SAMSUNG Research

Voice Presentation Attack Detection through Text-Converted Voice Command Analysis



Il-Youp Kwak, Jun Ho Huh, Seung Taek Han, Iljoo Kim and Jiwon Yoon

Motivation

Emergence of Voice assistants:

Samsung Bixby, Apple Siri, Amazon Alexa, etc

Threat Model

TV anchor says live on-air 'Alexa, order me a dollhouse' – guess what happens next

Story on accidental order begets story on accidental order begets accidental order

By Shaun Nichols in San Francisco 7 Jan 2017 at 00:58

244 🖵

SHARE ▼



A San Diego TV station sparked complaints this week – after an on-air report about a girl who ordered a dollhouse via her parents' Amazon Echo caused Echoes in viewers' homes to also attempt to order dollhouses.

Security Critical Commands

Voice assistants now support security-critical commands, making them attractive target for adversaries to exploit

"Open Samsung Pay and show me the registered credit card"

"Take a picture with the front camera"

"Open Facebook and post a recent picture"

"Change unlock password"

How to Defend?

- Voice Biometric Authentication

- Replay Attack Detection

- Voice-Command based Attack Detection

Voice-Command based Attack Detection

Start from global model that detect security critical commands

And grow to user-tailored model that detect security critical commands or user commands

Security Critical Commands

Security critical command:

command that can be used in a voice presentation attack to exploit one of the threats mentioned in "I've Got 99 Problems" (Porter et al. 2012)


Synthetic attack set:

security-critical commands selected from existing set of Bixby commands

6 / 13

System Overview

Voice Assistant Server



Modeling

Considered BoW (Back of Words) feature, logistic regression model with LASSO penalty


Global model trained from random user commands vs security critical commands.

User-tailored model trained from user commands vs security critical commands

8 / 13

Evaluation

Start with the global model for new users (available immediately), and switch to the user-tailored models when users use about 500 commands



Accuracy against Unseen Data (FAR)


Global model achieves low average FAR at 4.3%

For those who have used 100 or more commands, the user-tailored models achieve lower FARs between 1.7–4.3%

| | Global model | User-tailored model | | | | | |
|------------|--------------|---------------------|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| # Commands | | 20-30 | 30-50 | 50-100 | 100-500 | 500-1,000 | >1,000 |
| FAR | 4.3% (0.03) | $10.1\% \ (0.10)$ | 8.34% (0.08) | 5.9% (0.06) | 4.3% (0.04) | 2.3% (0.02) | 1.7% (0.02) |


Accuracy against Unseen Data (FRR)

Global model should be used initially to maintain consistent FRRs below 10%, and eventually the user-tailored models would have to be used to achieve FRRs below 5%



Security-Critical Command Users

Twice will maintain average EERs below 5% even for those who frequently use security-critical commands.



Conclusion

Can be used as an effective complementary technology to further enhance user attack detection accuracy

Combined use of the global model and user-tailored models are integral in maintaining low and consistent EERs at around 3.4% for all users

To maximize detection accuracy and minimize false rejections, we recommend a switch (from global to usertailored) when users have used up to about 500 commands.

Even for those users who frequently use security-critical commands, Twice is capable of achieving EERs below 5%.

SAMSUNG Research

Thank you

