### Module 2: Physician Agency and Treatment Decisions

Part 2: Agency and Fee-for-Service Payments

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## What are fee-for-service payments?

- Fee-for-service (FFS) means providers are paid a set payment for a well-defined service
- More services = more payments
- Potentially encourages overuse

- Until 1983, Medicare paid hospitals on a "cost-plus" basis
- Can you think of some problems with this approach?

- In 1983, Medicare switched to a "Prospective Payment System"
- PPS: fixed payment that hospitals know they will receive in advance
- **Fixed** based on the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) code and other hospital characteristics

Let's work through a simple example:

- 1. PPS "standardized" amounts (one for labor and one for capital)
- 2. Adjust labor amount for wage index and add standardized capital amount
- 3. Multiply by DRG weight
- 4. Multiply by disproportionate share and teaching hospital adjustments (if relevant)
- 5. Account for outliers

#### Step 1

 $((Labor \times Wage Index) + Capital) * DRG Weight = Base Payment$ 

#### Step 2

Base Payment  $\times$  (1 + DSH Adj + Teaching Adj) = Final Payment

Let's look at some of these in real life with the CMS IPPS Final Rule files.

## Downside to PPS system?

- Still an incentive for overuse
- Incentive to upcode

## In-class Problem: Agency and fixed prices

Assume  $B(x)=4x^{1/2}$ ,  $NB^0=0$ , and c=1. Further assume that prices are fixed administratively at,  $\bar{p}=2$ . Note that, in this case, we work only off of the patient's net benefit constraint.

- 1. What is the physician's and patient's optimal amount of care provided?
- 2. The government is considering increasing the price to  $\bar{p}=3$ . What are the new optimal levels of care for physicians and patients at this new price?
- 3. How would the price change affect the difference between the patient and physician's optimal amounts?

## Comparative statics

An increase in the administratively set price leads to a **decrease** in quantity of services provided. And vice versa, a reduction in price leads to an **increase** in quantity provided. Why?

$$b(x)rac{\mathrm{d}x}{\mathrm{d}p}-x-prac{\mathrm{d}x}{\mathrm{d}p}=0 \ rac{\mathrm{d}x}{\mathrm{d}p}=rac{-x}{p-b(x)}<0.$$

## Comparative statics

- This comes from the physician's constraint, which is essentially a reflection of demand
- ullet Higher ar p means the constraint is met at a lower value of x, and vice versa

## Why does this matter?

Say we want to reduce health care utilization, and we try to do so by cutting payments. Will this work?

## Fixed payments in practice

Real life is a little more complicated!

- Often more than one treatment to consider
- Often more than one payer (private and public) to consider
- Patient's shielded from the full cost of care
- Benefit function is unknown and subject to asymmetric information

## Some other ways to model provider treatment

- Target income hypothesis
- Physician-induced demand
- Real life is more nuanced

$$u(x) = V(\pi) - e(x) + \alpha B(x)$$