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## **EDUCATION**

Princeton University, Ph.D., Economics      2015 (exp.)

Princeton University, M.A., Economics      2012

Tsinghua University, B.A., Economics and Finance      2010

## **FIELDS**

Primary: Microeconomic Theory

Secondary: Finance

## **REFERENCES**

Professor Faruk Gul  
Department of Economics  
Princeton University  
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[fgul@princeton.edu](mailto:fgul@princeton.edu)

Professor Wolfgang Pesendorfer  
Department of Economics  
Princeton University  
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Professor Stephen Morris  
Department of Economics  
Princeton University  
609 258 4032  
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## **RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

Research Assistant for Professor Faruk Gul	2010 – 2015
Research Assistant for Professor Stephen Morris	2012

## **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Microeconomic Analysis: Basic for Professor Amy Craft	2014
Mathematics for Economics for Professor Jennifer Johnson	2013 – 2014
Junior Independent Work for Professor Avraham Ebenstein	2013 – 2014
Junior Independent Work for Professor Jakub Jurek	2012 – 2013
Statistics for Social Science for Professor Marc Ratkovic	2012

## **HONORS & SCHOLARSHIPS**

Goldfeld Summer Fellowship, Princeton University	2014
University Fellowship, Princeton University	2010 – 2015
Dean's List, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology	2009
National Undergraduate Research Grant, Tsinghua University	2008
1 <sup>st</sup> Class Scholarship for Academic Performance, Tsinghua University	2007 – 2009

## **RESEARCH PAPERS**

### **“Boundedly Rational Backward Induction” (Job Market Paper)**

We propose a model of backward induction with a decision maker who has limited understanding of continuation payoffs and her own future behavior. To an outside observer, her behavior appears stochastic and her choices become imperfect signals of her payoffs. Our axioms yield a two-parameter representation of the decision maker's behavior; one parameter characterizes her attitude towards complexity; i.e., her willingness to choose more complicated subtrees over simpler, shorter paths, the other her error-proneness. Our model nests fully rational backward induction as a limit of these parameters. We introduce and analyze a measure of complexity aversion and a measure of error-proneness. We apply our model to product assortment and advertising problems.

### **“The War of Advertising” (with Xingtan Zhang)**

We introduce a model of advertising competition between sellers with multiple products. By generalizing the logit/Luce formula, we allow advertisements to affect consumers' choice. Our

model exhibits a *concentration effect* where each seller's optimal strategy is to allocate all the advertising resources to one leading product. The product is selected according to an index that measures the tradeoff between a product's markup and its potential market share. When the opponent's cost of advertising decreases, a *flight-to-quality effect* in which the seller switches to advertising a high-utility-low-markup product, and a *spillover effect* in which the seller benefits from the opponent's change in advertising strategy are both possible. We identify an observable condition to predict which of them will be observed.

#### “Choice and Operational Risk in a Dynamic Model of Mistakes”

We propose a dynamic model of mistakes in which the decision maker chooses risky options. Our axioms yield a representation of the decision maker's behavior where the decision maker rationally anticipates her future mistakes, and might be averse to making choices. We introduce comparative measures of error-proneness and choice attitude, and characterize the decision model of logit quantal response equilibrium as a special case. We show that different from standard risk, when risk is induced by mistakes (operational risk), a future decision problem's expected value might increase when one of its options becomes worse.

### **RESEARCH IN PROGRESS**

“Endogenous Reasoning in Strategic Games”

“An Error-Robust Contract” (with Nemanja Antić)