

تمرین های سری ۲

زمان تحویل: دوشنبه ۱۳۹۸/۱۲/۱۲ پیش از شروع کلاس

Chapter 7: MWG Exercises 7.D.2

Chapter 8: MWG Exercises 8.B.5a, 8.C.4 (NOTE: the first η in the (D, l)-box should be a π .), 8.D.3, 5.

Additional Exercise 1: Consider the following game:

		Player 2		
		L	C	R
Player 1	T	3, -2	0, -3	2, 0
	M	0, -2	2, 0	2, -2
	B	0, 0	1, 0	0, -1

- Find all the strategy profiles that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
- Find all the Nash equilibria (including those in mixed strategies).

Additional Exercise 2: Find all the Nash equilibria of the following game:

		Player 2			
		a	b	c	d
Player 1	A	3, 1	0, 0	1, 0	0, 0
	B	1, 1	1, 0	1, 1	1, 2
	C	1, 2	0, 4	6, 2	1, 1
	D	0, 4	1, 0	1, 1	2, 3

Additional Exercise 3: Consider the following symmetric, two-player, simultaneous-move game: each player i chooses an action from the set $A_1 = A_2 = \{100, 200, 300\}$. The payoffs are as follows:

$$u_i(a_i, a_{-i}) = \begin{cases} a_i + 200 & \text{if } a_i < a_{-i} \\ a_i & \text{if } a_i = a_{-i} \\ a_i - 200 & \text{if } a_i > a_{-i} \end{cases}$$

- Write down the normal form payoff matrix for this game.
- Which actions are strictly dominated? Which actions are weakly dominated?
- Find all of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
- Find all of the Nash equilibria, including those in mixed strategies.