

A Liquid Alternative Commodity Index for All Weather Portfolio Diversification

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Abstract

The recent lackluster performance of the “All Weather” methodology of investing, popularized by Bridgewater Associates, has many investors looking more closely at the core tenets of the program. The strategy, intended to generate stable investment returns with acceptable levels of volatility, has not addressed major paradigm shifts in the commodity markets including backwardation-contango oscillation, factor crowding, massive flow of funds populating long only strategies, and significant slippage due to periodic rolls. In this paper we develop an all-weather methodology utilizing a more sophisticated commodity component with a newly created program called the Liquid Alternative Commodity Index (LACI®). The index uses a long/short/flat monthly positioning strategy for the commodity markets. It also incorporates a simple proprietary trend/counter-trend algorithm to determine the following month’s position. Risk adjusted performance shows that LACI is able to generate superior performance compared to a large number of brand name CTA’s and hedge funds as well as commodity based listed ETFs, ETNs, and mutual funds.

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I. Introduction

Investors have been investing in commodities for decades but the concept gained widespread traction with the introduction in 1991 of the GSCI¹ by Goldman Sachs. This marked a turning point as it provided a widely recognized and investable benchmark for the commodity asset class². From 1991-2004, it was primarily sophisticated institutional investors who took advantage of this new environment of commodity investment. Since 2004, there have been numerous new innovative products providing easier access to commodities for a broader group of investors.

Long-short commodity strategies have attracted interests from both practitioner and academic communities for their performance in terms of risk-returns, hedging benefits, and for portfolio asset allocation. The traditional role of commodities in a well balanced portfolio has been to serve as a counter-weight to traditional equity and bond holdings. Numerous academic papers have been written on the subject and advocate the use of passive long-only commodity exposures as a beneficial addition to a portfolio (see Miffre (2015) for a review). These studies rely heavily on the non-correlated aspects of the more popular commodity index benchmarks versus equities and bonds. These non-correlated characteristics have eroded over time and has weakened the passive long-only commodity argument. We believe that many of these long-short commodity strategies may be tweaked to offer much better performance in terms of profitability than what has been reported in the press.

Until recently many investors seeking access to alternative commodity strategies were relegated to the managed futures³ universe of hedge funds and CTA's who provided specialized strategies in the commodity asset class versus standard long only exposures. While traditionally these strategies, as measured by numerous

¹ In 2002 Standard & Poor's became the calculation agent for the Goldman Sachs Commodity Index. The GSCI index became S&PGSCI or SPGSCI in 2007.

² See Murphy (1999) for the development of the CRB index which facilitated development of commodities based investment strategies.

³ The benefits of a broad managed futures exposure have been widely reported. During a recent interview, Andrew Lo (MIT and Chairman of AlphaSimplex Group), states that managed futures can provide a highly liquid, counter-cyclic, low counter-party risk exposure to the equity market. It is these characteristics of futures based investing that make it a reasonable allocation for many investors seeking important diversification for their portfolios. See Barron's (May 27, 2016) issue.

managed futures indices, provided value-added diversification benefits, they did so with significant obstacles. Some of these have to do with issues of transparency, strategy style drift, volatility, manager selection, and high fee structures.

Commodity specific offerings have been plentiful but have mostly been concentrated on providing non-futures based exposures to the retail investor class in the form of exchange listed ETF's, ETN's, and mutual funds. Many of these are single commodity focused investments, such as Gold or Crude Oil, and are provided in different structures such as 2x leveraged, inverse, or even 3x inverse leveraged. There are also several index based commodity products. These involve standard index tracking vehicles which mimic a popular commodity index as well as more innovative structures. The alternative structures include strategic methodologies that provide a long only exposure but try to increase returns by using an alternative roll methodology versus those used by the index providers. Other strategic "smart beta" products utilize a variety of different strategies including long/short positioning, inter-market spread trading, contango/backwardation based analysis, and trend following.

Investors are now being offered a wider array of these types of strategies with emerging smart beta indices being introduced by a variety of firms. While the vast majority of these products have been concentrated in equity products there have been a few in the managed futures space and, to a lesser degree, the commodity arena. According to a recently published paper by FTSE-Russell⁴, investors are significantly increasing their smart beta allocations as these investments provide the diversifying attributes they require from alternative investments. The managed futures smart beta products attempt to provide index type vehicles that give investors the returns from a broad array of managers in a variety of futures- based investment strategies but with more transparency, higher liquidity, and more competitive fee structures. These strategies cover all four basic asset classes (equities, fixed income, currencies, and commodities). The largest of these to date, from an asset under management (AUM) measurement, is the AQR Managed Futures Strategy Fund (AQMIX") with \$11 billion AUM. This fund was introduced in January of 2010 and has so far produced mediocre results (.71% compounded return since inception through May 31, 2016).

⁴ Smart Beta: 2016 Global Survey of Asset Owners Findings, FTSE/Russell.

Addressing all of these issues in a single investment strategy is a challenging task. In this paper, we develop an alternative way to gain exposure to the commodity asset class. The trend following Liquid Alternative Commodity Index (LACI®) provides investors access to a strategy which uses a set of proprietary algorithms and incorporates a long/short/flat positioning methodology. The index is fully transparent, highly liquid, and provides stable returns. The index incorporates a proprietary trend/counter-trend algorithm to determine its positions. Risk adjusted performance shows that LACI generates superior performance compared to a large number of brand name CTAs, hedge funds, alternative mutual funds, and ETFs.

In Section II, we review the literature on long-short commodity programs to motivate the development of our new strategy. Section III presents the performance data with critical comparisons between the LACI and its competitors. The final section concludes the paper.

II. All Weather Investment Models

Any improvement over the existing long-short, trend following strategies, for example, must be rationalized on the uniqueness of the proposed methodology. The proposed investment strategy needs to deal with volatility of the spread during rebalancing, systemic exposure of the commodity contracts to the equity market, and extracting high quality signals that are robust to stylized features of the commodity markets when futures contracts oscillate between contango and backwardation. The significance of regime switching from backwardation to contango has not been fully explored in terms of innovative trading strategies that are also capable of dealing with roll-yields, inventory levels, and hedging pressures in the marketplace.

The introduction of the “all weather” methodology of investing, popularized by Bridgewater Associates, has been warmly received by the investing public as a prudent way to achieve stable investment returns with acceptable levels of volatility. The recent lackluster performance has many investors looking more closely at the details of the methodology.

The development of these new innovative products reflects a number of major changes that have impacted the way the commodity markets have traditionally functioned. In particular, this new paradigm is largely responsible for shaping the way traders now design profitable trading strategies and diversified

portfolios that can perform well in tranquil or turbulent markets. First, the growing influx of passive funds (Figure 1) from a wide array of investors significantly grew the amount of money in the space. These new passive funds, in addition to the rapidly increasing assets being placed with hedge funds and managed futures (Figure 2), fundamentally altered the way commodity markets functioned. The changes primarily affected the way forward markets in many key commodity futures were priced. This is critically important as the returns associated with rolling futures forward in the SPGSCI have accounted for more than half of the overall returns historically (Erb and Harvey (2005)).

Second, there has been a steady increase in correlation⁵ between SPGSCI and the broad based equity market index like the S&P500. We suspect that this is a consequence of factor crowding where investors use the same systemic factors to trade the same basket of stocks or commodities. Factor crowding increases herding among investors and also correlation between popular stocks and the index⁶. For commodity markets, an increasing correlation with the S&P500 index has eroded diversification benefits.

| SPGSCI / S&P 500 | |
|------------------|-------------|
| Period | Correlation |
| 1990 – May-16 | .24 |
| 1990 – 2004 | .00 |
| 2005 – 2015 | .45 |
| 2010 –May-16 | .60 |

The table clearly shows that the argument for including a long-only commodity exposure in a well- diversified portfolio has been steadily eroding. This is counter to what the majority of academic work prior to 2005 indicated should be the case. These papers have argued that “high real commodity prices can be a signal that monetary policy is loose” (Frankel, 2006).⁵ That has not been the case recently during this extended period of accommodative Fed policy. In past periods this has normally resolved itself as the business cycle would play itself out and the traditional correlation relationships would re-establish themselves. But has the commodity market permanently changed? And, if so, what part can be attributed to the considerable amount of passive investor funds contributing to the diminished return expectations from a long-only exposure to commodities?

⁵ The correlation between S&P500 and SPGSCI is as follows:

⁶ Factor crowding refers to hedge funds following similar systemic factors to forecast equity risk premium. As a result, the hedge funds strategies are becoming too crowded and are becoming more correlated, leading their risk premiums to be arbitrated away. See Cahan (2013) for more.

Since 2004, open interest has more than doubled for the average commodity. The table on the prior page suggests that an investor's ability to utilize commodities as a useful diversifying investment now requires a more active approach similar to those utilized by hedge funds, alternative fund of funds, and CTAs.

Historically, managed futures particularly have proven to be an excellent diversifier to a traditional equity/bond portfolio; however, their lack of transparency, high fee structure, manager selection, and issues relating to style drift has kept some investors from utilizing these strategies. Overall, however, investors search for yield has continued to siphon AUM towards alternatives (see Figures 1-2).

Third, most commodity allocations and commodity index benchmarks have WTI Crude Oil as their largest exposure. Through 2004, Crude Oil futures were backwardated, a pricing structure that allowed a passive investor to maintain a long position by rolling from a higher priced futures contract into a lower priced one, thus capturing a “roll yield”⁷. The Crude Oil market went from a pricing structure dominated by a backwardated curve structure to one now dominated by contango. This pricing anomaly was a primary driver of returns for not only Crude Oil but commodities in general (Erb and Harvey (2005)). This new forward structure has resulted in changing what was a “roll yield” into a “roll cost” (Bhardwaj, Gorton, Gary, and Rouwenhorst (2015)). Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate the futures curve for WTI Crude Oil on 10/1/1997 and 11/30/2015. As can be seen (Figure 5), the WTI crude oil market has historically oscillated between contango and backwardation. Between 1988 and 2004, the WTI traded in backwardation 69% of the time. Since 2004, the WTI has traded in contango 76% of the time.

Fourth, there has been noticeable increases in large order flows ahead of periodic rolls by major commodity hedge funds and index providers. Trading ahead of the major rolls is primarily devoted to avoiding the negative effect on spreads when index providers roll from front month to next nearby contracts. In Figure 6, the changing dynamics of the WTI Crude Oil roll period associated with the SPGSCI can be observed. Each index component commodity, when required, is rolled forward during the 5th through 9th business day (shaded area) of the month. Other long-only commodity index benchmarks also roll early in the

⁷ In a backwardated market, the inventory is low and the benefits of owning the commodity for selling in future exceeds the cost of storage. So, the futures price rolls up to the expected spot, generating a positive roll-yield for those going long. In a contangoed market, storage costs exceed the roll yield as the futures price gravitates downward to the spot market. In a contangoed market, short positions capture the negative roll-yield.

month on varying time frames but are similar to the SPGSCI methodology. As can be seen, the early part of the month through 2004 had marginal roll costs compared to the significant slippage associated with the roll function since 2004. Although the roll of month 1 to month 3 is shown, similar analysis demonstrates this degrading roll yield function across the active 12 month forward curve. Fama and French (1987) cite the level of interest rates and convenience yield to affect the roll yield or the basis. The paper by Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2012) claim, among others, inventory as the principal driver of the basis.

The practitioner and the academic communities have implemented these structural changes in designing trading strategies. In particular, studies have incorporated roll-yield, inventory, and the hedging pressure hypothesis in long-short or passive long trading strategies (see Mifre, 2015 for a review of the literature). In this section, we briefly highlight the major issues in applying these concepts in developing futures trading strategies.

The roll-yield has been used as a signal in trading strategies (see Erb and Harvey (2006), Dewally, Ederington, and Fernando (2013), and Gorton, et. al (2012)). In general, in a backwardated market (downward sloping futures curve), high roll-yield suggests going long and in a contango market (upward sloping futures curve), high negative roll-cost suggests going short would be profitable. To implement the strategy, one can observe the difference between front month and second nearest contract to guide asset allocation. The authors also suggest that the long-short portfolios trading the roll-yield generate returns similar to long-only passive commodity indexes like the SPGSCI. In contrast, developing trading strategies on the basis of standardized inventory (inventory divided by 12-month moving average of inventory) is profitable⁸. According to Gorton, et al (2012), profit from inventory based trading strategies have higher returns for commodities with backwardated futures curves. In addition, inventory based long-short strategies have a Sharpe ratio of .46, in comparison to long-only portfolios rebalanced at the monthly frequencies.

Hedging pressure theory derives its root from the normal backwardation theory (Keynes, 1930) which states that hedgers, who are net short face a risk of falling prices, offer a risk premium to speculators

⁸ The ratio is lower in a backwardated market.

who are net long. As futures price is expected to rise, speculators who are long earn a positive risk premium⁹. It follows then that backwardated and contangoed markets are driven by hedging pressure in the market. Empirically, the theory has been supported by several authors (see Bessembinder (1992) and Basu and Miffre (2013) and references therein). In particular, Basu and Miffre (2013) developed a long-short strategy based on 27 commodity futures and generated an average Sharpe ratio of 0.51 for the period 1992-2011. This is in contrast to a Sharpe ratio of 0.08 from a long-only equally-weighted portfolio that includes all commodities for the same period. Finally, during the same period the SPGSCI generates a Sharpe ratio of 0.19. These findings have been challenged in an another study by Daskalaki, Kostakis, and Skiadopoulos (2014). The authors show that returns to net short hedgers in a backwardated market are statistically insignificant from the returns earned by net long hedgers in a contangoed market.¹⁰

Long-short trend following strategies (see Erb and Harvey (2006), and Blitz and De Groot (2014), to name a few) applied to the commodity futures markets are quite popular and have done well in the past. The trend following momentum studies are two types: cross-sectional and time series momentum. Both strategies have done well (see Miffre (2015) for a summary of performance). In general, the cross-sectional momentum strategy that buys the winners and sells the losers have Sharpe ratio of 0.5, in contrast to -0.24 Sharpe for long-only equally-weighted portfolio (see Miffre and Rallis (2007)). While the cross-sectional momentum strategy is the most popular, time-series momentum strategy has also performed well. According to a recent study by Szakmary, Shen, and Sharma (2010), this strategy has a Sharpe ratio of 0.52. In another study by Hurst, Oci, and Pedersen (2014) of AQR Capital Management, the strategy offers a Sharpe ratio of 0.77, net of all fees, for the period January 1983 – December 2013. The authors attribute several factors contributing to the success of this strategy including investors' behavioral biases, market frictions, hedging demands, and market interventions by regulatory bodies such as the central banks and governments.

Trend following long-short strategies based on various measures of risk such as beta, total risk, and idiosyncratic volatility (see Frazini and Pedersen (2014), Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2012), and

⁹ Similarly, the futures price needs to be set at a high level for net short speculators to accommodate hedgers who are net long.

¹⁰ See Miffre (2015) for an analysis of the differences between these studies that may explain different results.

Szymanowska, De Roon, Nijman, and Van Den Goorbergh (2014)) have also been reported. The beta based strategy (Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)) which involves buying low beta assets and shorting high beta assets has a Sharpe ratio of only 0.11. Gorton, Hayashi, and Rouwenhorst (2012) note that a high volatility portfolio statistically outperforms a low volatility portfolio by 5.41% annually. In terms of Sharpe ratio, the long-short portfolio compares favorably compared to a long only portfolio. Fernandez-Perez, Fuertes and Miffre (2015) use residuals from a model that includes roll-yields, hedging pressure, and past performance to form quantile portfolios of commodities futures. The strategy (long contracts with high previous performance, high roll-yields, and low idiosyncratic volatility and short contracts with low previous performance, low roll-yields, and high idiosyncratic volatility) has a Sharpe ratio of 0.38 which is higher than 0.02 Sharpe ratio of the SPGSCI.

Finally, there are other strategies including cheapness/deariness, liquidity, inflation beta, dollar beta, open interest, skewness (long contracts with most negative skewness and short contracts with most positive skewness), and term structure of the commodity contracts (for example, shorting nearby contracts and buying distant contracts). Some of these strategies have produced attractive returns, compared to their chosen benchmarks. See Miffre (2015) for a review of these strategies.

Overall, trend following long-short strategies using commodity contracts are based on popular stock investing models like, for example, the four factor model. To the extent that investment psychology differs between the markets, it is not clear that some of these factor models are capable of dealing with contango and backwardation features in the commodity markets. In addition, the stock market's exposure to the world geopolitical environment certainly is different than the exposure of the commodity markets. Finally, as noted earlier, flow of AUM into passive long only portfolios have exacerbated the correlation between commodity and stock indices. The models have performed well in the past but their recent performance brings into question whether improvements can be made by tweaking these models.

III. All Weather Liquid Alternative Commodity Index (LACI)

We introduce a new index (Liquid Alternative Commodity Index (LACI) in the commodity space that stands out quite well among a large number of competing indices. As discussed below, the innovative design of the LACI allows it to be truly an all-weather index in terms of high Sharpe ratio and robustness. The proprietary construction of the index takes into consideration the disparate signals that have been identified in the literature such as backwardation, contango, roll-yields, momentums, cheapness/deariness, idiosyncratic volatility, beta, hedging pressure, and term structure of commodity contracts. By combining all these signals into an investible index, LACI has the potential to offer superior returns, in comparison to the competing brand name CTAs, hedge funds, mutual funds, and ETF/ETN products.

The data for the construction of the long/short/flat LACI Index is based on daily data on 27 commodity futures contracts representing the commodities included in the SPGSCI and DJ-UBS Commodity Indices. The data covers the period January 1990 to May 2016 and competing indices for comparison are available at irregular intervals. The LACI provides investors access to an innovative trading strategy which is based upon simple trend and counter-trend following algorithms and incorporates a long/short/flat positioning methodology. The fully transparent index is highly liquid and provides stable returns. The investment strategy deals with the volatility of the spread during rebalancing and offers significant improvements in the way signals are generated that are robust to stylized features of the commodity markets when futures contracts oscillate between contango and backwardation. The significance of regime switching from backwardation to contango has not been fully explored in terms of innovative trading strategies that are capable of dealing with roll-yields, inventory levels, and hedging pressures in the marketplace. We also construct two other versions of LACI – LACI-TLO (long only) and LACI-TSO (short only). These investible indices can also offer targeted diversification benefits when combined with traditional portfolios.

In Figure 8, we plot LACI against several benchmarks including the SPY (ETF) and the SPGSCI. The LACI is able to generate superior performance compared to the benchmarks. It has a Sharpe ratio of 1.02 for the entire sample¹¹, which compares quite favorably against the benchmarks. In Table 1, we report

¹¹ We adjust the Sharpe ratio for serial correlation. See Rulle (2015) for more.

several measures of performance of LACI against the benchmarks and several competing alternative products. As noticed, the Sharpe ratio indicates that LACI beats all its competitors. For the full sample, LACI again beats all its competitors.

Over the past several years there have been a variety of so-called “liquid alternatives” trying to fill this void but very few have been able to provide a consistently viable alternative for a dedicated commodity strategy. Many of these commodity related liquid alternatives were long-only strategies attempting to devise ways of minimizing the negative effects associated with rolling positions forward along the curve. Some of these strategies worked for a short period of time but were quickly arbitrated away. The LACI is intended to provide a more palatable exposure to the commodity asset class by capturing large trends in commodities in both up and down commodity cycles. In this manner it provides meaningful diversification when it is most needed. The table below shows the correlations between the SPGSCI and LACI to the S&P 500 over different periods.

| Period | SPGSCI S&P 500 Correlation | LACI S&P 500 Correlation |
|----------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1990 to 2004 | .00 | -.09 |
| 2005 to 2015 | .45 | -.30 |
| 2010 to May-16 | .60 | -.20 |

The LACI has consistently kept its diversifying characteristics while the SPGSCI has become a less effective diversifier. By replacing the passive long only commodity exposure with a more active commodity allocation, the overall Sharpe Ratios and drawdowns improve significantly. In Table 2, we present salient statistics of adding LACI to construct a series of simplified all weather type portfolios starting in May 1996. We use this point in time as it corresponds to the introduction of the Bridgewater All Weather fund, an evolutionary product that has gained a broad following among sophisticated investors. The value added monthly index (VAMI) for the selected portfolios are shown in Figure 9. The results indicate the addition of LACI improves the risk-return performance of the portfolios. We believe LACI truly becomes the all weather diversifier that is prudent for any investor utilizing the commodity markets. By focusing on the 30% Equity, 50% Bonds, and 20% LACI portfolio, we can then see how this mix compares to the actual performance of other widely held investments.

Finally, Table 4 displays the performance of LACI versus 139 ETFs, ETNs, and mutual funds. These competing products represent a broad cross section of commodity and alternative investment strategies without any bias with respect to assets under management (AUM). Performance data for the competing products of LACI are collected from publicly available databases. In Table 4, we see that LACI has the best Sharpe ratio (.96) for the most recent 10 year period shown.

Robustness Check

How unique is LACI? One way to test this would be to determine if LACI type returns can be harvested by replacing the performance of LACI by investing in close substitutes. One way to demonstrate this involves testing whether LACI is cointegrated with any of its competitors. Cointegration between two time series is consistent with the presence of short-run deviations of these assets from one another. However, in the long-run, their prices must track each other as successful arbitrage can push their prices to return to a long-run equilibrium. In other words, if two related variables move together in the long run, then there exists an error correction representation of the common relationship. This implies that today's relationship between these two variables depends upon the amount of disequilibrium in the previous period. For related financial assets, cointegration is consistent with the notion of the no-arbitrage condition. This is consistent with Fama (1991) where he defines efficiency as a lack of arbitrage opportunities. For instance, Hogan, Kroner and Sultan (1993) show that cointegration between the S&P500 cash price and the S&P500 futures price is due to index arbitrage.

Tests for cointegration is carried out in two stages. In the first stage, we use the Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) (CKP). The CKP method to see if level prices are non-stationary in the level, a requirement for two series to be cointegrated. The CKP method allows up to 5 structural breaks in both the level and slope of the trend function. There are three test statistics estimated, namely $MZ_a^{GLS}(\lambda)$, $MZB^{GLS}(\lambda)$, and $MZ_t^{GLS}(\lambda)$ which are robust to all the shortcomings of well-known conventional tests widely employed in the literature¹². In the second stage, we use Maki's (2012) cointegration test (MB ϵ) to check whether the log of LACI price

¹² See Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2009) for detailed technical explanations for the procedures of the tests.

and its close competitors have a long-run relationship. MB \hat{k} with unknown number of structural breaks tests the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration with i breaks ($i \leq k$ where k is the maximum number of breaks). This test performs even better than previously developed cointegration tests with structural breaks when the cointegration relationship has more than three breaks or persistent Markov switching shifts (Maki, 2012: 2011)¹³. To check for robustness, we further test our hypotheses using a robust least squares algorithm to deal with outliers. This is accomplished by using Huber's (1973) M -estimation method which is robust to outliers.

In Table 3, we report cointegration results for LACI and 27 of its publicly traded competitors. The competitors are chosen on the basis of publicly available data on the Morningstar and Yahoo Finance web sites and that resemble LACI's investible universe. Recall that for a cointegration test, both the LACI and a particular asset must be non-stationary in the levels. As can be seen, LACI is not cointegrated with any of the assets examined, which implies that the LACI and these assets do not share a common trend; and that each may be responding to a different set of economic forces. Hence, it would be very difficult to use any of these alternative assets to replicate the performance of LACI.

Herding and LACI Performance

The final robustness test conducted involves estimating sensitivity of LACI returns to factor crowding. Factor crowding increases the exposure of an investment strategy to systemic risk when investors use the same factors to trade the same basket of stocks or commodities. If everyone knows the factors that generate these risk premia, it is possible that they will be arbitrated away¹⁴. As noted earlier, factor crowding increases herding among investors and also correlation between popular stocks and the index. There is a vast literature on herding. See McAleer and Randalj (2013) for a survey of the literature. Herding is analogous to mimicking others when making investment decisions, even when such correlated actions so would contract

¹³ See also Maki (2012) for detailed explanations of the estimation steps for the test statistic, MB \hat{k} .

¹⁴ Cliff Asness of AQR suggests that factor strategies continue to work despite factor crowding. He cites two reasons. First, risk premium is for the investor for taking risk. So, the risk premium is a rational return that will not be arbitrated. Second, since investors are prone to making errors, it leads to mispricing, over valuation, over/under reaction in assets returns. Over time as the market returns to normalcy, risk premiums are generated, even if everyone knows about these factors. See <https://www.aqr.com/cliffs-perspective/how-can-a-strategy-still-work-if-everyone-knows-about-it>

the investors' own private information or rationale (Banerjee (1992)). Correlated behavior is linked to investors using the same information and interpreting it in a similar manners (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994)). Bikhchandani et al. (1992) claim that sequential decision making among investors is responsible for herding. Their explanation suggests that cascading buying and selling decisions from following the leader (s) places more importance to the actions by the leaders than on private information. Empirically, several authors have constructed measures of herding to understand investor psychology and its effects on the market. The LSV measure developed by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) uses observed percentages of buyers and sellers in a market to study herding among institutional traders. Christie and Huang (1995) define herding using the cross-section absolute deviation of returns (CSAD). A similar measure developed by Chang et al.(2000) looks at the squared dispersion of equity returns and the overall market return (CSSD). These authors find ample evidence of herding in commodities, currencies, equities, and financial futures, for example.

We estimate individual commodities-specific herding using both the cross sectional standard deviations (CSSD) and cross-sectional absolute standard deviations (CSAD) methods. We assume that the SPGSCI is the appropriate market index of commodities considered in this paper. The CSSD measure is then calculated as follows:

$$CSSD_t = \sqrt{\frac{\sum_{i=1}^N (r_{i,t} - r_{m,t})^2}{N-1}} \quad (1)$$

where $r_{i,t}$ are the daily returns from a particular commodity and the $r_{m,t}$ is the daily return from the market index (SPSCI). We then calculated a weighted aggregate measure of herding for all commodities by their respective weights in the LACI strategy. Because LACI returns distribution is not normal, we estimated a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, which assumes changing distributions of the second moments of the returns. The model is:

$$LACI_t = \delta_0 + \delta_1 CSSD_t + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

$$\varepsilon_t / \psi_{t-1} \sim N(0, \sigma_t^2) \quad (3)$$

$$\sigma_t^2 = \Omega + \sum_{i=1}^q \alpha_i \varepsilon_{t-i}^2 + \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j \sigma_{t-j}^2 \quad (4)$$

where $LACI_t$ in the mean equation (equation 2) are the daily LACI returns from our proprietary long-short-flat investment strategy and $CSSD_t$ is the aggregate measure of herding. Equation (3) describes the returns distribution given time varying conditional variances (Ψ_{t-1} is the information set). The variance equation (4) models the conditional variances as a GARCH(p,q) process where p and q denote the lag length. Ω is the intercept term, α_i are ARCH terms and β_j are GARCH terms. We would expect α and β terms to be positive and significant determinants of the conditional variance of returns. The model is estimated assuming t-distribution for the error term. For the second regression, we simply replace $CSSD$ with $CSAD$, which is defined as:

$$CSAD_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N |r_{i,t} - r_{m,t}| \quad (5)$$

where $CSAD$ in equation (5) is the aggregate weighted measure of herding for all the commodities considered in this study, with weights representing the proportion of each commodity in constructing LACI. An increase in $CSSD$ (or $CSAD$) indicates a decline in herding. So, a positive sign for the coefficient of herding should be interpreted as a decrease in herding leading to an increase in the LACI returns. To avoid contemporaneous relationship between LACI and measures of herding, $CSSD$ and $CSAD$ are lagged by one day. Regression¹⁵ results are reported below (with robust t-statistics in parentheses).

¹⁵ We report only the results using $CSSD$ as a measure of herding. Results using $CASD$ are also similar and therefore are not reported to conserve space.

Mean Equation

$$\text{LACI}_t = .000007 + 0.261 \text{ CSSD}_{t-1} - 0.0038 \text{ AR1}$$

(1.36) (0.51) (-0.28)

Variance Equation

$$\sigma^2_t = 0.000007 + 0.29 \mathcal{E}^2_{t-1} + 0.76 \sigma_{t-1} + 0.23 \text{TDF}^{16}$$

(6.61) (13.05) (61.74) (16.81)

The results suggest that LACI returns are insensitive to the level of herding. The coefficient δ_1 is positive but statistically insignificant. We consider this to be a strong evidence of the effectiveness of our investment strategy and it reinforces our prior assumption that as cascading investment decisions in the market lead to herding, the profitability of implementing a long-short-flat investment strategy as outlined in this paper remains robust. What this also implies is that herding is common in the commodities that we considered and yet it fails to affect LACI and LACI-like investment strategies.

V. Conclusions

The realization that falling commodity prices can be just as detrimental to equity and bond markets as rapidly rising prices requires a more active exposure to this asset class. Rising correlation between the commodity asset class and equities diminishes the utility of a plain passive long-only commodity exposure. Additionally, the structural changes in the commodity futures forward markets indicate that the cost of maintaining plain long-only exposures may continue to diminish the overall effectiveness of this passive type of allocation. What is shocking is that the popular commodity based ETFs, ETN's, and listed managed futures strategies, expected to offer stable investment returns with acceptable levels of volatility, has not addressed major paradigm shifts in the commodity markets including backwardation-contango oscillation, factor crowding, massive flow of funds populating long only strategies, and significant slippage due to periodic rolls. What is equally puzzling is that investors continue to pour money into these strategies despite the poor Sharpe ratios for an overwhelming number of these commodity specific alternative products.

¹⁶ TDF is the inverse of degrees of freedom parameter. The results indicate normality assumption is not valid as the degrees of freedom is 4.35 ($=1/.23$). The assumption of t-distribution corrects for the low degrees of freedom.

The proposed alternative investment strategy aims to fill the void. Our alternative methodology utilizes a more sophisticated commodity component with a newly created program called the Liquid Alternative Commodity Index (LACI®). The strategy is based on long/short/flat monthly positions for the commodity markets. The series of statistical tests on robustness of the strategy confirms our belief that LACI is a unique product which is difficult to replicate and capable of delivering attractive returns with high Sharpe ratios. In addition, we also find that two variants of LACI, namely LACI Tactical Long Only and LACI tactical Short Only, can be excellent additions to all-weather portfolios for superior diversification without sacrificing returns. Finally, the LACI provides a critical exposure in a highly liquid, fully transparent structure.

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Figure 1




Figure 2



Figure 3
Futures Curve Showing Backwardation in WTI Crude Oil
(10/1/1997)




Figure 4
Futures Curve Showing Contango in WTI Crude Oil
(11/30/2015)



Figure 5




Figure 6

WTI Crude Oil Month 1-3 Spread Cumulative % Change




Figure 7
WTI Crude Oil NYMEX Open Interest average for the first 12 listed futures contract months




Figure 8
 Value Added Monthly Index of LACI vs. Competing Benchmarks




Figure 9

Portfolio Diversification with LACI




Table 1

Liquid Alternative Commodity Index (LACI[®]) and Alternative ETF's, ETN's, and Mutual Funds

| Ticker | Fund Name | Expense Ratio | Later of Inception Date or 12/30/2005 | 1 Year | 3 Year (Annualized) | 5 Year (Annualized) | SHARPE ratio * |
|---------------|--|---------------|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------|----------------|
| LACI | Liquid Alternative Commodity Index | 1.00% | 12/30/2005 | +15.97% | +7.19% | +8.66% | 0.96 |
| MIP-BP | Marblehead IP Balanced Portfolio | 1.00% | 12/30/2005 | +5.06% | +6.23% | +6.96% | 1.27 |
| AQMIX | AQR Managed Futures Strategy Futures | 1.26% | 1/5/2010 | -11.13% | -0.60% | +0.00% | 0.06 |
| BCSAX | BlackRock Commodity Strategies Portfolio | 1.50% | 10/3/2011 | -12.37% | -10.21% | | (0.53) |
| BRCAX | Invesco Balanced-Risk Commodity | 1.57% | 11/29/2010 | -5.06% | -9.83% | -9.31% | (0.46) |
| CCXE | WisdomTree Commodity Country Equity | 0.58% | 10/12/2006 | -8.72% | -6.29% | -4.63% | 0.03 |
| CMCAX | Van Eck CM Commodity Index Fund | 0.95% | 12/30/2010 | -15.07% | -13.97% | -11.62% | (0.73) |
| CRSAX | Credit Suisse Commodity Return | 1.03% | 12/30/2005 | -15.47% | -13.76% | -12.77% | (0.38) |
| CSFFX | Arrow Commodity Strategy Fund | 2.07% | 12/30/2010 | -12.56% | -12.34% | -11.54% | (0.68) |
| CTF | Nuveen Long/Short Commodity TR Common | 1.73% | 10/25/2012 | -7.76% | -0.13% | | (0.42) |
| DDP | DB Commodity Short ETN | 0.75% | 5/21/2008 | +16.33% | +19.54% | +11.43% | 0.23 |
| DPU | DB Commodity Long ETN | 0.75% | 5/21/2008 | -18.52% | -16.49% | -14.25% | (0.31) |
| DXCTX | Direxion Indexed Commodity Strategy | 1.26% | 6/9/2008 | -5.31% | -8.17% | -12.34% | (0.60) |
| EACSX | Eaton Vance Commodity Strategy | 1.50% | 4/8/2010 | -14.97% | -14.69% | -13.32% | (0.19) |
| EIPCX | Parametric Commodity Strategy Fund | 0.70% | 5/25/2011 | -13.10% | -11.77% | -10.94% | (0.86) |
| GSCAX | Goldman Sachs Commodity Strategy | 0.98% | 3/30/2007 | -24.76% | -19.04% | -14.82% | (0.40) |
| HDG | Hedge Replication ETF | 0.95% | 7/13/2011 | -3.06% | +1.10% | | 0.15 |
| IMUAX | Transamerica Multi-Manager Alternative Portfolio | 2.28% | 1/3/2007 | -6.54% | -0.20% | +0.69% | 0.11 |
| JCRAX | ALPS Core Commodity Management Commodities Strategy Fund | 1.45% | 6/30/2010 | -13.08% | -11.16% | -10.62% | (0.21) |
| LCSAX | LoCorr Long/Short Commodities S | 2.20% | 1/17/2012 | +23.40% | +14.45% | | 0.48 |
| LSC | S&P Commodity Trend Index ETN | 0.75% | 6/10/2008 | +2.94% | +2.91% | -7.28% | (0.32) |
| MCRO | IQ Hedge Macro Tracker ETF | 0.75% | 6/8/2009 | -3.32% | -1.48% | -1.39% | 0.10 |
| MCSAX | MFS Commodity Strategy Fund CI | 1.07% | 6/1/2010 | -13.33% | -12.88% | -12.03% | (0.38) |
| NGSAX | Nuveen Gresham Long/Short Commodity TR Common | 1.71% | 7/27/2012 | +2.98% | +0.41% | | (0.22) |
| NGVAX | Nuveen Gresham Diversified Commodity | 1.32% | 7/27/2012 | -18.11% | -13.89% | | (1.05) |
| NRBAX | Neuberger Berman Risk Commodity | 1.46% | 8/24/2012 | -15.44% | -13.33% | | (1.06) |
| PCLAX | PIMCO CommoditiesPLUS Strategy | 1.24% | 5/31/2010 | -21.36% | -15.80% | -11.88% | (0.25) |
| PCRAX | PIMCO Commodity Real Return Strategy | 1.19% | 10/1/2009 | -18.43% | -15.94% | -13.02% | (0.28) |
| QAI | IQ Hedge Multi-Strategy Tracker ETF | 0.75% | 3/24/2009 | -3.03% | +1.85% | +2.02% | 0.46 |
| QGMIX | AQR Global Macro Fund | 1.51% | 7/20/2011 | -0.67% | +3.69% | | 0.43 |
| QRAAX | Oppenheimer Commodity Strategy | 1.46% | 12/30/2005 | -25.46% | -19.71% | -15.05% | (0.53) |
| RCSAX | Russell Commodity Strategies Futures | 1.56% | 6/30/2010 | -16.64% | -14.84% | -13.53% | (0.53) |
| RTSRX | State Street/Ramius Managed Futures | 3.35% | 10/27/2011 | -9.07% | +1.86% | | 0.09 |
| RYMEX | Rydex Series Fds Commodities Strategy | 1.59% | 12/30/2005 | -28.40% | -21.71% | -16.52% | (0.51) |
| SKNRX | Deutsche Enhanced Commodity Strategy | 1.48% | 3/11/2009 | -7.04% | -6.53% | -7.85% | 0.13 |
| TGGWX | TCW Enhanced Commodity Strategy | 0.70% | 3/31/2011 | -15.45% | -12.55% | -10.82% | (0.77) |
| VWELX | Vanguard Wellington Income Fund | 0.26% | 12/30/2005 | +1.29% | +7.32% | +8.37% | 0.50 |
| VWINX | Vanguard Wellesley Income Fund | 0.23% | 12/30/2005 | +4.31% | +5.97% | +7.28% | 0.91 |
| WDTI | Managed Futures Strategy Fund | 0.95% | 1/4/2011 | -3.44% | +1.57% | -3.77% | (0.46) |

* data shown is through 5/31/2016

** SHARPE ratios are from the inception date shown

Table 2
LACI and Portfolio Asset Allocation

| | 60% SPY / 40% AGG | 50% SPY / 30% AGG / 20% Commodity | 30% SPY / 50% AGG / 20% Commodity | 50% SPY / 30% AGG / 20% LACI * | 30% SPY / 50% AGG / 20% LACI * |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---|---|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Annualized average return | +7.15% | +6.11% | +5.63% | +8.34% | +7.79% |
| Average annual vol | 9.34% | 9.87% | 7.40% | 7.58% | 5.03% |
| Sharpe | 0.52 | 0.39 | 0.45 | 0.79 | 1.09 |
| Serial Correlation | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.01 | -0.03 |
| Adjusted Sharpe | 0.49 | 0.36 | 0.43 | 0.79 | 1.12 |
| Max drawdown | -32.32% | -37.07% | -28.15% | -18.29% | -6.22% |

NOTE: Data represented is from 6/1/1996 through 05/31/2016 (20.0 years)

** LACI, LACI-TLO, and LACI-TSO returns are NET of all expected transaction costs and management fees.*

*** Adjusted Sharpe uses the Van Belle volatility adjustment methodology to account for serial correlation in a return series.*

*The formula for the adjustment is: $\text{SQRT}((1 - \text{serial corr}) / (1 + \text{serial corr}))$ * Sharpe Ratio*

SPY = SPDR S&P 500 ETF

VWELX = Vanguard Wellington Income Fund

AGG = from 5/1/1996 through 8/31/2003 the returns from the Lehman Aggregate Bond Index is used. Starting 9/1/2003 the iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bond ETF is used.

Commodity = The Goldman Sachs Commodity Index - Total Return is used from 5/1/1996 through 7/31/2006

Starting 8/1/2006 an average of the PowerShares DB Commodity Index ETF (DBC) and the S&P GSCI

Commodity Indexed Trust ETF (GSG) are used. Each allocation is rebalanced at the beginning of each month.

LACI = Liquid Alternative Commodity Index

TABLE 3

Cointegration between LACI and Brand Name CTAs, Mutual Funds, Hedge Funds, and ETFs

| Ticker | Name | Cointegrated? | Maki (2012) | Break Points Observations | | | | |
|--------|-------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| | | | Test Statistics | B1 | B2 | B3 | B4 | B5 |
| SPY | SPDR S&P 500 | Not Cointegrated | -5.29 | 754 | - | - | - | - |
| AGG | iShares Core U.S. Aggregate Bon | Not Cointegrated | -5.793 | 725 | - | - | - | - |
| DBC | PowerShares DB Commodity Index | Not Cointegrated | -6.62 | 628 | 793 | 1026 | - | - |
| GSG | iShares GSCI Commodity-Indexed | Not Cointegrated | -6.492 | 509 | 704 | 1243 | 1530 | 1795 |
| CTF | Nuveen Long/Short Commodity Total | Not Cointegrated | -4.038 | 272 | 354 | 435 | 800 | 857 |
| GSC | Goldman Sachs Connect S&P Enhan | Not Cointegrated | -5.37 | 330 | 870 | 1156 | 1416 | |
| DXCTIX | Direxion Indexed Commodity Stra | Not Cointegrated | -5.698 | 128 | 415 | 786 | 1038 | 1945 |
| QRAAX | Oppenheimer Commodity Strategy | Not Cointegrated | -5.32 | 352 | 655 | 849 | 1389 | 1675 |
| NGSAX | Nuveen Gresham Long/Short Commodity | Not Cointegrated | -5.492 | 754 | 857 | 921 | - | - |
| AQMIX | AQR Managed Futures Strategy Fu | Not Cointegrated | -4.788 | 108 | 536 | 950 | 1550 | - |
| ARCIX | AQR Risk-Balanced Commodities F | Not Cointegrated | -4.382 | 86 | 137 | 296 | 433 | 860 |
| BCSAX | BlackRock Commodity Strategies | Not Cointegrated | -5.488 | 173 | 315 | 451 | 539 | 1075 |
| CMCAX | Van Eck CM Commodity Index Fd C | Not Cointegrated | -6.53 | 71 | 252 | 370 | 496 | 1313 |
| LCSAX | LoCorr Long/Short Commodities S | Not Cointegrated | -6.375 | 91 | 316 | 386 | 883 | 940 |
| WDTI | WisdomTree Managed Futures Stra | Not Cointegrated | -6.078 | 380 | 939 | 1017 | 1143 | 1305 |
| DJP | iPath Bloomberg Commodity Index | Not Cointegrated | -6.283 | 438 | 633 | 1173 | 1325 | 1459 |
| VWELX | Vanguard Wellington Income Fund | Not Cointegrated | -5.691 | 478 | 622 | 831 | 1494 | - |
| VWINX | Vanguard Wellesley Income Fund | Not Cointegrated | -5.532 | 610 | 833 | - | - | - |
| BRCAX | Invesco Balanced-Risk Commodity | Not Cointegrated | -4.688 | 109 | 198 | 407 | 564 | 1334 |
| NRBAX | Neuberger Berman Risk Commodity | Not Cointegrated | | | | | | |
| PCLAX | PIMCO CommoditiesPLUS Strategy | Not Cointegrated | -6.131 | 49 | 102 | 249 | 305 | 852 |
| RCSAX | Russell Commodity Strategies Fu | Not Cointegrated | -4.927 | 977 | 1058 | 1240 | 1329 | 1436 |

Table 4

Comparison of Performance: LACI vs commodity related ETF's, ETN's, and Mutual Funds

| Ticker | Fund Name | Expense Ratio | Inception Date | AUM | Segment | 1 Year | 3 Year (Annualized) | 5 Year (Annualized) | SHARPE ratio ** |
|--------|---|---------------|----------------|-----------|----------------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| LACI | RTMLiquid Alternative Commodity Index | 1.00% | 12/30/2005 | N/A | Broad Liquid Alternative | +15.97% | +7.19% | +8.66% | 0.96 |
| MIP-BP | Marblehead IP Balanced Portfolio | 1.00% | 12/30/2005 | N/A | All Weather | +5.06% | +6.23% | +6.96% | 1.27 |
| CMD | ProShares UltraShort Bloomberg Commodity | 0.91% | 11/28/2008 | \$6.96M | Inverse Broad Market | +29.21% | +26.65% | +22.16% | (0.02) |
| DEE | DB Commodity Double Short ETN | 0.75% | 4/30/2008 | \$1.63M | Inverse Broad Market | +52.38% | +35.99% | +22.94% | 0.32 |
| DDP | DB Commodity Short ETN | 0.75% | 5/30/2008 | \$1.17M | Inverse Broad Market | +16.33% | +18.99% | +11.43% | 0.28 |
| UCIB | ETRACS CMCi Total Return ETN Series B | 0.55% | 10/30/2015 | \$19.64M | Broad Market | +0.00% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (0.47) |
| MLM | Mount Lucas Long/Short Commodity Strategy | 1.00% | 12/30/2005 | \$345.00M | Broad Market | +4.62% | +7.37% | -0.71% | 0.07 |
| PDBC | PowerShares DB Optimum Yield Diversified Commodity Strategy Portfolio | 0.60% | 11/28/2014 | \$372.24M | Broad Market | -16.14% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (1.02) |
| CSGR | Credit Suisse X-Links Commodity Rotation ETN | 0.85% | 6/28/2013 | \$1.04M | Broad Market | -13.35% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (0.81) |
| FTGC | First Trust Global Tactical Commodity Strategy Fund | 0.95% | 10/31/2013 | \$306.82M | Broad Market | -14.37% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (0.93) |
| CMDT | iShares Commodity Optimized Trust | 0.48% | 8/30/2013 | \$8.84M | Broad Market | -12.23% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (1.03) |
| BCM | iPath Pure Beta Broad Commodity ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$33.41M | Broad Market | -15.65% | -13.02% | -12.75% | (0.73) |
| DYV | DB Commodity Double Long ETN | 0.75% | 5/30/2008 | \$1.22M | Leveraged Broad Market | -60.00% | -34.34% | -28.83% | (0.59) |
| UCI | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg Constant Maturity Commodity Index TR ETN | 0.55% | 4/30/2008 | \$68.61M | Broad Market | -15.06% | -13.51% | -11.57% | (0.40) |
| USCI | United States Commodity Index Fund | 0.92% | 8/31/2010 | \$541.92M | Broad Market | -9.93% | -9.14% | -9.29% | (0.23) |
| GSC | GS Connect S&P GSCI Enhanced Commodity TR Strategy ETN | 1.25% | 12/31/2007 | \$114.83M | Broad Market | -23.71% | -20.23% | -15.86% | (0.47) |
| RJI | Elements Rogers International Commodity Index-Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$219.94M | Broad Market | -18.76% | -15.11% | -12.75% | (0.40) |
| GSP | iPath S&P GSCI Total Return Index ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2006 | \$50.12M | Broad Market | -30.32% | -22.56% | -17.15% | (0.50) |
| GSG | iShares S&P GSCI Commodity Indexed Trust | 0.48% | 7/31/2006 | \$913.84M | Broad Market | -27.13% | -20.60% | -15.72% | (0.51) |
| DBC | PowerShares DB Commodity Index Tracking Fund | 0.85% | 2/28/2006 | \$2.34B | Broad Market | -16.94% | -17.14% | -13.43% | (0.24) |
| GCC | WisdomTree Continuous Commodity Index Fund | 0.79% | 1/31/2008 | \$221.21M | Broad Market | -9.05% | -9.90% | -10.90% | (0.33) |
| SBV | iPath Pure Beta S&P GSCI-Weighted ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$2.92M | Broad Market | -31.49% | -20.16% | -15.59% | (0.87) |
| DJCI | E-TRACS Bloomberg Commodity Index Total Return ETN | 0.50% | 10/30/2009 | \$134.69M | Broad Market | -16.40% | -14.00% | -13.22% | (0.45) |
| UCD | ProShares Ultra Bloomberg Commodity | 0.93% | 11/28/2008 | \$11.50M | Leveraged Broad Market | -30.54% | -26.80% | -26.14% | (0.42) |
| DJP | iPath Bloomberg Commodity Index Total Return ETN | 0.70% | 10/31/2006 | \$837.44M | Broad Market | -17.78% | -15.04% | -14.14% | (0.42) |
| DTO | DB Crude Oil Double Short ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$62.68M | Inverse Energy Crude Oil | +97.73% | +40.86% | +22.65% | 0.35 |
| BOM | DB Base Metals Double Short ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$3.67M | Inverse Industrial Metals | +39.17% | +13.88% | +14.27% | (0.02) |
| AGA | DB Agriculture Double Short ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$1.07M | Inverse Agriculture | -23.54% | +22.35% | +8.93% | 0.06 |
| DWTI | VelocityShares 3X Inverse Crude Oil ETN | 1.35% | 2/29/2012 | \$380.15M | Inverse Energy Crude Oil | +15.84% | +16.89% | +0.00% | 0.17 |
| DGLD | VelocityShares 3X Inverse Gold ETN | 1.35% | 10/31/2011 | \$22.97M | Inverse Precious Metals Gold | -19.19% | -3.95% | +0.00% | 0.10 |
| DSLV | VelocityShares 3X Inverse Silver ETN | 1.65% | 10/31/2011 | \$24.42M | Inverse Precious Metals Silver | -20.58% | -11.52% | +0.00% | 0.00 |
| DZZ | DB Gold Double Short ETN | 0.75% | 2/29/2008 | \$49.98M | Inverse Precious Metals Gold | -12.53% | +0.00% | -0.74% | (0.38) |
| DGAX | VelocityShares 3X Inverse Natural Gas ETN | 1.65% | 2/29/2012 | \$58.83M | Inverse Energy Natural Gas | +98.62% | +9.28% | +0.00% | (0.19) |
| SZO | DB Crude Oil Short ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$10.01M | Inverse Energy Crude Oil | +41.62% | +22.85% | +14.27% | 0.48 |
| DNO | United States Short Oil Fund LP | 0.70% | 9/30/2009 | \$20.18M | Inverse Energy Crude Oil | +34.56% | +20.70% | +12.71% | 0.16 |
| KOLD | ProShares UltraShort Bloomberg Natural Gas | 1.28% | 10/31/2011 | \$13.75M | Inverse Energy Natural Gas | +84.74% | +31.02% | +0.00% | 0.33 |
| BOS | DB Base Metals Short ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$1.73M | Inverse Industrial Metals | +17.71% | +9.23% | +7.94% | 0.05 |
| ADZ | DB Agriculture Short ETN | 0.75% | 4/30/2008 | \$890.68K | Inverse Agriculture | -8.81% | +12.20% | +5.79% | 0.06 |
| SCO | ProShares UltraShort Bloomberg Crude Oil | 0.86% | 11/28/2008 | \$224.12M | Inverse Energy Crude Oil | +46.58% | +26.67% | +13.99% | (0.11) |
| DGZ | DB Gold Short ETN | 0.75% | 2/29/2008 | \$23.29M | Inverse Precious Metals Gold | -5.26% | +1.12% | +1.09% | (0.33) |
| ZSL | ProShares UltraShort Silver | 0.91% | 12/31/2008 | \$44.15M | Inverse Precious Metals Silver | -7.95% | +2.85% | +2.09% | (0.62) |
| GLL | ProShares UltraShort Gold | 0.90% | 12/31/2008 | \$69.73M | Inverse Precious Metals Gold | -13.19% | -0.91% | -1.96% | (0.51) |
| DGP | DB Gold Double Long ETN | 0.75% | 2/29/2008 | \$139.32M | Leveraged Precious Metals Gold | +3.29% | -11.39% | -13.11% | (0.03) |
| UGL | ProShares Ultra Gold | 0.90% | 12/31/2008 | \$89.63M | Leveraged Precious Metals Gold | -0.70% | -12.40% | -13.98% | 0.07 |
| UGLD | VelocityShares 3X Long Gold ETN | 1.35% | 10/31/2011 | \$73.91M | Leveraged Precious Metals Gold | -3.64% | -21.37% | +0.00% | (0.57) |
| DAG | DB Agriculture Double Long ETN | 0.75% | 4/30/2008 | \$9.99M | Leveraged Agriculture | -29.12% | -25.47% | -22.43% | (0.42) |
| USLV | VelocityShares 3X Long Silver ETN | 1.65% | 10/31/2011 | \$151.26M | Leveraged Precious Metals Silver | -31.66% | -45.93% | +0.00% | (0.65) |
| AGQ | ProShares Ultra Silver | 0.88% | 12/31/2008 | \$294.26M | Leveraged Precious Metals Silver | -16.28% | -26.74% | -39.08% | (0.11) |
| BDD | DB Base Metals Double Long ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$2.95M | Leveraged Industrial Metals | -30.43% | -18.08% | -23.69% | (0.42) |
| UGAZ | VelocityShares 3X Long Natural Gas ETN | 1.65% | 2/29/2012 | \$282.58M | Leveraged Energy Natural Gas | -89.65% | -80.49% | +0.00% | (0.79) |
| UWTI | VelocityShares 3x Long Crude Oil ETN | 1.35% | 2/29/2012 | \$1.05B | Leveraged Energy Crude Oil | -89.72% | -75.83% | +0.00% | (0.82) |
| UCO | ProShares Ultra Bloomberg Crude Oil | 0.87% | 11/28/2008 | \$930.28M | Leveraged Energy Crude Oil | -72.88% | -54.64% | -44.80% | (0.62) |
| BOIL | ProShares Ultra Bloomberg Natural Gas | 1.24% | 10/31/2011 | \$26.50M | Leveraged Energy Natural Gas | -71.30% | -59.95% | +0.00% | (0.94) |
| GEUR | AdvisorShares Gartsman Gold/EURO ETF | 0.65% | 2/28/2014 | \$16.97M | Precious Metals Gold | +0.75% | +0.00% | +0.00% | 0.27 |
| GYEN | AdvisorShares Gartsman Gold/Yen ETF | 0.65% | 2/28/2014 | \$25.91M | Precious Metals Gold | -9.63% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (0.08) |
| OUNZ | VanEck Merk Gold | 0.40% | 5/30/2014 | \$110.12M | Precious Metals Gold | +1.81% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (0.11) |
| CHOC | iPath Pure Beta Cocoa ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$8.14M | Agriculture Cocoa | -1.37% | +11.19% | -1.66% | (0.16) |
| NIB | iPath Bloomberg Cocoa Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.70% | 6/30/2008 | \$15.09M | Agriculture Cocoa | -4.71% | +9.49% | -1.96% | (0.13) |
| UBC | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCi Livestock Total Return ETN | 0.65% | 4/30/2008 | \$4.48M | Agriculture Livestock | -13.73% | +1.66% | -1.04% | (0.27) |
| SOYB | Teucrium Soybean Fund | 3.41% | 9/30/2011 | \$12.72M | Agriculture Soybeans | +8.08% | -6.77% | +0.00% | (0.11) |
| USAG | United States Agriculture Index Fund | 2.59% | 5/31/2012 | \$2.05M | Agriculture | -0.50% | -5.91% | +0.00% | (0.17) |
| LSTK | iPath Pure Beta Livestock ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$3.17M | Agriculture Livestock | -15.52% | +2.41% | -1.29% | (0.24) |
| LD | iPath Bloomberg Lead Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.70% | 6/30/2008 | \$664.65K | Industrial Metals Lead | -7.16% | -9.97% | -9.74% | (0.07) |
| FUE | Elements MLX Biofuels Index-Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 2/29/2008 | \$1.70M | Agriculture Grains | +9.62% | -6.62% | -6.08% | (0.12) |
| COW | ProShares Bloomberg Livestock Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 11/30/2007 | \$11.56M | Agriculture Livestock | -15.24% | -2.94% | -3.14% | (0.60) |
| IAU | iShares Gold Trust | 0.25% | 12/30/2005 | \$7.87B | Precious Metals Gold | +1.82% | -4.51% | -4.80% | 0.37 |
| WEET | iPath Pure Beta Grains ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$875.33K | Agriculture Grains | +3.90% | -8.68% | -5.94% | (0.26) |
| GLD | SPDR Gold Trust | 0.40% | 12/30/2005 | \$34.29B | Precious Metals Gold | +1.72% | -4.66% | -4.96% | 0.36 |
| SGOL | ETFS Physical Swiss Gold Shares | 0.39% | 9/30/2009 | \$975.23M | Precious Metals Gold | +1.74% | -4.62% | -4.95% | 0.13 |
| PALL | ETFS Physical Palladium Shares | 0.60% | 1/29/2010 | \$164.86M | Precious Metals Palladium | -29.97% | -10.44% | -7.31% | 0.13 |
| TONS | WisdomTree Coal Fund | 0.99% | 2/27/2015 | \$888.79K | Energy Coal | -12.54% | +0.00% | +0.00% | (1.05) |
| UBG | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCi Gold Total Return ETN | 0.30% | 4/30/2008 | \$12.37M | Precious Metals Gold | +1.63% | -5.11% | -5.45% | 0.13 |
| DGL | PowerShares DB Gold Fund DB Gold Inv Fund | 0.62% | 1/31/2007 | \$232.52M | Precious Metals Gold | +1.40% | -5.42% | -5.91% | 0.23 |
| BDG | DB Base Metals Long ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$566.60K | Industrial Metals | -13.64% | -1.61% | -10.91% | (0.23) |

* data shown is through 5/31/2016

** SHARPE ratio time frame is from inception date or from 5/31/2011.

Table 4 (contd.)
Comparison of Performance: LACI vs commodity related ETF's, ETN's, and Mutual Funds

| Ticker | Fund Name | Expense Ratio | Inception Date | AUM | Segment | 1 Year | 3 Year (Annualized) | 5 Year (Annualized) | SHARPE ratio ** |
|--------|---|---------------|----------------|-----------|----------------------------|---------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| JJG | iPath Bloomberg Grains Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$117.29M | Agriculture Grains | +4.15% | -13.34% | -8.98% | (0.33) |
| GRU | Elements MLCX Grains Index-Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 2/29/2008 | \$4.58M | Agriculture Grains | +3.64% | -13.50% | -9.58% | (0.35) |
| AGF | DB Agriculture Long ETN | 0.75% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.85M | Agriculture | +5.28% | -8.79% | -10.62% | (0.35) |
| DIRT | iPath Pure Beta Agriculture ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.59M | Agriculture | +5.32% | -9.40% | -7.18% | (0.36) |
| JJT | iPath Bloomberg Tin Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$2.12M | Industrial Metals Tin | +2.01% | -9.09% | -11.28% | (0.37) |
| LEDD | iPath Pure Beta Lead ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$3.18M | Industrial Metals Lead | -17.16% | -9.63% | -7.94% | (0.37) |
| BLNG | iPath Pure Beta Precious Metals ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.76M | Precious Metals | +5.94% | -5.05% | -7.03% | (0.37) |
| CUPM | iPath Pure Beta Copper ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.72M | Industrial Metals Copper | -23.94% | -13.41% | -12.95% | (0.38) |
| FUD | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Food Total Return ETN | 0.65% | 4/30/2008 | \$19.26M | Agriculture | +7.59% | -7.45% | -6.44% | (0.38) |
| UAG | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Agriculture Total Return ETN | 0.65% | 4/30/2008 | \$14.99M | Agriculture | +11.19% | -8.77% | -7.60% | (0.39) |
| SLVO | Credit Suisse X-Links Silver Shares Covered Call ETN | 0.65% | 4/30/2013 | \$32.95M | Precious Metals Silver | -6.40% | -9.89% | +0.00% | (0.39) |
| JJP | iPath Bloomberg Precious Metals Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$7.12M | Precious Metals | -1.11% | -7.30% | -9.14% | (0.41) |
| DBP | PowerShares DB Precious Metals Fund | 0.62% | 1/31/2007 | \$179.62M | Precious Metals | -0.27% | -6.82% | -8.44% | (0.43) |
| JJA | iPath Bloomberg Agriculture Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$20.05M | Agriculture | +8.30% | -9.75% | -9.36% | (0.43) |
| UGA | United States Gasoline Fund LP | 0.68% | 2/29/2008 | \$91.19M | Energy Gasoline | -31.13% | -20.06% | -11.18% | (0.43) |
| SGG | iPath Bloomberg Sugar Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$56.12M | Agriculture Sugar | +31.17% | -12.45% | -11.88% | (0.45) |
| GRN | iPath Global Carbon ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$1.56M | Energy Carbon Credits | -28.32% | +12.76% | -25.66% | (0.46) |
| GLTR | ETFS Physical Precious Metals Basket Shares | 0.60% | 10/29/2010 | \$176.59M | Precious Metals | -3.69% | -7.59% | -9.95% | (0.45) |
| SGAR | iPath Pure Beta Sugar ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.05M | Agriculture Sugar | +33.04% | -9.24% | -10.88% | (0.47) |
| GLDI | Credit Suisse X-Links Gold Shares Covered Call ETN | 0.65% | 1/31/2013 | \$39.75M | Precious Metals Gold | -1.14% | -5.17% | +0.00% | (0.47) |
| CORN | Teuconium Corn Fund | 2.89% | 6/30/2010 | \$65.15M | Agriculture Corn | -2.17% | -19.52% | -13.34% | (0.51) |
| PTM | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Platinum Total Return ETN | 0.65% | 5/30/2008 | \$21.47M | Precious Metals Platinum | -14.00% | -14.12% | -13.44% | (0.52) |
| FOIL | iPath Pure Beta Aluminum ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.28M | Industrial Metals Aluminum | -12.05% | -9.95% | -13.93% | (0.52) |
| USV | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Silver Total Return ETN | 0.40% | 4/30/2008 | \$8.80M | Precious Metals Silver | -5.47% | -11.86% | -17.27% | (0.53) |
| SIVR | ETFS Physical Silver Shares | 0.30% | 7/31/2009 | \$300.32M | Precious Metals Silver | -4.68% | -10.64% | -16.39% | (0.52) |
| SLV | iShares Silver Trust | 0.50% | 4/28/2006 | \$5.44B | Precious Metals Silver | -5.00% | -10.85% | -16.58% | (0.56) |
| TAGS | Teuconium Agricultural Fund | 0.50% | 3/30/2012 | \$1.40M | Agriculture | +3.45% | -12.20% | +0.00% | (0.55) |
| NINI | iPath Pure Beta Nickel ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$724.34K | Industrial Metals Nickel | -34.62% | -18.64% | -20.74% | (0.55) |
| DBS | PowerShares DB Silver Fund | 0.44% | 1/31/2007 | \$20.51M | Precious Metals Silver | -5.53% | -12.28% | -17.84% | (0.57) |
| UHN | United States Diesel-Heating Oil Fund LP | 0.70% | 4/30/2008 | \$3.96M | Energy Heating Oil | -32.61% | -18.96% | -14.39% | (0.55) |
| BAL | iPath Bloomberg Cotton Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$15.34M | Agriculture Cotton | -2.86% | -5.04% | -13.50% | (0.56) |
| PPLT | ETFS Physical Platinum Shares | 0.60% | 1/29/2010 | \$491.79M | Precious Metals Platinum | -12.60% | -12.92% | -12.33% | (0.56) |
| PGM | iPath Bloomberg Platinum Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$7.36M | Precious Metals Platinum | -13.45% | -14.49% | -13.73% | (0.57) |
| RJA | Elements Rogers International Commodity Index-Agriculture TR ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$108.57M | Agriculture | -0.76% | -8.88% | -9.56% | (0.59) |
| CTNN | iPath Pure Beta Cotton ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.26M | Agriculture Cotton | -5.42% | -6.76% | -13.01% | (0.59) |
| BNO | United States Brent Oil Fund LP | 0.94% | 6/30/2010 | \$131.69M | Energy Crude Oil | -36.14% | -26.61% | -17.26% | (0.59) |
| RJZ | Elements Rogers International Commodity Index-Metals Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$8.32M | Broad Market Metals | -10.30% | -9.23% | -11.17% | (0.62) |
| HEVY | iPath Pure Beta Industrial Metals ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$434.68K | Industrial Metals | -15.17% | -10.10% | -12.01% | (0.62) |
| DBA | PowerShares DB Agriculture Fund | 0.75% | 1/31/2007 | \$820.70M | Agriculture | -2.38% | -5.80% | -8.22% | (0.66) |
| USL | United States 12 Month Oil Fund LP | 0.92% | 12/31/2007 | \$120.64M | Energy Crude Oil | -28.88% | -20.84% | -16.26% | (0.65) |
| DBB | PowerShares DB Base Metals Fund | 0.66% | 1/31/2007 | \$130.17M | Industrial Metals | -17.93% | -10.04% | -12.23% | (0.68) |
| CPER | United States Copper Index Fund | 3.24% | 11/30/2011 | \$2.74M | Industrial Metals Copper | -24.76% | -15.03% | +0.00% | (0.65) |
| OLEM | iPath Pure Beta Crude Oil ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$29.26M | Energy Crude Oil | -28.83% | -22.95% | -17.61% | (0.66) |
| JJC | iPath Bloomberg Copper Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$33.70M | Industrial Metals Copper | -26.98% | -16.11% | -15.45% | (0.68) |
| WEAT | Teuconium Wheat Fund | 3.35% | 9/30/2011 | \$29.26M | Agriculture Wheat | -12.53% | -22.63% | +0.00% | (0.69) |
| JO | iPath Bloomberg Coffee Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$139.59M | Agriculture Coffee | -15.26% | -12.33% | -23.35% | (0.72) |
| RJN | Elements Rogers International Commodity Index-Energy TR ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$12.52M | Energy | -35.96% | -25.59% | -18.70% | (0.73) |
| CAFE | iPath Pure Beta Coffee ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$5.14M | Agriculture Coffee | -12.18% | -10.19% | -21.81% | (0.72) |
| JJN | iPath Bloomberg Nickel Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$8.08M | Industrial Metals Nickel | -38.96% | -20.76% | -22.02% | (0.73) |
| USO | United States Oil Fund LP | 0.74% | 4/28/2006 | \$3.54B | Energy Crude Oil | -41.56% | -28.60% | -21.77% | (0.75) |
| GRWN | iPath Pure Beta Softs ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$745.56K | Agriculture Softs | +3.31% | -9.73% | -13.58% | (0.72) |
| DBE | PowerShares DB Energy Fund | 0.62% | 1/31/2007 | \$105.01M | Energy | -30.06% | -23.36% | -16.87% | (0.75) |
| ONG | iPath Pure Beta Energy ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$1.07M | Energy | -44.40% | -27.56% | -20.00% | (0.73) |
| CANE | Teuconium Sugar Fund | 1.79% | 9/30/2011 | \$6.20M | Agriculture Sugar | +22.34% | -8.70% | +0.00% | (0.73) |
| UBN | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Energy Total Return ETN | 0.65% | 4/30/2008 | \$3.11M | Energy | -28.35% | -22.27% | -16.54% | (0.74) |
| OIL | iPath S&P GSCI Crude Oil Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 8/31/2006 | \$867.43M | Energy Crude Oil | -47.94% | -32.89% | -24.82% | (0.78) |
| UBM | ETRACS UBS Bloomberg CMCI Industrial Metals Total Return ETN | 0.65% | 4/30/2008 | \$3.11M | Industrial Metals | -23.03% | -13.32% | -13.93% | (0.76) |
| OLO | DB Crude Oil Long ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$12.01M | Energy Crude Oil | -37.72% | -28.18% | -20.83% | (0.76) |
| JJS | iPath Bloomberg Softs Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$975.18K | Agriculture Softs | +8.40% | -9.27% | -15.37% | (0.76) |
| JJM | iPath Bloomberg Industrial Metals Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 12/31/2007 | \$5.35M | Industrial Metals | -23.50% | -13.80% | -15.44% | (0.77) |
| DBO | PowerShares DB Oil Fund | 0.62% | 1/31/2007 | \$478.80M | Energy Crude Oil | -38.53% | -29.04% | -21.67% | (0.82) |
| JJU | iPath Bloomberg Aluminum Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 6/30/2008 | \$2.11M | Industrial Metals Aluminum | -16.92% | -13.75% | -17.05% | (0.86) |
| GAZ | iPath Bloomberg Natural Gas Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$4.31M | Energy Natural Gas | -67.50% | -47.85% | -45.50% | (0.87) |
| UNG | United States Natural Gas Fund LP | 1.01% | 4/30/2007 | \$526.93M | Energy Natural Gas | -46.46% | -31.37% | -31.93% | (0.93) |
| JJE | iPath Bloomberg Energy Subindex Total Return ETN | 0.75% | 10/31/2007 | \$1.35M | Energy | -43.01% | -30.03% | -24.55% | (0.96) |
| DCNG | iPath Seasonal Natural Gas ETN | 0.85% | 4/29/2011 | \$587.46K | Energy Natural Gas | -18.22% | -18.64% | -20.12% | (0.96) |
| UNL | United States 12 Month Natural Gas Fund LP | 0.86% | 1/29/2010 | \$12.82M | Energy Natural Gas | -22.38% | -20.45% | -22.68% | (0.97) |

* data shown is through 5/31/2016

** SHARPE ratio time frame is from inception date or from 5/31/2011.

Appendix A

Description of Maki's Cointegration Testing with Structural Breaks

We briefly describe Maki (2012)'s cointegration test (MB \hat{k}). This methodology offers several improvements over previous methods for testing cointegration. First, the MB \hat{k} method allows for unknown number of structural breaks in the return generating process (Bai and Perron (2003)). Second, the unit roots tests are conducted assuming structural breaks (Kapetanios (2005)), assuming that the number of breaks of the cointegrating vector is smaller than or equal to the maximum number of breaks set a priori. Third, Maki's methodology is not computationally intensive. Finally, based on the Monte Carlo simulations, Maki (2012) advocates that MB \hat{k} test performs better than the tests of Gregory and Hansen (1996a) and Hatemi-J (2008) when the cointegration relationship has more than three breaks or persistent Markov switching shifts.

Maki (2012) proposes four regression models in order to test cointegration allowing for multiple structural breaks:

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i D_{i,t} + \beta' \mathbf{x}_t + u_t \quad (1)$$

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i D_{i,t} + \beta' \mathbf{x}_t + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta_i' \mathbf{x}_t D_{i,t} + u_t \quad (2)$$

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i D_{i,t} + \gamma t + \beta' \mathbf{x}_t + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta_i' \mathbf{x}_t D_{i,t} + u_t \quad (3)$$

$$y_t = \mu + \sum_{i=1}^k \mu_i D_{i,t} + \gamma t + \sum_{i=1}^k \gamma_i t D_{i,t} + \beta' \mathbf{x}_t + \sum_{i=1}^k \beta_i' \mathbf{x}_t D_{i,t} + u_t \quad (4)$$

where $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$. y_t (dependent) and $\mathbf{x}_t = (x_{1t}, \dots, x_{mt})'$ (regressors) indicate observable integrated of order one ($I(1)$) variables, and u_t is the equilibrium error. $D_{i,t}$ takes value of 1 if $t > T_{Bi}$ ($i = 1, \dots, k$) and of 0 otherwise, where k is the maximum number of breaks and T_{Bi} indicates the time period of break. The first model, level shift model, captures changes in the level (μ) only. Second model accounts for structural breaks both in the level (μ) and regressors (\mathbf{x}), called regime shift model. Third model is regime shift model with trend (γ); and the fourth model constitutes structural breaks of levels, trends, and regressors.

MB \hat{k} with the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration with i breaks ($i \leq k$) are implemented in the following steps (Maki, 2012:2012): First, we estimate one of the four regression models and then save the residuals. Second, we compute the t -statistics in order to test for unit root in the residuals, obtained from the estimated model, for all possible periods of the break. Let the set of all possible partitions and the t -statistics be represented by T_i^a and τ_ρ^i , respectively. Third, the i^{th} breakpoint (\hat{bp}_i) is chosen by minimizing the sum of squared residuals (SSR) for the estimated model. Here, the breakpoint i can be indicated as $\hat{bp}_i = \arg \min_{T_i^a} SSR_i$. Finally, we adopt τ_{\min}^k as the test statistic (MB \hat{k}), that is, the minimum t -statistic over the set $\tau_\rho^k = \tau_1 \cup \tau_2 \cup \dots \cup \tau_k$.