

Linear Cryptanalysis of MORUS

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Overview

► MORUS & MiniMORUS

► Linear Cryptanalysis of MiniMORUS

► Extension to MORUS and Consequences



- ► Authenticated encryption algorithm (Encrypt-and-MAC)
- ▶ Designed by Wu and Huang

Table: Security goals of MORUS.


	Confidentiality (bits)	Integrity (bits)	
MORUS-640-128	128	128	
MORUS-1280-128	128	128	
MORUS-1280-256	256	128	


Impose rekeying every 2⁶⁴ encrypted blocks.


MORUS state:


- ▶ 5 registers of 4 words.
- ightharpoonup MORUS-640, 32-bit words \implies 128-bit registers \implies SSE instructions.
- ightharpoonup MORUS-1280, 64-bit words \implies 256-bit registers \implies AVX2 instructions.













MiniMORUS!



MiniMORUS with chosen plaintext!



Linear Cryptanalysis of MiniMORUS

Weight and Bias

This linear approximation holds with a bias ε :

$$\Pr(E) = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$$


The correlation and weight of an approximation is:

$$\mathsf{cor}(E) := 2 \, \mathsf{Pr}(E) - 1 = 2 arepsilon$$
 $\mathsf{weight}(E) := -\log_2 |\, \mathsf{cor}(E)|$


Pilling Up Lemma (Matsui M., 1993)


The correlation (resp. weight) of an XOR of independent variables is equal to the product (resp. sum) of their individual correlations (resp. weights)


MiniMORUS: trails $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \varepsilon$





Building Trails








































$$C_{27}^0 \oplus C_0^1 \oplus C_8^1 \oplus C_{26}^1 \oplus C_7^2 \oplus C_{13}^2 \oplus C_{31}^2 \oplus C_{12}^3 \to S_{2,0}^2$$













MiniMORUS: Weight of $\beta_i^t \oplus \gamma_i^t$



Weight of $\beta_i^t \oplus \gamma_i^t$ is 0 (not 2).

MiniMORUS-640: Weight corrected



MiniMORUS: Full Trail

► MiniMORUS-640

$$\chi_1 \oplus \chi_2 = C_{27}^0 \oplus C_0^1 \oplus C_2^1 \oplus C_8^1 \oplus C_{16}^1 \oplus C_{16}^2 \oplus C_{13}^2 \oplus C_{13}^2 \oplus C_{27}^2 \oplus C_{27}^2 \oplus C_{31}^3 \oplus C_6^3 \oplus C_{14}^3 \oplus C_{20}^3 \oplus C_{19}^4 \to 0$$

► MiniMORUS-1280

$$C_{51}^{0} \oplus C_{0}^{1} \oplus C_{25}^{1} \oplus C_{33}^{1} \oplus C_{55}^{1} \oplus C_{4}^{2} \oplus C_{7}^{2} \oplus C_{29}^{2} \oplus C_{37}^{2} \oplus C_{38}^{2} \oplus C_{46}^{2} \oplus C_{51}^{2} \oplus C_{11}^{3} \oplus C_{20}^{3} \oplus C_{42}^{3} \oplus C_{50}^{3} \oplus C_{24}^{4} \to 0$$

In both case, the weight of the trail is 7 + 9 = 16.

MiniMORUS: Experimental verification

			Weight		
Арр	Approximations for MiniMORUS-640		Bool.	Meas.	
χ_1	$S_0^{2,2} = C_{27}^0 \oplus C_{0,8,26}^1 \oplus C_{7,13,31}^2 \oplus C_{12}^3$	7	7	7	
χ_2	$S_0^{2,2} = C_2^1 \oplus C_{1,7,15,27}^2 \oplus C_{6,14,20}^3 \oplus C_{19}^4$	9	9	9	
χ	$0 = C_{27}^0 \oplus C_{0,2,26,8}^1 \oplus C_{1,13,15,27,31}^2 \oplus C_{6,12,14,20}^3 \oplus C_{19}^4$	16	16	15.5	
Арр	roximations for MiniMORUS-1280				
χ_1	$S_0^{2,2} = C_{51}^0 \oplus C_{0,33,55}^1 \oplus C_{4,37,46}^2 \oplus C_{50}^3$	7	7	7	
χ_2	$S_0^{2,2} = C_{25}^1 \oplus C_{7,29,38,51}^2 \oplus C_{11,20,42}^3 \oplus C_{24}^4$	9	9	9	
χ	$0 = C_{51}^0 \oplus C_{0,25,33,55}^1 \oplus C_{4,7,29,37,38,46,51}^2 \oplus C_{11,20,42,50}^3 \oplus C_{24}^4$	16	16	15.9	

The programs we used to verify the bias experimentally are available at: https://github.com/ildyria/MorusBias

Extension to MORUS and Consequences

From MiniMORUS to MORUS

► Trail extension:

 $S_{i,j}$ in MiniMORUS is translated into $S_{i,j} \oplus S_{i,j+w} \oplus S_{i,j+2w} \oplus S_{i,j+3w}$ in MORUS e.g. $S_{2,0}$ in MiniMORUS-1280 $\iff S_{2,0} \oplus S_{2,64} \oplus S_{2,128} \oplus S_{2,192}$ in MORUS-1280.

- ▶ Weight implication: word "equality" occurs with probability $\frac{1}{2^4}$ ⇒ weight ×4
- $ightharpoonup eta_i + \gamma_i$ has weight 0 in MiniMORUS but weight 4 in MORUS

Weight of the trails

MORUS-640: Weight(
$$\chi$$
) = 73

MORUS-1280: Weight(
$$\chi$$
) = 76

Impact for MORUS

► Keystream correlation

- The bias is absolute: does not depends on Key or Nonce!
- Similar to RC4, BEAST attack...
- Known plaintext \implies Distinguisher.
- $\bullet \ \ \mathsf{Multiple} \ \mathsf{fixed} \ \mathsf{plaintext} \ \Longrightarrow \ \mathsf{plaintext} \ \mathsf{recovery}.$

Impact for MORUS

▶ Keystream correlation

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- Similar to RC4, BEAST attack...
- Known plaintext \implies Distinguisher.
- ullet Multiple fixed plaintext \Longrightarrow plaintext recovery.

▶ Data complexity

- Immune to rekeying every 2⁶⁴ encrypted block.
- Require 2¹⁴⁶ blocks for MORUS-640
- Require 2¹⁵² blocks for MORUS-1280 (violate 256-bit confidentiality claim)
- trail is immune to bit-shift:
 - save 2⁵ data for MORUS-640.
 - save 2⁶ data for MORUS-1280.
- Not practical. :(

https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/464.pdf