

The impact of DDoS and other security shocks on Bitcoin currency exchanges: evidence from Mt. Gox

Amir Feder ¹, Neil Gandal ¹, J. T. Hamrick ^[?] and Tyler Moore ^{2,*}

¹ Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, 69978 Tel Aviv, Israel;
Tandy School of Computer Science, The University of Tulsa, 800 S Tucker Dr, Tulsa, 74104

*Corresponding author: Email: tyler-moore@utulsa.edu

Received 9 October 2017; accepted 17 November 2017

Abstract

We investigate how distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and other disruptions affect the Bitcoin ecosystem. In particular, we investigate the impact of shocks on trading activity at the leading Mt. Gox exchange between April 2011 and November 2013. We find that following DDoS attacks on Mt. Gox, the number of large trades on the exchange fell sharply. In particular, the distribution of the daily trading volume becomes less skewed (fewer big trades) and had smaller kurtosis on days following DDoS attacks. The results are robust to alternative specifications, as well as to restricting the data to activity prior to March 2013, i.e., the period before the first large appreciation in the price of and attention paid to Bitcoin.

Key words: bitcoin, cryptocurrencies, distributed denial of service

1 Introduction

The recent rise in digital currencies, led by the introduction of Bitcoin in 2009 [6], creates an opportunity to measure information security risk in a way that has often not been possible in other contexts. Digital currencies (or cryptocurrencies) aspire to compete against other online payment methods such as credit/debit cards and PayPal, as well as serve as an alternative store of value. They have been designed with transparency in mind, which creates an

opportunity to quantify risks better. While Bitcoin's design provides some safeguards against "counterfeiting" of the currency, in practice the ecosystem is vulnerable to thefts by cybercriminals, frequently targeting intermediaries such as wallets or exchanges.

In this article, we investigate how one such risk, distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, affects the Bitcoin ecosystem. While denial-of-service attacks have been launched on a wide range of Bitcoin services, from gambling sites to mining pools [2,3], we fo-

cus our investigation on how DDoS attacks affected the Mt. Gox exchange. We do so for several reasons. First, prior research has established that Mt. Gox has been targeted by DDoS attacks far more than any other Bitcoin service [2]. Second, DDoS attacks on currency exchanges have the potential to be financially lucrative to its proponents as well as extremely disruptive: preventing others from buying or selling creates an unfair financial advantage for the perpetrator at the expense of ordinary participants. Third, following Mt. Gox’s collapse, a dump of millions of transactions was publicly disclosed, creating a unique opportunity to quantify the impact of DDoS attacks on trading. Finally, as Fig. 1 shows, Mt. Gox was by far the leading Bitcoin exchange during most of the 2.5-year period for which we have data.

While we cannot know for certain

what has motivated the spate of DDoS attacks on Bitcoin currency exchanges, there are several plausible explanations for why someone might do so. First, there is considerable competition among currency exchanges, along with high turnover in terms of which platforms dominate. Figure 1 shows evidence of this: while Mt. Gox was the dominant exchange in 2011, a series of four new entrants emerged in 2012 and 2013 to overtake Mt. Gox. While one cannot conclude that the 34 reported DDoS attacks on Mt. Gox caused it to shed market share to new entrants, it remains a distinct possibility since frequent service interruptions might drive wary customers to alternative platforms. While there is no evidence that the new entrants were behind the DDoS attacks on Mt. Gox, they certainly would have stood to gain from doing so. The lawless nature of Bitcoin during this period, combined




Figure 1. Distribution of market share among Bitcoin currency exchanges by reported trade volume, April 2011 to November 2013 (Source: bitcoincharts.com).

with scores of new exchanges fighting for market share, might have led one or more of the smaller exchanges to target their biggest rival.

Second, profit-motivated traders

might also launch DDoS attacks to create favorable trading conditions. This could happen both when prices rise and fall. As prices rise, DDoS attacks could slow that rise by preventing traders who want to buy from being able to do so. For instance, a trader who is trying to buy bitcoin on its way up might put in a large order at a smaller exchange while blocking access to the larger Mt. Gox exchange. His lower bid might be accepted by sellers who temporarily cannot sell on the larger platform. Alternatively, if the attacker holds bitcoin, he might be able to ask for a higher price on a smaller exchange when buyers are blocked from participating on Mt. Gox. As prices fall, DDoS attacks might slow a decrease by limiting the completion of sell orders that drive the price downwards. An attacker who holds bitcoin but is concerned that its value may fall could be tempted to launch a DDoS attack.

It is worth noting that even if these attacks do not have the intended effect of artificially raising or lowering prices as the perpetrators intend, they still could be launched in expectation that they could work. The low cost of launching DDoS attacks combined with a very low likelihood of being caught could drive miscreants to experiment with strategies regardless of whether or not they actually succeed in making money.

Using an event study design, we find that following DDoS attacks on Mt. Gox, there was a significant reduction in the number of large trades on the exchange. In particular, the distribution of the daily trading volume becomes less skewed (fewer big trades) on days following DDoS attacks. The results are robust to alternative speci-

fications and to restricting the data to the period March 2013, i.e., the period before the big appreciation in the price of Bitcoin.

The question is important because exchanges are critical institutions in the Bitcoin ecosystem. In the exchanges, sellers benefit from a larger number of buyers, and buyers benefit from a larger number of sellers (so-called positive cross-side network effects). An exchange is an example of a platform; in order for an exchange to succeed, it must build up trust among its users, since a loss of confidence in an exchange can quickly lead to a downwards spiral in which buyers and sellers quickly cease trading on the platform.

The market for cryptocurrency exchanges is very vibrant. The exchanges considered to be the major players changed significantly over time. New ones appeared, and existing ones were pushed out of the market. The Mt. Gox failure in February 2014 showed that even a large exchange may suddenly exit the market.

2 Related work

The popularity of Bitcoin, especially when compared to prior cryptocurrencies, has spawned a huge amount of research activity. Bonneau et al. [4] review the (primarily) technical research, ranging from vulnerabilities in the implementation and operation to the development of alternative systems aiming to improve on Bitcoin’s design. Böhme et al. [5] discuss Bitcoin’s design, risks, and open challenges geared toward a social science audience. Taken together, these articles offer a baseline understanding of key issues facing cryptocurrencies iden-

tified by scholars.

A growing number of researchers have leveraged Bitcoin's transparency to study user behavior and attacks. Some have mined the blockchain, the public ledger of completed transactions. Meiklejohn et al. conducted a large-scale investigation of the blockchain in part to trace transactions back to popular Bitcoin service providers, such as currency exchanges [6]. Ron and Shamir constructed a graph of Bitcoin transactions from the blockchain to identify suspicious transaction chains [7]. Several studies mine the blockchain to document the prevalence of undesirable activity, including money laundering [8], mining botnets [9], scams such as Ponzi schemes [10], and stolen "brain" wallets [11].

Currency exchanges have been recognized to play a central role in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Moore and Christin reported that by early 2013, 45% of Bitcoin currency exchanges had closed, and that many are plagued by frequent outages and security breaches [12]. Vasek et al. [10] documented reports of denial-of-service attacks targeting a range of Bitcoin services, including 58 attacks on exchanges.

These disruptions may reflect the volatility of today's Bitcoin ecosystem, but they might also represent something more sinister. People could deliberately introduce shocks to Bitcoin exchanges to profit financially (e.g. by preventing others from buying to bid up low prices). A denial-of-service attack might introduce enough instability for a malevolent actor to exploit. We hope to explore this issue in future work. In this article, we conduct the first econometric study of the impact of denial-of-service attacks on trading activity at Bitcoin exchanges.

3 Methodology

We first describe the data sources used, then explain how the regression model is designed.

4 Data sources

We collected two principal types of data: on exchange activity and shock events.

5 Exchange activity

Shortly after filing for bankruptcy in early 2014, a trade history of Mt. Gox transactions was publicly leaked. The leaked data includes transaction time, user identifier (numeric, apparently for internal use only), currency converting to/from bitcoins, transaction amount, and exchange rate. These data offer much finer granularity than is typically available, since most buy and sell transactions are recorded only by the exchange and never appear on the blockchain. The data can be leveraged to monitor changes in user participation as well as overall transaction volume at times surrounding shocks. In total, nearly 18 million matching buy and sell transactions are reported between April 2011 and November 2013.

We supplemented these data with daily transaction volumes reported by the bitcoincharts.com website for all monitored Bitcoin exchanges, in addition to Mt. Gox. Because some entries obtained from bitcoincharts.com included missing values, we also gathered weekly transaction data from bitcoinity.org to validate the gathered data.

Dataset validation. While it is impossible to directly ascertain the valid-

ity of the Mt. Gox transaction data, we did conduct a few sanity checks to ensure that the data are consistent. As a first check, we verified that the total buy transactions are matched in number and aggregate value for the sell transactions.

Upon delving deeper into the Mt. Gox leaked data, we identified that there are many duplicate entries in the dump file. We have found that the Mt. Gox registry sometimes had multiple entries for transactions with the same user ID, transaction time, transaction type (buy/sell), and transaction amount. We considered two forms of de-duplication. The more conservative approach is to treat each (user ID, timestamp, transaction type, amount in BTC, amount in Japanese Yen) tuple as unique (de-duplication strategy 1). Removing such duplicates narrows the data from ~ 18 million to 14 million transactions. (Note that each completed transaction has both a buy and sell record, which means that the total number of unique completed transactions is 7 million.) A more aggressive de-duplication strategy is to consider "user id, timestamp, transaction type, amount in BTC" tuples as unique (de-duplication strategy 2). Using this strategy, transactions that are reported at the same time but at different exchange rates are treated as duplicates.

As a further sanity check, we compared the de-duplicated data with other data reported by others. To that end, we compared the Mt. Gox transaction volumes to the daily totals reported on bitcoincharts.com to the leaked dataset. Both de-duplicated datasets are more consistent with the daily totals found on bitcoincharts.com than original leaked data.

Figure 2 plots the daily differences in transaction between leaked dataset and totals reported by bitcoincharts.com. Differences are normalized as a fraction of the leaked daily volume. Positive numbers indicate that the leaked data reported higher volume. Note that some difference is expected, particularly if the time zones used in the leaked data and on bitcoincharts.com differ. Also, note that there were a few gaps in when data were reported by bitcoincharts.com (e.g. in mid-2012 and January 2013). These gaps only affect the comparisons between datasets, not the subsequent analysis.

Overlaid on the graph is a red dotted line on days where DDoS attacks are reported at Mt. Gox, and a blue dashed line for other shocks. From this we can see that data are available during the shocks, and there does not appear to be any increase in the disparity between sources on days where shocks occurred.

The top graph reports on de-duplication strategy 1. We can see that the transaction volume is always the same or higher in the leaked data. The difference, while volatile, increases somewhat as time passes. The bottom graph reports on de-duplication strategy 2. During 2011, bitcoincharts.com reports higher volumes than Mt. Gox tracked internally, but this changed as time progressed, and the overall trend lines are similar in both graphs.

Finally, we note that we have communicated with multiple Mt. Gox users, who confirmed that their own transactions were accurately reported in the leaked data.

From this analysis, we conclude that the de-duplicated leaked data appears robust enough to provide a reli-

able signal of the true levels of trade activity at Mt. Gox. We use de-duplication strategy 1 for the subsequent analysis in the article, but we note that the results remain consistent regardless of the de-duplication strategy used (including even when not removing any duplicates).

Ethical considerations. We elected to use the leaked Mt. Gox data in our research because the data had already been publicly disclosed by others. Consequently, our examination of the data does not add to any existing harms imposed by the dataset’s initial publication. In fact, by analyzing the transactions for a prominent closed exchange, we hope to shed light on how denial-of-service attacks might impact today’s exchanges.

6 Shocks to Mt. Gox and expected effects of the shocks

We are primarily interested in measuring the impact of denial-of-service attacks targeting the Mt. Gox exchange. We expect that the attacks will affect the different types of traders on Mt. Gox in different ways. In particular, we expect that an attack will lead to a temporary reduction in "large vol-

ume" trades on Mt. Gox following the attacks. There are two reasons for this. First, large traders probably have better and more up-to-date information than small traders. Second, large traders may struggle to find sufficient depth in the market to complete large-volume trades immediately following a DDoS attack.

Dataset D1: Reported DDoS attacks. We combine three sources of reported DDoS attacks affecting Mt. Gox: user reports in the bitcointalk.org forum, user reports in the /r/bitcoin Reddit sub-forum, and public announcements by Mt. Gox in the press and on social media.

In [2], Vasek et al. measure the prevalence of DDoS attacks on a range of Bitcoin services by inspecting posts on the popular bitcointalk.org discussion forum. We use the data published by the authors (available from doi: 10.7910/DVN/25541), which reports the day that a thread describing a reported DDoS attack on Mt. Gox is started. The authors in [2] used a keyword-based classifier to identify candidate threads discussing DDoS attacks, then manually inspected all threads to ensure that a purported DDoS attack is in fact being discussed (as opposed to a general discussion of DDoS attacks or their




Figure 2. Daily differences in transaction volume between leaked dataset and totals reported by bitcoincharts.com. Differences are normalized as a fraction of the leaked daily volume. Positive numbers indicate that the leaked data reported higher volume.

Table 1. Additional shocks, other than DDoS, affecting Mt. Gox

Date	Description
2011 – 06 – 19	Security breach causes BTC fall to 0.01 USD
2012 – 02 – 21	Kernel panic triggers outage
2012 – 06 – 23	Invalid trading causes outage
2012 – 09 – 05	Unplanned trading outage
2013 – 02 – 22	Dwolla AML efforts cancel USD transfers
2013 – 03 – 11	Blockchain fork glitch
2013 – 04 – 09	Outage reportedly caused by high trade volume
2013 – 05 – 14	DHS seizes cash in court action
2013 – 06 – 20	Suspends USD withdrawals
2013 – 08 – 05	Announces significant losses due to early crediting

hypothetical impact). Reports were gathered between February 2011 and October 2013, with 34 attacks reported on Mt. Gox.

The /r/bitcoin forum on Reddit is another popular discussion forum. We inspected historical posts using the Reddit API, following the same procedure as the authors in [2]. In all, we found eight reported DDoS attacks on Mt. Gox discussed on Reddit, reported between April and November 2013. Three of these attacks were also reported on bitcointalk.org.

Of course, what’s being measured here are reported DDoS attacks, not confirmed events. It is possible that some of the outages experienced by users were caused by other reasons than a DDoS attack.

Mt. Gox frequently issued press releases via its website and social media whenever outages occurred. Sometimes the outages were directly attributed to DDoS attacks. Unfortunately, after Mt. Gox collapsed, most of these pages were deleted, and so their public statements have been lost forever. (We even checked archive.org, which did not preserve the pages with public statements.) In a few cases, however, reports could be obtained from third-party websites or Gox’s Google+ page (that was seemingly forgotten when the other social media accounts were deleted). In total, we

found direct acknowledgment of DDoS attacks by Mt. Gox on nine occasions.

Some of the attacks were reported in more than one source. Across all three data sources, DDoS attacks were reported on 37 days.

D2: Additional security shocks. DDoS attacks were far from the only adverse event afflicting Mt. Gox while operating. The exchange faced pressure from regulators, thefts from users, and self-inflicted IT outages. We have documented 10 publicly-available shocks by examining statements from Mt. Gox obtained from news reports, press releases, and social media. The events are described in Table 1.

D3: Confirmed DDoS attacks. Because we cannot be certain that all DDoS attacks reported on the discussion forums actually transpired, we also examine a narrow subset of nine DDoS attacks that Mt. Gox directly acknowledged.

While the possibility false negatives (i.e. shock events that transpired but we did not observe) cannot be eliminated, we are confident that most events affecting Mt. Gox are included. By scouring public reports from the two most popular discussion forums and direct acknowledgments by the company, we believe that the number of missing events is likely quite small.




Figure 3. Distribution of transactions by amount in JPY on days following a reported DDoS attack (in red) and on all other days (in black).

7 Model

We now describe the regression models used. "Transaction volume and large trades" section describes a first attempt, using transaction volumes and large trades as the dependent variable, while "Endogeneity" section describes the more robust dependent variables of skewness and kurtosis of daily transaction volumes.

8 Transaction volume and large trades

A security shock increases the probability of a failed trade, and in some reported incidents entire value of the transaction can be lost. Therefore, it would seem reasonable for users to re-

frain from buying or selling Bitcoins on an exchange after witnessing attacks. To measure the effect of those shocks on the Bitcoin ecosystem, we turn to transaction volume, the most common indicator of user activity. We aggregate the daily transactions listed in the Mt. Gox leaked data set and use this daily sum as our dependent variable.

Before we run any regressions, it is important to examine the raw data. Figure 3 clearly shows that there are fewer large transactions on days following a DDos attack. It is nice that this appears clearly in the raw data. We now will examine whether this effect is significant in a regression model.

We start by looking at the effect of reported events from the D1 and D2 data sets on the transaction volume. This time series has a positive

trend that is highly correlated with the sharp appreciation in the price of Bitcoin that occurred between April and

October 2013. Assuming a linear time trend, we first estimate the following regression equation:

$$\text{TransactionVolume}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D1_t + \beta_2 D2_t + \beta_3 \text{Time}_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Transaction volume is the daily volume of trade in Japanese Yen (JPY). D1 is a dummy variable that takes on the value one the day following a DDoS attack and zero otherwise. D2 is a dummy variable that takes on the value one on the day following the other 10 shocks as described above. The variable "Time" is a time trend, and ϵ is the error term. The subscript t indicates that the data we employ are

daily observations.

Since the hypothesis is that there is a drop in relatively large transactions following a DDoS attack, we also can use the daily highest transaction (denoted Max. Transaction) as an independent variable and check whether there is indeed a substantial change on the day after the attack. For the same reasons noted above, we Table 2. Transaction volume and large trades

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variables	Transaction volume	Max. Transaction	Large transactions
D1	-2.826e+07 (1.306e+08)	-700,953 (1.265e+06)	-104.6 (277.3)
D2	1.588e+08 (1.963e+08)	1.559e+06 (1.901e+06)	311.4 (416.8)
Time	1.053e+06*** (76,263)	13,140*** (738.5)	2.246*** (0.162)
Constant	-2.334e+08*** (4.064e+07)	-2.215e+06*** (393,531)	-537.5*** (86.28)
Observations	924	924	924
Adjusted R^2	0.171	0.255	0.172

Standard errors in parentheses *** $P < 0.01$, ** $P < 0.05$, * $P < 0.1$

employ a time trend and will estimate the following regression equation:

$$\text{Max.Transaction}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D1_t + \beta_2 D2_t + \beta_3 \text{Time}_t + \epsilon_t.$$

Since testing the size of the biggest daily transaction can only shed a bit of light on the effect of a shock, we also compute the daily number of very large transactions and use that as our independent variable. The threshold is of course debatable, but we have found similar results with all the definitions

we tried. In the results section, we present results for large transactions defined as those exceeding 1000 USD, taking into account the exchange rate to JPY, the currency Mt. Gox had used for its internal storage. Again, we employ a regression with the same dependent variables:

$$\text{LargeTransactions}_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D1_t + \beta_2 D2_t + \beta_3 \text{Time}_t + \epsilon_t.$$

9 Endogeneity

Since the data set is composed of daily aggregates listed in a chronological order, we must deal with problems that might arise when using time series data. Prior work has shown that attempted attacks are correlated with the volume of Bitcoins traded [2], and it is more likely the attacks will occur in periods with high liquidity and larger volume of transactions. This important finding means that high volumes of trade can lead to an increased likelihood of a DDoS attacks. In such a case, the regressions described above in Equations (1 – 3) would all suffer from endogeneity bias. We report results from Equations (1-3) above in Table 2, but because of the potential endogeneity, the parameter estimates from these OLS regressions are likely biased.

10 Skewness and kurtosis

One way to address endogeneity is to employ instrumental variables. Ideal instrumental variables are cost-shifters. But no instruments exist in our setting. Hence to address the potential endogeneity, we will employ kurtosis and skewness as dependent

variables. Using the skewness and kurtosis of the daily transaction distribution as dependent variables is important for several reasons.

- First, there is no significant time trend in skewness and kurtosis; the data show that while the volume of trade to grow over time, the distribution of daily trades (in the form of kurtosis and skewness) does not change at all.
- Second, the variables skewness and kurtosis captures the very essence of the hypothesis we are interested in testing, namely that DDoS attacks might affect different types of trades (large and small) in different ways.
- Finally and most important, there is no potential endogeneity; that is, changes in kurtosis and skewness are not likely to lead to an increased likelihood of a DDoS attack. That is, changes in these variables will not lead to DDoS attacks and there is no endogeneity issue; our OLS regressions (with robust standard errors) are fine.

Both kurtosis and skewness are higher when the distribution has heavy tails. In the case of trades at Mt.

Gox, in general, most of the trades are for small amounts and there are a smaller number of trades involving larger amounts. Hence, if the DDoS attacks lead to a reduction in the number and/or size of the large trades, the kurtosis and skewness will fall. We use the natural log of kurtosis and skewness as the dependent variables, but the results are robust to using levels of these variables.

Although in theory, kurtosis and skewness can be negative, the distribution of trades is highly skewed, so that (i) there is more in the tails than the normal distribution and (ii) the right tail is longer so that the mass of the distribution is concentrated on the left part of the distribution. Thus, in our data set (and other similar data sets) kurtosis and skewness are always positive. (We report summary statistics in the Appendix Table A1.) Hence, there is no problem employing the natural log of kurtosis and skewness in the analysis.

The key independent variable is the incidence of DDoS attacks. The variable $D1$ takes on the value one if an attack occurred the previous day and zero otherwise. In a few cases, a DDoS attack lasted for more than 1 day. In such a case, we considered two alternatives: (i) define $D1$ as the day after the end of the continuous attack and (ii) define $D1$ to also include day two and three etc. of the attack as

"days after an attack." Our results are robust to either of these specifications. (When we add a dummy variable for the day the attack is taking place, our results are qualitatively unchanged, i.e., there is reduced volume the day following the attacks and the coefficients on the lagged variables are essentially the same.)

Other independent (control) variables include the number of users on the exchange, the total volume of the exchange, and a time trend. While the number of unique users (denoted $Users$) and the transaction volume are co-determined in the system, there is no reason why there should be correlation between these variables and the error term when the dependent variable is either skewness or kurtosis. Hence, there is no bias introduced by including these measures as explanatory variables. (We also ran regressions without these variables and the results are very similar and extremely robust.) Thus ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are appropriate. (Our results with kurtosis and skewness as the dependent variables are robust to whether or not we include a time trend.) However, we do want to control for the possibility that the errors are not identically and independently distributed. Hence, we run the regressions using robust standard errors. Our main results come from the following regression equations:

$$\ln(\text{skewness})_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D1_t + \beta_2 D2_t + \beta_3 \ln(\text{TransactionVolume})_t + \beta_4 \text{Users}_t + \beta_5 \text{Time}_t + \epsilon_t.$$

$$\ln(\text{kurtosis})_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 D1_t + \beta_2 D2_t + \beta_3 \ln(\text{TransactionVolume})_t + \beta_4 \text{Users}_t + \beta_5 \text{Time}_t + \epsilon_t.$$

11 Results

Looking first at the effects of D1 and D2 events on the transaction volume and large trades on the Mt. Gox, the regression results are inconclusive. From the regression results in Table 2, the sign of the estimated coefficient on D1 is negative as we hypothesized, but the estimates are not significant. This may be because of the endogeneity bias discussed above, which would lead to upper-ward biased estimates. The estimated coefficient on D2 is positive, but again insignificant. These estimates may also be biased upwards. (The relatively high values of adjusted R^2 are due to the extremely significant time trend in the data.) For the reasons discussed above, the endogeneity bias is a severe handicap in identifying what exactly happens after users realize that a DDoS attack has occurred.

As noted above our preferred models have kurtosis and skewness as dependent variables. In Table 3, we report results from the regressions that examine the effect of D1 and D2 events on the Skewness and Kurtosis of the transaction distribution. We use the natural logarithm of both Skewness/Kurtosis, but qualitatively similar results obtain with levels of these variables.

The results in Table 3 show that a DDoS attack changes both Skewness and the Kurtosis in the days following the attack. In fact, we see a significant drop of 56% in the Kurtosis and 28% in the Skewness following a DDoS attack. The sign of the coefficient estimate associated with D2 is now negative as expected, but it is not statistically significant in either of the regressions in Table 3. This suggests that DDoS attacks had more serious effects than other types of shocks Mt. Gox incurred. (We also ran the regressions with a variable that is the interaction between D1 and time. Our main results are qualitatively unchanged, namely that following DDoS attacks, there are fewer large trades. Interestingly, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and "borderline significant at the 10 percent level." This suggests that, over time, large traders became slightly less sensitive to the attacks.)

The estimated effect of the (natural logarithm of the) daily transaction volume is as expected positive and significant in both equations. This variable is primarily included as a control variable. Excluding transaction volume has no effect on our main results, namely that DDoS attacks lead to a significant drop in both Kurtosis and Skewness.

Table 3. Skewness and kurtosis

	(1)	(2)
Variables	ln(Skewness)	ln(Kurtosis)
D1	-0.276*** (0.094)	-0.560*** (0.184)
D2	-0.0766 (0.146)	-0.160 (0.289)
Users	-0.000144**** (1.97e - 05)	-0.000247*** (3.84e - 05)
ln(Transaction Volume)	0.327*** (0.0280)	0.640*** (0.0538)
Time	-0.000889**** (0.000113)	-0.00167*** (0.000214)
Constant	-2.358*** (0.435)	-4.192*** (0.834)
Observations	924	924
Adjusted R^2	0.17	0.20

Standard errors in parentheses. We employ robust Standard errors. *** $P < 0.01$; ** $P < 0.05$; * $P < 0.1$. Table 4. Robustness analysis

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Variables	ln(Skewness)	ln(Kurtosis)	ln(Skewness)	ln(Kurtosis)
D1-without-D3	-0.365*** (0.086)	-0.742*** (0.165)		
D1-alt-without-D3			-0.241** (0.092)	-0.497** (0.177)
D2	-0.0663 (0.148)	-0.140 (0.292)	-0.0789 (0.146)	-0.165 (0.288)
D3	-0.0535 (0.243)	-0.150 (0.453)	-0.0208 (0.246)	-0.0825 (0.460)
Users	-0.000147*** (2.0e-05)	-0.000252*** (3.9e-05)	-0.000145*** (2.0e-05)	-0.000248*** (3.9e-05)
ln(TransactionVolume)	0.328*** (0.0282)	0.644*** (0.0540)	0.327*** (0.0282)	0.641*** (0.0539)
Time	-0.000890*** (0.000113)	-0.00167*** (0.000214)	-0.000885*** (0.000113)	-0.00166*** (0.000214)
Constant	-2.383*** (0.436)	-4.242*** (0.836)	-2.363*** (0.436)	-4.202*** (0.835)
Observations	924	924	924	924
Adjusted R^2	0.17	0.20	0.17	0.20

Standard errors in parentheses. We employ robust Standard errors. * $P < 0.01$; ** $P < 0.05$; * $P < 0.1$.

12 Robustness analysis

In this section, we want to examine whether the regression results we reported in Table 3 are robust. Hence four robustness regressions are shown in Table 4. In the first two regres-

sions, we reestimate Equations (4) and (5) and include the variable D3, which takes on the value one for DDoS attacks Mt. Gox acknowledged. In these regressions, the variable "D1- without-D3" only includes the attacks not acknowledged by Mt. Gox. Hence, the DDoS attacks are split between attacks

not acknowledged by Mt. Gox (D1 - without - D3) and attacks acknowledged by Mt. Gox (D3). The regressions show that attacks not acknowledged by Mt. Gox lead to significant reductions of skewness (by 37%) and kurtosis (by 74%). Attacks acknowledged by Mt. Gox lead to reductions of skewness and kurtosis, but this effect is not significant. (This may be because there are a very small number of attacks acknowledged by Mt. Gox.)

In the third and forth regressions in Table 4, we reestimate Equations (4) and (5) using the alternative definition for D1, namely that in the case of a continuous attack, all days except for the first day of the attack have the variable "D1- alt-withoutD3" equal to one. Of course, for the day following each attack (D1- alt- withoutD3) takes on the value one. The results in these regressions show that our findings are robust to this alternative definition as well.

Finally, our results from estimating Equations (4) and (5) are extremely robust in general. In particular they are robust to the following:

- Including or excluding a time trend.
- Including or excluding transaction volumes and the number of users.
- Estimating (4) and (5) in levels and not logarithms.
- All combinations of the above. (For ease of presentation, these regressions are not shown in the article.)

13 Discussion

Additional analysis - user activity

Since our main hypothesis is that there is a significant drop in large trades following an attack, it could be worth investigating how the composition of users change in response to a DoS security shock. Our Mt. Gox leaked data set gives us a unique opportunity to see how different users respond to an attack, or more precisely a reported attack. It is reasonable to suspect that not all users are even aware that an attack has occurred and are not a part of the forum communities that we have monitored in this research. If this is true, it would be reasonable to expect different responses for different subgroups of users. So, a deeper look into patterns of trade by different type of users could shed some light on the observed change in the distribution of transactions. We intend to address this issue in future work.

Additional analysis - effect on other exchanges

Since Mt. Gox was by far the dominant exchange during this period, it would be interesting to examine whether DDoS attacks on Mt. Gox led users to conduct more trades on other exchanges. We will also address this issue in future work.

14 Conclusion

In this article, we have conducted the first econometric study measuring the impact of DDoS attacks on Bitcoin currency exchanges. We gathered evidence of reported DDoS attacks from two popular Bitcoin discussion forums, finding attacks targeting Mt. Gox on 37 days between April 2011 and

November 2013. We also investigated the impact of 10 additional shocks affecting Mt. Gox during the period, such as security breaches and unplanned outages. We compared these data sets against transaction data obtained from Mt. Gox > 2.5 years.

We constructed a series of regressions to measure the effect of shocks on transaction volume. Unfortunately, using the transaction volume directly as the dependent variable in the regressions is problematic, due to endogeneity issues and the rising trend in transaction volume over time. Consequently, we selected skewness and kurtosis of the daily transaction volume, which does not suffer from the same problems as measuring transaction volume directly. With these measures, we find that on days where DDoS attacks or other shocks occur, both the skewness and kurtosis decrease. In other words, the distribution of daily transaction volume shifts so that fewer extremely large transactions take place when shocks occur.

In future work, we plan to carry out similar analysis on cryptocurrency exchanges active today, as well as on other Bitcoin services. Furthermore, the analysis presented here has only measured the direct impact of DDoS attacks on transaction volume. Our eventual goal is to measure any effect of active manipulation by profit-motivated cybercriminals who can leverage the manipulation in financial markets afforded by these shocks.

15 Acknowledgements

The authors gratefully acknowledge support from a research grant from the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Re-

search Center, Tel Aviv University. We also thank three anonymous reviewers whose comments and suggestions significantly improved the article.

16 References

1. Nakamoto S. Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system. <https://bit coin.org/bitcoin.pdf>, 2008.
2. Vasek M, Thornton M, Moore T. Empirical analysis of denial-of-service attacks in the Bitcoin ecosystem. In 1st Workshop on Bitcoin Research, Vol. 8438 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2014, 57-71.
3. Johnson B, Laszka A, Grossklags J, et al. Game-theoretic analysis of DDoS attacks against Bitcoin mining pools. In 1st Workshop on Bitcoin Research, Vol. 8438 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2014, 72-86.
4. Bonneau J, Miller A, Clark J, et al. Research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2015 .
5. Böhme R, Christin N, Edelman B, et al. Bitcoin: economics, technology, and governance. J Econ Perspect 2015;29:213-38.
6. Meiklejohn S, Pomarole M, Jordan G, et al. A fistful of Bitcoins: characterizing payments among men with no names. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference. New York:

- ACM, 2013, 127-40. 7. Ron D, Shamir A. Quantitative analysis of the full Bitcoin transaction graph. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Vol. 7859 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2013, 6-24.
7. Möser M, Böhme R, Breuker D. An inquiry into money laundering tools in the Bitcoin ecosystem. In Proceedings of the Seventh APWG eCrime Researcher’s Summit. Piscataway, New Jersey: IEEE, 2013, 1-14.
8. Huang DY, Dharmdasani H, Meiklejohn S, et al. Botcoin: monetizing stolen cycles. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium. Reston, Virginia: Internet Society, 2014.
9. Vasek M, Moore T. There’s no free lunch, even using Bitcoin: tracking the popularity and profits of virtual currency scams. In Böhme R and Okamoto T (eds), Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Vol. 8975 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2015, 44-61.
10. Vasek M, Bonneau J, Castellucci R, et al. The Bitcoin brain drain: a short paper on the use and abuse of bitcoin brain wallets. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2016.
11. Moore T, Christin N. Beware the middleman: empirical analysis of Bitcoin-exchange risk. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Vol. 7859 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2013, 25 – 33.

Table A1. Descriptive statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
vol_skew	925	19.91137	13.08789	1.925792	104.4759
vol_kurt	925	791.3124	1163.691	6.54137	12386.96
D1	925	.0248649	.1557974	0	1
D2	925	.0108108	.1034674	0	1
users_ds	925	1522.066	1489.602	29	10339
Trans_Vol	925	2.55e + 08	6.76e + 08	318906.5	7.79e + 09

Note that there are 925 observations in the data set, but only 924 in the regression because we use a "lagged variable."

References

- [1] Rainer Böhme, Nicolas Christin, Benjamin Edelman, and Tyler Moore. Bitcoin: Economics, technology, and governance. *Journal of economic Perspectives*, 29(2):213–38, 2015.

- [2] Joseph Bonneau, Andrew Miller, Jeremy Clark, Arvind Narayanan, Joshua A Kroll, and Edward W Felten. Sok: Research perspectives and challenges for bitcoin and cryptocurrencies. In *2015 IEEE symposium on security and privacy*, pages 104–121. IEEE, 2015.
- [3] Danny Yuxing Huang, Hitesh Dharmdasani, Sarah Meiklejohn, Vacha Dave, Chris Grier, Damon McCoy, Stefan Savage, Nicholas Weaver, Alex C Snoeren, and Kirill Levchenko. Botcoin: Monetizing stolen cycles. In *NDSS*, volume 2014, pages 1–16, 2014.
- [4] Benjamin Johnson, Aron Laszka, Jens Grossklags, Marie Vasek, and Tyler Moore. Game-theoretic analysis of ddos attacks against bitcoin mining pools. In *International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security*, pages 72–86. Springer, 2014.
- [5] Sarah Meiklejohn, Marjori Pomarole, Grant Jordan, Kirill Levchenko, Damon McCoy, Geoffrey M Voelker, and Stefan Savage. A fistful of bitcoins: characterizing payments among men with no names. In *Proceedings of the 2013 conference on Internet measurement conference*, pages 127–140, 2013.
- [6] S Nakamoto. Nakamoto, s, bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system, 2009.
- [7] Marie Vasek, Joseph Bonneau, Ryan Castellucci, Cameron Keith, and Tyler Moore. The bitcoin brain drain: a short paper on the use and abuse of bitcoin brain wallets. *Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer*, 2016.
- [8] Marie Vasek and Tyler Moore. There’s no free lunch, even using bitcoin: Tracking the popularity and profits of virtual currency scams. In *International conference on financial cryptography and data security*, pages 44–61. Springer, 2015.
- [9] Marie Vasek, Micah Thornton, and Tyler Moore. Empirical analysis of denial-of-service attacks in the bitcoin ecosystem. In *International conference on financial cryptography and data security*, pages 57–71. Springer, 2014.

[4] [6] [9] [1] [2] [3] [5] [8] [7]