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Prior Education Experience:

College of the Bahamas. Nassau, Bahamas. Fall 2001 – Summer 2002.
Economics, *Baccalaureate Student Speaker*

Duke University. Durham, NC. Fall 2002 – May 2006.
Physics (BSc) & Mathematics (BSc), *Magna Cum Laude*

Harvard University. Cambridge, MA. Fall 2006 – Spring 2010.
Physics (MSc), Doctoral Student

Graduate Education in Economics:

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2010 to present
Thesis Title: *"Essays in Residential Segregation and Educational Inequality"*
Expected Completion Date: June 2015

Thesis Committee and References:

Professor Todd Sinai
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Teaching and Research Fields:
Primary fields: Urban Economics, and Economics of Education
Secondary fields: Applied Microeconomic Theory and Development Economics

Teaching Experience/Preparation:

Spring 2012	Tax Policy Module (MBA), Wharton, TA for Professor Mark Duggan
Fall 2012	Nations Markets and Politics (MBA), Wharton, TA for Professor Stephen Golub
Spring 2014	Managerial Economics, Wharton, TA for Professor Eduardo Azevedo
Fall 2014	Real Estate Finance, Wharton, learning to teach course from Professor Todd Sinai

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2005	Barry Goldwater Scholarship
2006	Rhodes Scholarship (Finalist)
	University Seal Bearer at Graduation (Duke)
	Graduate Prize Fellowship (Harvard)
	Bell Labs Graduate Research Fellowship
2010	Wallace Noyes Fellowship
2011	NSF Graduate Research Fellowship
	Amy Morse Prize
	Lauder Ciber Travel Grant
	Fontaine Society Travel Grant
2013	Harvey Fellowship

Job Market Paper: *"The Effect of Outside Options on Neighborhood Tipping Points"*

Recent estimates of tipping points in the literature suggest that racial progress in the US has been slow. According to these estimates, the mean tipping point of US cities increased by 1 percentage point per decade – from 12% in 1970 to 14% in 1990 (Card et. al 2008). I develop a new method for estimating tipping points that depends on both the racial preferences of households and on their outside options – the minority composition of alternative neighborhoods in their city. Previous work has focused on racial preferences, ignoring the substantive role of outside options in tipping. I produce the first estimates of tipping points of individual census tracts within cities. These estimates paint a more optimistic picture of racial progress in the US: the mean tract-level tipping point has increased from 15% in 1970 to 42% in 2010; and the mean city tipping point has increased from 13% (1970) to 35% (2010). I show that the previous estimates of city (MSA) tipping points are smaller than my estimates because they are local averages of the tipping points of the marginal census tracts, i.e. those which are close to tipping. Because I estimate census tract tipping points, my city tipping points are averages of the tipping points of both marginal and inframarginal census tracts. I also find that the concentration of minorities in outside options play an increasingly important role in explaining differences in tipping points across cities, whereas racial preferences are declining in their importance over time. In 2010, a one standard deviation increase in the concentration of minorities in a city is associated with a 14 percentage point increase in the city tipping point – up from 1 percentage point in 1970. By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in racial preferences for minority neighbors in 2010 results in a 0.5 percentage point increase in a city's tipping point, down from 6.6 percentage points in 1970.

Working Papers

1. *"Elite Premia in Federal Funding to US Colleges & Universities"*

   Elite colleges and universities, those whose students' SAT scores place them in the top 2% of all colleges and universities, receive, on average, 40 times more federal funding than the median college or university. To test whether this allocation is efficient, I account for productivity-based features of elite colleges that distinguish them from non-elite institutions. After controlling for a reasonable set of productivity measures, I find reduced-form evidence that elite institutions receive, on average, 3 times more federal funding than the median college/university. Modeling the allocation of federal resources from the perspective of a social planner who maximizes aggregate productivity, I also find that elite universities receive 300 cents on the dollar, whereas the median university receives 86 cents on the dollar. These results suggest that there may be aggregate productivity gains associated with more redistribution to non-elite universities.

2. *"Why Don't Elite Colleges Expand Supply?" (joint w/ Professor Kent Smetters)*

   While both the skills premium and the demand for elite colleges has increased over time, elite colleges have not increased supply, choosing instead to reduce their admissions rates. To explain this, we propose a model in which colleges have utility over their selectivity relative to that of their peers. These preferences generate prestige externalities and multiple admissions equilibria. Calibrating our model to the data, it appears that colleges are coordinating on the low admission equilibrium, which is Pareto dominated by the high admissions equilibrium. Our model also creates several comparative statics that we test empirically.

3. *"Property Rights and Economic Development: A Caribbean Case Study"*

   Foreign direct investment represents an important share of GDP in many developing countries. In this paper, I take advantage of a natural policy experiment in the Bahamas to study how property rights for non-natives affect foreign direct investment and economic development. I employ a treatment/control methodology where the treatment is a change in Bahamian law that affected the ability of non-natives to buy and sell land in the Bahamas (1981-1993). I take Barbados, a similar Caribbean country, to be an appropriate control since the property rights of natives and non-natives in Barbados were unchanged during the period of observation. I find evidence that reduced protection of private property for non-natives discouraged foreign direct investment in the Bahamas but did not negatively impact GDP growth rates. I find that high levels of FDI resulting from investments in the Bahamian real estate market (~$150M) did not increase GDP growth rates significantly. These findings contribute to the growing literature on property rights in developing countries by identifying the impact of property rights for non-natives on foreign direct investment in real estate and subsequently, the impact of foreign direct investment in real estate on GDP growth rates.

4. *"Ties that Bind: Social Capital and Mobility"*
   The stability of a community depends on its members investing in a level of social capital that ties the household to the community. In the literature, the link between social capital and mobility is ambiguous. In some models, increased mobility reduces social capital (Glaeser et al. 2001), leading one to ask: why invest if exit is imminent? In other models (Fryer 2007), a higher exit probability endogenously increases the equilibrium level of social capital required for cooperation. In this paper, I show that both equilibria exist in a model in which social capital and human capital are substitutes and low levels of human capital, moreover, depreciate with increased mobility, i.e. labor markets with high mobility differential reduce the relative returns to low skill labor vis-à-vis the returns to high skill labor. As mobility increases, the model predicts a convergence in the social capital and human capital between places that started in opposing equilibria. Using data from 1790-1860, I construct four mobility metrics based on slave-holdings by states prior to abolition. I use slave-holdings by states as a proxy for initial black mobility in the state. Testing for a relationship between initial levels of black mobility and current trends in the achievement gap, I find that for each unit decrease in initial social mobility, the educational inequality index, a relative measure of the achievement gap measured by National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP), shrinks 2.7 times more quickly.

Invited Presentations

2010: Caribbean Science Foundation (Trinidad)
2011: University of the West Indies (SALISES), Central Bank of Barbados, Bank of Jamaica
2012: University of Chicago (Summer School on Inequality), Korean Military Academy, Lovely Professional University (Jalandhar, India)
2013: University of Chicago (MIP Conference on Segregation), IDB Tax Reform Symposium
2014: Wharton Applied Economics Faculty Seminar, NASRC Annual Conference (Washington, DC)

Workshops

2010: Advances with Field Experiments, PIER Conference on Political Economics
2012: Summer Institute on Behavioral Economics (Singapore)
2013: Price Theory Workshop, Wharton IDDEAS Minority Recruitment Workshop (Mentor)
2014: Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics Conference

Referee: *Journal of Public Economics, Management Science*
Profession Associations*: AEA, Urban Economics Association, National Economic Association*
Languages*: French (fluent)*