Keshav Dogra

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Department of Economics Columbia University New York, NY 10027 (646) 552-1448 <u>kd2338@columbia.edu</u> <u>www.columbia.edu/~kd2338</u>

Placement Chair: Michael Riordan, email: mhr21@columbia.edu

Placement Assistant: Shane Bordeau, (212) 854-6881, email: stb2111@columbia.edu

Education:

2015 (expected) Ph.D.		Economics	Columbia University
2012	M.Phil.	Economics	Columbia University
2011	M.A.	Economics	Columbia University
2009	MSc	Economics	University of Edinburgh
2008	M.A.	Economics and Politics (first class)	University of Edinburgh

Fields of Specialization: Macroeconomics, International Macroeconomics

Job Market Paper:

"Liquidity traps, debt relief, and macroprudential policy: a mechanism design approach"

Abstract: I present a unified framework to analyze debt relief and macroprudential policies in a liquidity trap when households have private information. I develop a model with a deleveraging-driven recession and a liquidity trap in which households differ in their impatience, which is unobservable. Ex post debt relief stimulates the economy, but anticipated debt relief encourages overborrowing ex ante, making savers worse off. Macroprudential taxes and debt limits prevent the recession, but can harm impatient households, since the planner cannot directly identify and compensate them. I solve for optimal policy, subject to the incentive constraints imposed by private information. Optimal allocations can be implemented either by providing debt relief to moderate borrowers up to a maximum level, combined with a marginal tax on debt above the cap, or with ex ante macroprudential policy - a targeted loan support program, combined with a tax on excessive borrowing. These policies are ex ante Pareto improving in a liquidity trap; in normal times, however, they are purely redistributive. These results extend to economies with aggregate uncertainty, alternative sources of heterogeneity, and endogenous labor supply.

Working papers:

"Optimal debt restructuring and lending policy in a monetary union," November 2014

Abstract: I present a theoretical framework to understand sovereign debt crises in a monetary union and the optimal policy response to these crises. The risk of default encourages indebted countries to pay down their short term debt, depressing consumption demand throughout the union. This fall in demand can cause the monetary union to hit the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, leading to a union-wide recession. I evaluate three policies to prevent such a recession: debt relief, which writes off a portion

of short term debt; lending policy, which allows indebted countries to issue new debt at above-market prices; and debt postponement, which converts short into long term debt. I show that if countries can be prevented from retrading in secondary markets after debt restructuring, all three policies are equivalent, and are welfare improving. If retrading is possible, lending policy and debt postponement are superior to debt relief.

"Consumption volatility, liquidity constraints and household welfare," with Olga Gorbachev, October 2014. Revise and resubmit, *Economic Journal*

Abstract: We evaluate the impact of increased income uncertainty and financial liberalisation in the US on consumption volatility and household welfare. We estimate Euler equations and measure the volatility of unpredictable changes in consumption as the squared residuals. We directly control for liquidity constraints using SCF data on access to credit, and document that despite the increase in household debt between 1983 and 2007, there was no decline in the proportion of liquidity constrained households. Consumption volatility increased significantly over this period, especially for liquidity constrained households, indicating substantial welfare losses.

Work in progress:

"Optimal fiscal stimulus", November 2014

"Unemployment insurance, consumption smoothing, and the business cycle", September 2013

"Information choice and the propagation of wealth inequality," with James Best, June 2012

Seminar and Conference Presentations:

August 2010 European Economic Association Annual Congress, Glasgow

July 2014 Workshop presentation, University of Edinburgh

Honors and Awards:

2014-2015

2017 2013	Dissertation I chowship, GSI is, Columbia Chiversity
2009-2014	Doctoral Fellowship, Columbia University
2012	Wueller Award for best Graduate teaching assistant, Columbia University
2008	Mary Theresa Rankin Prize for highest grade in Economics Honours,
	University of Edinburgh

Dissertation Fellowship GSAS Columbia University

Research Experience:

2013-2014	Research Assistant for Ricardo Reis, Columbia University	
2011-2012	Research Assistant for Emi Nakamura and Jón Steinsson, Columb	
	University	
2008-2009	Research Assistant for Olga Gorbachev, University of Edinburgh	

Teaching Experience:

2011, 2012, 2013	Instructor, Summer Math Camp for incoming Economics Ph.D. students
Fall 2012	TA, Money and Banking (Perry Mehrling), Columbia University
Spring 2012	TA, Advanced Macroeconomics (Argia Sbordone), Columbia University

Fall 2011 TA, Math Methods for Economists (Ph.D. core; Rajiv Sethi), Columbia

University

Spring 2011 TA, Money and Banking (Stefania Albanesi), Columbia University Fall 2010 TA, Money and Banking (Noha Emara), Columbia University

2008-2009 TA, Economics 2 (Undergraduate Intermediate Micro and Macro; József

Sákovics, Santiago Sánchez-Páges, José V. Rodríguez Mora), University

of Edinburgh

Personal:

Citizenship: United Kingdom Language: English (Native)

References

Ricardo Reis (sponsor)
Department of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 851-4007
rreis@columbia.edu

Jennifer La'O
Department of Economics
Columbia University
(212) 854-4407
jenlao@columbia.edu

Michael Woodford Department of Economics Columbia University (212) 854-1094

michael.woodford@columbia.edu