

## Health Effects of Health Insurance

Health Economics II

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## Overview of Miller et al.



# Medicaid and Mortality: New Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data Sarah Miller, Norman Johnson, and Laura R. Wherry (2021)

Households that earn less than 138% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) experience higher risks of dying from


- diabetes (787%)
- cardiovascular disease (552%)
- respiratory disease (813%)

Utilize nonuniform adoption of ACA expansion to examine the effects of increased access to health insurance on health outcomes



#### Data comes from

- American Community Survey (ACS) 2008-2013
- Numident 2014-2017
- Mortality Disparities in American Communities (MDAC) project 2008-2015



http://kff.ore/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/



 ${\bf TABLE~I}$  Effect of the ACA Expansions on Coverage and Mortality: Difference-in-Differences Estimates

|                                 | Medicaid<br>eligibility<br>(1) | Any Medicaid<br>coverage in year<br>(2) | Days of<br>Medicaid<br>in year<br>(3) | Cumulative<br>Medicaid<br>years experienced<br>(4) | Uninsured (5)           | Died in year (6)            |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|--|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Difference-in-difference        | es model                       |   |                                       |  |                         |                             |
| Expansion $\times$ post         | 0.498 (0.026)***               | 0.128 (0.020)***                        | 42.99 (8.89)***                       | $0.375 \; (0.061)^{***}$                           | $-0.044\ (0.010)^{***}$ | $-0.00132\ (0.00050)^{**}$  |
| Event study model               |                                |   |                                       |  |                         |                             |
| Year 3                          | 0.493 (0.032)***               | NA                                      | NA                                    | 0.671 (0.082)***                                   | -0.039 (0.012)***       | -0.00208 (0.00083)**        |
| Year 2                          | 0.511 (0.026)***               | 0.128 (0.028)***                        | 43.33 (9.78)***                       | 0.472 (0.065)***                                   | $-0.050\ (0.010)^{***}$ | $-0.00131 \ (0.00056)^{**}$ |
| Year 1                          | 0.500 (0.025)***               | 0.129 (0.021)***                        | 50.79 (12.49)***                      | 0.305 (0.047)***                                   | $-0.053 \ (0.011)***$   | $-0.00119 \ (0.00044)***$   |
| Year 0                          | 0.510 (0.022)***               | 0.115 (0.020)***                        | 33.74 (7.27)***                       | 0.128 (0.021)***                                   | $-0.038  (0.006)^{***}$ | -0.00089 (0.00036)**        |
| Year −1 (omitted)               | 0                              | 0                                       | 0                                     | 0  | 0                       | 0                           |
| Year -2                         | 0.010 (0.006)*                 | -0.008(0.006)                           | -2.33(2.05)                           | -0.018(0.011)                                      | 0.002(0.006)            | $0.00015 \; (0.00047)$      |
| Year -3                         | 0.009(0.010)                   | -0.008(0.010)                           | -3.45(3.75)                           | -0.029(0.021)                                      | 0.001(0.006)            | -0.00029(0.00053)           |
| Year -4                         | 0.008(0.010)                   | -0.006(0.010)                           | -0.49(2.78)                           | -0.038(0.030)                                      | -0.007 (0.009)          | $0.00011 \ (0.00069)$       |
| Year -5                         | 0.008(0.011)                   | -0.004 (0.013)                          | 0.35(3.59)                            | 0.053(0.036)                                       | 0.000(0.009)            | 0.00091 (0.00069)           |
| Year −6                         | 0.006(0.011)                   | -0.015(0.021)                           | -2.86(5.58)                           | 0.077 (0.045)*                                     | -0.003(0.015)           | $-0.00021 \ (0.00070)$      |
| $N$ (Individuals $\times$ year) | 714,673                        | 3,493,000                               | 3,493,000                             | 4,000,000  | 714,673                 | 4,030,000                   |
| N (Individuals)                 | 714,673                        | 566,000                                 | 566,000                               | 566,000  | 714,673                 | 566,000                     |





 ${\bf TABLE~II}$  Effect of the ACA Expansions on Coverage and Mortality: Cause of Death

|                          | Deaths from<br>internal causes<br>(1) | Deaths from health<br>care–amenable causes<br>(2) | Deaths from<br>external causes<br>(3) |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|
| Difference-in-difference | s model                               |   |                                       |
| Expansion × post         | -0.00235 $(0.00675)***$               | -0.00099<br>(0.00050)*                            | 0.00038<br>(0.00020)*                 |
| Event study model        |                                       |   |                                       |
| Year 1                   | -0.00221 $(0.00126)$ *                | -0.00041 $(0.00082)$                              | 0.00010<br>(0.00039)                  |
| Year 0                   | -0.00209<br>(0.00108)*                | -0.00103 $(0.00075)$                              | 0.00025<br>(0.00032)                  |
| Year -1 (omitted)        | 0.00100)                              | 0.00070)  | 0.00032)                              |
| Year -2                  | -0.00053 $(0.00083)$                  | 0.00065<br>(0.00053)                              | -0.00007 $(0.00034)$                  |
| Year -3                  | 0.00088                               | 0.00014   | -0.00007                              |
| Year -4                  | $(0.00104) \\ -0.00044$               | $(0.00072) \\ -0.00008$                           | $(0.00044) \\ -0.00032$               |
| Year -5                  | (0.00112) $0.00075$                   | (0.00082)<br>0.00047                              | (0.00038) $-0.00022$                  |
| 2002                     | (0.00095)                             | (0.00074)   | (0.00037)                             |
| Year -6                  | 0.00071<br>(0.00106)                  | 0.00023<br>(0.00062)                              | -0.00060 $(0.00035)$                  |
| N (Individuals × year)   | 683,000                               | 683,000   | 683,000                               |
| N (Individuals)          | 88,500                                | 88,500  | 88,500                                |

Largest negative estimates for deaths relating to:

- cancer
- endocrine and metabolic diseases
- cardiovascular and circulatory system diseases
- respiratory diseases

## Overview of Goldin et al.



# Health Insurance and Mortality: Experimental Evidence from Taxpayer Outreach Jacob Goldin, Ithai Z. Lurie, and Janet McCubbin (2021)

- 21-26% of Americans lack insurance coverage for one or more months during the year
- 6.1 million 2015 tax returns reported owing a positive penalty under the ACA
- IRS sent 86% of these taxpayers a letter explaining the penalty and how to avoid it
- Several different types of intervention implemented in mid-January 2017
  - Baseline
  - Baseline without personalization
  - Baseline + exemption information
  - Early Baseline (November 2016)

## Goldin et al.



#### Data comes from

- IRS administrative records
- Form 1095 January 2015 December 2018
- Social Security Death File

TABLE II COVERAGE EFFECT BY PRIOR-YEAR INSURANCE

|                  | Full<br>sample               |                        | Prior-year<br>insured        |                        | Prior-year<br>uninsured      |                        |
|------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------|
|                  | Months of<br>coverage<br>(1) | Any<br>coverage<br>(2) | Months of<br>coverage<br>(3) | Any<br>coverage<br>(4) | Months of<br>coverage<br>(5) | Any<br>coverage<br>(6) |
| Panel A: All age | s                            |                        |                              |                        |                              |                        |
| Treated          | 0.152                        | 0.685                  | 0.018                        | 0.029                  | 0.232                        | 1.107                  |
|                  | (0.013)                      | (0.052)                | (0.011)                      | (0.025)                | (0.016)                      | (0.077)                |
| Control mean     | 14.410                       | 75.431                 | 20.970                       | 98.072                 | 9.512                        | 58.525                 |
| Observations     | 8,893,653                    | 8,893,653              | 3,809,488                    | 3,809,488              | 5,084,165                    | 5,084,168              |
| Panel B: Middle  | -aged adult                  | s                      |                              |                        |                              |                        |
| Treated          | 0.271                        | 1.286                  | 0.052                        | 0.040                  | 0.358                        | 1.831                  |
|                  | (0.024)                      | (0.105)                | (0.022)                      | (0.053)                | (0.026)                      | (0.135)                |
| Control mean     | 12.286                       | 65.223                 | 21.189                       | 97.869                 | 7.795                        | 48.753                 |
| Observations     | 2,047,778                    | 2,047,778              | 688,795                      | 688,795                | 1,358,983                    | 1,358,983              |



TABLE IV

EFFECTS OF INTERVENTION AND COVERAGE ON MIDDLE-AGE MORTALITY

|                | Mortality<br>(reduced form)<br>(1) | Mortality<br>(OLS)<br>(2) | Coverage<br>(first stage)<br>(3) | Mortality<br>(IV)<br>(4) |
|----------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Treated        | -0.063                             |                           | 0.358                            |                          |
|                | (0.025)                            |                           | (0.026)                          |                          |
| Covered months |                                    | -0.026                    |                                  | -0.178                   |
|                |                                    | (0.001)                   |                                  | (0.070)                  |
| Control mean   | 1.007                              | 1.007                     | 7.795                            | 1.007                    |
| Observations   | 1,358,983                          | 1,358,983                 | 1,358,983                        | 1,358,983                |

## Alternate explanations:


- reduced penalties led to increased income
- intervention encouraged people to seek ESI
- intervention adjusted beliefs about costs and reduced stress
- sample participants were later enrolled in safety net programs

## Goldin et al.



## Mechanisms

- Reduced delays between symptom onset and beginning treatment
- 2. Insured patients received more extensive treatment
- 3. Improved diagnosis of subacute conditions
- 4. Reduced stress



## Conclusions



- health insurance has a negative impact on mortality rates, at least in the short-term
- estimated 15,600 deaths could have been averted with universal expansion of the ACA according to Miller et al.
- estimated 1 death per 1,587 treated people prevented by IRS outreach according to Goldin et al.

## Discussion



Are there other mechanisms that may be responsible for the impact of health insurance on mortality?