

# CO331 – Network and Web Security

## 18. Browser storage


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# HTTP state management

- HTTP is a stateless protocol
  - Each request-response exchange is independent of the previous one
  - Compare with TCP: after initial handshake, data-ack packets are tied by increasing session numbers
- Web applications need to keep their own state
  - Server-side: can save files, access databases
  - Client-side: in 1994 Netscape introduced Cookies
    - Key-value pairs stored by the browser on behalf of a web application
- Cookies are used for
  - Storing website preferences
  - Storing session tokens
  - Tracking users
- Current specification is IETF RFC 6265, from 2011
  - Some basic guarantees on browser implementations
    - “At least 4096 bytes per cookie”
    - “At least 50 cookies per domain”
    - “At least 3000 cookies total”



# Cookies in HTTP

- First client request carries no cookies

```
Remote Address: 216.58.211.163:443
Request URL: https://www.google.co.uk/
Request Method: GET
```

- The server sets each cookie using a response header
  - `Set-Cookie: name = value; [(attribute [= value];)*]`
  - Optional attributes tell browser how to handle that cookie

```
set-cookie: PREF=ID=52bad12bb5ef8029:FF=0:TM=1425900847:LM=1425900847:S=dImeFFdj
reBPRx0o; expires=Wed, 08-Mar-2017 11:34:07 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.co.uk
set-cookie: NID=67=qYQJrMMAbvyKM5s8GkkD2EW9aKAYUrdIO3AebEQI3y01B8qSNxfnfRJK9QTAR
H20cEbFgZ_dMDmQF_mxG4uKGmBGP7sEsfVEHxSrE1jFosFIsqic2BLK9AWg6MkerKBo; expires=Tu
e, 08-Sep-2015 11:34:07 GMT; path=/; domain=.google.co.uk; HttpOnly
status: 200
```

- Browser includes relevant cookies for subsequent requests in one request header
  - `Cookie: (name = value;)+ ...`

```
cookie: PREF=ID=52bad12bb5ef8029:FF=0:TM=1425900847:LM=1425900847:S=dImeFFdj reBP
Rx0o; NID=67=qYQJrMMAbvyKM5s8GkkD2EW9aKAYUrdIO3AebEQI3y01B8qSNxfnfRJK9QTARH20cE
bFgZ_dMDmQF_mxG4uKGmBGP7sEsfVEHxSrE1jFosFIsqic2BLK9AWg6MkerKBo
```

# Cookie attributes

- **Domain** = *domain*
  - Send cookie back when *domain* is suffix of requested domain
    - Cookie for `example.com` is sent to `login.example.com`
  - Must be a non-trivial suffix of host domain: cannot set for “.com, .co.uk, .googlecode.com”
    - The [Public Suffix List](#) is used to keep track of valid suffixes
  - Defaults to host of URL that caused the response
- **Path** = *path*
  - Send cookie back when *path* is prefix of request path
    - Cookie for `example.com/login` is not sent to `example.com/`
  - Defaults to path of URL that caused the response
- **Expires** = *date* (similar for **Max-Age**)
  - Date in the future: store *persistent* cookie on file until *date*
  - Date in the past: delete the cookie immediately
  - Null (default): keep *session-only* cookie in memory until browser is closed
- **Secure**
  - Send the cookie only over HTTPS
  - Provides confidentiality against network attacker
- **HttpOnly**
  - Prevent non-HTTP APIs (for example JavaScript) from accessing cookie
  - Mitigates risk of cookie theft via XSS
- **SameSite**
  - Experimental feature, already supported by Chrome, Firefox and Opera
  - Mitigates cross-origin information leakage (for example CSRF: see next module)
  - **Strict**: cookie is sent only from a page with same domain
  - **Lax**: don't block for top-level cross-domain navigation with safe HTTP methods (GET, OPTIONS, HEAD, TRACE)

# Cookie scope

- Cookie origin: domain, path
- Cookie is identified by name and origin
- Cookie scope is determined by origin and secure attribute
- Browser request sends all cookies that are in scope to server
  - All the server sees is the name=value pairs
  - Attributes are not sent back

Cookie store for https://www.google.co.uk/maps


Name ▲	Value	Domain	Path	Expires / ...	Size	HTTP	Secure
NID	43	.www.google.co.uk	/maps	2015-09...	5		
NID	67=m9e7s...	.google.co.uk	/	2015-09...	134	✓	
NID	42	.www.google.co.uk	/	2015-09...	5		✓
OGPC	4061130-17:	.google.co.uk	/	2015-04...	15		
PREF	ID=4c1471...	.google.co.uk	/	2017-03...	94		

Request header for https://www.google.co.uk/maps

**cookie:** NID=43; PREF=ID=4c1471102240a913:U=8a7add608648797c:FF=0:TM=1425832665:LM=1425832823:S=tL9sk5NbFUSpdqGo; NID=67=m9e7s8GTbMN0eX4sSKYZRBHV2ld-N6lURDfqUQnSg7LxWP-M81IG\_qEEu8flvA46az0vUfh\_wAZ1Y8m8JIbPSPuhc70EehZ7SXDxE88PtIemEK8T2YI60-AvgRjWkHsm; OGPC=4061130-16;; NID=42

# Cookies in the browser

- Cookies are also accessible to JavaScript in the browser
  - `document.cookie` provides access to all the cookies **in scope** for the document origin
- Examples
  - Write: `document.cookie = "userid=123; path=/; secure";`
  - Delete: `document.cookie = "userid=; path=/; expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:01 GMT";`
  - Read: `alert(document.cookie);` (this will not show httponly cookies)



# Security considerations

- Server does not see cookie attributes
  - `example.com` cannot tell if cookie was set by `subdomain.example.com`
  - Cannot tell if cookie is effectively `httponly` or was written by JavaScript
- Path does not restrict visibility of cookies
  - Path in cookie origin is only meant to improve efficiency
    - Send to server only the cookies that are needed for a specific request
  - Scripts from different path can
    - Load iframe with page from target path
    - Access `document.cookie` of iframe thanks to SOP (which ignores path)
- Cookie integrity is not guaranteed
  - User can access cookies SQLite database in browser
  - Any JavaScript from the same origin can set/edit cookies
  - Even **secure** does not guarantee cookie integrity
    - Secure cookies can be set by JavaScript (risk of XSS, injection)
    - Active network attacker can intercept HTTPS response and set cookie with spoofed HTTP response: next request sends tampered “secure” cookie

# HTML5 browser storage

- HTML5 also provides Web Storage and Indexed Database APIs.
  - We look at Web Storage (easier to use, larger adoption)
  - Implements client-side state using lists of key-value pairs
- `window.localStorage`
  - Associated to page origin
  - Data is kept until it is deleted explicitly
- `window.sessionStorage`
  - Associated to current tab **and** page origin
  - Data is kept until the tab is closed
- JavaScript API (where `xxx` = `localStorage` or `sessionStorage`)
  - `xxx.length` //return list length
  - `xxx.key(n)` //read n-th key in list
  - `xxx.getItem(k)` or `xxx.k` //read value of k
  - `xxx.setItem(k,v)` //set value v for key k
  - `xxx.removeItem(k)` //remove entry with key k
  - `xxx.clear()` //delete all entries
- HTML5 storage is not sent/set over HTTP
  - Up to the page if/how to involve the server (AJAX, GET/POST, etc.)
  - Attacker model is script injection, XSS



# Attack: Resident XSS

## Target page:

```
<html><body>
Welcome user:
<script>
    document.write(localStorage.getItem("user_name"));
</script>
</body></html>
```

## Attack vector:

```
localStorage.setItem("user_name", "<script>alert('XSS!')</script>");
```

- Resident XSS (RXSS) is a variant of DOM-based XSS that exploits browser storage
  - Cookie, Web storage, Indexed DB, etc.
- Attacker must already be able to inject JavaScript to exploit the RXSS
  - **RXSS remains effective also after vulnerable page is patched**
    - Unlike DOM-based and Reflected XSS
  - RXSS cannot be detected by server, IDS, XSS Auditor
    - Unlike Reflected, Stored XSS
- Countermeasure: do not trust values stored in the browser (*defense-in-depth*)
  - Sanitise stored values like other user input
  - Periodically validate, refresh or delete stored data