1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
2	FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE )
5	COMMISSION, )
6	Plaintiff, ) Civil Action
7	v. ) No. 1:24-cv-12586-AK ) Pages 1 to 25
8	MANPREET SINGH KOHLI, )
9	Defendant. )
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12	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANGEL KELLEY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
13	MOTION HEARING
14	MOTION HEARING
15	April 14, 2025
16	11:02 a.m.
17	John J. Moakley United States Courthouse
18	Courtroom No. 8 One Courthouse Way
19	Boston, Massachusetts 02210
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22	Proceedings reported and produced by computer-aided stenography.
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1	PROCEEDINGS
2	THE CLERK: All rise.
3	THE COURT: You can have a seat.
4	Okay. You can call it.
11:02 5	THE CLERK: Thank you, Your Honor.
6	The United States District Court for the District of
7	Massachusetts is now in session, the Honorable Angel Kelley
8	presiding. Today is April 14th, 2025. Civil Action 24-12586,
9	the Commission versus Armand, et al., will now be heard before
11:02 10	this Court.
11	THE COURT: Good morning, Counsel. Would you please
12	state your appearances for the record.
13	MR. D'ADDIO: Good morning, Your Honor. David D'Addio
14	for the Securities and Exchange Commission.
11:02 15	THE COURT: Thank you.
16	MR. HOLCOMB: Good morning, Your Honor. David Holcomb
17	for the intervenor Department of Justice.
18	MR. ROSEN: Good morning, Your Honor. Eric Rosen and
19	my colleague Douglas Stephens for the defendant Manpreet Kholi.
11:03 20	THE COURT: Eric Rosen and Douglas Stephens. All
21	right. Thank you.
22	So a couple of things let me just double-check. So
23	there's a total of four outstanding motions. Two are
24	assented-to motions to approve consent judgment, one by
11:03 25	defendant Hernandez and the other defendant Armand. Neither of

1 those defendants are present here today. But I have not acted 2 on those yet, but I assume that there's no reason why I can't act on them at this time. MR. D'ADDIO: No reason that the Commission can 11:04 consider, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So those two assented-to 7 motions for entry of proposed judgment will be allowed. That's dockets 4 and 5. 9 And then we have defendant Kholi's motion to dismiss, 11:04 10 which is paper 16, and then the government or Department of 11 Justice's motion to intervene and stay, which is paper 19. I 12 think that that motion sort of leads our conversation today. 13 So why don't I have AUSA Holcomb speak to that, and Counsel, 14 I'll give you an opportunity to respond. 11:04 15 MR. HOLCOMB: Thank you, Your Honor. And just as an additional matter, I believe that the 16 motion to intervene is unopposed, that portion of the motion, 17 and so I won't address that unless the Court would like me to, 18 19 and I'll instead focus on the motion to stay. 11:05 20 THE COURT: Okay. Is that accurate, Counsel? 21 MR. ROSEN: Yes. 22 THE COURT: All right. Very good. Thank you. 23 MR. HOLCOMB: Your Honor, I'll just highlight the two 24 kind of main points why the government is moving to stay here

and thinks the stay is appropriate.

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First, what the government is requesting is a very common procedure in cases where there are parallel civil and criminal securities enforcement actions, and that's to allow the criminal case to be tried like any other criminal case first before allowing the SEC's enforcement action to proceed.

The defendant's briefing suggests that there is something somehow unfair or inappropriate about DOJ and the SEC bringing two cases at once, but there is nothing inappropriate about parallel actions. The securities laws provide for civil and criminal coordination and enforcement here. And so this is a fairly common case where the alleged conduct arises to the level of criminal violations, and therefore, both the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission have brought parallel actions.

And the common thread throughout all of the cases that the government cites in its briefing is that courts can and should use their discretion to sequence the cases so that the cases don't work at cross purposes to each other. Most of the time what this means is that courts resolve the criminal case first and the civil case second because, first, it's the efficient way to resolve them, and second, also, because the criminal case should -- can then proceed like any other criminal case instead of proceeding under special rules where the defendant, just because there's a civil case pending, gets to put the government's witnesses under oath well before any

1 criminal trial happens. The defendant's brief, as identified, really has just 2 3 two exceptions to this general rule within this district in SEC enforcement actions, both of which issued from the same session 11:07 in the same year, and that's the Kanodia and O'Neill cases, and those cases give essentially the same reasons for denying a 7 stay. My reading of those cases is that they really focus on the Court's --THE COURT: Can you tell me which -- what page of your 11:07 10 11 motion is that listed? 12 MR. HOLCOMB: Your Honor, the government addresses 13 those cases in its response. 14 THE COURT: Reply, okay. MR. HOLCOMB: But the defendant first raises them in 11:07 15 its opposition, which is docket 22. 16 THE COURT: All right. Just point me to where you 17 cite it. What is the case name again? 18 MR. HOLCOMB: Kanodia. 19 11:08 20 THE COURT: I see it, in note 2. 21 MR. HOLCOMB: It's page 4, footnote 2. 22 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. And I'll find it 23 in the opposition papers. You may proceed. 24 MR. HOLCOMB: Okay. And the focus of that -- of the 11:08 25 ruling in both of those cases was the Court's refusal to -- in

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what the Court viewed as to generally delay the disclosure of relevant information. And respectfully, the issue and the government's concern goes far beyond merely delaying disclosure of relevant information that would need to be disclosed in any event. We're talking about a dramatically different set of procedures that discovery in the SEC case proceeds under and what the defendant is permitted to do under that.

And that's -- that would be essentially ex parte discovery for the criminal case because that's discovery in which the SEC could seek to depose witnesses for the government, victims, and engage in discovery that the Department of Justice can play no role in. They can't object, they can't refresh a witness's recollection, they can't correct the record, or rehabilitate a witness's credibility. The defendants would get to do all of that -- would get to do all of that under the SEC case -- discovery in that case, and the government could play no role until the government would have to live with those statements at an eventual trial, and that's far different from merely early disclosure of relevant information.

And so the numerous cases that the government cites in its filings recognize that that would be deeply unfair in that just because there is a parallel civil case should not mean that the criminal case needs to be tried under a different set of rules. Other sessions of this Court have not followed Kanodia and O'Neill since those orders.

Judge Saylor, for instance, explained why in the Muraca case in 2017. This is cited in the government's reply, docket 27. It's actually quoted at length on page 3, Your Honor. And there Judge Saylor noted that there are good reasons why the law provides for both criminal and civil enforcement, so that there's nothing nefarious or unfair about parallel cases being brought. He acknowledged that the concerns about this kind of what would be ex parte one-sided discovery are real concerns that the Court should be concerned with. And he said that there's really no fairness principle that is served by allowing the defendant to proceed with discovery in the civil case where the discovery could only be one-sided based on the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. And that's where I think the efficiency point comes in.

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I recognize that the efficiency argument often sounds self-serving when it's framed as, well, we should sit back and see if the DOJ wins its criminal case so that the SEC then has an easy case or, you know, little more to do after that. And the Court in Kanodia and O'Neill clearly thought it sounded self-serving. But I think the better way to think about the efficiency argument is that it just recognizes the practical reality that the SEC case cannot be resolved before the criminal case.

So long as Mr. Kholi has a Fifth Amendment right or a Fifth Amendment privilege, he won't be sitting for a

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deposition, so -- and the defendant's briefing does not indicate that he's prepared to waive the Fifth Amendment and sit for a deposition or assert it and risk the adverse inference in the SEC case.

And so the efficiency point is just that there's no world in which the SEC case gets resolved before the criminal case. So where the criminal case likely would resolve some issues in the civil case and the criminal case has to proceed anyways, a stay just makes sense to resolve the criminal case first.

No session more recently in this district has followed <code>Kanodia</code> and <code>O'Neill</code> either. In the most recent case that the government is aware of where there was a contested motion by the government to stay the parallel SEC case, that's the <code>Forte</code> case in 2023, I believe, the defendants relied on <code>Kanodia</code> and <code>O'Neill</code>, and Judge Sorokin granted the DOJ's motion to stay without any oral argument.

So on this larger first point, Courts have recognized that the government's concerns are real concerns, and the way to address those concerns is simply to allow the criminal case to proceed first. The alternative that the defendant suggests is that the SEC can dismiss its case to avoid these concerns, and there's no serious support for the idea that the main civil securities regulator should have to forgo its remedies in cases where the conduct also arises to a criminal violation. That's

just not in the public interest. By contrast, all the government is asking is to be permitted to proceed with its case like any other criminal case.

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Your Honor, the second point is that the defendant still has not articulated any prejudice from a stay that the Court should recognize. He's not prejudiced by having already filed a motion to dismiss. He was on notice that the government was going to file -- or was going to move to stay this case. He did not need to file his motion before alerting the government of his opposition to a stay. He was not up against an immovable deadline to file that motion. He chose to get it on the docket. So that's not a prejudice.

He's not prejudiced by a delay in resolving the civil case because, as I've already noted, it can't be resolved before the criminal case anyways. Instead, his main argument is he is prejudiced because if he can't seek discovery in the SEC case, he can't use that discovery to fight his extradition in the United Kingdom. That's a really remarkable claim.

First, it assumes that he's entitled in the first place to get discovery from the SEC not to use in his defense of the SEC case but to use in a wholly foreign jurisdiction to fight extradition, and he's not entitled to that. So staying this case does not somehow put him in any worse position in his extradition proceedings than he otherwise would be or should be in the U.K. court.

1 And second, it assumes that the Court has any interest 2 at all in helping him avoid extradition on charges in another criminal case -- in a criminal case before this same session of this Court. In our last filing, the government cited cases showing how courts actually actively discouraged criminal defendants who are outside the U.S., whether they're fugitives 7 or merely contesting extradition, how courts discouraged them from avoiding criminal charges in U.S. Federal Courts. those cases are just meant to illustrate that the defendant's 11:15 10 interest in avoiding extradition is not one that the Court 11 should be asked to recognize or to protect here. And the 12 defendant has offered no support at all for why the Court should be concerned with his extradition proceedings. 13 14

So setting that argument aside, there really isn't any other prejudice argument remaining. So in summary, Your Honor, a stay is warranted because it would permit the criminal case to proceed under the rules applicable to any other criminal case, because the civil case can't proceed to resolution in the meantime anyways, and because the defendant should not be permitted to use civil discovery here to fish for material that might somehow be helpful to him in fighting extradition.

THE COURT: Thank you. The government makes a compelling argument, Counsel, so I'll hear from you.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, the government here is asking this Court to delay justice in a civil case it chose to bring.

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1 The SEC filed this complaint. It served Mr. Kholi overseas.

He's choosing to defend himself. We have not articulated one

3 way or another whether the Fifth Amendment would or would not

apply. And now they want to freeze it without articulating any

prejudice that's specific to this actual case. That's

6 unfairness to Mr. Kholi. That's gamesmanship. And a stay

7 | would reward that and prejudice him because he's done nothing

8 more than asking this Court to allow his case that the

9 regulators chose to bring to go forward.

Mr. Holcomb obviously is a very intelligent,

11 well-spoken AUSA, but he forgot the government's standing. And

12 that's the First Circuit case of *Microfinancial versus Premier* 

13 Holidays. And what is that? The movant looking for the stay

must demonstrate a clear case of hardship to be entitled to a

discretionary stay, a clear case of hardship. Where is that

16 showing besides generic talking about witnesses or discovery or

17 | anything else? That's boilerplate arguments about discovery

18 risk without identifying any witness or any evidence

19 threatened. We have no idea who the witnesses are going to be.

We have no idea who we're going to seek to depose. Two of the

21 defendants in this case, Armand and Russell, have already

22 entered into consent decrees with the SEC, and in doing so,

23 they're not even allowed to contradict the fact that they have

24 committed the charged conduct.

So I don't know where this -- you know, the Fifth

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Amendment, it's not gamesmanship. It's these people have already effectively waived it. There is nothing particularized about anything, anything that the government suggests, and that's the standard that the First Circuit has held. It can't be generic, it has to be particular to this case, and there are many reasons why a stay should not go forward.

What Mr. Holcomb didn't mention is that Mr. Kholi is not alone in the criminal indictment. There's another co-defendant who is proceeding, Mr. Haroon Mohsini. What does that mean? Why is that important? It's critical because the discovery, the documents that the government's holding back and doesn't want Mr. Kholi to see, those are getting produced anyway. To the extent that there's witnesses testifying while Mr. Kholi fights extradition, he'll have access to those transcripts. This is an open court system.

The main reason is just -- you know, in a single-defendant case it could make sense. In a multi-defendant case where one person is proceeding with their case, it makes no sense. We've heard a lot about civil discovery and things like that, but let's remember where we are. It's unprecedented. I haven't found a single case, and apparently neither has the government, where the U.S. Attorney after a defendant files a motion to dismiss, they intervene to stay and torpedo that motion to dismiss.

The idea that we had some opportunity not to file

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anything is a myth. We were served in the United Kingdom. We negotiated an answer or motion date with the SEC, as

Mr. D'Addio will tell the Court, and we filed. That was our requirement under the Rules of Civil Procedure. There was no gamesmanship. We didn't bring this case ourselves. We're not intervening in anything. We're responding to serious accusations from the Nation's securities regulator, and we have an absolute requirement to do that.

Mr. Kholi is sitting there in the United Kingdom wearing an ankle monitor, which he may be for the next couple of years. He can't travel, he can't do anything as this case plays out, and the idea that he can just sit there for those years and not allow anything to transpire, not allow him to dismiss a case that he's put time, effort and money into on jurisdictional extraterritorial grounds is absurd. I don't know of any court that's ever allowed that to happen, and I don't suggest that this Court should be the first one to do so.

Your Honor, civil discovery, to the extent it ever takes place, the SEC knows what to do, to the extent they don't want discovery to get out or be spilled over into other cases. They can file for a protective order. That's the remedy. The remedy is not to allow the SEC to get its press release and then prevent Mr. Kholi from fighting back. That's not what our justice system is about. It's not the way we work.

The DOJ expressed credulity as a fact that we want to

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use potentially -- and again, potentially, because we don't know what's in the discovery -- but potentially discovery to help Mr. Kholi fight extradition. We're transparent because we have no need not to be transparent. We're fighting the SEC case. That's what we're doing. To the extent that there's discovery that can help Mr. Kholi with extradition, of course we'd use it. We'd be ineffective if we didn't use it. There's nothing preventing that. And again, the SEC can get a protective order if they can convince this Court that a protective order is needed to prevent anything from being used.

And I found it deeply ironic for the DOJ, which worked in parallel, which typically takes on a lot of voluminous SEC discovery for its own case, to say that Mr. Kholi is the one engaging in gamesmanship here. He is not. He is playing the cards that he was dealt, and he is doing it within the rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is not Mr. Kholi's burden to show prejudice. It is the government's burden to show a clear case of hardship, which they've failed, but Mr. Kholi will suffer prejudice. Again, the SEC has brought a case, and they're depriving him of an opportunity to fight the charges, his due process right to do so. He is entitled to clear his name and discuss what happens.

He intends to fight both the criminal case and the civil case as well. He's spent time and resources. This would -- a stay now would waste those complete resources, and

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of course it would deprive Mr. Kholi of evidence needed to challenge his extradition, to show that what he is alleged to have done took place within the U.K.

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As you know from our motion to dismiss, we have serious and significant exterritoriality arguments that the SEC after ten weeks has not responded to, as well as personal jurisdictional arguments, and we're entitled to make those arguments.

And in recent case law in the United Kingdom -- I have attached a case called *El-Khouri* -- is critical because *El-Khouri* talks about these extradition issues and how U.K. courts just can't extradite people whose conduct took place entirely or almost entirely within a third-party country under its own dual prosecution principles. Not to mention the fact that, Your Honor, extradition can take years. The charges are already somewhat old, and the charges require Mr. Kholi potentially to have witnesses' memories be fresh and be accurate and be able -- and we're talking about not a stay of a typical criminal case of a year potentially. We're talking about maybe a five-, six-year stay. If extradition takes three years and then he comes over and if --

THE COURT: Is that what it normally takes? Is that what you're saying?

MR. ROSEN: Extradition would normally take three or four years if we challenge to the U.S. Supreme Court, yes.

THE COURT: Any comment?

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MR. HOLCOMB: Your Honor, I don't know that it would take that long. I know that there are proceedings scheduled for June. From there, you know, it could take years, it could take a shorter time. I don't have reason to think it would be as long as three to four years.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. ROSEN: If we're dealing with criminal cases, it could take a year or two to play out. So we're talking about a minimum, I would say, three- to six-year delay before depositions. People of course don't remember what happened a year ago, let alone three, six years. It's important to preserve people's recollections because of that.

And I do note that none of the cases cited by the government involved a situation like here where, A, there's already an ongoing criminal case that is not stayed, and B, the defendant is overseas, therefore severely delaying the stay.

We're talking about a very long stay that is needed.

The government, we don't believe, is correct that it's standard practice to stay parallel SEC and DOJ cases. We've obviously pointed to a number of cases that they disagree with, I understand that. But footnote 3, the government -- in the government's opposition -- reply brief, sorry. It's docket 27 and it's page 4. Footnote 3 lists string cites, a list of cases, but those were all when the parties agreed to stay the

case. And certainly in 90 percent of cases a stay could make sense, and we're not disputing that. But we have to show a clear case of hardship in this case, not other cases.

Footnote 4 is allegedly where courts have granted opposed motions to stay, but if you look at that footnote --

THE COURT: You said number 4?

MR. ROSEN: Yeah, it's footnote 4. It cites one, two, three, four, five cases. Starting on the bottom there with DFRF Enterprises, as the government points out, it granted the DOJ's motion to stay before the defendant even appeared.

Padilla and Kawuba, it granted the DOJ's motion where defendant took no position. Muraca, I understand Judge Saylor, obviously very well respected, we're not disputing sometimes his logic is completely appropriate, but that was a situation where the criminal case was proceeding rapidly in the SDNY. And I don't believe the defense actually filed a brief in that matter, but it was obviously nothing like that here.

And Forte, the Forte case that the government relies upon with Judge Sorokin, there's no opinion that was issued, although, unless the government is correct that Judge Sorokin did grant that stay. But the, again, criminal case was proceeding rapidly and the prejudice to defendant was minimal. There is no case that — in their briefing, I believe, that they've cited where the stay is granted in a situation like this here where we face perhaps interminable delay. And I know

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the government thinks he's a fugitive. He's not. He was arrested at his home in the United Kingdom. We are debating — as I sort of hinted in our opposition to their motion to — against our motion for oral argument, there is case law in the Second Circuit, the Bescond case, allowing people who are not fugitives but happen to be charged while living overseas, didn't flee from anywhere, to challenge their criminal case, and we're thinking of doing that here in the near future.

So I would submit, Your Honor, that the case law here is not favorable to the government. It was highly favorable to the defense.

There's one other topic that I would --

THE COURT: Is there some middle ground where some discovery would be appropriate in the civil action to address the concerns that you have?

MR. ROSEN: Certainly. And I think, you know -- and I'm not asking for the government's motion to be denied with prejudice. Certainly they can always, you know -- you know, I assume that the SEC will amend their complaint or reply to our opposition -- reply to our motion to dismiss. It will take Your Honor some time of course to rule upon that. Depending on what the outcome is, discovery will then kick off, and that could be six months from now. I would encourage document discovery. I think we're entitled to that. Certainly I have no problem revisiting the issue of the depositions, to the

extent there are any, later on down the road. I'm -- again,

I'm not asking for Mr. Holcomb's motion to be denied with

prejudice. I'm saying right now where discovery is so far away

it's entirely premature to grant it.

And one other final issue that's more of a policy and public interest issue is that, as you know -- I don't know if it's been litigated here yet in this courtroom, but there's been a lot of changes to government crypto policy from both the DOJ and SEC side. Particularly from the SEC, I know they're reconsidering these cases.

I do think a freeze of the case, you know, perhaps it's Not the -- perhaps they would still consider it even with the freeze, but certainly it takes away the momentum of a case moving forward. If a case is frozen, we're asking the SEC to reconsider based on whatever policies the Commission comes up with.

And so for all those reasons, we think a stay is premature, Your Honor, and can be revisited when it becomes necessary.

THE COURT: Anything further? You don't have to, but if you have --

MR. HOLCOMB: I'll try to be brief, Your Honor, and just respond to the points made.

On the governing standard, I think the defense is being a little selective in terms of the governing standard.

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He's citing a case of two civil litigants, private parties, for this principle that there should be a specific hardship to the government. That's nowhere to be found in the articulation of the standard in SEC cases. And I think that we should stay focused on SEC cases here because that's the kind of case this is.

As to, you know, the assertion that there's no specific prejudice to the government here, the government's laid out how --

THE COURT: But what about -- so you said that the standard that they're relying on involved two civil cases. But what about civil and criminal where not necessarily the SEC is involved?

MR. HOLCOMB: Your Honor, I meant that -- the Microfinancial case is not an enforcement action. That's all I meant by that.

THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. HOLCOMB: The cases, the standard that the government has cited to in its motion are SEC cases. That's where the factors to be considered are. The extent of the overlap between the civil and criminal cases, the status of the cases, the interests of the civil litigants, and any potential prejudice or hardship they might suffer, that's not a question of what the government's hardship is, that's the civil litigants' hardship, the convenience of both the civil and

criminal courts and the interests of the public and third parties and the good faith of the litigants. So here I think we have laid out -- or the government has laid out why -- the interests of the public and it's to the interest of the government to favor a stay.

As to, you know, if there was some type of higher standard for a specific showing of prejudice that the government needs to show, the government has laid out how proceeding to discovery in the SEC case would expose its case to ex parte discovery essentially. And just because that's a prejudice that applies in a lot of criminal cases doesn't mean that it's not a specific prejudice here.

As to the Fifth Amendment and, you know, the claim that they don't know -- defense doesn't know who its witnesses might be and who it might depose, it's already highlighted to the two co-defendants who were subject to the consent judgments here. And just to point out, their Fifth Amendment rights or the Fifth Amendment privilege they retain up until the time they're sentenced. They haven't been sentenced yet. And so it's not like their Fifth Amendment privilege has gone away.

As to Mr. Mohsini, the defense has raised as, you know, a potential co-defendant in the criminal case, he will proceed to trial in all likelihood before Mr. Kholi. There's a huge difference between Mr. Mohsini going to trial and transcripts becoming available of, you know, Mohsini's

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counsel's cross-examination of the government witnesses and allowing Mr. Kholi to take depositions of those same witnesses two or three years, you know, in the defense's telling, before any criminal trial of Mr. Kholi without the Department of Justice being present for those depositions. That is a huge difference in the kind of discovery that will become available to Mr. Kholi if — absent a stay.

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On the timing of the motion to dismiss, the Court only needs to look at the docket to see that the defense and the SEC have negotiated deadlines for answers and filing motions to dismiss. I think it's preposterous that -- to argue that Mr. Kholi had to proceed with his motion to dismiss here and expend those time and resources when the government went to Mr. Kholi's counsel, said, hey, we anticipate seeking a stay. What is your position? They said, we'll get back to you, never got back to us, filed this motion to dismiss, and then said we oppose a stay. That's not -- that didn't need to happen that way, and so that argument should not be credited.

And it's also sort of confusing why the defense is arguing that their prejudice is not being able to use the materials in an extradition proceeding but then they say, oh, well, the government -- or the SEC should seek a protective order. Well, that's, you know, the SEC's business. They can decide if in the normal course this is a case where they would seek a protective order. I don't know whether it is or isn't.

And I don't know whether the Court would be inclined to grant one, but I don't think the idea of a protective order here should be used as both a sword and shield.

So as to Your Honor's question as to whether there's a middle ground, I don't believe that there is one here because allowing the case to proceed and then just leaving open the possibility of government objections is a very haphazard way of allowing the civil case to hurry up and go when the civil case can't ultimately proceed past a certain point, and it's all going to be one-sided.

And the very immediate concern is that proceeding with the case will lead to a hearing on the motion to dismiss, presumably, and at that hearing the Court would either -- well, I should say that the SEC would either be required to proffer its evidence as to extraterritoriality or put on witnesses, and so we would already be at a point where defendant Kholi would have the opportunity to be questioning future government witnesses under oath; needlessly, really, because the bottom line is the civil case cannot proceed to resolution before the criminal case.

I'll rest on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'm going to take it under advisement. You'll be notified. Thank you very much.

THE CLERK: We're adjourned. All rise.

(Adjourned at 11:37 a.m.)

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1	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER
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3	I, Linda Walsh, Registered Professional Reporter
4	and Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States
5	District Court for the District of Massachusetts, do hereby
6	certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct
7	transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in
8	the above-entitled matter, to the best of my skill and ability.
9	Dated this 12th day of May, 2025.
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12	/s/ Linda Walsh
13	Linda Walsh, RPR, CRR
14	Official Court Reporter
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