **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
 - CE range: [103, 108], gains of trade: 245, equilibrium quantity: 7

FullFromStoB From sellers to buyers, Full OB, First price (May 2018)



- 10 rounds (120 seconds each)
- Rounds 1-5:
 - 8 buyers, 10 sellers
 - **Buyer valuations**: [138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
 - **Seller valuations**: [73, 78, 83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
 - CE range: [103, 108], gains of trade: 245, equilibrium quantity: 7
- Rounds 6-10:
 - 10 buyers, 8 sellers
 - **Buyer valuations**: [148, 143, 138, 133, 128, 123, 118, 113, 108, 103]
 - **Seller valuations**: [83, 88, 93, 98, 103, 108, 113, 118]
 - $\,$ $\,$ CE range: [113, 118], gains of trade: 245, equilibrium quantity: 7