YUMI KOH
http://economics.sas.upenn.edu/graduate-program/candidates/yumi-koh
kohym@sas.upenn.edu

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Placement Director: Iourii Manovskii	MANOVSKI@ ECON.UPENN.EDU	215-898-6880
Placement Director: Andrew Postlewaite	APOSTLEW@ECON.UPENN.EDU	215-898-7350
Graduate Student Coordinator: Kelly Quinn	KQUINN @ ECON.UPENN.EDU	215-898-5691

Office Contact Information:
3718 Locust Walk McNeil 160
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(+1) 267 414 3439

Personal Information:
Republic of Korea, F-1 Visa, Female

Undergraduate Studies:
B.A., Economics, Seoul National University, *summa cum laude*, 2009

Graduate Studies:
University of Pennsylvania, 2010 to present
Thesis Title: "Essays in Public Economics and Political Economy"
Expected Completion Date: June 2015

Thesis Committee and References:

Professor Antonio Merlo <Main Advisor>
Rice University, Dept of Economics
6100 Main Street Baker Hall
Houston, TX 77005
(+1) 713 348 3699, amerlo@rice.edu

Professor Holger Sieg
University of Pennsylvania, Dept of Economics
3718 Locust Walk McNeil Building
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(+1) 215 898 7194, holgers@econ.upenn.edu

Professor Kenneth I. Wolpin
University of Pennsylvania, Dept of Economics
3718 Locust Walk McNeil Building
Philadelphia, PA 19104
(+1) 713 348 2522, wolpink@econ.upenn.edu

Teaching and Research Fields:
Public Economics, Political Economy, Empirical Microeconomics

Teaching Experience:

Fall, 2014	Urban Fiscal Policy, Penn Economics, TA for Professor Holger Sieg
Fall, 2014	Law & Economics, Penn Economics, TA for Professor Camilo García-Jimeno
Spring, 2013	Managerial Economics, Wharton Business Economics and Public Policy, Recitation Instructor for Professor Jean-François Houde
Fall, 2012	Microeconomics For Managers : Foundations, Wharton MBA, Recitation Instructor for Professor Bruce Allen
Fall, 2012	Microeconomics For Managers : Advanced Applications, Wharton MBA, Recitation Instructor for Professor Neil A. Doherty

Spring, 2012 Managerial Economics, Wharton Business Economics and Public Policy, Recitation Instructor for Professor Judd Kessler

Research Experience and Other Employment:

Summer, 2012 Research Assistant for Professor Petra E. Todd
Spring, 2009 Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, Research Assistant
Winter, 2008 Korea Investment Trust Management Co. Ltd, Internship

Professional Activities:

Conference Presentation

Fall, 2014 University of Pennsylvania
Summer, 2014 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society Conference

Others

2012 - 2013 Organizer of Empirical Micro Club, University of Pennsylvania

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2010 - 2015 Scholarship, Samsung Foundation
2006 - 2009 Scholarship, Kwanjeong Educational Foundation

Research Papers:

"Universalism and Inefficiency in Distributive Politics " **(Job Market Paper)**

Abstract: While legislatures typically use majority rule to allocate a given budget in distributive legislation, near-unanimous consent over broad allocation of benefits is pervasive. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as "universalism." I study both theoretically and empirically how a legislature allocates a budget to fund local public projects in an omnibus bill under unanimous agreement. I develop a game-theoretic model where heterogeneous players strategically interact in a universal coalition to determine allocations, with non-cooperative bargaining as a threat point for the breakdown of cooperation. I structurally estimate the model to quantify the effects of political power and actual needs on the agreed-upon allocation. I analyze two types of inefficiencies which can arise in a distributive, omnibus bill with a given budget. First, political power in the legislature can distort budgetary allocations geographically. Second, money may be spent on inefficient projects, given a budgetary allocation. In the empirical application, I focus on a specific bill called the "Bridge Bill Capital Budget" passed in 1992, which is an omnibus of grants for replacement and repair of bridges in Pennsylvania. I construct a unique dataset from this bill that includes bridge-level data from the National Bridge Inventory and data on the political environment in the state legislature. I find that political power in the legislature induces large inefficiency by distorting the geographical outlay of money, but there is little inefficiency in the choice of bridges granted funds.

"Optimal Replacement of Bridges: A Dynamic Stochastic Discrete Choice Analysis"

Abstract: I estimate a dynamic stochastic discrete choice model to study the optimal timing of replacement of bridges. One feature of the decision-making process is that the actual bridge replacement takes place after monetary grant has been authorized by the state legislature. This paper complements my job market paper as it studies the optimal bridge replacement decision on the engineering side, after the authorization by the legislature. I solve a dynamic optimization problem where the engineer has rational expectations about the transition of the aggregate quantity and quality of the bridge stock. I use an equilibrium concept in which the transition of the stock of bridges generates self-fulfilling expectations of the engineer. Using data from the National Bridge Inventory, I estimate the model with a sample that consists of 5,560 observations of 544 randomly selected state bridges in Pennsylvania, which has the highest percentage of deficient bridges in the US. The empirical findings suggest that the state and expected evolution of the aggregate stock attributes as well as technical characteristics of individual bridges affect replacement decisions.

Programming Skills:

FORTRAN, MATLAB, STATA

Languages :

Korean(native), English(fluent), Spanish(basic)