

# Smart Contract Security Assessment

Final Report

# For LayerZero (SolvBTC)

09 December 2024





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The audit report has made all reasonable attempts to provide clear and articulate recommendations to the Project team with respect to the rectification, amendment and/or revision of any highlighted issues, vulnerabilities or exploits within the contracts provided. It is the sole responsibility of the Project team to sufficiently test and perform checks, ensuring that the contracts are functioning as intended, specifically that the functions therein contained within said contracts have the desired intended effects, functionalities and outcomes of the Project team.

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# 1 Overview

This report has been prepared for LayerZero's SolvBTC's contracts on the Ethereum network. Paladin provides a user-centred examination of the smart contracts to look for vulnerabilities, logic errors or other issues from both an internal and external perspective.

#### 1.1 Summary

Project Name	LayerZero
URL	https://layerzero.network/
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solidity
Preliminary Contracts	https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/solvbtc-oft/tree/ 21e60d13e44a0359495e857e021a67720137c7c3/contracts
Resolution #1	https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/solvbtc-oft/pull/1/commits/ 1cf67eff33a2f096aa1893d497dd03ff248e14e7

#### 1.2 Contracts Assessed

Name	Contract	Live Code Match
SolvBTCAdapter	Proxy: 0xB12979Ff302Ac903849948037A51792cF7186E8e	<b>✓</b> MATCH
	<pre>Implementation: 0x2265A8E449eA5FF78ee4C115370E9B5957358a68</pre>	

# 1.3 Findings Summary

Severity	Found	Resolved	Partially Resolved	Acknowledged (no change made)
High	0	-	-	-
Medium	0	-	-	-
Low	0	-	-	-
Informational	6	3	1	2
Total	6	3	1	2

#### Classification of Issues

Severity	Description
High	Exploits, vulnerabilities or errors that will certainly or probabilistically lead towards loss of funds, control, or impairment of the contract and its functions. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed with utmost urgency.
Medium	Bugs or issues with that may be subject to exploit, though their impact is somewhat limited. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed as soon as possible.
Low	Effects are minimal in isolation and do not pose a significant danger to the project or its users. Issues under this classification are recommended to be fixed nonetheless.
Informational	Consistency, syntax or style best practices. Generally pose a negligible level of risk, if any.

## 1.3.1 SolvBTCAdapter

ID	Severity	Summary	Status
01	INFO	Missing _disableInitializers in the constructor	✓ RESOLVED
02	INFO	User is required to approve the adapter to use send()	ACKNOWLEDGED
03	INFO	_credit can fail if _to is address(0)	✓ RESOLVED
04	INFO	If adapter receives native funds, they will get stuck	ACKNOWLEDGED
05	INFO	SolvBTCAdapter should call MintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeUpgradeable_init	✓ RESOLVED
06	INFO	Typographical issues	PARTIAL

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# 2 Findings

#### 2.1 SolvBTCAdapter

SolvBTCAdapter is an extension of the MintAndBurnOFTAdapter that implements a rate limiter which limits the \_debit and \_credit operations based on the limits configured by the owner.

The contract relies on

MintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeAndRateLimitUpgradeable, FeeUpgradable and RateLimiterUpgradable abstract contracts that were previously audited.

The current audit points out only the integration of these with the SolvBTC and SolvBTC.BBN tokens present at the following contract addresses:

https://etherscan.io/address/

0x9f2a9f488d82683e8a4a51a581fd34155d50d541#code

https://etherscan.io/address/

0x8add70845fbb80564503879a4a25e9b38856528c#code

#### 2.1.1 Privileged Functions

- withdrawFees
- setDefaultFeeBps
- setFeeBps
- setRateLimits
- transferOwnership
- renounceOwnership

#### 2.1.2 Issues & Recommendations

Issue #01	Missing _disableInitializers in the constructor
Severity	INFORMATIONAL
Description	Within the proxy pattern, a contract's implementation is initialized by using a function that has initializer modifier. This pattern is inherited from the Initializable contract.
	To avoid the initialization of the implementation by random actors, a _disableInitializers call is required in any constructor of the main contract.  https://docs.openzeppelin.com/upgrades-plugins/1.x/writing-upgradeable#initializing_the_implementation_contract
Recommendation	Consider adding the _disableInitializers call in the constructor.
Resolution	<b>₩</b> RESOLVED

Issue #02	User is required to approve the adapter to use send()
Severity	INFORMATIONAL
Description	In the original implementation of the MintAndBurnOFTAdapter, the user does not need to approve the contract in order to use the send() function.
	It has been changed so that the user is required to increase the allowance of the adapter in order for the tokens to be transferred and the fees to be deducted from this transferred amount before being burned.
	While this does not pose a risk, the difference might be a bit confusing for the users.
Recommendation	If it is desired to keep the same features of the MintAndBurnOFTAdapter in MintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeAndRateLimitUpgradeable, then the _debit function can be modified as follows: burn the full amount from the caller and just mint the fee to the contract—this way, there is no need for user approvals.
	Additionally, SolvBTC does have a function with the following signature function burn(address account_, uint256 value_) under the SOLVBTC_POOL_BURNER_ROLE role, which means that the adapter would need to have two roles: SOLVBTC_MINTER_ROLE needed for mint and SOLVBTC_POOL_BURNER_ROLE needed for this special burn operation.
Resolution	■ ACKNOWLEDGED

Issue #03	_credit can fail if _to is address(θ)	
Severity	INFORMATIONAL	
Description	In the _credit function, innerToken is minted to the _to address.	
	SolvBTC reverts if minting to address(0) is attempted: <a href="https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/solvbtc-oft/blob/21e60d13e44a0359495e857e021a67720137c7c3/contracts/solvbtc/SolvBTC.sol#L88">https://github.com/LayerZero-Labs/solvbtc-oft/blob/21e60d13e44a0359495e857e021a67720137c7c3/contracts/solvbtc/SolvBTC.sol#L88</a>	
Recommendation	Consider replacing the _to address with address(0xdead) when it is equal to address(0):  if (_to == address(0x0)) _to = address(0xdead);	
Resolution	<b>₩</b> RESOLVED	

Issue #04	If adapter receives native funds, they will get stuck	
Severity	INFORMATIONAL	
Description	If the user specifies extra options with their message that causes the executor to send a msg.value when calling lzReceive(), these funds will get stuck since lzReceive() does not handle msg.value in any way and there is no withdraw function that the adapter owner can use to retrieve the funds.	
Recommendation	Consider implementing a withdraw function for the OApps that are not supposed to handle msg.value.	
Resolution	The team stated: "A similar issue can be raised for many other OApps. We're not advising anyone to send msg.value to that contract."	

Issue #05	SolvBTCAdapter should callMintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeUpgradeable_init
Severity	INFORMATIONAL
Description	SolvBTCAdapter callsOFTAdapter_init during initialization.  However, to maintain consistency and adhere to the initialization pattern of dependencies, it should instead callMintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeUpgradeable_init.  While this issue does not pose a direct risk asMintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeUpgradeable_init internally callsOFTAdapter_init, this disrupts the expected sequence of subsequent initialization calls.
Recommendation	Consider callingMintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeUpgradeable_init in initialize instead ofOFTAdapter_init.
Resolution	<b>₩</b> RESOLVED

Issue #06	Typographical issues
Severity	INFORMATIONAL
Description	Missing NatSpec comments for the SolvBTCAdapter.
	_
	MintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeAndRateLimitUpgradeable#L113
	The comment is a bit misleading:
	Burns tokens from the sender's specified balance, but transfers the fee to the contract. However, the logic is that the full amount is transferred to the contract, then the amount without the fee is burned from the contract and the fee remains locked in the contract. If this logic is kept then the comment needs to be improved.
	<del></del>
	MintAndBurnOFTAdapterWithFeeAndRateLimitUpgradeable#L135
	The comment can be improved to specify that the fees include the dust resulting from the de-dust operation:
	<pre>// @dev increment the total fees that can be withdrawn should be</pre>
	// @dev increment the total fees that can be withdrawn. Fees
	include the dust resulting from the de-dust operation.
Recommendation	Consider fixing the typographical issues.
Resolution	PARTIALLY RESOLVED

