Compilation using LLVM

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Quarkslab

Last course

- Symbolic Execution
- Dynamic Symbolic Execution

Today's objective

- Protecting Data
- Whitebox Cryptography

Protecting Data vs Code

Until now we seen how to protect the code.

- The input/output of a function still can be instrumented
- Functions can be debugged to trace intermediate values

Different ways of protecting data:

- OpaqueConstants
- Encrypt constant data
- Encode constant data

Encrypt constant data and decrypt at program startup

- Log strings leak a lot of information
- Once the data is decrypted everything is clear in memory

Encode constant data applying a bijective function on every element

- Data is never completely clear in memory
- All the uses of the data must be available
- The values can still be seen when operating with the data

```
static const uint8_t secret[256] = { 0xa, 0xb, ... };
uint8_t work_with_secret(uint8_t value, uint8_t i) {
  return value + secret[i];
}
```

```
static const uint8_t secret[256] = { rol(0xa, 3)+3, rol(0xb, 3)+3, ... };

uint8_t work_with_secret(uint8_t value, uint8_t i) {
  return value + ror(secret[i]-3, 3);
}
```

```
static const uint8_t _add_secret[256][256] = { 0+0xa, 0+0xb, ... };
uint8_t work_with_secret(uint8_t value, uint8_t i) {
  return _add_secret[value][i];
}
```

```
static const uint8_t _bij[256] = { ... }; // random permutation
static const uint8_t _bij_inv[256] = { ... }; // bij inverse
static const uint8_t _add_secret[256][256] = { ... };

uint8_t work_with_secret(uint8_t value, uint8_t i) {
  return _bij_inv[_add_secret[_bij[value]][_bij[i]]];
}
```

Whitebox Cryprography

Whitebox Cryprography

Tailored cryptographic algorithms for a particular key

- The key is distributed in the tables that encode the operations
- The key is never clear in memory
- Inmediate results from operating with the key are never clear in memory

Whitebox Cryprography

Tabulate all operations in an algorithm that work with products of the key

This is not enough!

Differential-Fault-Analysis

Conclusions

- Tailored algorithms for a particular key
- Static and Dynamic versions
- Greybox attacks
- Encoding the operations is not enough!