

Mass Polarization and Democratic Decline: Global Evidence from a
Half-Century of Public Opinion

Supplementary Information

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S1 Measurement Model

The main text briefly discusses the use of a Bayesian approach to building dynamic panels of mass polarization. Here, I fully explicate this model and describe its estimation and validation. My primary objective in fitting this measurement model is approximating a population-level distribution of ideology and party affect for each country-year. A Bayesian approach is especially useful here, as I am not actually interested in the point estimates of latent ideology or party affect, but rather their *distribution*. A measure of polarization can then be recovered through post-processing of these country-year latent distributions. Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) show that preserving and taking into account the entire distribution is critical in the measurement of polarization; estimating only ideal points can lead to spurious inferences if the number, discrimination, or difficulty of items varies across countries or years.

A secondary objective is to collate the multitude of aggregate, country-level survey data available to scholars and correct for non-stochastic variation arising as a consequence of these data being splintered across time, space, and survey program. The following section describes how I employ dynamic latent variable models and an infinite Gaussian mixture model in a Bayesian framework to accomplish these objectives.

S1.1 Model

I first construct a dynamic latent variable model similar to that of Claassen (2019). Authors using these types of models often collapse multinomial or ordinal response options into a binary scale, or model some derived measure such as the proportion of respondents giving each response option (Caughey, O’Grady, and Warshaw 2019; Caughey and Warshaw 2015; Linzer 2013). However, these practices typically throw away information about respondents who fall into extreme categories—a key quantity of interest in the measurement of polarization (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). I therefore aim to preserve the discrete structure of survey data by modeling the number of respondents y_{itj} in country i at time t who offer response option k to item j .

These survey data, however, are imperfect; they provide noisy signals of aggregate public opinion and approximate, but do not capture directly, ideology or party affect in a given population. I instead use these survey data to recover latent ideology or party affect θ_{itk} , where i denotes country and t denotes time period (year, in this case). Thus,

$$y_{itj} \sim \text{Multinom}(n_{itj}, \pi_{itjk}), \quad (\text{S1})$$

where n_{itj} is the number of observations collected for a survey item in a given country-year (weighted to be nationally representative where possible) and π_{itjk} is a vector of probabilities $\pi_{itj1}, \dots, \pi_{itjK}$ for that item's response categories. From here, there are two specification options. π_{itjk} can be modeled directly as a function of latent traits, or it can take a Dirichlet prior to allow for additional dispersion in survey responses beyond sampling error (e.g. Adida et al. 2016; Biemer 2010; Weisberg 2005). In the case of the Dirichlet-multinomial distribution,

$$\pi_{itjk} \sim \text{Dir}(\alpha_{itjk}), \quad (\text{S2})$$

where α_{itjk} is a vector of concentration parameters $\alpha_{itj1}, \dots, \alpha_{itjK}$. α_{itjk} can be reparameterized with an expectation parameter η_{itjk} and scale parameter ϕ ,

$$\begin{aligned} \eta_{itjk} &= \frac{\alpha_{itjk}}{\sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_{itjk}}, \\ \phi &= \sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_{itjk}, \end{aligned} \quad (\text{S3})$$

$$\rightarrow \alpha_{itjk} = \eta_{itjk}\phi,$$

where $\phi \sim \Gamma(4, 0.1)$ and η_{itjk} (or π_{itjk} in the models without the Dirichlet prior) is modeled as a function of latent traits. Including corrections for various sources of bias in this part of the model is especially critical. Hill and Tausanovitch (2015) show that failing to correct for variation in item discrimination leads to spurious estimates of polarization, and Hare et al. (2015) show that failing to account for differential item functioning—a key concern in comparative public opinion (Stegmüller 2011)—leads to underestimates of polarization in ideological self-placement.

To ameliorate these concerns, the model takes item bias effects λ_{jk} , item-country latent effects δ_{ijk} , item slopes γ_{jk} , and my primary quantity of interest, country-year latent effects θ_{itk} . I incorporate these parameters one by one to yield six models each for ideology and party affect (three multinomial models and three Dirichlet-multinomial models) but present only the four-parameter model here:

$$\begin{aligned} \eta_{itjk} &= \text{softmax}^{-1}(\lambda_{jk} + \delta_{ijk} + \gamma_{jk}\theta_{itk}), \\ &= \ln(\lambda_{jk} + \delta_{ijk} + \gamma_{jk}\theta_{itk}) + c. \end{aligned} \quad (\text{S4})$$

where $c = \ln(\sum_{k=1}^K e^{\eta_{itjk}})$. λ_{jk} , γ_{jk} , and δ_{ijk} are modeled hierarchically as a function of data with response options nested in survey items (for λ_{jk} and γ_{jk}) and response options nested in survey items and countries (for δ_{ijk}), making this a fully hierarchical linear model. Because item bias effects and item slopes may be correlated, they additionally take a bivariate normal distribution with correlation ρ :¹

$$\begin{bmatrix} \lambda_{jk} \\ \gamma_{jk} \end{bmatrix} \sim N \left(\begin{bmatrix} \mu_\lambda \\ \mu_\gamma \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_\lambda^2 & \rho\sigma_\lambda\sigma_\gamma \\ \rho\sigma_\lambda\sigma_\gamma & \sigma_\gamma^2 \end{bmatrix} \right), \quad (S5)$$

$$\delta_{ijk} \sim N(0, \sigma_\delta^2),$$

where $\rho \sim N^+(0, 2)$ and the variance-covariance matrix is estimated using a Cholesky decomposition with an LKJ(2) prior (Lewandowski, Kurowicka, and Joe 2009). σ_δ^2 further takes a weakly informative $N^+(0, 2)$ prior.²

Finally, the country-year latent effects θ_{it} must be smoothed over time. I do this by simply specifying a random walk (Claassen 2019; Jackman 2005):

$$\theta_{itk} \sim N(\theta_{i,t-1,k}, \sigma_\theta^2), \quad (S6)$$

where σ_θ^2 , like other variance terms above, is held constant across countries, years, and response options; is estimated from the data; and takes a weakly informative $N^+(0, 2)$ prior.

The result of this dynamic latent variable model is a collection of vectors θ_{itk} modeled hierarchically and smoothed over time. The next challenge is to take these estimates of latent ideology and party affect and recover the distribution of those latent variables. Doing so is relatively simple: Pushing θ_{itk} back through the softmax function maps those latent estimates onto a simplex, which can then be passed to a multinomial distribution along with the total number of survey responses observed in each country n_{it} to generate \tilde{y}_{it} —the number of responses in each country-year-category corrected for item-category and country-item-category effects:

$$\tilde{y}_{it} \sim \text{Multinom}(n_{it}, \text{softmax}^{-1}(\theta_{itk})). \quad (S7)$$

¹In the two- and three-parameter models, which do not take item slopes γ_{jk} , item bias effects λ_{jk} take a univariate normal prior $\lambda_{jk} \sim N(\mu_\lambda, \sigma_\lambda^2)$ and σ_λ^2 further takes a weakly informative $N^+(0, 2)$ prior.

²Although inverse-gamma or half-Cauchy distributions are often preferred for this type of prior, recent work has moved toward using half-normals due to their computational tractability and numerical stability.

These corrected data can now be used to approximate a distribution from which to estimate polarization. In particular, I treat \tilde{y}_{it} as the outcome of a Gaussian mixture:

$$\tilde{y}_{it} = \sum_{c=1}^C \omega_{itc} \mathcal{N}(\mu_{itc}, \sigma_{itc}^2), \quad (\text{S8})$$

where ω_{itc} gives the mixture weights and c is the component index. The parameters in (S8) take the following priors:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu_{itc} &\sim \mathcal{N}(\bar{y}_{it}, \sigma_{\mu_{itc}}^2), \\ \sigma_{itc}^2 &\sim \mathcal{N}^+(0, 0.5), \end{aligned} \quad (\text{S9})$$

where \bar{y}_{it} denotes the mean of \tilde{y}_{it} for each country-year and $\sigma_{\mu_{itc}}^2$ further takes the weakly informative $\mathcal{N}^+(0, 2)$ prior.

Because the hierarchical and dynamic nature of the data was accounted for in the dynamic latent variable model, no such construction is necessary for this mixture distribution; I can simply estimate the mixture weights ω_{itc} , means μ_{itc} , and standard deviations σ_{itc} for each country-year by fitting a separate mixture to that country-year's vector of data \tilde{y}_{it} .

A couple key problems remain. First, fitting a Gaussian mixture would require the *a priori* specification of the number of components C . It is not entirely clear what that number should be and, more perniciously, the appropriate number of latent components likely varies across countries and years. To account for this variation, I proceed nonparameterically and consider (S8) an infinite Gaussian mixture such that $C \rightarrow \infty$, implying that the model follows a Dirichlet process.³ Note that this does not mean that the distribution of \hat{y}_{it} will have infinitely many components. Rather, it will take a countably infinite set of component parameters, with most component weights approaching zero in the limit, leaving only those components within which most of the probability mass is contained. $\omega_{itc} \forall c \in 1, \dots, C$ is therefore a sparse vector of length C , where the degree of sparsity is controlled by β in (S10).

But this poses a second problem: The component indicator variable that would typically be required in a Dirichlet process is computationally intractable, as discrete parameters are unsupported by most sampling algorithms. Marginalizing over that parameter, however, produces the notation in (S8), where the mixture weights ω_{itc} can be expressed as the outcome of a stick-breaking process:

³Of course, a computer cannot hold any object with dimensions of infinite size. In practice, then, an upper bound must be placed on C . I reason that it is unlikely to uncover more than five distinct, important opinion clusters (indeed, prior knowledge suggests most cases will produce only two or three identifiable clusters), so I specify $C = 5$ to help conserve computing resources. Results suggest that this maximum number of components is sufficient, as ω_{it4} and ω_{it5} approach zero for most country-years.

$$\begin{aligned}
\omega_{itC} &= 1 - \sum_{c=1}^{C-1} \omega_{itc}, \\
\omega_{itc} &= \nu_{itc} \prod_{\ell=2}^{c-1} (1 - \nu_{it\ell}), \\
\omega_{it1} &= \nu_{it1}, \\
\nu_{it\ell} &\sim \text{Beta}(1, \beta),
\end{aligned} \tag{S10}$$

where I specify $\beta = 4$. This is a relatively high value for β relative to typical implementations of stick-breaking processes, but the benefit of specifying a prior with so much probability density close to zero is that I can be more confident that whatever components are uncovered by the mixture model do, in fact, represent meaningful clusters of data.

The result of this infinite Gaussian mixture model is therefore a set of component means μ_{itc} , standard deviations σ_{itc}^2 , and weights ω_{itc} for each component in each country-year. These parameters represent the location, dispersion, and size, respectively, of each opinion cluster. The emphasis on estimating both location and dispersion parameters is deliberate: Polarization is a function of both distance between groups and concentration within groups (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Fortunato and Stevenson 2021; Ura and Ellis 2012), and these two dynamics can only be captured by fully parameterizing the latent distribution (Hill and Tausanovitch 2015; Levendusky and Pope 2011). I can therefore obtain a measure of polarization for each country-year by estimating the degree of polarization in the distribution parameterized by μ_{itc} , σ_{itc}^2 , and ω_{itc} . I do this by applying the cluster-polarization coefficient (for details, see Mehlhaff 2021), which corrects for different numbers of opinion clusters across country-years.

S1.2 Identifying Restrictions

The model I present above contains several degeneracies that require identifying restrictions. First, the latent variable model defined in (S4) suffers from both additive and multiplicative aliasing (Bafumi et al. 2005). In the first case, a constant can be added to all terms without changing the model output. In the second case, either the item slopes γ_{jk} or the latent traits θ_{itk} can be multiplied by a constant and, if the other is divided by the same constant, the model output will not change. I identify the two-parameter models by fixing the first item bias effect to $\lambda_{1,k} = 0$; all subsequent λ_{jk} parameters can then be interpreted with respect to the fixed parameter as a baseline. I break the additive aliasing in the three-parameter models by

fixing $\lambda_{1,k}$ and additionally specifying the mean of δ_{ijk} to be zero, ensuring that the latent traits θ_{itk} are the only parameters allowed to float freely. The four-parameter models are identified by fixing the means of μ_λ and μ_γ in the multivariate normal prior in (S5) to zero and one, respectively, and by constraining item slopes γ_{jk} to be positive. δ_{ijk} further retains a mean of zero. Finally, dynamic models like this one must impose some structure on the dynamic parameters θ_{itk} so the time series as a whole is anchored to some baseline value. I do this by placing a prior on the first vector of latent traits in each country, such that $\theta_{i1,k} \sim N(0, 1)$.

Second, the mixture model defined in (S8) suffers from labeling degeneracy, as identical component distributions impose ambiguity about which parameters are associated with which component. One common way to break this degeneracy is to impose non-exchangeable, repulsive priors. However, it is not clear in this case what such priors should be, as the number of identified components in an infinite mixture model will vary. Fortunately, the inferences drawn from the model are also exchangeable. Components do not have meaningful labels; the only information that needs to be preserved is their location relative to each other. As a consequence of this symmetry, I can retain the exchangeable priors in (S9) but specify an ordering constraint such that $\mu_{it1} < \mu_{it2} < \dots < \mu_{itC}$.

S1.3 Estimation

Typically, the default method for fitting a model like the one described above is to employ Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques to fully explore the parameter space. Unfortunately, even the most advanced MCMC methods can be extremely slow to converge when the posterior is complex or the number of data points is large, as are both the case here. Indeed, Caughey and Warshaw (2015) testify that their dynamic latent variable models needed up to several weeks to converge. Even leveraging recent advances in within-chain parallelization, I likewise estimate that the simplest two-parameter model would have taken approximately one week to converge, while the more complex four-parameter models would have needed well over one month.

Instead, I turn to variational inference to fit the models. Variational inference is a method of deterministic posterior approximation that is guaranteed to converge, easily assessed by convergence criteria, and finds the analytical posterior solution most closely resembling the true (analytically intractable) posterior by minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the two distributions (Grimmer 2011). Variational inference has become an indispensable tool in computer science and statistics (e.g. Airoldi et al. 2008; Blei, Ng, and Jordan 2003), but its application to political science has been more limited (for examples, see Grimmer 2013; Imai, Lo, and Olmsted 2016). To further reduce strain on computational resources, I split

the model in two, fitting the latent variable models on the full data set and then fitting each country’s mixture model separately, as countries are independent of each other once the latent variable models have been fit. In all cases, the evidence lower bound (ELBO)—the criterion used to monitor the variational algorithm—indicates convergence to the approximate posterior.

S1.4 Validation and Model Selection

The previous sections laid out six latent variable models each for ideology and party affect. This section validates the estimates obtained by those models and details how a particular model was selected for the calculation of polarization estimates. I conduct two internal validation exercises with mean absolute error and leave-one-out information criteria (LOOIC) (Vehtari, Gelman, and Gabry 2017) and two external validation exercises with mean absolute error and 80% credible interval (both equal-tailed (ETIC) and high-density (HDIC)) coverage based on a randomly selected 75% training set and 25% test set.⁴ Table S1 displays the results of these exercises.

Table S1: Internal and External Validation of Latent Variable Models

		<i>Internal Validation</i>		<i>External Validation</i>		
Variable	Model	MAE	LOOIC	MAE	ETIC	HDIC
Party Affect	2PL Multinomial	0.509	747300	13.091	0.899	0.893
	3PL Multinomial	14.847	102840338	16.069	0.889	0.889
	4PL Multinomial	0.629	1632477	14.287	0.897	0.891
	2PL Dirichlet-Multinomial	9.749	1415294	6.645	0.893	0.896
	3PL Dirichlet-Multinomial	6.115	1371934	6.779	0.892	0.896
	4PL Dirichlet-Multinomial	5.213	1340400	16.014	0.893	0.889
Ideology	2PL Multinomial	1.293	384842	32.708	0.757	0.696
	3PL Multinomial	1.309	403066	33.158	0.759	0.693
	4PL Multinomial	1.376	641674	33.952	0.759	0.685
	2PL Dirichlet-Multinomial	35.618	6786645	27.328	0.659	0.725
	3PL Dirichlet-Multinomial	10.591	6781720	27.425	0.659	0.724
	4PL Dirichlet-Multinomial	20.722	6769666	47.921	0.853	0.674

Beginning with internal validation, it is clear that the Dirichlet-multinomial specifications introduce greater error into the in-sample predictions. With the exception of the three-parameter affect model, the specifications without the Dirichlet prior display MAE values that are orders of magnitude lower than those produced by the Dirichlet-multinomial specifications. This result is echoed by the LOOIC, which have no

⁴Credible interval coverage (CIC) measures the accuracy of the model’s uncertainty estimates by calculating the percentage of observations contained in the out-of-sample credible interval. CIC indicates a good fit when the value is as close as possible to the width of the interval—80% in this case. Values well over 0.8 indicate standard errors that are too wide, and values well under 0.8 indicate standard errors that are too narrow.

intrinsic meaning themselves but can be used to compare models with respect to each other, with lower values indicating a better fit.

However, there is generally a tradeoff between internal and external fit—models can be well-fit to the data on which they are trained but may display poor out-of-sample predictive power. That is the case here. Looking at the external validation results, the Dirichlet-multinomial specifications typically display substantially lower MAE than the multinomial specifications, with the exception of the four-parameter ideology model. The models are more evenly matched in evaluating ETIC and HDIC. The affect models' coverage differs by, at most, one percentage point. The ideology models' coverage displays more variation, but the models that perform well on ETIC perform worse on HDIC, and vice versa.

As previously alluded to, it is important to keep in mind that selecting a model requires the balancing of tradeoffs; one model may not have a clear advantage over the others on all criteria. I ultimately selected the three-parameter Dirichlet-multinomial specification for both party affect and ideology. These models display low-to-middling levels of internal MAE, external MAE, and LOOIC, suggesting that they offer a good middle ground between a model that is overfit on in-sample data (like the multinomial models) and a model that contains high levels of uncertainty (like the two- and four-parameter Dirichlet-multinomial models). Additionally, these chosen models' ETIC and HDIC do not differ significantly from the next closest specifications. I use the output from these models to proceed through the rest of the model defined above.

S2 Data Sources and Manipulation

I take data from all available national public opinion survey projects that ask about ideology on the left-right scale and feelings or attitudes toward parties. I exclude items asking about feelings toward political leaders, as these may tap into a different attitude (e.g. someone can feel very close to their party but dislike their chosen candidate). Whenever included by the survey project, I apply weights to make the data nationally representative. Table S2 displays the survey programs providing ideological self-placement and party affect data, how many country-years each program contributes, and the range of dates covered by each.

As stated above, I endeavor to preserve the integrity of these data as much as possible, so I engage in minimal data manipulation. First, I scale the values of each response option to be on the same scale, which allows the latent variable model to estimate country- and item-level variation in specific response options across items with different numbers of response options. This requires me to make an assumption of cardinality, but because the latent variable model operates on categories and not values, the assumption applies only to the mixture model. Further, I believe this assumption is not an especially strong one and it

Table S2: Survey Programs, Country-Years, and Year Ranges

Survey Program	N Country-Years	Year Range
<i>Ideology</i>		
AmericasBarometer	112	2004-2019
Australian Election Study	7	1987-2016
Parliamentary Election Belarus ^a	2	1995-2002
Canadian Election Study	2	1988-1993
Comparative National Election Project	24	1992-2018
Croatian National Election Study	5	1990-2003
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems	176	1996-2018
Party Preferences Czech Republic	1	2000
Eurobarometer	726	1973-2019
Central and Eastern Eurobarometer ^b	56	1990-2004
European Values Study	59	1981-2019
Hungarian Election Study	1	1994
Icelandic National Election Study	4	1987-2016
Israel National Election Study	9	1981-2016
Latinobarómetro	238	1995-2018
Statistics Norway Election Survey	2	1989-2017
New Zealand Election Study	5	1990-2017
Pew Global Attitudes	19	2002-2018
Election Study Serbia ^c	3	1990-2002
Slovenian Public Opinion Survey	1	1997
Statistics Sweden Election Study	3	1988-1994
Swiss Election Study	8	1971-2019
American National Election Studies	12	1972-2002
General Social Survey	1	2014
World Values Survey	177	1981-2016
<i>Party Affect</i>		
Australian Election Study	2	1993-2016
Canadian Election Study	3	1988-2000
Comparative National Election Project	25	1992-2018
Croatian National Election Study	2	2000-2003
Comparative Study of Electoral Systems	182	1996-2018
Danish Election Study	3	1994-2011
Politbarometer	37	1977-2018
Hungarian Election Study	1	1994
Icelandic National Election Study	5	1987-2017
Israel National Election Study	7	1988-2019
Dutch Parliamentary Election Study	3	1986-2012
Statistics Norway Election Survey	2	1989-2017
New Zealand Election Study	5	1990-2017
Polish National Election Study	1	2000
Current Problems of Slovakia	1	1999
Slovenian Public Opinion Survey	1	1997
Statistics Sweden Election Study	4	1988-2010
Swiss Election Study	2	1975-1995
British Election Study	3	1992-2010
American National Election Studies	10	1978-2000

^aIncludes *Democratic Attitudes in Belarus*.^bIncludes *Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe* and *Candidate Countries Eurobarometer*.^cIncludes *Political and Social Attitudes in Serbia*.

is routinely employed by scholars calculating statistics such as mean or standard deviation from these data. After the data values have been scaled, I calculate the number of respondents offering each response option, weighted to be nationally representative when possible. These weighted counts are fed directly to the latent variable model.

When calculating affective polarization, many authors weight party affect by party vote shares to help deal with the problem of different numbers of small parties being included on surveys (e.g. Wagner 2021). Fortunately, such a procedure is not necessary here, as the infinite mixture model deals with that problem itself. By clustering parties together in their level of affect, we can recover lower-dimensional estimates and evaluate affective polarization without needing to make ad hoc decisions about which parties to include and which to exclude or worrying about how the number of small parties changes over time.

S3 Full Model Results

Table S3: Time Series Models of Polarization and Democracy

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Pooled OLS				System GMM			
	Electoral (1)	Electoral (2)	Liberal (3)	Liberal (4)	Electoral (5)	Electoral (6)	Liberal (7)	Liberal (8)
Electoral _{t-1}	1.191* (0.045)	1.255* (0.048)			1.172* (0.033)	1.176* (0.050)		
Electoral _{t-2}	-0.248* (0.048)	-0.319* (0.047)			-0.237* (0.031)	-0.312* (0.035)		
Liberal _{t-1}			1.268* (0.047)	1.281* (0.049)			1.230* (0.027)	1.209* (0.039)
Liberal _{t-2}			-0.312* (0.049)	-0.330* (0.047)			-0.288* (0.028)	-0.317* (0.034)
Ideological _{t-1}	-0.008 (0.006)		-0.007 (0.005)		-0.005 (0.003)		-0.005 (0.003)	
Affective _{t-1}		0.001 (0.005)		-0.001 (0.004)		-0.002 (0.004)		-0.003 (0.004)
Presidential _{t-1}	-0.004 (0.013)	0.004 (0.010)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.022* (0.006)	0.032* (0.012)	0.013* (0.005)	0.019 (0.011)
GDP _{t-1}	0.017 (0.013)	0.017 (0.027)	0.011 (0.013)	0.008 (0.029)	0.040* (0.011)	0.093* (0.027)	0.039* (0.013)	0.084* (0.023)
Gini _{t-1}	-0.00003 (0.005)	-0.0001 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.008* (0.003)	0.015 (0.008)	0.006* (0.003)	0.012 (0.006)
Resources _{t-1}	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.015 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.005)	-0.034 (0.021)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.026 (0.018)
Intercept	0.005 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.005 (0.011)	0.013 (0.013)				
Country FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N Observations	3578	2047	3578	2047	4508	4508	4508	4508
N Units	89	63	89	63	92	92	92	92
N Time Periods	45	45	45	45	49	49	49	49
Arellano-Bond Test					-1.325	-1.182	-0.375	-0.709
Hansen-Sargan Test					86	48	86	48

Note: *p<0.05. Values in parentheses give panel-corrected (OLS) or heteroskedasticity-consistent (GMM) standard errors. All real-valued variables unit-normalized.

Table S4: Testing the Effect of Democracy on Polarization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	<i>Pooled OLS</i>				<i>System GMM</i>			
	Ideological (1)	Affective (2)	Ideological (3)	Affective (4)	Ideological (5)	Affective (6)	Ideological (7)	Affective (8)
Ideological _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.033 (0.032)	0.037 (0.032)			-0.108* (0.017)	-0.108* (0.017)		
Affective _{<i>t</i>-1}			-0.149* (0.045)	-0.148* (0.045)			-0.120* (0.031)	-0.119* (0.031)
Electoral _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.218* (0.030)		-0.093* (0.045)		-0.300* (0.027)		-0.076* (0.031)	
Liberal _{<i>t</i>-1}		-0.206* (0.027)		-0.083 (0.044)		-0.290* (0.031)		-0.069* (0.032)
Growth _{<i>t</i>}	-0.013 (0.020)	-0.012 (0.020)	0.054 (0.045)	0.055 (0.045)	-0.020 (0.018)	-0.019 (0.018)	0.053 (0.028)	0.054 (0.028)
Gini _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.020 (0.019)	-0.022 (0.019)	0.010 (0.029)	0.009 (0.030)	-0.013 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.024)	0.005 (0.022)	0.005 (0.023)
Access _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.273* (0.119)	-0.292* (0.116)	0.112 (0.203)	0.096 (0.223)	-0.080 (0.049)	-0.085 (0.050)	0.022 (0.042)	0.021 (0.041)
Intercept	0.154 (0.095)	0.164 (0.092)	-0.063 (0.173)	-0.052 (0.183)				
Country FE	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N Observations	3844	3843	2013	2012	4508	4508	4508	4508
N Units	91	91	51	51	92	92	92	92
N Time Periods	49	49	44	44	49	49	49	49
Arellano-Bond Test					0.982	-0.95	0.975	-0.872
Hansen-Sargan Test					89	51	89	51

Note: *p<0.05. Values in parentheses give panel-corrected (OLS) or heteroskedasticity-consistent (GMM) standard errors. All real-valued variables unit-normalized.

S4 Binomial Logit Model Results

One additional strategy for capturing the extent to which polarization and backsliding are related is to determine whether democracy decreased in each country year relative to the prior year and evaluate how polarization contributes to whether or not democracy declines, regardless of how big or small the decline is. I pursue this strategy here by assigning each country-year a value of 1 if its level of democracy decreased relative to the prior year and a value of 0 otherwise. I then fit a binomial logit to these data with the temporal structure defined in (2) in the main text. Results, presented in Table S5, are consistent with what I find in other model specifications: polarization has a minimal effect on whether democracy declines in any given country-year. Only one of the coefficients associated with ideological and affective polarization achieve statistical significance at the $p < 0.05$ level. It should be noted, however, that these coefficients no longer carry an interpretation in terms of standard deviations, so they can not be compared directly to parameter estimates from other models or the thresholds for meaningful effects identified in the main text.

Table S5: Binomial Logit Models of Polarization and Backsliding

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Electoral	Liberal	Electoral	Liberal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ideological _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.082* (0.037)	-0.051 (0.036)		
Affective _{<i>t</i>-1}			-0.031 (0.047)	0.005 (0.046)
Presidential _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.100 (0.082)	0.075 (0.081)	0.196 (0.118)	0.170 (0.117)
GDP _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.011 (0.042)	0.019 (0.041)	0.142 (0.073)	0.171* (0.072)
Gini _{<i>t</i>-1}	-0.026 (0.037)	-0.008 (0.037)	-0.010 (0.047)	-0.003 (0.047)
Resources _{<i>t</i>-1}	0.041 (0.035)	0.028 (0.035)	0.094 (0.088)	0.076 (0.087)
Intercept	-0.613* (0.053)	-0.495* (0.052)	-0.716* (0.083)	-0.615* (0.082)
Observations	3,512	3,512	2,010	2,010
Log Likelihood	-2,298.007	-2,344.242	-1,306.021	-1,334.669
Akaike Inf. Crit.	4,608.014	4,700.483	2,624.042	2,681.338

Note: * $p < 0.05$. Values in parentheses give standard errors. All real-valued variables unit-normalized.

S5 Analysis by Regime Type

Figure S1 presents results of the negligible effects analysis in the main text, stratified by regime type.⁵ This analysis reveals some interesting variation: Although affective polarization is very weakly related to democracy in the full sample, this result may be a consequence of the phenomenon having different effects in different contexts. In particular, affective polarization appears to have a much more sizable effect in hybrid regimes and autocracies—contexts lacking in strong (or any) democratic institutions—whereas its effect in liberal democracies is actually positive, although still statistically insignificant in all cases.




Figure S1: Testing for a Negligible Effect of Polarization on Democracy. Point estimates correspond to δ in (2) and (3) in the main text. Error bars give 90% confidence intervals. Dotted lines represent $-\tau$ and τ for each dimension of democracy.

⁵I use the “Regimes of the World” index from the Varieties of Democracy project to determine regime classifications (Coppedge et al. 2020; Pemstein et al. 2020).

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