

STAGES OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION: SUGAR, POLITICS, AND CASTRO

Imayavaramban Anabayan

Introduction

The road to the Cuban Revolution is long and complicated. Many shortcomings within the Cuban economy, government, and society made such a revolution possible; decades of American intervention following the Spanish-American War also played a role. Resentment over U.S. meddling, combined with the Cuban economy's overreliance on sugar largely due to half a century of American trade policy and widespread corruption following independence from Spain, drove Cuba to revolution. Ultimately, fifty years of economic and political instability were the fuel; Batista's oppressive regime and Castro's charismatic genius combined to provide the match.

Origin of Foreign Influence

Cubans had struggled with foreign control for centuries. From the native efforts against Spanish conquest to the working class' resentment of U.S. domination of their economy, the his-

Imayavaramban Anabayan is a Senior at Marquette High School in Chesterfield, Missouri, where he wrote this paper for Scott Szevery's AP U.S. History course in the 2016/2017 academic year.

tory of Cuba has been one of exploitation and vulnerability, and economics played a major role in precipitating revolution.

America's efforts to ensure that Cuba suited American economic interests began in earnest with the Platt Amendment of 1903, which laid the framework for U.S. economic intervention and even direct political control.¹ The Cubans were forced to add it to the 1898 Cuban Constitution.² By no means the only American action to interfere with Cuban affairs, it was eventually repealed by FDR in 1934, by which time it had established Cuba as essentially an American protectorate.³ Every article of the amendment limited Cuba's ability to control its own affairs and left openings for American action in the future. In this respect, the most important articles of the Platt Amendment were articles I, II, and III. Article I stated:

The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.⁴

It was an enormous blow to Cuban sovereignty. Disguised as an attempt to protect Cuba from colonization, it was an unmistakable display of American imperialism. The second article had an even larger economic impact on the nation. It appeared to ensure that the infant Cuban government did not overspend itself to death, but actually severely restricted the government's ability to manage its own funds. Article III played the largest role in generating resentment against foreign influence. It stated that the U.S. "may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty."⁵ These purposely vague terms gave the U.S. tremendous flexibility in what future action it could take. The political status of Cuba for over fifty years was determined by the Platt Amendment.

Economically, the Platt Amendment's most important impact was that it gave the U.S. control of the Cuban economy

through the various tariffs, treaties in force, and trade deals that were enacted roughly between the founding of the first Cuban republic in 1902 until the revolution in 1959. These actions allowed the U.S. government to bend and shape the Cuban economy to the will of American capitalists by solidifying its status as an exporter of sugar and importer of American manufactured goods.⁶ And without a doubt, growing resentment around this sugar monoculture made the revolution possible.

Part I: Trade Policy and the Growth of Sugar Overdependence and Resentment

From the time of independence from Spain in 1898 until the revolution, American trade and political interests dominated Cuba. Since independence, the Cuban economy had suffered numerous depressions, partly due to U.S. tariff and forced trade policy, had endured rises and crashes due to an overreliance on exporting sugar, and had weathered the negative impacts of American corporations and banks.

American trade tactics were largely responsible for incentivizing and sometimes forcing the Cubans to continue to export sugar. Overreliance on sugar was the foundation of many of Cuba's economic woes.

First Tariffs and Treaties

A tariff is a schedule of duties imposed by a government on imported (or in some countries exported) goods.⁷ In regards to American and Cuban economic relations, tariffs were initially imposed to grow trade between the nations, but they also had negative impacts.⁸ One effect of the tariffs was that they incentivized Cuba to focus on sugar as its largest export. Sugar was in high demand around the world, more so than other crops, and the U.S. was willing to make Cuban sugar even more appealing to its citizens by reducing Cuban tariffs.⁹ At the dawn of the first republic of Cuba, the initial trade treaty with the U.S. was ratified in 1902 and enacted in 1903. It was named the Treaty of Reciprocity, in order to show that this agreement was intended to have a mutual

benefit to both nations. In fact, it had the goal of increasing the volume of trade between the two countries, keeping Cuba close to the United States economically, and facilitating U.S. investment in Cuba, which lacked capital after the costly struggle for independence against Spain.¹⁰ Although the treaty was originally seen as a boon, it was the first step on a long road of American exploitation.

In the United States, Cuban sugar received a 20 percent tariff reduction. While on the other hand, U.S. imports received reductions anywhere from 25 percent to 40 percent.¹¹ The economic incentives were not equal to both nations, and this disparity only grew in the future.¹² Just as the Platt Amendment had set the precedent for American political control, the Treaty of Reciprocity set the precedent for close trading relations between the U.S. and Cuba and the role of Cuba as an exporter primarily of sugar to the United States. In the coming years, America continued to pass tariff policies that made it favorable for the Cubans to export more products to the U.S. These trade deals were effective, as from 1902 to 1945, 80 percent of all Cuban exports were to America. Furthermore, the percentage of imports that were American rose from 66 percent in 1911–1940 to 75 percent by 1956.¹³

WWI and the Bubble

The actions of the United States during WWI highlighted just how much economic control America had on Cuba. During this time, Europe was paralyzed by conflict, and its beet sugar production was severely compromised, decreasing the world supply and inflating the international demand for sugar.¹⁴ Cuba was again economically incentivized to export more sugar and other crops, as America made sure to capitalize on having a sugar supplier in its backyard. As the war went on, sugar prices were the highest in New York since the Civil War, and the price of raw sugar climbed to 6.75 cents per pound in the New York market.¹⁵ Washington and its allies were not prepared to allow Cuban sugar to skyrocket in price, not when it was the primary supplier to the Allied forces. Washington passed the Sugar Act, which utilized the Lever Act

to lower the price of sugar by making supply fall under a central body. And placing control of pricing in the hands of the United States government would virtually eliminate Cuba's bargaining power. Under this plan, a new International Sugar Committee made up of British and American representatives was established, which set the price of raw sugar and controlled the apportionment of Cuban sugar crop among the other nations. The first act of this new agency was simply to lower the price of sugar to 4.6 cents per pound plus the cost of freighting to New York.¹⁶ This move decimated many Cuban farmers and suppliers, but the Cuban people were powerless to stop it; and unless the Cuban government approved the Sugar Act, they would not have been granted import licenses from the Food Administration in order to buy American wheat or coal. Cuba resisted for three long months before agreeing to the new reality. The Sugar Plan demonstrated to the Cuban people that the United States would be relentless, and sometimes ruthless, in achieving its interests.

The 1920s and 1930s included the complete overtaking of the Cuban economy by American banks. The trend of increasing sugar prices continued from the end of WWI, and this speculative bubble—known as the “Dance of Millions”—continued to expand. Fueled with desire from seemingly never-ending profits from sugar, sugar producers took out more and more loans from banks and fanatically overproduced.¹⁷ Of course, all bubbles must eventually burst, and this one did in the summer of 1920. The price of sugar steadily fell from 22.5 cents per pound in May to only 3.75 cents per pound in December of the same year.¹⁸

Takeover

During this crisis, complete foreign takeover ensued. Sugar mill owners could not repay their loans to the banks, and banks that could not continue to pay depositors had to close their doors. In their absence, numerous American corporations came in and took over Cuban properties. Banks such as the National City Bank replaced Cuban counterparts such as the Banco Nacional.¹⁹ Investments by American companies increased 536 percent between 1913

and 1928.²⁰ In 1920, American-owned sugar mills produced 48.4 percent of the industry. By 1928 however, Americans controlled 70 to 75 percent of the industry.²¹ The takeover further crippled the economic conditions of Cuban citizens by forcing them off of their land and reducing the chance for diversification in the economy. Furthermore, the massive influx of American investment and capital served to further corrupt Cuban officials. The Cuban people would have to endure U.S. exploitation for many years to come. For instance, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930 further crushed the Cuban sugar producers and farmers when it raised the tariff on foreign goods to unprecedented levels within the United States. It caused the Cuban share of the American sugar market to drop from 49 percent to 25 percent in just three years, and sugar production in Cuba to drop by 60 percent.²² The Cuban share of the American market during this time was the lowest it had ever been, which sent Cuba's economy into another tailspin.²³

From 1930 to 1959, the majority of U.S. investment had come to pass, and economic policy was viewed through the lens of the Cold War. The United States believed the best way to prevent Communism from taking hold in Cuba was by promoting similar interests between the two countries. This meant keeping Cuba close to the United States economically and passing mutually beneficial treaties.²⁴ WWII did not mark an important change regarding U.S. policy in Cuba with the exception of one incident. The Cooley Bill of 1955 stated Cuba's share of the American sugar market would be 96 percent until 1956, but thereafter it would be reduced to 29.59 percent.²⁵ This was massively opposed by Cuban sugar producers due to the fact that it ran contrary to the "close" relations that the two countries had maintained for fifty years, and it would encourage other nations to produce more sugar at a time when the world supply was already dangerously high. The Cuban government warned Washington that this action would seriously harm Cuban sugar producers, but just as had been done during the 1930s, the United States pushed through this protectionist trade policy to the detriment of the Cuban people.²⁶ The poor Cuban peasant class' hatred of American corporations and economic meddling was cemented through the constant booms

and busts that resulted from harmful U.S.-driven trade policy. It would be extremely easy for opposition leaders, such as Castro, to capitalize on this in their movements.

Part II: Development of Cuba's Political Illegitimacy and Instability

Political Illegitimacy and Instability

After independence from Spain, Cuba never implemented an administration or institution that had complete and autonomous legitimacy because the U.S. determined which governments remained in power.²⁷ Furthermore, there was a persistent tendency among the people to resort to violence in order to facilitate change within the various administrations.²⁸ In many ways, the first government after Spanish independence was the most important since it set the precedent of instability.

Estrada Palma's Presidency of Terrible Precedents

Immediately following the Spanish-American War, the mood of the nation was optimistic and hopeful; people were willing to work toward a brighter future. Their hopes were dashed. The actions of the United States and the inherent issues within the system ensured that no democratic republican government in Cuba would be able to maintain social stability.²⁹ The first administration was headed by Tomás Estrada Palma. Despite curtailed Cuban sovereignty, he ruled acceptably during relatively prosperous economic times, largely due to massive U.S. investment and the redevelopment of the sugar industry after the Spanish-American War. Estrada Palma enjoyed somewhat of a free hand because the United States was reluctant to meddle within Cuban affairs after very recently setting up the entire government.³⁰ The problem came when it was time for his reelection. Estrada Palma belonged to the Moderate Party and held deep political hatred for the opposing Liberal Party. When the election was approaching in 1905, the Liberals seemed poised to win with their policies of universal male suffrage, and Estrada Palma was reluctant to give

up power. Instead of facilitating a peaceful transition of power and allowing his rivals to win, Estrada Palma purged Liberals from the municipal governments and illegally added 150,000 new names to the electoral registries. This resulted in a fraudulent election in which Estrada Palma was the only presidential candidate, and the Liberals were forced to withdraw.³¹

In response, the Liberals launched into violent revolt against the government by organizing thousands of armed men within weeks.³² Both the Liberals and the Moderates had expected the United States to interfere, given the provisions in the Platt Amendment that stated that whenever mass unrest was rampant in Cuba, the United States would restore order.³³ When the United States reluctantly intervened in 1906, it sent two secretaries and established a provisional government that lasted for three years. Once a sufficient body of law for the executive, judiciary, and the provincial and municipal governments was drawn up, the United States called for municipal and national elections. Furthermore, the U.S. considered the enactment of legislation that would prevent civil wars.³⁴ Despite these attempts by the United States to prevent future conflict, its intervention after the first administration completely delegitimized Cuban democracy and confirmed to the Cuban people that the events before, during, and after Estrada Palma's presidency would define the foreseeable future.

Menocal, Corruption, and More U.S. Intervention

If the various leaders of Cuba's republic had been able to stay faithful to the people and resist their own greed, Cuba may have avoided the road to a more radical revolution. However, nearly all of Estrada Palma's successors further alienated the people by ignoring the will of the nation and rule of law. The fraudulent elections of 1905 and 1906 were examples of this. In this instance, Mario García Menocal, a Conservative, was the president. Menocal was a Cornell-educated man known for his close ties to the United States.³⁵ He facilitated the development of a massive corrupt political machine. Foreign loans, dubious work projects, and legalized gambling were all acts of Menocal

that aroused the scorn of the people. That being said, his largest contribution to the eventual revolution was his ensuring that he did not lose reelection.³⁶

Menocal was part of the Conservative Party, and in the election of 1916 his party platform appealed to the upper class and the United States. In addition, higher sugar prices due to WWI enabled him to remain competitive despite his unpopular public image as being corrupt. However, it was ultimately fraud and corruption that allowed him to win over Liberal candidate Alfredo Zayas. In response, the Liberal Party appealed to the Central Electoral Board, and the Conservatives appealed to the Supreme Court; both institutions ruled that there must be free and fair new elections in the provinces of Las Villas and Oriente. Knowing that fair elections would cause him to lose, Menocal harkened back to his predecessor by revising the electoral registries to add numerous new names of Conservative surrogates in order to pack the electorate.³⁷ Enraged by his corrupt tactics, the Liberal Party led an insurrection against Menocal, who refused to resign. Following the precedent Estrada Palma had set, Cubans were willing to erupt into violence to create political change. Again, the United States intervened, providing arms in support of Menocal because of fear of a Liberal takeover and concern for American business interests. Menocal eventually crushed the rebels with the help of 500 U.S. marines and remained in power.³⁸ This increased the Cuban people's tendency to rely on American intervention to resolve political problems. The cycle of repeated political violence, corruption, and U.S. intervention made it much easier for Castro to win over the people by promising a change to the way things had been done for nearly fifty years.

The *Machado* Revolution

Nearly thirty years into their new republic, the Cuban people were on the verge of social and political mobilization in the form of another revolutionary movement. Its aftermath directly led to the Cuban Revolution as it brought Fulgencio Batista to national prominence. The president at the time, Machado,

provoked the 1933 revolutionary movement. Some of his policies met with favor: construction of the Central Highway, increased enrollment in public schools, and improved standards of education. However, in private he told the U.S. that none of his actions would interfere with American business interests. This double dealing provoked the public to form a social movement against him. Furthermore, as the world faced the Great Depression and sugar prices plummeted in the 1930s, more businesses and banks failed, unemployment increased, and wages lowered. In March 1930, 200,000 workers went on strike. In response, Machado employed intimidation, harassment, and violence. At this point, Franklin Roosevelt sent Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Cuba to create a compromise between the opposition and Machado, although Machado became increasingly hostile to any compromise.³⁹ Citizen opposition to Machado was the greatest cause for his ejection. Labor strikes spread to the entire countryside, and the nation was paralyzed. Machado was forced to withdraw from Cuba on August 12, 1933.⁴⁰

The Machado Revolution's Aftermath, the Revolution of 1933, and Batista's Rise

Instead of a Cuban government immediately taking control after Machado's exit, the United States appointed Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, a U.S. pawn, as president to succeed Machado.⁴¹ Just as in 1903, initial optimism for a Cuba for Cubans was dashed by American attempts to install a system that would continue to be beholden to U.S. interests. Yet times were changing. The recently organized public movement to oust Machado was again able to overthrow an unpopular leader, this time in spite of American disapproval. On September 4, 1933, Fulgencio Batista led a group of veterans and soldiers in a revolt against the Céspedes government, who had ignored demands for better working conditions and pay.⁴² Batista was a general in the military and was able to organize and execute a proper uprising. The victors set up a government that was eventually headed by Ramón San Martín. This government was set up without U.S. approval and was largely radically nationalistic. It passed a 50 percent law that stated at least one

half of all employees in all workplaces were required to be Cuban, promoted land reform that guaranteed the land rights of regular Cubans against large corporations, and openly denounced the Platt Amendment as outdated.⁴³ Foreign labor necessary for the sugar industry was in jeopardy, along with continued American control of the Cuban economy. Because the United States had not officially recognized the San Martín government, there was still opposition within Cuba against San Martín despite the government's positive actions.⁴⁴

Batista then headed the opposition to San Martín, which is when he truly became a power player within Cuban politics. As the situation in Cuba continued to worsen, Sumner Welles extended his support to a new leader from the opposition named Mendieta. San Martín was forced to resign after just four months due to another U.S. intervention.⁴⁵ Although Mendieta was formerly the head, the United States determined Batista to be the one truly in charge.⁴⁶ From 1934 to 1940, Batista and the army formed a new type of government. The Platt Amendment was abrogated in 1934 in favor of a new treaty, U.S. intervention slowed down, the army became a strong player in national politics, and the old political ruling class of the first thirty years of the Cuban republic's history never regained power in the face of Batista's tremendous control.⁴⁷ For example, Batista was able to wield enough control on Congress to impeach a president for questioning the military's role in education. The Machado Revolution was important in that it gave the Cuban people confidence in their power to lead a revolutionary movement, but failed due to an immediate U.S. intervention followed by a military strongman seizing power. All other attempts to alleviate the Cuban situation before Castro failed for similar reasons; Castro's success came from his ability to avoid such errors.

Part III: Batista's Role, Castro's Resolve, and the Political Actions of the 1950s that Sparked the Cuban Revolution

The foundation had been laid over thirty years. From Batista's regime on, the specific actions of Batista, the impacts of the long history of political and economic incapability, and

the abilities of Fidel Castro would determine the outcome of the Cuban Revolution.

Batista's Puppets and First Term

Mendieta was a puppet of Batista and the military, which held control for nearly seven years. Until 1940, Batista ran the country from the background, under the guise of weak puppet presidents such as Carlos Mendieta (1934–1935), José A. Barnet (1935–1936), Miguel Mariano Gómez (1936) and Federico Laredo Brú (1936–1940).⁴⁸ Batista continued the long tradition of corruption and maintained close ties to the United States. His harsh tactics, such as assassinating his political rivals and leaders of revolutionary student groups, stopped any movement against him dead in its tracks. However, Batista also passed many beneficial reforms that pleased the working class. In 1937, he announced a three-year social and economic program that included plans for agricultural diversification, a national bank, distribution of public lands to peasant families, and improvement of public health.⁴⁹ His negative image and oppressive tactics were overshadowed in these early years by his programs, which had ushered in a relative Pax Batistatiana. These actions allowed him to maintain stability, at least more than his immediate predecessors. In fact, Sumner Welles told him, “You’re the only individual in Cuba today who represents authority.”⁵⁰

Batista further improved his public image when he called for a Constitutional Convention in 1940 to draft a new document that would improve Cuban sovereignty and help reach a stable governing pact. The constitution was drafted with the collaboration of a Constitutional Convention, presided over by Carlos Márquez Sterling and included seventy-six delegates from nine political parties. It was determined that it covered the most significant Cuban political views and opinions, be it Conservative, Liberal, or Moderate.⁵¹ Batista’s actions were praised by the elite in Cuba, the United States, and even the Cuban public. What capped it off was Batista’s legal election as president in 1940. Furthermore, when his term ended, he simply left for Florida in 1944, for once

showing a somewhat successful transfer of power in Cuba. This peace was maintained until 1952, showing the largest stretch of constitutional democracy in Cuban history.⁵²

This positive action by Batista restored hope to the Cuban people. His new constitution and the abrogation of the Platt Amendment had made the future of a stable government and society seem possible. Yet in the end, Batista simply followed the trend and become utterly corrupted by the need for power. When he returned from Florida, what Cubans believed would never happen again—the return to military rule—became a reality.

Batista's Return and the Rise of Castro's Revolution

Without Batista, Fidel Castro could not have succeeded in his goal. Batista took specific actions that made Castro who he was. The former president's close relations with the United States, in addition to American policies, made it possible for Castro and the public to rebel.

Batista returned to the national scene in 1952 in a way that was eerily similar to his arrival to it: a military coup. However, unlike the first time when he led the army and people to oust a U.S. puppet president, this time it was for his own power. Batista ran for the presidency in 1952 against the incumbent, Carlos Prío Socarrás.⁵³ Socarrás wanted to maintain beneficial relations with the United States due to Cuba's dependence on exporting sugar to America. He was not vastly unpopular, and Batista knew that Socarrás was likely to win the election. Thus, on June 11, 1952—before the election—Batista walked into Camp Columbia and took control of the army. Shortly afterward, he once more succeeded in taking over the government.⁵⁴ He quickly suspended the Constitution of 1940, the same one that he had helped draft, and eliminated free speech and the right to strike in an effort to weaken any opposition.⁵⁵

As fate would have it, Batista chose the worst possible time to ruin the fair election. A young, recent graduate of University of Havana's law school was running for Congress in the election of 1952. His name was Fidel Castro. Castro had been favored to

win his race before the entire election was destroyed by Batista's *coup d'état*.

Fidel Castro was born into a moderately wealthy family. His father, Angel Castro, had immigrated to Cuba from Spain, and Fidel was born to his second wife. Castro was raised on his father's plantation where he and his brothers witnessed the terrible poverty of the countryside.⁵⁶ This gave young Castro a desire to help his fellow countrymen and to reform the economic system that was causing great harm to Cubans.

When he joined the University of Havana, he followed the long tradition of student activism. He worked for better conditions for Cuba's poor, the end of corruption in the government, and the end of racial discrimination. In the middle of his schooling, he took a break and joined the revolutionary force in the nearby Dominican Republic.⁵⁷ This gave him invaluable experience in organizing a revolution.⁵⁸ He also participated within gangs to create a revolutionary student group and even faced two murder accusations, neither of which was proved.⁵⁹ Despite these potential crimes, he quickly became president of the students' governing body. He supported the Ortodoxo Party and, specifically, its presidential candidate, Eduardo Chibás. Chibás stood for the end of corruption in government, better conditions for Cuba's poor, and the restoration of full rights for all Cubans.⁶⁰ Although he lost in the election of 1948, Chibás had a significant impact on Castro's sharply pro-Cuban political views.

Castro graduated from law school and opened his own practice that helped the poor, political prisoners, and blacks. He continued his political activism and was continuously arrested for protests and sit-ins. Furthermore, Castro started a campaign for Congress as part of his beloved hero's political party, the Ortodoxo Party.⁶¹ However, Castro never reached Congress, as his fate became locked with that of Batista.

Thus, when Batista took over the government in complete defiance of the democratic rule of law, Castro could not stand for it—not when his chance for change had been unfairly stolen by a dictator. Castro refused to let Cuba lose its chance at a legitimate government to another corrupt dictator concerned only with

personal glory and American money. Batista's *coup* planted the seeds for his downfall.

Castro first pursued Batista through legal channels as he appealed to the Supreme Court. Calling upon his years of legal experience, Castro submitted a case, which stated that Batista and his army had violated six articles of the Code of Social Defense and that his sentence should be 108 years in jail.⁶² As expected, Castro's plea was denied by all courts. The only logical next step to Castro was rebellion. If he could not stop Batista by taking the proper legal action, then he would need to take matters into his own hands and use his years of public-communication experience and time in the Dominican Republic to take down this corrupt military dictator for the glory of a free Cuba.

After nearly a year of preparing his rebel army in secret, Fidel and his brother Raul organized about two hundred men and two women. These rebels were mostly in their twenties—the ages of Castro and his brother—and had sacrificed much to buy weapons and supplies.⁶³ Their first attack was on Fort Moncada, which was situated in Castro's native Oriente Province and was the second largest of the nation's military fortresses. The plan was to capture the fort, take the advanced supplies, and use the broadcasting and radio stations to air one of the late Chibas' speeches to the public. If successful, this would greatly strengthen the supplies, numbers, and support for their movement.

On July 26, 1953, Castro and his team raided the fortress. The revolutionaries were badly outgunned and had little to no military experience.⁶⁴ They were decimated by nearly 1,000 soldiers; Castro escaped. Fortunately, the raid was not a complete failure because Batista's reaction boosted the revolutionary cause. In the aftermath of the attack, the Cuban army and police roamed the countryside searching for the rebels and slaughtered nearly 20,000 Cubans.⁶⁵ All civil rights were suspended. In this moment of great suffering, utter brutality came to characterize the Batista regime in the eyes of the people.

When Castro was finally captured, he was sentenced to solitary confinement for several months. Castro used the time to focus on what his movement would stand for. He read extensively the

works of José Martí—Cuba’s glorious independence leader—and other intellectuals. He also renamed his movement the “26th of July Movement” and was able to continue to coordinate its activities. Once more, Batista had made a decision that strengthened Castro’s movement.

Eventually, Castro was put on trial for his revolutionary activity. In these trials, he used his expert oratory and debating skills to make it seem as if the Batista regime was the one on trial for its crimes against the public. In “History Will Absolve Me,” his speech before the tribunal that sentenced him, Castro outlined his political program. He associated his movement with the ideals of José Martí and Chibas. Castro called for reforms that were within the mainstream of Cuba’s political traditions. Furthermore, he included economic policies that he thought would cure unemployment, underemployment, dependence, and the ills of the dominant sugar-based economy.⁶⁶

In 1955, Batista freed Castro to satisfy critics who claimed that he was becoming too oppressive and violent.⁶⁷ Freeing Castro was the worst thing Batista could have done to his administration. The Castro brothers fled to Mexico to gather more men and weapons, gaining invaluable military experience and supplies.⁶⁸ Castro went on a highly successful speaking tour in the United States and earned nearly \$50,000 for his fledgling army. He also recruited Colonel Alberto Bayo, a 63-year-old Cuban who had trained in Spain and fought in that nation’s civil war.⁶⁹ Bayo taught Castro and his forces in three months what usually takes three years: how to make bombs, shoot rifles and machine guns, carry and care for the wounded, and march through the jungle without being seen or heard. At the end of the training, Castro had a force that had been professionally trained and was highly effective in guerilla warfare.

In November 1956, Castro and his army returned to Cuba on a small 58-foot yacht called the *Granma*.⁷⁰ After a grueling journey in which all of their heavy equipment, explosives, extra ammunition, food, and medicine had to be left behind, they crawled onto the island. Their plan was to go to the mountains, but on

the way, they were ambushed by Batista's forces on the Alegría del Pío sugar plantation.⁷¹ The survivors were hunted down, but once more, Batista and his forces made a grave error by simply assuming that Fidel Castro had been killed. Fidel and 11 others made it to the Sierra Maestra after hiding for nearly three days and surviving on only cane juice from the sugar plantations.⁷² If Castro had been killed, it is likely that the revolution would have ended. Nonetheless, the damage to the revolutionary movement had been done, and the Cuban people were led to believe that Castro and his movement had been crushed. However, Castro's resolve was unshakeable. In fact, even in his weakened state, Castro exclaimed, "The days of the dictatorships are numbered."⁷³

The entire nation believed that Castro was dead, and oddly enough, what broke the news of his survival was an interview with a reporter named Herbert L. Matthews from the *New York Times*. According to the article, Castro was a man fighting for freedom against an oppressive, violent dictator. The article made the following statement about Castro: "His is a political mind rather than a military one. He has strong idea of liberty, democracy, social justice, the need to restore the Constitution, and to hold elections."⁷⁴ This helped turn the American public to his side and further strengthened his movement in Cuba by showing that Castro was still fighting on behalf of the Cuban people despite the best attempts of Batista to silence him.

The Power of the People and the Second Half of the Revolution

In some respects, hiding in the Sierra Maestra was a saving grace for Castro's revolution. The greatest advantage that Castro had over previous revolutionaries was his ability to appeal to nearly all aspects of Cuban society. The great majority of the Cuban people who supported the anti-Batista struggle hoped for honesty in government, an end to violence, and a return to the Constitution of 1940. Castro knew this and designed his platform to appeal to the Cuban mainstream while avoiding alienating America. He and his companions had to rely on the poor farmers in the area to feed them and hide them from Batista's forces.

Over time, this enormous and valuable class went from hiding the rebels to becoming one with their movement.

In addition to their major policies, the behavior of Castro's soldiers turned the peasants to their side. These soldiers were friendly and willing to talk, and they paid for everything they took. They showed discipline and did not commit violence against the people. The soldiers constructed a field hospital in the Sierra Maestra to care for their wounded and eventually treated the peasants as well.⁷⁵ Compared to Batista's murderous soldiers, these men seemed like regular Cubans who were fighting for an honorable cause. Perhaps even more importantly, Castro showed the people respect. He was kind, talked with them, ate with them, and repeatedly explained his programs to them. He knew of the fifty years of economic oppression and hardships they had faced, as he had witnessed firsthand in his childhood, and he had pragmatic solutions to their problems.

Fifty years of sugar dependence and U.S. trade policies had taken its toll on the people. Their land had been absorbed by sugar corporations, and because the sugar season (*zafra*) only lasted for three to four months, they were unemployed for most of the year.⁷⁶ In fact, the annual unemployment rate in the 1956–1957 seasons was 16.4 percent.⁷⁷ In addition, small farms were being absorbed by a few companies through purchases, economic pressure, or fraud.⁷⁸ In 1960, the United States and its business interests controlled about 75 percent of the arable land in Cuba.⁷⁹ As a result, many small farmers were forced off their land and moved their operations either farther inland or onto the mountainsides. This accelerated the process of erosion, as sugar companies continued to plow through Cuban natural resources, such as mahogany, in their craze for more arable land.⁸⁰ The entire Cuban economy was on the brink of depression every time the price of sugar dropped.⁸¹ Castro was willing to speak to the peasants in candid terms about how he would fix these problems, which inspired them to fight for a better life: workers saw a movement that would give them better working conditions, peasant farmers saw a movement that would redistribute the land after stripping power from abusive

landlords, and soldiers saw a movement that would allow them to fight for their country and families.

The people of Cuba aided the revolutionary movement in multiple ways. They carried out workers' strikes, made home-made bombs to destroy government property, gathered supplies for the production of revolutionary propaganda, distributed *Cuba Libre*—a propaganda newspaper—and even sold secret revolutionary bonds in every province in Cuba. Every month, these bonds added thousands of dollars to the revolutionary treasury.⁸² Castro broadcast his revolutionary radio show called *Radio Rebelde*, which provided a steady source of revolutionary and anti-Batista rhetoric. Night after night, Castro utilized his extraordinary oratory skills to offer fiery and graphic condemnations of the dictatorship's atrocities. He effectively expressed his bitterness and grief, and he was able to incite anger in the people against the regime even during the lowest points of the revolution. Most importantly, the people believed in Castro and became one with his movement. Castro's rebellion was one of the people for the people, and any actions Batista took only further ignited the rebel flame.

Naturally, the revolutionary cause suffered setbacks. The United States continued to supply Batista with weapons, putting Castro's forces at a great disadvantage.⁸³ Many rebel leaders were caught and executed, and major rebel activities were foiled. However, the spirit of the people had been awakened. For every head Batista cut off, three more appeared to keep the revolution alive.

Batista failed to recognize this, and on May 5, 1958, he made the fatal mistake of launching an exhaustive campaign to crush the revolutionary army. The odds were twelve thousand soldiers with advanced weaponry to three hundred revolutionaries.⁸⁴ However, the revolutionaries had the upper hand for three reasons. First, the battle took place in the mountainous terrain and treacherous jungles that were home to the revolutionaries, and their guerilla tactics gave them a great advantage. Second, the revolutionaries were fighting for a cause that they truly believed in compared to Batista's soldiers who were fighting because they were paid to do so. Third, the skills and passion of the revolutionary army's military

leaders were superior to those of Batista's paid generals. In the face of defeat, Batista fled Cuba on January 1, 1959.

Before the war ended, Castro made a decision that determined how the Castro regime would be able to exist until today: Castro would not sign any unifying treaties with the other revolutionary groups fighting against Batista for the majority of the duration of the war. He only agreed to sign an agreement on July 20, 1958.⁸⁵ Castro was so adamant against any unification treaties before the war ended because history had taught him that such agreements had made the new regimes too weak in distancing themselves from the previous governments. Furthermore, the previous treaties that were presented to him still had some loopholes and caveats in which the old political elite and Batista's army could have had significant influence in the system. Castro wrote the final draft of his agreement, the Pact of Caracas.⁸⁶ This pact gave a push to the revolutionary efforts near the end of the war and foreshadowed just how much control Castro would have in determining the post-Batista government. Castro knew that the government would need to be radically different if he wanted to accomplish his socialist goals. He understood the reasons for the failures of the many past attempts to restore Cuban independence, and he took the necessary steps to ensure that his movement was not for naught.

However, before Castro transformed into a leader more oppressive than Batista ever was, he basked in the glory of victory alongside his countrymen. The revolutionaries marched through the nation on their way into Havana, and the country was exuberant. The national optimism of 1895, the year of Cuban independence, had returned after over six decades of turmoil, but once again, the future was not as bright as the people believed it would be.

Conclusion: Irony of the Revolution


Castro's ability to capitalize on Batista's mistakes and avoid the missteps of previous revolutionaries made this specific outcome possible. Batista's greed and continuation of previous

political tactics enraged the people, but it was Castro's foresight, determination, and luck that ultimately made the revolution successful. Furthermore, the economic conditions of the 1950s spurred the Cubans into action. Much of Castro's success was also rooted in the fifty years of history prior to Batista's return to Cuba. The economic dependence on sugar and America, the seasonal sugar economy, the foreign domination, and the half-century of American economic imperialism and dollar diplomacy were all long-term fuses. In addition, between the Platt Amendment, the Sugar Plan, and the indirect support of Batista's coup, the United States had been a player in Cuba for too long. In response, the Cuban people were so deeply disillusioned with their country that they were once more willing to risk their lives to create a new system.

While pouring his heart out for five hours during his trial after the Moncada assault, Fidel Castro passionately and scathingly exclaimed, "*La historia me absolverá*": his most famous words. He was confident that history would absolve him even if the Batistan dictatorship attempted to execute or imprison him. He would accomplish the impossible and create a free Cuban society. He remembered this promise as he stated in his victory speech, "No thieves, no traitors, no interventionists! This time the revolution is for real!"⁸⁷ In Castro's mind, the Cuban people would finally be free. Unfortunately, despite all of his revolutionary prowess, Castro's Cuba was not the utopia that he had promised.

Ironically, Castro created a government that was more oppressive than Batista's. His state enforced strict censorship and policing, and Castro was also a terrible economist.⁸⁸ His efforts to relieve Cuba's overreliance on America and sugar completely backfired when the United States placed an embargo on Cuba. As a result, Cuba suffered economically for nearly sixty years in some respects even more than it had with the sugar economy intact.⁸⁹ More than six hundred thousand refugees escaped Castro's totalitarian rule in 1980, and at least ten thousand Cubans became victims of his regime since he took power.⁹⁰ Castro turned his back on everything he said he was fighting for in his pursuit of national regeneration and socialism.

Hindsight may be 20/20, but the history of Cuba proves that Castro could never have been completely successful. Too many men were corrupted by power, and too many governments were unsuccessful in defying the United States; so Castro inevitably followed that trend. Although the Cuban Revolution was unprecedented, it eventually ended up becoming something that was all too familiar in Cuba's bloody history of oppression and failed promises.



Endnotes

¹ Louis A Pérez, *Cuba Under the Platt Amendment, 1902-1934* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), 1.

² "Platt Amendment (1903)," accessed January 10, 2017, <https://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=55>.

³ Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Caffery), telegram, March 4, 1935. FRUS Vol. IV, 1935, 476.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "Platt Amendment".

⁶ Samuel Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered* (United States: University of North Carolina Press, The, 2006) 9.

⁷ Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. "tariff," accessed January 10, 2017, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tariff>.

⁸ Marifeli Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 3.

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Ann-Marie Holmes, "The Relationship Between the United States and Cuba Began Based on Trade Needs" (Hawaii Pacific University, 2009), 29, https://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/GraduateDegree/MADMSTheses/files/Ann_Marie_Holmes.pdf.

¹¹ Samuel Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered*, 9.

¹² Holmes, "The Relationship Between," 83.

¹³ Michael Mason, *Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World Since 1945* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1997), 131.

¹⁴ Cassandra Copeland, Curtis Jolly, Henry Thompson, "The History and Potential of Trade between Cuba and the U.S.," *Journal of Economics and Business* (2011): 5.

¹⁵ Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution* (London: Monthly Review Press, U.S., 1961), 20.

¹⁶ Holmes, "The Relationship Between," 32.

¹⁷ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 20.

¹⁸ Ibid., 21.

¹⁹ Ibid., 21.

²⁰ César J. Ayala, "Social and Economic Aspects of Sugar Production in Cuba 1880-1930," *Latin American Research Review* 30.1 (2007): 9

²¹ Jon S. Bertrand, "The Cuban Dilemma of the United States" (master's thesis, University of Washington, 1973), <http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/16549/cubandilemmaofun00bert.pdf?sequence=1>.

²² Mark T. Gilderhus, *The Second Century: U.S.–Latin American Relations Since 1889* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2000), 76.

²³ Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered*, 10.

²⁴ Ambassador in Cuba (Norweb) to the Secretary of State, secret report, March 29, 1946. FRUS 1946, Vol. XI, 719.

²⁵ Editorial note, FRUS 1955–1957, Vol. VI, 830.

²⁶ Holmes, "The Relationship Between," 59.

²⁷ Claire Suddath, "A Brief History of U.S.–Cuba Relations," *Time*, April 15, 2009, 1.

²⁸ Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 19.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁰ Acting Secretary of State to Consul General Steinhart, telegram, September 10, 1906. FRUS 1906, Vol. I, 474.

³¹ Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 31.

³² *Ibid.*, 32.

³³ "Platt Amendment (1903)."

³⁴ Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, *Cuba: A Country Study*, ed. Rex A. Hudson (City: Publisher, 2001), 36.

³⁵ Holmes, "The Relationship Between," 28.

³⁶ Sergio Díaz-Briquets et al., *Corruption in Cuba: Castro and Beyond* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006) 38.

³⁷ Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 34.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 34.

³⁹ Federal Research Division, *Cuba: A Country Study*.

⁴⁰ "Cubans' General Strike to Overthrow President, 1933," June 15, 2011, accessed December 31, 2016, <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/cubans-general-strike-overthrow-president-1933>.

⁴¹ Holmes, "The Relationship Between," 43.

⁴² Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 39.

⁴³ Federal Research Division, *Cuba: A Country Study*, 46.

⁴⁴ Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Cuba (Welles), telegram, September 11, 1933. FRUS, Vol. V, 1933, 424.

⁴⁵ Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 39.

⁴⁶ Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, telegram, October 4, 1933. FRUS, Vol. V, 1933, 472.

⁴⁷ Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 40.

⁴⁸ Federal Research Division, *Cuba: A Country Study*, 50.

- ⁴⁹ Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 40.
- ⁵⁰ Ambassador in Cuba (Welles) to the Secretary of State, telegram, October 4, 1933. FRUS, Vol. V, 1933, 472.
- ⁵¹ Rudo Kemper, "Cuban Memories: The Cuban Constitution of 1940, Then and Today," *University of Miami Libraries, Cuban Heritage Collection*, October 14, 2010, accessed December 22, 2016. <http://library.miami.edu/chc/2010/10/14/cuban-memories-the-cuban-constitution-of-1940-then-and-today//>.
- ⁵² Perez-Stable, *The Cuban Revolution*, 41.
- ⁵³ Hudson, *Cuba: A Country Study*, 55.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 57.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.
- ⁵⁶ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 26.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 27.
- ⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.
- ⁵⁹ Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered*, 55.
- ⁶⁰ Ilan Ehrlich, "Eduardo Chibás: The Incurable Man of Cuban Politics" (PhD diss., City University of New York, 2009), 127, http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1411.
- ⁶¹ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 28.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, 25.
- ⁶³ *Ibid.*, 28.
- ⁶⁴ Rafael Escobar, *The Cuban Revolution: A Shift In American Support* (Central Connecticut State University New Britain, Connecticut, 2004), 42.
- ⁶⁵ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 28.
- ⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.
- ⁶⁷ Escobar, *A Shift In American Support*, 44.
- ⁶⁸ Federal Research Division, *Cuba A Country Study*, 60.
- ⁶⁹ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 50.
- ⁷⁰ Escobar, *A Shift In American Support*, 44.
- ⁷¹ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 54.
- ⁷² *Ibid.*, 54.
- ⁷³ J. Michael Lennon, *Norman Mailer: A Double Life* (New York City: Simon & Schuster, 2013), 264.
- ⁷⁴ Herbert L. Matthews, "Cuban Rebel is Visited in Hideout," *New York Times*, February 24, 1957. 2.
- ⁷⁵ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 57.
- ⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.
- ⁷⁷ Jorge I Domínguez, *Cuba: Order and Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), 91.
- ⁷⁸ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 9.

⁷⁹ Copeland, "The History and Potential of Trade between Cuba and the U.S.," 6.

⁸⁰ Justin McCollum, "A Brief Historiography of U.S. Hegemony in the Cuban Sugar Industry," *The Journal of Planning Practice and Education* 3 (2011): 7.

⁸¹ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 9.

⁸² Ibid., 58.

⁸³ Holmes, "The Relationship Between," 60.

⁸⁴ Huberman, *Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution*, 63.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 62-64.

⁸⁶ Ramon L. Bonachea, Marta San Martín, *The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1974).

⁸⁷ *Latin Times*, "23 of the Best Fidel Castro Quotes," *Lifestyle* (*Latin Times*), November 26, 2016, <http://www.latintimes.com/fidel-castro-dies-23-quotes-cubas-revolutionary-leader-405416>.

⁸⁸ "Six Facts about Censorship in Cuba," March 11, 2016, accessed January 10, 2017, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/03/six-facts-about-censorship-in-cuba/>.

⁸⁹ Oscar A. Echevarría, *Cuba and the International Sugar Market* (ASCE, 1995), 1.

⁹⁰ Mary Anastasia O'Grady, "Counting Castro's Victims," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 30, 2005. 1.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

"Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1933, The American Republics, Volume V - Office of the Historian." U.S. Department of State. Accessed January 10, 2017. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v05/d240>.

Huberman, Leo, and Paul M. Sweezy. *Cuba: Anatomy of A Revolution*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1961.

"Platt Amendment (1903)." Our Documents—Platt Amendment (1903). Accessed January 10, 2017. <https://ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=55>.

Secondary Sources.

Art, Michael. *Development and Disorder: A History of the Third World since 1945*. Hanover: Univ. Press of New England, 1997.

Ayala, Cesar J. "Social and Economic Aspects of Sugar Production in Cuba, 1880-1930." *Latin American Research Review* 30, no. 1 (1995): 95-124. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2504088?seq=27#page_scan_tab_contents.

Bertrand, Jon S. *The Cuban Dilemma of the United States*. Graduate School of Public Affairs, Master of Public Administration, 1973. https://archive.org/stream/cubandilemmaofun00bertpdf/cubandilemmaofun00bert_djvu.txt.

Copeland, Cassandra, Jolly Curtis, Henry Thompson. "The History and Potential of Trade between Cuba and the U.S." *Journal of Economics and Business*. 2011, accessed December 15th, 2016. <http://www.auburn.edu/~thomph1/cubahistory.pdf>.

"Cuban Memories: the Cuban Constitution of 1940, Then and Today." Cuban Heritage Collection. Accessed January 10, 2017. <http://library.miami.edu/chc/2010/10/14/cuban-memories-the-cuban-constitution-of-1940-then-and-today/>.

Diaz-Briquets, Sergio, and Jorge Perez-López. *Corruption in Cuba: Castro and Beyond*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006.

Domínguez, Jorge I. *Cuba: Order and Revolution*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978.

Echevarría, Oscar A., Yue Zhang, and Guohong Fu. "Cuba and the International Sugar Market." *Cuba in Transition: Papers and Proceedings of the Fifth Annual Meeting* 5 (1995): 363. Accessed January 11, 2017. <http://www.ascecuba.org/c/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/v05-FILE30.pdf>.

Ehrlich, Ilan, "Eduardo Chibás: The Incorrigible Man of Cuban Politics" (2009). *CUNY Academic Works*. http://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/1411.

Escobar, Rafael. *The Cuban Revolution: A Shift In American Support*. New Britain: Central Connecticut State University. <http://content.library.ccsu.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ccsutheses/id/1111>.

Farber, Samuel. *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006.

Gilderhus, Mark T. *The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations Since 1889*. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000.

Holmes, Ann-Marie. *The Relationship Between the United States and Cuba Based on Trade Needs*. Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies (2009). accessed December 20th, 2016. https://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/GraduateDegree/MADMSTheses/files/Ann_Marie_Holmes.pdf.

Hudson, Rex A. *Cuba A Country Study*. Federal Research Division: Library of Congress, Research, April 2001. Accessed December 31, 2016. https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/06/13/CS_Cuba.pdf.

Jr. Perez, Louis A. *Cuba under the Platt Amendment 1902–1934*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986. <http://digital.library.pitt.edu/cgi-bin/t/text/text-idx?c=pittpress;cc=pittpress;view=toc;idno=31735057896189>.

Lakey, George and Olivia Ensign. “Cubans General Strike to Overthrow President, 1933.” *Global Nonviolent Action Database*. 2010, accessed January 3rd 2017. <http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/cubans-general-strike-overthrow-president-1933>.

Lennon, J. Michael. *Norman Mailer: A Double Life*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013.

Marta San Martín, Ramon L. *The Cuban Insurrection, 1952–1959*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1974.

Matthews, Herbert. “Cuban Rebel Visited in Hideout.” *New York Times*, February 24, 1957. Accessed January 3, 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/books/matthews/matthews022457.pdf>.

Mccollum, Justin. “A Brief Historiography of U.S. Hegemony in the Cuban Sugar Industry.” *Forum: The Journal of Planning Practice and Education* 3, no. 1 (2011). doi:10.15368/forum.2011v3n1.8. <http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=forum>.

Merriam-Webster Online, s.v. “tariff,” accessed January 10, 2017, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tariff>.

O’Grady, Mary Anastasia. “Counting Castro’s Victims.” *The Wall Street Journal*. December 30, 2005. Accessed January 10, 2017. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113590852154334404>.

Pérez-Stable, Marifeli. *The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Suddath, Claire. “U.S.-Cuba Relations.” *Time*. April 15, 2009. Accessed January 10, 2017. <http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891359,00.html>.

“Six Facts About Censorship in Cuba.” Censorship in Cuba. Accessed January 10, 2017. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2016/03/six-facts-about-censorship-in-cuba/>.

Times, Latin. “23 of the Best Fidel Castro Quotes.” *Latin Times*. November 26, 2016. Accessed January 15, 2017. <http://www.latintimes.com/fidel-castro-dies-23-quotes-cubas-revolutionary-leader-405416>.