Quality Disclosure and Regulation

Scoring Design in Medicare Advantage

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What's the point?

1. Endogenous quality (Spence, 1975)

- **Setting:** Monopoly (or oligopoly) when firms set both price and quality
- **Intuition:** Firm invests to the point where marginal quality valuation meets marginal costs of quality, but socially optimal quality depends on average valuation
- **Takeaway:** Profit-maximizing quality will differ from socially optimal quality when the marginal customer is not representative of the average

Natural in the presence of adverse selection, where the marginal patient is almost always different from the average patient

2. Types of quality disclosure


- Self-disclosed quality via advertising
- Word-of-mouth and aggregated reviews form users (Google, Rotten Tomatoes, etc.)
- Third-party rating agencies
- Government regulation via mandated disclosure or licensing


The main idea

- Need some form of quality disclosure to aid decision making
- Full-disclosure likely yields under-investment in quality
- Regulator can improve quality via coarse rating scores
- but...firms will respond to the scoring design accordingly

Context

Medicare Advantage






Selecting an MA plan

When someone nears 65, they'll receive:

- Medicare & You Booklet (128 pages in 2022)
- Points beneficiary to Medicare's online plan finder tool
- Lots of other marketing materials touting different types of plans
 - Standalone Part D plans
 - Medicare supplemental plans
 - Medicare Advantage plans
- Assume someone has decided to search for an MA plan online







All fields on the page are required unless noted as Optional. How do you get your Medicare coverage? Original Medicare Medicare Health Plan (Such as an HMO, PPO, or Private-Fee-for-service plan) I don't have any Medicare coverage yet I don't know what coverage I have Do you get help from Medicare or your state to pay your Medicare prescription drug costs? I get help from Medicaid I get supplemental security income I belong to a Medicare Savings Program (MSP) I applied for and got extra help through social security I don't get any extra help I don't know Go Back Continue to Plan Results >

Please select the information (e.g. dosing frequency) as prescribed by your doctor. Failure to enter information consistent with your prescription may result in the display of inaccurate pricing information. For example, if you select a frequency greater than that prescribed by your doctor, it may result in the display of the full drug cost rather than the appropriate cost-sharing amount. This will help us estimate your costs and allow you to see which plans cover your drugs. The site doesn't show pricing for most over the counter drugs or diabetic supplies. For more information, you may contact the plan.

I don't take any drugs I don't want to add drugs now

Current Coverage: New I
Current Subsidy: No Extr
Important Coverage Info





Original Medicare (H0001-001-0) Includes Part A (Hospital Insurance) and/or Part B (Medical Insurance) - Excludes Part D Drug								
Coverage Estimated Annual Drug Costs: [?]	Monthly Premium: [?]	Deductibles: [?] and Drug Copay [?] / Coinsurance: [?]	Health Benefits: [?]		Drug Coverage [?] , Drug Restrictions [?]		Estimated Annual Health and Drug Costs: [?]	Overall Star Rating: [?]
Retail Annual: <u>N/A</u> Mail Order Annual: N/A	Standard Part B: \$134	Part B Deductible: \$183	Doctor Choice: Any Willing Doctor Out of Pocket Spending Limit: Not Applicable		N/A		\$3,890	Not Available
Medicare Health Plans with Drug Coverage Star Ratings								
15 plans were found in 37920 based on your search criteria. View 10 View 15 Compare Plans Sort Results by Lowest Estimated Annual Health and Drug Cost Sort Sort								
Cigna-HealthSpring Preferred KNX (HMO) (H4454-031-0) Organization: Cigna-HealthSpring								
Estimated Annual Drug Costs: [?]	Premium: [?]	Deductibles [?] and Drug Copay [?] / Coinsurance: [?]	Health Benefits: [?]	Drug Cov [?] , Drug Restriction and Other Program	g ons [?] er	Estimated Annual Health and Drug Costs: [?]	Star	
Retail	\$8.00	Annual Drug	Doctor Choice: Blan	All Your D		\$2,920	****	Enroll


verview	Health & Drug P Benefits	an Drug Costs & Coverage		Star Ratings	Manage Drugs	
Humana Gold Plus H4461-031 (HMO)		AARP Medicare Plan 1 (HMO-PC		BlueAdvantage Sapphire (PPO)		
(H4461-031) ¹ Pl Organization: Ca	an Type: <u>HMO</u> ariten Health Plan Inc.	(H5253-047) ¹ Plan Option Organization: Unite	Type: <u>HMO with POS</u> edHealthcare	(H7917-030) ¹ Plan Type: <u>Local Preferre</u> <u>Provider Organization</u> Organization: BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee		
Members: 1-800-457-4708 711(TTY/TDD) Non Members: 1-800-833-2364 711(TTY/TDD)		Members: 1-800-6 711(TTY/TDD) Non Members: 1- 711(TTY/TDD)		Members: 1-800-831-2583 711(TTY/TDD) Non Members: 1-800-292-5146 711(TTY/TDD)		
Coverage: Provi coverage	des health and drug	Coverage: Provide coverage	s health and drug	Coverage: Provides health and drug coverage		
00		000		0 0 0		
Enroll		Enroll		Enroll		
Addition	al Plan Informat	ion				
Overall Star Rating: [?]	**** 4.5 out of 5 stars	Overall Star Rating: [?]	**** 4 out of 5 stars	Overall Star Rating: [?]	**** 4 out of 5 stars	
Health Plan Sta Ratings: [?]	**** 4 out of 5 stars	Health Plan Star Ratings: [?]	**** 4 out of 5 stars	Health Plan Star Ratings: [?]	**** 4 out of 5 stars	
Drug Plan Star	***** 4.5 out of 5 stars	Drug Plan Star Ratings: [?]	**** 3.5 out of 5 stars	Drug Plan Star Ratings: [?]	***** 4.5 out of 5 stars	
Ratings: [?]	out of 5 stars					


Star Ratings

MEASURE	DEFINITION			
Overall Star Rating	The Overall Star Rating gives an overall rating of the plan's quality and performance for the types of services each plan offers. For plans covering health services, this is an overall rating for the quality of many medical/health care services that fall into 5 categories:			
	Staying healthy: screening tests and vaccines. Includes whether members got various screening tests, vaccines, and other check-ups to help them stay healthy.			
	 Managing chronic (long-term) conditions: Includes how often members with certain conditions got recommended tests and treatments to help manage their condition. 			
	Member experience with the health plan: Includes member ratings of the plan.			
	 Member complaints and changes in the health plan's performance: Includes how often Medicare found problems with the plan and how often members had problems with the plan. Includes how much the plan's performance has improved (if at all) over time. 			
	 Health plan customer service: Includes how well the plan handles member appeals. 			
	For plans covering drug services, this is an overall rating for the quality of prescription-related services that fall into 4 categories:			
	Drug plan customer service: Includes how well the plan handles member appeals.			
	 Member complaints and changes in the drug plan's performance: Includes how often Medicare found problems with the plan and how often members had problems with the plan. Includes how much the plan's performance has improved (if at all) over time. 			
	 Member experience with plan's drug services: Includes member ratings of the plan. 			
	 Drug safety and accuracy of drug pricing: Includes how accurate the plan's pricing information is and how often members with certain medical conditions are prescribed drugs in a way that is safer and clinically recommended for their condition. 			

Preview of findings

- 1. Estimate structural model of price and quality investments
- 2. Identify optimal scoring design







Some points of applause

- Substantial contribution, both theoretical and empirical
- Highly policy relevant

"To address this, I completed the data by reviewing a decade of public communications by CMS aimed at insurers. I recover year-to-year changes to the scoring design, replicating the public scoring assignment perfectly."

Setup and estimation





What's new here?

- Endogenous quality investments with imperfect mapping into quality scores
- Endogenous scoring design

Scoring
$$\psi$$
 Investments \boldsymbol{x} Quality $\boldsymbol{q} \sim F(\cdot|\boldsymbol{x})$ Prices \boldsymbol{p} $D(\boldsymbol{p}, \psi(\boldsymbol{q}), \psi)$ 1 1 2 3 4

$$u_{ij} = \underbrace{\alpha_i P_j}_{ ext{premium}} + \underbrace{\beta_i b_j}_{ ext{coverage}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{E}_{\psi}[oldsymbol{\gamma'}oldsymbol{q}|\psi(q_j)]}_{ ext{quality}} + \underbrace{\lambda' z_{ij}}_{ ext{Obs.}} + \underbrace{\xi_j}_{ ext{unobs.}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{ij}}_{\sim ext{T1EV}}$$

Demand estimation

$$u_{ij} = \underbrace{\alpha_i P_j}_{ ext{premium}} + \underbrace{\beta_i b_j}_{ ext{coverage}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{E}_{\psi}[oldsymbol{\gamma'}oldsymbol{q}|\psi(q_j)]}_{ ext{quality}} + \underbrace{\lambda' z_{ij}}_{ ext{Obs.}} + \underbrace{\xi_j}_{ ext{unobs.}} + \underbrace{\varepsilon_{ij}}_{ ext{\sim T1EV}}$$

Two-step process:

- 1. Estimate mean preferences, $\hat{\delta}_{j}$, from $u_{ij} = \pmb{\delta_{j}} + \pmb{\xi}_{j} + \pmb{arepsilon}_{ij}$,
- 2. TSLS regression of δ_j on observable characteristics and fixed effects. 3 (if needed). Estimate preference for quality by minimizing the square difference between a contract fixed effect and expected quality, $\eta_j \gamma \mathcal{E}[\boldsymbol{q}|r,\psi]$, across time periods (pairwise time period differences).

Question/concern

Estimating preferences for quality...

- ullet within an estimated fixed effect, $\hat{\eta}$
- ullet within an estimated mean preference, $\hat{oldsymbol{\delta}}$
- What does the distribution of these fixed effects look like?
- How much variation exists in within-contract quality (or expected quality)
 over time?

Scoring
$$\psi$$
 Investments ${\pmb x}$ Quality ${\pmb q} \sim F(\cdot|{\pmb x})$ Prices ${\pmb p}$ $D({\pmb p},\psi({\pmb q}),\psi)$ 1 2 1 1 2


$$\pi_f(oldsymbol{q},\psi) = \max_{\{p_j\}_{j\in J_f}} \sum_{j\in J_f} \underbrace{D_j(oldsymbol{p},\psi(oldsymbol{q}))}_{ ext{demand}}(\underbrace{R_j(p_j)}_{ ext{mg. revenue}} - \underbrace{C(oldsymbol{q}_j,oldsymbol{z}_j,oldsymbol{ heta}_j)}_{ ext{mg. cost}})$$

Pricing (insurance costs) estimation

$$\pi_f(oldsymbol{q},\psi) = \max_{\{p_j\}_{j\in J_f}} \sum_{j\in J_f} \underbrace{D_j(oldsymbol{p},\psi(oldsymbol{q}))}_{ ext{demand}}(\underbrace{R_j(p_j)}_{ ext{mg. revenue}} - \underbrace{C(oldsymbol{q}_j,oldsymbol{z}_j,oldsymbol{ heta}_j)}_{ ext{mg. cost}})$$

- ullet Profit maximization yields standard MR=MC expression
- Recover marginal costs
- Decompose marginal costs into part due to quality, other observable components, and residual,

$$MC = oldsymbol{ heta}_q^c oldsymbol{q} + oldsymbol{ heta}_a^c oldsymbol{a} + c$$



$$egin{aligned} \max_{oldsymbol{x}_f \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{Q}| imes |J_f|}} \int E\left[\pi_f(oldsymbol{q}_f, oldsymbol{q}_{-f}, \psi)
ight] dF(oldsymbol{q}_f | oldsymbol{x}_f) - \underbrace{I(oldsymbol{x}_f, oldsymbol{\mu_f})}_{ ext{investment cost}} \end{aligned}$$


Quality (investment costs) estimation

$$egin{aligned} \max_{oldsymbol{x}_f \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{Q}| imes |J_f|}} \int E\left[\pi_f(oldsymbol{q}_f, oldsymbol{q}_{-f}, \psi)
ight] dF(oldsymbol{q}_f | oldsymbol{x}_f) - \underbrace{I(oldsymbol{x}_f, oldsymbol{\mu_f})}_{ ext{investment cost}} \end{aligned}$$

- Equate marginal revenue from quality investment with marginal investment cost
- Assume investment costs are quadratic and separable across products and categories

Question/concern

- Costs almost surely are **not** separable across categories
- Investment in network changes access, outcomes, patient surveys
- Investment for one contract likely spills over into other contracts for same insurer
- How much does this matter?



$$\max_{\psi \in \Psi} E_{\boldsymbol{q}} [\underbrace{CS(\psi, \boldsymbol{q})}_{\text{Consumer surplus}} + \rho^F \underbrace{\sum_{f} V_f(\psi, \boldsymbol{q}) - I(\boldsymbol{x}_f^*(\psi), \mu_f)}_{\text{Consumer surplus}} - \rho^G \underbrace{Gov(\psi, \boldsymbol{q})}_{\text{Government spending}} |\boldsymbol{x}^*(\psi)]$$

Scoring design estimation

$$\max_{\psi \in \Psi} E_{oldsymbol{q}}[\underbrace{CS(\psi, oldsymbol{q})}_{ ext{Consumer surplus}} +
ho^F \sum_f V_f(\psi, oldsymbol{q}) - I(oldsymbol{x}_f^*(\psi), \mu_f) -
ho^G \underbrace{Gov(\psi, oldsymbol{q})}_{ ext{Government spending}} |oldsymbol{x}^*(\psi)]$$


- ullet Designer chooses scoring rule, ψ , from class of rules, $oldsymbol{\Psi}$
- Trades off information for efficiency
- Paper shows that any monotone partitional score reduces to two elements: an aggregator and a cutoff function
- ullet Considers optimal design among the set of designs with no more than 15 partitions and quadratic aggregators, setting $ho^F=1$ and $ho^G=0$, for year 2015

Question/concern

- Do optimal cutoffs and aggregator change in different years?
- With different ho^F and ho^G ?
- ullet No firm response to quality bonuses, but costs to CMS could be in ho^G

Main results


Demand




Supply

Category	Insurance Costs, $ heta_q$	Investment Costs, μ_k
Access	31.16	15.620*
Intermediate	108.40*	19.530*
Outcome	16.810*	15.000*
Patient	-244.30*	14.730*
Process	-175.60*	1.106


Scoring design






- Optimal design involves linear aggregator among 5 partitions
- Pooling at the bottom, with very little demand for low-quality plans
- Closely matches consumer WTP (except for Intermediate category?)
- **Question:** How much is 3.5 vs 3.6 just noise?


Scoring design with uninformed beneficiaries








- Is CMS pretty close already?
- Current design seems consistent with some feasible set of preferences
- Would be very interesting to know under what preferences the current design is actually optimal












Considerations for this paper

(not necessarily actionable)

The bid process



- Not just setting price
- Separate Part D bid process
- Ability to use Part C rebate to go toward Part D premium

Contracts vs plans

- Beneficiaries choose plans, defined by specific premium and benefits
- Quality is measured by contract
- Paper argues that there is really only one plan per contract
 - Makes sense in recent years but maybe not in early years
- Can't have it both ways
 - Price variation within contract good
 - but product differentiation within given quality score irrelevant?

Scoring design

Does (should) the setup incorporate...

- Bonuses for high scores? No
- Contract consolidation of plans? **No**
- Part D quality? **No**
- Penalty for high-variance contracts (i-factor)? **Maybe**
- Alert for ratings below 3 stars or at 5 stars? Maybe

Scoring design

More fundamental questions...

- Are ratings reflective of quality? How do we define a "good" health insurance plan?
- Is the rating monotonically increasing in underlying quality?

Considerations for more papers

1. Measuring quality

- What's the best way to measure the underlying quality score?
- Many of the current measures are provider (network) specific
- Relates to the *aggregator* in current framework, but would not take current categories (or construction of current categories) as given

2. Policy uncertainty

- Can some policy uncertainty avoid bunching just above the threshold values?
- How much policy uncertainty is optimal?
- How do insurers respond to such uncertainty?
- Already in the model: mapping between quality investments and the quality score
- Already in the data: introduction of new measures and publication of specific threshold values for some measures

3. Learning about scoring designs

- The scoring designs are complicated
- Likely takes time for insurers to understand the policy and update plans/contracts accordingly

Final thoughts

