
Algorithm 1 Sustainable Backdoor Attack based on Steganographic Algorithm

Input: original image P and the string S that needs to be encrypted into P , current epoch e , start epoch E_s , attack num E_a , end epoch E_e , client set C , selected client set C_n , adversary client set C_{adv} , global model G , local model θ , central server C_s , aggregate algorithm $PartFedAvg$, benign datasets D , poisoned datasets D_p , benign learning rate η_b , poison learning rate η_p , PartFedAvg gradient removal scale $\mathcal{R}\%$

Output: a global model with high accuracy, stealth and robust backdoor and high accuracy in main-task

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1: Define encoder U-Net and decoder STN
2: while train U-Net and STN do
3:   sample = Concatenate(Normalize(Totensor( $P$ )), Totensor( $S$ ))
4:    $P_{res}$  = U-Net(sample)
5:    $P_{trigger}$  =  $P + P_{res}$ 
6:    $S_{decode}$  = STN( $P_{trigger}$ )
7:    $Loss$  =  $w_1 * P_{trigger} - P_{org} + w_2 * L_{LIPS} + w_3 * CrossEntropyLoss(S, S_{decode}) + w_4 * D_{fake}$ 
8:   Update U-Net and STN by  $Loss$ 
9:  $C_s$  select  $n$  clients by random into  $C_n$ ,  $C_s$  build a global model  $G$ ,  $C_s$  send  $G$  to each client in  $C_n$ 
10: for  $e < E_e$  and  $e < E_s + E_a$  do
11:   for the  $k$ -th client  $C_e^k$  in  $C_n$  do
12:     if  $C_e^k \in C_{adv}$  then
13:       poisoned dataset  $D_p$  = U-Net( $D$ ) +  $D$ 
14:       Download  $G$  as local model  $L$  and train by  $D_p$ ,
15:       Compute gradient by  $D_p$  on batch  $B_i$  of size  $\ell$ 
16:        $g_{e+1}^p = \frac{1}{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}(\theta_{C_e^k}, D_p)$ 
17:       for  $Value(g_{e+1}^p[x, y])$  in  $g_{e+1}^p$  do
18:         if  $Value(g_{e+1}^p[x, y]) \subseteq top_{5\%}(Value(g_{e+1}^p[x, y]))$  then
19:           Set  $g_{e+1}^p[x, y] = 0$ 
20:       Update  $\theta_{C_{e+1}^k} = \theta_{C_e^k}^k - \eta_p g_{e+1}^p$ 
21:       Upload  $\theta_{C_{e+1}^k}$  to  $C_s$ 
22:     else if client  $C_e^k \notin C_{adv}$  then
23:       Download  $G$  as local model  $L$  and train by  $D$ ,
24:       Compute gradient by  $D_b$  on batch  $B_i$  of size  $\ell$ 
25:        $g_{e+1}^b = \frac{1}{\ell} \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \nabla_{\theta} \mathcal{L}(\theta_{C_e^k}, D)$ 
26:       Update  $\theta_{C_{e+1}^k} = \theta_{C_e^k}^k - \eta_p g_{e+1}^b$ 
27:       Upload  $\theta_{C_{e+1}^k}$  to  $C_s$ 
28:    $C_s$  receive  $\sum_1^k \theta_{C_{e+1}^k}$  and randomly set  $\mathcal{R}\%$  of update  $\sum_1^k \theta_{C_{e+1}^k}$  to zero
29:   Generate update  $U_{e+1}$  for  $G_{e+1}$ 
30:    $G_{e+1} = G_e - U_{e+1}$ 
31: for epoch  $< E_e$  and epoch  $> E_s + E_a$  do
32:   Conduct normal federated learning client training, upload model updates, and update the global model.
33: return Final global model  $G$  with backdoor
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