

Voice Presentation Attack Detection through Text-Converted Voice Command Analysis



Shape the Future with Innovation and Intelligence

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Emergence of Voice assistants:

Samsung Bixby, Apple Siri, Amazon Alexa, etc

Security Critical Commands

Voice assistants now support security-critical commands, making them attractive target for adversaries to exploit

“Open Samsung Pay and show me the registered credit card”

“Take a picture with the front camera”

“Open Facebook and post a recent picture”

“Change unlock password”

Threat Model

TV anchor says live on-air 'Alexa, order me a dollhouse' – guess what happens next

Story on accidental order begets story on accidental order begets accidental order

By Shaun Nichols in San Francisco 7 Jan 2017 at 00:58

244

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A San Diego TV station sparked complaints this week – after an on-air report about a girl who ordered a dollhouse via her parents' Amazon Echo caused Echoes in viewers' homes to also attempt to order dollhouses.

Mitigation Strategies

- Voice Biometric Authentication
- Voice Liveness Detection
- **Voice-Command based Attack Detection**

Bixby Dataset

**English voice commands that were processed
from a voice assistant, Bixby.**

**Attained 34.8 million voice commands collected
from 2.6 million users in Nov and Dec, 2017**

Security Critical Commands

Security critical command:

command that can be used in a voice presentation attack to exploit one of the threats mentioned in *"I've Got 99 Problems"* (Porter et al. 2012)

Synthetic attack set:


security-critical commands selected from existing set of Bixby commands

Voice-Command based Attack Detection

Starts from **global model** that detects **security critical commands**

And switches to **user-tailored model** that also considers **users' genuine commands**

System Overview



Modeling


We used BoW (Back of Words) feature, and logistic regression model with LASSO penalty

Global model trained from **randomly selected commands from 700 users** vs **security critical commands**

User-tailored model trained from **user-specific commands** vs **security critical commands**

Evaluation

Starts with the global model for new users (available immediately), and switches to the user-tailored models when users use about 500 commands



Accuracy against Unseen Data (FAR)


Global model achieves low average FAR at **4.3%**

For those who have used 100 or more commands, the user-tailored models achieve lower FARs between **1.7–4.3%**

# Commands	Global model	User-tailored model					
		20–30	30–50	50–100	100–500	500–1,000	>1,000
FAR	4.3% (0.03)	10.1% (0.10)	8.34% (0.08)	5.9% (0.06)	4.3% (0.04)	2.3% (0.02)	1.7% (0.02)


Accuracy against Unseen Data (FRR)

Global model should be used initially to maintain consistent **FRRs below 10%**, and eventually the **user-tailored models** would have to be used to achieve **FRRs below 5%**



Security-Critical Command Users

Twice will maintain **average EERs below 5%** even for those who frequently use security-critical commands.



Conclusion & Future Work

Can be used as an effective **complementary technology** to further enhance voice attack detection accuracy

Combined use of the global model and user-tailored models are integral in maintaining low and consistent **EERs** at around **3.4%** for all users

Even for those users who frequently use security-critical commands, we achieve EERs below 5%.

Working toward an adaptive model based solution: user-tailored models are updated periodically

SAMSUNG Research

Thank you



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