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# A GRAMMAR OF PROOF

**Warrick Macmillan**

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## **Abstract**

Brief summary of research question, background, method, results...

# Preface

Acknowledgements, etc.

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# Introduction

The central concern of this thesis is the syntax of mathematics, programming languages, and their respective mutual influence, as conceived and practiced by mathematicians and computer scientists. From one vantage point, the role of syntax in mathematics may be regarded as a 2nd order concern, a topic for discussion during a Fika, an artifact of ad hoc development by the working mathematician whose real goals are producing genuine mathematical knowledge. For the programmers and computer scientists, syntax may be regarded as a matter of taste, with friendly debates recurring regarding the use of semicolons, brackets, and white space. Yet, when viewed through the lens of the propositions-as-types paradigm, these discussions intersect in new and interesting ways. When one introduces a third paradigm through which to analyze the use of syntax in mathematics and programming, namely Linguistics, I propose what some may regard as superficial detail, indeed becomes a central paradigm, with many interesting and important questions.

To get a feel for this syntactic paradigm, let us look at a basic mathematical example: that of a group homomorphism, as expressed in a variety of sources.

**Definition 1** *In mathematics, given two groups,  $(G, *)$  and  $(H, \cdot)$ , a group homomorphism from  $(G, *)$  to  $(H, \cdot)$  is a function  $h : G \rightarrow H$  such that for all  $u$  and  $v$  in  $G$  it holds that*

$$h(u * v) = h(u) \cdot h(v)$$

**Definition 2** *Let  $G = (G, \cdot)$  and  $G' = (G', *)$  be groups, and let  $\phi : G \rightarrow G'$  be a map between them. We call  $\phi$  a **homomorphism** if for every pair of elements  $g, h \in G$ , we have*

$$\phi(g * h) = \phi(g) \cdot \phi(h)$$

**Definition 3** *Let  $G, H$ , be groups. A map  $\phi : G \rightarrow H$  is called a group homomorphism if*

$$\phi(xy) = \phi(x)\phi(y) \text{ for all } x, y \in G$$

*(Note that  $xy$  on the left is formed using the group operation in  $G$ , whilst the product  $\phi(x)\phi(y)$  is formed using the group operation  $H$ .)*

**Definition 4** *Classically, a group is a monoid in which every element has an inverse (necessarily unique).*

We inquire the reader to pay attention to nuance and difference in presentation that is normally ignored or taken for granted by the fluent mathematician.

If one want to distill the meaning of each of these presentations, there is a significant amount of subliminal interpretation happening very much analagous to our innate lingusitic ussage. The inverse and identity are discarded, even though they are necessary data when defning a group. The order of presentation of information is incostent, as well as the choice to use symbolic or natural language information. In (3), the group operation is used implicitly, and its clarification a side remark.

Details aside, these all mean the same thing-don't they? This thesis seeks to provide an abstract framework to determine whether two lingusitically nuanced pre-senations mean the same thing via their syntactic transformations.

These syntactic transformations come in two flavors : parsing and linearization, and are natively handled by a Logical Framework (LF) for specifying grammars : Grammatical Framework (GF).

We now show yet another definition of a group homomorphism formalized in the Agda programming language:

[TODO: replace monoidhom with grouphom]

theres supposed to be agda here

```
monoidHom : {ℓ : Level}
  → ((monoid' a _ _ _ _ _ ) (monoid' a' _ _ _ _ _ ) : Monoid' {ℓ} )
  → (a → a') → Type ℓ
monoidHom
  (monoid' A ε _ • left-unit right-unit assoc carrier-set)
  (monoid' A1 ε1 _ •1 left-unit1 right-unit1 assoc1 carrier-set1)
  f
  = (m1 m2 : A) → f (m1 • m2) ≡ (f m1) •1 (f m2)
```

While the first three definitions above are should be linguistically comprehensible to a non-mathematician, this last definition is most certainly not. While may carry degree of comprehension to a programmer or mathematician not exposed to Agda, it is certainly comprehensible to a computer : that is, it typechecks on a computer where Cubical Agda is installed. While GF is designed for multilingual syntactic transformations and is targeted for natural language translation, it's underlying theory is largely based on ideas from the compiler communities. A cousin of the BNF Converter (BNFC), GF is fully capable of parsing progamming languages like Agda! And while the above definition is just another concrete syntactic presentation of a group homomorphism, it is distinct from the natural language presentations above in that the colors indicate it has indeed type checked.

While this example may not exemplify the power of Agda's type checker, it is of considerable interest to many. The typechecker has merely assured us that monoidHom, is a well-formed type. The type-checker is much more useful than is



immediately evident: it delegates the work of verifying that a proof is correct, that is, the work of judging whether a term has a type, to the computer. While it's of practical concern is immediate to any exploited grad student grading papers late on a Sunday night, its theoretical concern has led to many recent developments in modern mathematics. Thomas Hales solution to the Kepler Conjecture was seen as unverifiable by those reviewing it. This led to Hales outsourcing the verification to Interactive Theorem provers HOL Light and Isabelle, during which led to many minor corrections in the original proof which were never spotted due to human oversight.

Fields Medalist Vladimir Voevodsky, had the experience of being told one day his proof of the Milnor conjecture was fatally flawed. Although the leak in the proof was patched, this experience of temporarily believing much of his life's work invalid led him to investigate proof assistants as a tool for future thought. Indeed, this proof verification error was a key event that led to the Univalent Foundations Project [21].

While Agda and other programming languages are capable of encoding definitions, theorems, and proofs, they have so far seen little adoption, and in some cases treated with suspicion and scorn by many mathematicians. This isn't entirely unfounded : it's a lot of work to learn how to use Agda or Coq, software updates may cause proofs to break, and the inevitable errors we humans are instilled in these Theorem Provers. And that's not to mention that Martin-Löf Type Theory, the constructive foundational project which underlies these proof assistants, is rejected by those who dogmatically accept the law of the excluded middle and ZFC as the word of God.

It should be noted, the constructivist rejects neither the law of the excluded middle nor ZFC. She merely observes them, and admits their handiness in certain situations. Excluded middle is indeed a helpful tool, as many mathematicians may attest. The contention is that it should be avoided whenever possible - proofs which don't rely on it, or it's corollary of proof by contradiction, are much more amenable to formalization in systems with decidable type checking. And ZFC, while serving the mathematicians of the early 20th century, is lacking when it comes to the higher dimensional structure of n-categories and infinity groupoids.

What these theorem provers give the mathematician is confidence that her work is correct, and even more importantly, that the work which she takes for granted and references in her work is also correct. The task before us is then one of religious conversion. And one doesn't undertake a conversion by simply by preaching. Foundational details aside, this thesis is meant to provide a blueprint for the syntactic reformation that must take place.

It doesn't ask the mathematician to relinquish the beautiful language she has come to love in expressing her ideas. Rather, it asks her to make a compromise for the time being, and use a Controlled Natural Language (CNL) to develop her work. In exchange she'll get the confidence that Agda provides. Not only that, she'll be able to search through a library, to see who else has possibly already postulated and proved her conjecture. A version of this grandiose vision is explored in The

Formal Abstracts Project.

## Perspectives

...when it comes to understanding the power of mathematical language to guide our thought and help us reason well, formal mathematical languages like the ones used by interactive proof assistants provide informative models of informal mathematical language. The formal languages underlying foundational frameworks such as set theory and type theory were designed to provide an account of the correct rules of mathematical reasoning, and, as Gödel observed, they do a remarkably good job. But correctness isn't everything: we want our mathematical languages to enable us to reason efficiently and effectively as well. To that end, we need not just accounts as to what makes a mathematical argument correct, but also accounts of the structural features of our theorizing that help us manage mathematical complexity.[1]

### Linguistic and Programming Language Abstractions

The key development of this thesis is to explore the formal and informal distinction of presenting mathematics as understood by mathematicians and computer scientists by means of rule-based, syntax oriented machine translation.

Computational linguistics, particularly those in the tradition of type theoretical semantics[20], gives one a way of comparing natural and programming languages. Type theoretical semantics is concerned with the semantics of natural language in the logical tradition of Montague, who synthesized work in the shadows of Chomsky [2] and Frege [4]. This work ended up inspiring the GF system, a side effect of which was to realize that machine translation was possible as a side effect of this abstracted view of natural language semantics. Indeed, one such description of GF is that it is a compiler tool applied to domain specific machine translation. We may compare the “compiler view” of PLs and the “linguistics view” of NLs, and interpolate this comparison to other general phenomenon in the respective domains.

We will reference these programming language and linguistic abstraction ladders, and after viewing Figure 3, the reader should examine this comparison with her own knowledge and expertise in mind. These respective ladders are perhaps the most important or lens one should keep in mind while reading this thesis. Importantly, we should observe that the PL dimension, the left diagram, represents synthetic processes, those which we design, make decisions about, and describe formally. Alternatively, the NL abstractions on the right represent analytic observations. They are therefore subject to different, in some ways orthogonal, constraints.

The linguistic abstractions are subject to empirical observations and constraints, and this diagram only serves as an atlas for the different abstractions and relations between these abstractions, which may be subject to modifications depending on the linguist or philosopher investigating such matters. The PL abstractions as represented, while also an approximation, serves as an actual high altitude




Figure 1: PL (left) and NL (right) Abstraction Ladders

blueprint for the design of programming languages. While the devil is in the details and this view is greatly simplified, the representation of PL design is unlikely to create angst in the computer science communities. The linguistic abstractions are at the intersection of many fascinating debates between linguists, and there is certainly nothing close to any type of consensus among linguists which linguistic abstractions, as well as their hierarchical arrangement, are more practically useful, theoretically compelling, or empirically testable.

There are also many relevant concerns not addressed in either abstraction chain that are necessary to give a more comprehensive snapshot. For instance, we may consider intrinsic and extrinsic abstractions that diverge from the idealized picture. In PL extrinsic domain, we can inquire about

- systems with multiple interactive programming language
- how the programming languages behave with respect to given programs
- embedding programming languages into one another

Alternatively, intrinsic to a given PL, there picture is also not so clear. Agda, for example, requires the evaluation of terms during typechecking. It is implemented with 4.5 different stages between the syntax written by the programmers and the “fully reflected Abstract Syntax Tree (AST)”. But this example is perhaps an outlier, because Agda’s typechecker is so powerful that the design, implemenation, and use of Agda revolves around its type-checker, (which, ironically, is already called during the parsing phase). It is not anticipated that floating point computation, for instance, would ever be considered when implementing new features of Agda, at least not for the foreseeable future. Indeed, the ways Agda represents ASTs were an obstacle encountered doing this work, because deciding which parsing




Figure 2: GF in a nutshell

stage one should connect to the Portable Grammar Format (PGF) embedding is nontrivial.

Let's zoom in a little and observe the so-called front-end part of the compiler. Displayed in Figure 4 is the highest possible overview of GF. This is deceptively simple depiction of such a powerful and intricate system.

What makes GF so compelling is its ability to translate between inductively defined languages that type theorists define and relatively expressive fragments of natural languages, via the composition GF's parsing and linearization capabilities. It is in some sense the attempt to overlay the abstraction ladders that led to this development.

For natural language, some intrinsic properties might take place, if one chooses, at the neurological level, where one somehow can contrast the internal language, mechanism of externalization (generally speech), as proposed by Chomsky. Extrinsically to the linguistic abstractions depicted, pragmatics is absent, but of incredible interest in the field generally.

The point is to recognize there are stark differences between natural languages and programming languages which are even more apparent when one gets to certain abstractions. Classifying both programming languages and natural languages as languages is best read as an incomplete (and even sometimes contradictory) metaphor, due to perceived similarities (of which there are ample).

Nonetheless, the point of this thesis is to take a crack at that exact question : how can one compare programming and natural languages, in the sense that a natural language, when restricted to a small enough (and presumably well-behaved) domain, behaves as a programming language. Simultaneously, we probe the topic of Natural Language Generation (NLG). Given a logic or type system with some theory inside (say arithmetic over the naturals), how do we not just find a natural language representation which interprets our expressions, but also does so in a way that is linguistically coherent in a sense that a competent speaker can read such an expression and make sense of it.

The specific linguistic domain we focus on, that of mathematics, is a particular sweet spot at the intersection of these natural and formal language spaces. It should be noted that this problem, that of translating between formal (in a PL or logic) and informal (in linguistic sense) mathematics as stated, is both vague and difficult. It is difficult in both the practical sense, that it may be either of infeasible complexity or even perhaps undecidable. But it is also difficult in the philosophical sense, that it is a question which one may entertain arguments which a priori may deflate its effectiveness or meaningfulness. Like all collective human endeavors, mathematics is a historical construction - that is, its conventions, notations, understanding, methodologies, and means of publication and distribution have all been in a constant flux. While in some sense the mathematics today can be seen today as a much refined version of whatever the Greeks or Egyptians were doing, there is no consensus on what mathematics is, how it is to be done, and most relevant for this treatise, how it is to be expressed.

We present a sketch of the difference of this so-called formal/informal distinction. Mathematics, that is mathematical constructions like numbers and geometrical figures, arose out of ad-hoc needs as human cultures grew and evolved over the millennia. Indeed, just like many of the most interesting human developments of which there is a sparsely documented record until relatively recently, it is likely to remain a mystery what the long historical arc of mathematics could have looked like in the context of human evolution. And while mathematical intuitions precede mathematical constructions (the spherical planet precedes the human use of a ruler compass construction to generate a circle), we should take it as a starting point that mathematics arises naturally out of our linguistic capacity. This may very well not be the case, or at least not universally so, but it is impossible to imagine humans developing mathematical constructions elaborating anything particularly general without linguistic faculties. Despite whatever empirical or philosophical dispute one takes with this linguistic view of mathematical abilities, we seek to make a first order approximation of our linguistic view for the sake of this work. The discussion around mathematics relation to linguistics generally, regardless of the stance one takes, should benefit from this work.

## Formalization and Informalization

Formalization is the process of taking an informal piece of natural language mathematics, embedding it in into a theorem prover, constructing a model, , working with types instead of sets. This often requires significant amounts of work, and if the proof is big enough, warrants the title *proof engineering*. We note some interesting artifacts about a piece of mathematics being formalized:

- it may be formalized differently by two different people in many different ways
- it may have to be modified, to include hidden lemmas, to correct of an error, or other bureaucratic obstacles
- it may not type check, and only be presumed hypothetically to be 'a correct formalization' given evidence

Informalization, on the other hand is a process of taking a piece formal syntax, and turning it into a natural language utterance, along with commentary motivating and or relating it to other mathematics. It is a clarification of the meaning of a piece of code, suppressing certain details and sometimes redundantly reiterating other details.

Mathematicians working in either direction know this is a respectable task, often leading to new methods, abstractions, and research altogether. And just as any type of machine translation, rule-based or statistical, for a Virginia Woolf novel or Emily Dickinson poem from English to Mandarin would be entirely laughable, so to would the pretense that the methods we explore here using GF could actually match the competence of mathematicians translating work between a computer a book. Despite the futility of beating a mathematician at proof translation, it shouldn't deter those so inspired to try.

## Syntactic Completeness and Semantic Adequacy

The GF pipeline, that of bidirectional translation through an intermediary abstract syntax representation, has, two fundamental criteria that must be assessed for one to judge the success of an approach over both formalization and informalization.

The first criterion mentioned above, which we'll call *syntactic completeness*, asks the following : given an utterance or natural language expression that a mathematician might understand, does the GF grammar emit a well-formed syntactic expression in the target logic or programming language? [Example?]

This problem is certain to be infeasible in many cases - a mathematician might not be able to reconstruct the unstated syntactic details of a proof in a discipline outside her expertise, it is at worthy pursuit to ask why it is so difficult! Additionally, one does not know a priori that the generated expression in the logic has its intended meaning, other than through some meta verification procedure.

Conversely, given a well formed syntactic expression in, for instance, Agda, one can ask if the resulting English expression generated by GF is *semantically adequate*. This notion of semantic adequacy is also delicate, as mathematicians themselves may dispute, for instance, the proof of a given proposition or the correct definition of some notion. However, if it is doubtful that there would be many mathematicians who would not understand some standard theorem statement and proof in an arbitrary introductory analysis text, even if one may dispute it's presentation, clarity, pedagogy, or other pedantic details. Whether one asks that semantic adequacy means some kind of sociological consensus among those with relevant expertise, or a more relaxed criterion that some expert herself understands the argument, a dubious perspective in scientific circles, semantic adequacy should appease at least one and potentially more mathematicians.

We introduce these terms, syntactic completeness and semantic adequacy, to highlight a perspective and insight that seems to underlie the biggest differences between informal and formal mathematics. We claim that mathematics, as done on

a theorem prover, is a syntax oriented endeavor, whereas mathematics, as practiced by mathematicians, prioritizes semantic understanding. Developing a system which is able to formalize and informalize utterances which preserve syntactic completeness and semantic adequacy, respectively, is probably infeasible. Even introducing objective criteria to really judge these terms is likely to be infeasible.

This perspective represents an observation, and not intended to judge whether the syntactic or semantic perspective on mathematics is better - there is a dialectical phenomena between the two. Let's highlight some advantages both provide, and try to distinguish more precisely what a syntactic and semantic perspective may be.

When the Agda user builds her proof, she is outsourcing much of the bookkeeping to the type-checker. This isn't purely a mechanical process though, she often does have to think, how her definitions will interact with downstream programs, as well as whether they are even sensible to begin with (i.e. does this have a proof). The syntactic side is expressly clear from the readers perspective as well. If Agda proofs were semantically coherent, one would only need to look at code, with perhaps a few occasional remarks about various intentions and conclusions, to understand the mathematics being expressed. Yet, papers are often written exclusively in Latex, where Agda proofs have had to be reverse engineered, preserving only semantic details and forsaking syntactic nuance. Oftentimes the code is kept in the appendix so as to provide a complete syntactic blueprint. But the act of writing an Agda proof and reading them are often orthogonal, as the term somehow shadows the application of typing rules which enable its construction. In some sense, the construction of the proof is entirely engaged with the types, whereas the human witness of a large term is either lost as to why it fulfills the typing judgment, they have to reexamine parts of the proof reasoning in their head or perhaps, again, try to build it interactively with Agda's help.

Even in cases where Agda code is included in a paper, it is most often the types which are emphasized and produced. Complex proof terms are seldom to be read on their own terms. The natural language description and commentary is still largely necessary to convey whatever results, regardless if the Agda code is self-contained. And while literate Agda is some type of bridge, it is still the commentary which in some sense unfolds the code and ultimately makes the Agda code legible.

This is particularly pronounced in the Coq programming language, where proof terms are built using Ltac, which can be seen as some kind of imperative syntactic metaprogramming over the core language, Gallina. The user rarely sees the internal proof tree that one becomes familiar with in Agda. The tactics are not typed, often feel very adhoc, and tacticals, sequences of tactics, may carry very little semantic value (or even possibly muddy one's understanding when reading proofs with unknown tactics). Indeed, since Ltac isn't itself typed, it often descends into the sorrows of so-called untyped languages (which are really uni-typed), and there are recent attempts to change this [6] [14]. From our perspective, the use of tactics is an additional syntactic obfuscation of what a proof should look like from the mathematicians perspective - and attempt to remedy this is. Alecytron is one impressive development in giving Coq proofs more readability through a interac-



tive back-end which shows the proof state, and offers other semantically appealing models like interactive graphics [13]. This kind of system could and should inspire other proof assistants to allow for experimentation with syntactic alternative to code.

Tactics obviously have their uses, and sometimes enhance high level proof understanding, as tactics like *ring* or *omega* often save the reader overhead of parsing pedantic and uninformative details. And for certain proofs, especially those involving many hundreds of cases, the metaprogramming facilities actually give one exclusive advantages not offered to the classical mathematician using pen and paper. Nonetheless, the dependent type theorist's dream that all mathematicians begin using theorem provers in their everyday work is largely just a dream, and with relatively little mainstream adoption by mathematicians, the future is all but clear.

Mathematicians may indeed like some of the facilities theorem provers provide, but ultimately, they may not see that as the "essence" of what they are doing. What is this essence? We will try to shine a small light on perhaps the most fundamental question in mathematics.

## What is a proof?

A proof is what makes a judgment evident [11].

The proofs of Agda, and any programming language supporting proof development, are *formal proofs*. Formal proofs have no holes, and while there may very well be bugs in the underlying technologies supporting these proofs, formal proofs are seen as some kind of immutable form of data. One could say they provide [?] for judgments, which themselves are objective entities when encoded on a computer. What we call formal proofs might provide a science fiction writer an interesting thought experiment as regards communicating mathematics with an alien species incapable of understanding our language otherwise. Formal proofs, however, certainly don't appease all mathematicians writing for other mathematicians.

Mathematics, and the act of proving theorems, according to Brouwer is a social process. And because social processes between humans involve our linguistic faculties, as we hope to elucidate what a proof with a simplified description. Suppose we have two humans,  $h_1$  and  $h_2$ . If  $h_1$  claims to have a proof  $p_1$ , and elaborates it to  $p_2$  who claims she can either verify  $p_1$  or reproduce and re-articulate it via  $p'_1$ , such that  $h_1$  and  $h_2$  agree that  $p_1$  and  $p'_1$  are equivalent, then they have discovered some mathematics. In fact, in this guise mathematics, can be viewed as a science, even if in fact it is constructed instead of discovered.

An apt comparison is to see the mathematician as architect, whereas the computer scientist responsible for formalizing the mathematics is a civil engineer. The mathematics is the building which, like all human endeavors, is created via resources and labor of many people. The role of the architect is to envision the facade, the ex-

terior layer directly perceived by others, giving a building its character, purpose, and function. The engineer is on the other hand, tasked with assuring the building gets built, doesn't collapse, and functions with many implicit features which the user of the building may not notice : the running water, insulation, and electricity. Whereas the architect is responsible for the building's *specification*, the engineer is tasked with its *implementation*.

We claim informal proofs are specifications and formal proofs are implementations. Additionally, via the propositions-as-types interpretation, one may see a logic as a specification and a PL as an implementation of a given logic, often with multiple ways of assigning terms to a given type. Therefore, one may see the mathematician ambiently developing a theorem in classical first order logic as providing a specification of a proposition in that language, whereas a given implementation of that theorem in Agda could be viewed as a model construction of some NL fragment, where truth in the model would correspond to termination of type-checking. Alternatively, during the informalization process, two different authors may suppress different details, or phrase a given utterance entirely differently, possibly leading to two different, but possibly similar proofs. Extrapolating our analogy, the same way, two architects hypothetically, given the same engineering plans, could produce two entirely different looking buildings.

There isn't a natural notion of equivalence between informal and formal proofs, but rather, loosely, some kind of adjunction in the categorical sense between these two sets. We note the fact that the "acceptable" Natural language utterances aren't inductively defined precludes us from actually constructing a canonical mathematical model of formal/informal relationship, but we most certainly believe that if the GF perspective of translation is used, there at least an approximation of what a model may look like.

Mathematicians seek model independence in their results (i.e., they don't need a direct encoding of Fermat's last theorem in set theory in order to trust its validity). This is one possible reason why there is so much reluctance to adopt proof assistant, because the implementation of a result in Coq, Agda, or HOL4 may lead to many permutations of the same result, each presumably representing the same piece of knowledge with. It's also noted a proof doesn't obey the same universality that it does when it's on paper or verbalized - that Agda 2.6.2, and its standard library, when updated in the future, may break current developments, and proofs. While this is a unanimous problem with all software, we believe the GF approach offers at least a vision of not only linguistic, but also foundation independence with respect to mathematics.

This thesis examines not just a practical problem, but touches many deep issues in some space in the intersection of the foundations, both practical and philosophical, of mathematics, logic, computer science, and their relations studied via linguistic formalisms. These subjects, and their various relations, are the subject of countless hours of work and consideration by many great minds. We barely scratches the surface of a few of these developments, but it nonetheless, it is hoped, provides a nontrivial perspective at many important issues.

Recapitulating much of what was said, we hope that the following questions may have a new perspective :

- what are mathematical objects ?
- how do their encodings in different foundational formalisms affect their interpretations ?
- how does mathematics develop as a social process ?
- how does what mathematics is and how it is done rely on given technologies of a given historical era. ?

While various branches of linguistics have seen rapid evolution due to, in large part, their adoption of mathematical tools, the dual application of linguistic tools to mathematics is quite sparse and open terrain. We hope the reader can walk away with an new appreciation to some of these questions and topics after reading this. These nuances we will not explore here, but shall be further elaborated in the future and and more importantly, hopefully inspire other readers to respond accordingly.

Although not given in specific detail, the view of what mathematics is, in both a philosophical and mathematical sense, as well as from the view of what a foundational perspective, requires deep consideration in its relation to linguistics. And while this work is perhaps just a finer grain of sandpaper on an incomplete and primordial marble sculpture, it is hoped that the sculptor's own reflection is a little bit more clear after we polish it here.

## Previous Work

There is a story that at some point, Göran Sundholm and Per Martin-Löf were sitting at a dinner table, discussing various questions of interest to the respective scholars, and Sundholm presented Martin-Löf with the problem of Donkey Sentences in natural language semantics, those analogous ‘Every man who owns a donkey beats it’. This had been puzzling to those in the Montague tradition, whereby higher order logic didn’t provide facile ways of interpreting these sentences. Martin-Löf apparently then, using his dependent type constructors, provided an interpretation of the donkey sentence on the back of the napkin. This is perhaps the genesis of Dependent Type Theory in natural language semantics. The research program was thereafter taken up by Martin-Löf’s student Aarne Ranta [20], bled into the development of GF, and has now in some sense led to this current work.

The prior exploration of these interleaving subjects is vast, and we can only sample the available literature here. Indeed, there are so many approaches that this work should be seen in a small (but important) case in the context of a deep and broad literature [7]. Acquiring expertise in such a breadth of work is outside the scope of this thesis. Our approach, using GF ASTs as a basis language for Mathematics and the logic the mathematical objects are described in, is both distinct but has many roots and interconnections with the remaining literature. The success of finding a suitable language for mathematics will obviously require a comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in the goals in such a vast bibliography. How the GF approach compares with this long merits careful consideration and future work.

It will function of our purpose, constrained by the limited scope of this work, to focus on a few important resources.

### Ranta

The initial considerations of Ranta were both oriented towards the language of mathematics [15], as well as purely linguistic concerns [20]. In the treatise, Ranta explored not just the many avenues to describe NL semantic phenomena with Dependent Types, but, after concentrating on a linguistic analysis, he also proposed a primitive way of parsing and sugaring these dependently typed interpretations of utterances into the strings themselves - introducing the common nouns as types idea which has been since seen great interest from both type theoretic and linguistic communities [9]. Therefore, if we interpret the set of men and the set of donkeys as types, e.g. we judge  $\vdash \text{man} : \text{type}$  and  $\vdash \text{donkey} : \text{type}$  where type really denotes a universe, and ditransitive verbs “owns” and “beats” as predicates, or dependent types over the CN types, i.e.  $\vdash \text{owns} : \text{man} \rightarrow \text{donkey} \rightarrow \text{type}$  we can interpret the sentence “every man who owns a donkey beats it” in DTT via the following judgment :

$$\Pi z : (\Sigma x : \text{man}. \Sigma y : \text{donkey}. \text{owns}(x, y)). \text{beats}(\pi_1 z, \pi_1(\pi_2 z))$$

We note that the natural language quantifiers, which were largely the subject of Montague’s original investigations [12], find a natural interpretation as the dependent product and sum types,  $\Pi$  and  $\Sigma$ , respectively. As type theory is constructive, and requires explicit witnesses for claims, we admit the behavior following semantic interpretation : given a man  $m$ , a donkey  $d$  and evidence  $m - owns - d$  that the man owns the donkey, we can supply, via the term of the above type applied to our own tripple  $(m, d, m - owns - d)$  , evidence that the man beats the donkey,  $beats(m, d)$  via  $pi_1$  and  $pi_2$ , the projections, or  $\Sigma$  eliminators.

In the final chapter of [20], *Sugaring and Parsing*, Ranta explores the explicit relation, and of translation between the above logical form and the string, where he presents a GF predecessor in the Alfa proof assistant, itself a predecessor of Agda. To accomplish this translation he introduces an intermediary , a functional phrase structure tree, which later becomes the basis for GFs abstract syntax. What is referred to as “sugaring” later changes to “linearization”.

Soon thereafter, GF became a fully realized vision, with better and more expressive parsing algorithms [8] developed in Göteborg allowed for sugaring that can largely accommodate morphological features of the target natural language [3], the translation between the functional phrase structure (ASTs) and strings [16].

Interestingly, the functions that were called *ambiguation* :  $MLTT \rightarrow \{PhraseStructure\}$  and *interpretation* :  $\{PhraseStructure\} \rightarrow MLTT$  were absorbed into GF by providing dependently typed ASTs, which allows GF not just to parse syntactic strings, but only parse semantically well formed, or meaningful strings. Although this feature was in some sense the genesis that allowed GF to implement the linguistic ideas from the book [18], it has remained relatively limited in terms of actual GF programmers using it in their day to day work. Nonetheless, it was intriguing enough to investigate briefly during the course of this work as one can implement a programming language grammar that only accepts well typed programs, at least as far as they can be encoded via GF’s dependent types [10]. Although GF isn’t designed with TypeChecking in mind explicitly, it would be very interesting to apply GF dependent types in the more advanced programming languages to filter parses of meaningless strings.

While the semantics of natural language in MLTT is relevant historically, it is not the focus of this thesis. Its relevance comes from the fact that all these ideas were circulating in the same circles - that is, Ranta’s writings on the language of mathematics, his approach to NL semantics, and their confluence among other things, with the development of GF. This led to the development of a natural language layer to Alfa [5], which in some sense can be seen as a direct predecessor to this work. In some sense, the scope of work seeks to recapitulate what was already done in 1998 - but this was prior to both GF’s completion, and Alfa’s hard fork to Agda.

## Prior GF Formalizations

Prior to the grammars explored thin this thesis, Ranta produced two main results [17] [19]. These are incredibly important precedents in this approach to

proof translation, and serve as important comparative work for which this work responds. In [17], Ranta designed a grammar which allowed for predicate logic with domain specific lexicon supporting mathematical theories on top of the logic like geometry or arithmetic. The the syntax was both meant to be relatively complete, so that typical logical utterances of interest could be accommodated, as well as relatively non-trivial linguistic nuance including lists of terms, predicates, and propositions, in-situ and bounded quantification, and multiple forms of constructing more syntactically nuanced predicates. The syntactic nuance captured in this work was by means of an extended grammar, via a Portable Grammar Format (PGF), on top of the minimal, core logical formalism.

One could translate from the core and extended via a denotational semantics approach. The tree representing the *syntactically complete* phrase “for all natural numbers  $x$ ,  $x$  is even or  $x$  is odd” would be evaluated to a tree which linearizes to the *semantically adequate* phrase “every natural number is even or odd”. In the opposite direction, the desugaring of a logically informal statement into something linguistically idiomatic is also accomplished. In some sense, this grammar serves as a case study for what this thesis is trying to do. However, we note that the core logic only supports propositions without proofs - it is not a type theory with terms. This means that we are being slightly abusive to our terms, as the formal/informal translation is taking place is at the PGF level. The GF translation between concrete syntaxes supports multiple NLs, but the syntactic completeness has no mechanism of verification via Agda’s type checker. Additionally, the domain of arithmetic is an important case study, but scaling this grammar (or any other, for that matter) to allow for *semantic adequacy* of real mathematics is still far away, or as Ranta concedes, “it seems that text generation involves undecidable optimization problems that have no ultimate automatic solution.” It would be interesting to further extend this grammar with both terms and an Agda-like concrete syntax.

In 2014, Ranta gave an unpublished talk at the Stockholm Mathematics seminar [19]. Fortunately the code is available, although many of the design choices aren’t documented in the grammar. This project aimed to provide a translation like the one desired in our current work, but it took a real piece of mathematics text as the main influence on the design of the Abstract syntax.

This work took a page of text from Peter Aczel’s book which more or less goes over standard HoTT definitions and theorems, and allows the translation of the latex to a pidgin logical language. The central motivation of this grammar was to capture, entirely “real” natural language mathematics, i.e. that which was written for the mathematician. Therefore, it isn’t reminiscent of the slender abstract syntax the type theorist adores, and sacrificed “syntactic completeness” for “semantic adequacy”. This means that the abstract syntax is much larger and very expressive, but it no longer becomes easy to reason about and additionally quite ad-hoc. Another defect is that this grammar overgenerates, so producing a unique parse from the PL side will become tricky. Nonetheless, this means that it’s presumably possible to carve a subset of the GF HoTT abstract file to accommodate an Agda program, but one encounters rocks as soon as one begins to dig. For example, in Figure 3 is some rendered latex taken verbatim from Ranta’s test code.

**Definition:** A type  $A$  is contractible, if there is  $a : A$ , called the center of contraction, such that for all  $x : A$ ,  $a = x$ .

**Definition:** A map  $f : A \rightarrow B$  is an equivalence, if for all  $y : B$ , its fiber,  $\{x : A \mid fx = y\}$ , is contractible. We write  $A \simeq B$ , if there is an equivalence  $A \rightarrow B$ .

Figure 3: Rendered Latex

```
isContr ( A : Set ) : Set = ( a : A ) ( * ) ( ( x : A ) -> Id ( a ) ( x ) )

Equivalence ( f : A -> B ) : Set =
  ( y : B ) -> ( isContr ( fiber it ) ) ; ; ;
  fiber it : Set = ( x : A ) ( * ) ( Id ( f ( x ) ) ( y ) )
```

Figure 4: Pidgin cubicalTT

```
isContr : (A : Set) → Set
isContr A =  $\Sigma$  A  $\lambda$  a → (x : A) → (a ≡ x)

Equivalence : (A B : Set) → (f : A → B) → Set
Equivalence A B f =  $\forall$  (y : B) → isContr (fiber' y)
where
  fiber' : (y : B) → Set
  fiber' y =  $\Sigma$  A ( $\lambda$  x → y ≡ f x)
```

Figure 5: Agda

With some of hours of tinkering on the pidgin logic concrete syntax and some reverse engineering with help from the GF shell, one is able to get these definitions in Figure 4, which are intended to share the same syntactic space as cubicalTT. We note the first definition of “contractability” actually runs in cubicalTT up to renaming a lexical items, and it is clear that the translation from that to Agda should be a benign task. However, the *equivalence* syntax is stuck with the artifact from the bloated abstract syntax for the of the anaphoric use of “it”, which may presumably be fixed with a few hours more of tinkering, but becomes even more complicated when not just defining new types, but actually writing real mathematical proofs, or relatively large terms. To extend this grammar to accommodate a chapter worth of material, let alone a book, will not just require extending the lexicon, but encountering other syntactic phenomena that will further be difficult to compress when defining Agda’s concrete syntax.

Additionally, we give the Agda code in Figure 5, so-as to see what the end result of such a program would be. The astute reader will also notice a semantic in the pidgin rendering error relative to the Agda implementation. `fiber` has the type `it : Set` instead of something like `(y : B) : Set`, and the `y` variable is unbound in the `fiber` expression. This demonstrates that to design a grammar prioritizing *semantic adequacy* and subsequently trying to incorporate *syntactic completeness*

becomes a very difficult problem. Depending on the application of the grammar, the emphasis on this axis is most assuredly a choice one should consider up front.

While both these grammars have their strengths and weaknesses, one shall see shortly that the approach in this thesis, taking an actual programming language parser in Backus-Naur Form Converter (BNFC), GFifying it, and trying to use the abstract syntax to model natural language, gives in some sense a dual challenge, where the abstract syntax remains simple, but its linearizations become must increase in complexity.

## Mohan Ganesalingam

Perhaps the most substantial analysis of the linguistic perspective on written mathematics comes from Ganesalingam. This work presents a substantial model using Discourse Representation Theory to capture

One of the most important precedents for this current work was published in a book called *The Language of Mathematics* by Mohan

there is a considerable gap between what mathematicians claim is true and what they believe, and this mismatch causes a number of serious linguistic problems [? ]

-for equality section Sense vs reference, in some sense mathematics should be concerned with the reference of mathematical claims, independent of the language they are being stated in. The abstractions of mathematics, while compositionally built out of the piece (which, classically, end up as sets), behave like their own things, with emergent properties (What Buckminster Fuller describes as synergy) so that in the same way that a helium molecule's behavior is not theoretically tractable (numerical approximations are necessary) much of mathematics is similar

also think, analytic vs synthetic distinction

this gives us a new perspective on HoTT, because the description of spaces and other topological constructions, via HITs, uses a more sophisticated foundational machinery to connect the semantic intuition of a space with its syntactic description (rather than defining Homotopies classically over  $\mathbb{R}$  or  $\mathbb{C}$ , etc)

- this is a current phenomena

" meaningful statements in some underlying logic. If it was pointed out that a particular sentence had no translation into such a logic, a mathematician would genuinely feel that they had been insufficiently precise. (The actual translation into logic is never performed, because it is exceptionally laborious; "

" mathematics has a normative notion of what its content should look like; there is no analogue in natural languages. "



### 1.2.3 full adaptivity

" From a linguistic perspective, the formal mode is more novel and interesting because it is restricted enough to describe completely, both in terms of syntax and semantics. By contrast, the informal mode seems as hard to describe as general natural language. We will therefore look only at mathematics in the formal mode. "

## Section 2

" The primary function of symbolic mathematics is to abbreviate material that would be too cumbersome to state with text alone. Thus a sentence "

" Because symbolic material functions primarily in an abbreviative capacity, symbolic mathematics tends to occur inside textual mathematics rather than vice versa. Thus mathematical texts are largely composed out of textual "

" adaptivity a phenomenon that is much more remarkable than the use of symbols. Mathematical language expands as more mathematics is encountered. The kind of "

" Thus definitions always contain enough information to fully specify the semantics of the material being defined. "

" As a result, textual mathematics predominantly uses the third person singular and third person plural, to denote individual "

" verbs, typically to refer to the mutual intent of the author and reader. Working mathematicians treat mathematical objects as if they were Platonic ideals, timeless objects existing independently of the physical world. The "

" The limited variation in person and tense means that inflectional morphology plays only a small part in mathematical language. The only morphological "

"The syntax of textual mathematics also exhibits relatively limited variation."

this means that textual mathematics can be effectively captured by a context-free grammar (in the sense of (Jurafsky and Martin, 2009, p. 387)).

In contrast to the morphology and syntax of textual mathematics, its lexicon is remarkably varied. As we have noted above, the mechanism of

no tense or events no intentionality no modality

" usual. To a first approximation, mathematics does not exhibit any pragmatic phenomena: the meaning of a mathematical sentence is merely its compositionally determined semantic content, and nothing more. In order to state this point "

" Due to the absence of pragmatic phenomena, phenomena which are sometimes

analysed as semantic and sometimes analysed as pragmatic can be treated as being purely semantic where they occur in mathematics, i.e. they can be analysed in purely truth-conditional terms. This applies particularly to presuppositions, which play an important role in mathematics. Because "

" Thus, in some intuitive sense, syntax is dependent on the types of expressions in a way that does not occur in existing formal languages. As we will show in §3.2 and Chapter 4, this notion of type is too semantic itself to be formalised in syntactic terms. In other words, the type of an expression is too closely related to what that expression refers to for purely syntactic notions of type to be applicable. "

" most ambiguity in mathematics is not noticed by mathematicians, just as the extensive ambiguity in natural languages is "simply not noticed by the majority of language "

" in an extremely compact manner. In essence, they serve as a mathematical alternative to anaphor. They cannot be eliminated precisely because anaphor "

reanalysis

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be equal as distinct. In both cases, a disparity between the way we think about mathematical objects and the way they are formally defined causes our linguistic theories to make incorrect predictions. In order to obtain the correct predictions about language, we need to make sure that the formal situation matches actual usage.

mal proofs are provided; and the cycle repeats. Thus informal mathematics changes over the centuries. 187

engineers are motivated by needs and desires (emirical, descriptive, practical) , whereas mathematicians are much more idealistic in their pursuits, almost comparable to a stance on religious scripture

mathematics developing over time is natural, the more and deeper we dig into the ground, the more we develop refinements of what kind of tools we are using, develop better iterations of the same tools (or possibly entirely new ones) as well as knowledge about the ground in which we are digging (these are adjoining)

in some sense the library of babel problem, whereby we don't just discover predefined ideas by randomly sampling bags of words, but we have to work with hard labor, sweat, and tears, to imbue the sentences of mathematics with meaning that makes them descriptive, that there is some kind of internal, but distributed, mental process which is mirror what's on paper (and the 'reality' it describes)

relate this to HoTT as a perfect 'case study' in the foundations of mathematics

other authors

The question

We note that NaProche, Mizar, Coq (coquand), Boxer Boxer system [29] is able to parse any English sentence and translate it into a formula of predicate calculus. Combined with theorem proving and model checking, Boxer can moreover solve problems in open-domain textual entailment by formal reasoning [30]. The problem that remains with Boxer is that the quality of formalization and rea-

## Preliminaries

We give brief but relevant overviews of the background ideas and tools that went into the generation of this thesis.

### Martin-Löf Type Theory

#### Judgments

With Kant, something important happened, namely, that the term judgement, Ger. Urteil, came to be used instead of proposition [11].

A central contribution of Per Martin-Löf in the development of type theory was the recognition of the centrality of judgments in logic. Many mathematicians aren't familiar with the spectrum of judgments available, and merely believe they are concerned with *the* notion of truth, namely *the truth* of a mathematical proposition or theorem. There are many judgments one can make which most mathematicians aren't aware of or at least never mention. These include, for instance,

- $A$  is a proposition
- $A$  is possible
- $A$  is probable

These judgments are understood not in the object language in which we state our propositions, possibilities, or probabilities, but as assertions in the metalanguage which require evidence for us to know and believe them. Most mathematicians may reach for their wallets if I come in and give a talk saying it is possible that the Riemann Hypothesis is true, partially because they already know that, and partially because it doesn't seem particularly interesting to say that something is possible, in the same way that a physicist may flinch if you say alchemy is possible. Most mathematicians, however, would agree that  $P = NP$  is possible but isn't probable.

For the logician these judgments may well be interesting because their may be logics in which the discussion of possibility or probability is even more interesting than the discussion of truth. And for the type theorist, interested in designing and building programming languages over many various logics, these judgments become a prime focus. The role of the type-checker in a programming language is to present evidence for, or decide the validity of the judgments. The four main judgments of type theory are :

- $T$  is a type
- $T$  and  $T'$  are equal types
- $t$  is a term of type  $T$
- $t$  and  $t'$  are equal terms of type  $T$

We succinctly present these in a mathematical notation where Frege's turnstile,  $\vdash$ , denotes a judgment :

- $\vdash T$  type
- $\vdash T = T'$
- $\vdash t : T$
- $\vdash t = t' : T$

These judgments become much more interesting when we add the ability for them to be interpreted in a some context with judgment hypotheses. Given a series of judgments  $J_1, \dots, J_n$ , denoted  $\Gamma$ , where  $J_i$  can depend on previously listed  $J'_s$ , we can make judgment  $J$  under the hypotheses, e.g.  $J_1, \dots, J_n \vdash J$ . Often these hypotheses  $J_i$ , alternatively called \*antecedents\*, denote variables which may occur freely in the \*consequent\* judgment  $J$ . For instance, the antecedent,  $x : \mathbb{R}$  occurs freely in the syntactic expression  $\sin x$ , a which is given meaning in the judgment  $\vdash \sin x : \mathbb{R}$ . We write our hypothetical judgement as follows :

$$x : \mathbb{R} \vdash \sin x : \mathbb{R}$$

One reason why hypothetical judgments are so interesting is we can devise rules which allow us to translate from the metalanguage to the object language using lambda expressions. These play the role of a function in mathematics and implication in logic. This comes out in the following introduction rule :

$$\frac{\Gamma, x:A \vdash b:B}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. b: A \rightarrow B}$$

Using this rule, we now see a typical judgment, typical in a field like from real analysis,

$$\vdash \lambda x. \sin x : \rightarrow$$

Equality :

Mathematicians denote this judgement

$$\begin{aligned} f: \mathbb{R} &\rightarrow \mathbb{R} \\ x &\mapsto \sin(x) \end{aligned}$$

## Grammatical Framework

### Overview

I will introduce Grammatical Framework (GF) through an extended example targeted at a general audience familiar with logic, functional programming, or mathematics. GF is a powerful tool for specifying grammars. A grammar specification in GF is actually an abstract syntax. With an abstract syntax specified, one can then define various linearization rules which compositionally evaluate to strings. An

Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) may then be linearized to various strings admitted by different concrete syntaxes. Conversely, given a string admitted by the language being defined, GF's powerful parser will generate all the ASTs which linearize to that tree.

## Overview

We introduce this subject assuming no familiarity with GF, but a general mathematical and programming maturity. While GF is certainly geared to applications in domain specific machine translation, this writing will hopefully make evident that learning about GF, even without the intention of using it for its intended application, is a useful exercise in abstractly understanding syntax and its importance in just about any domain.

A working high-level introduction of Grammatical Framework emphasizing both theoretical and practical elements of GF, as well as their interplay. Specific things covered will be

- Historical developments leading to the creation and discovery of the GF formalism
- The difference between Abstract and Concrete Syntax, and the linearization and parsing functions between these two categories
- The basic judgments :
  - Abstract : 'cat, fun'
  - Concrete : 'lincat, lin'
  - Auxiliary : 'oper, param'
- A library for building natural language applications with GF
  - The Resource Grammar Library (RGL)
  - A way of interfacing GF with Haskell and transforming ASTs externally
  - The Portable Grammar Format (PGF)
- Module System and directory structure
- A brief comparison with other tools like BNFC

These topics will be understood via a simple example of an expression language, 'Arith', which will serve as a case study for understanding the many robust, theoretical topics mentioned above - indeed, mathematics is best understood and learned through examples. The best exercises are the reader's own ideas, questions, and contentions which may arise while reading through this.

## Theoretical Overview

**What is a GF grammar ?** [TODO : update with latex]

Consider a language  $L$ , for now given a single linear presentation  $C_0^L$ , where  $AST_L String_L$  denote the

$Parse : String \rightarrow AST$   $Linearize : AST \rightarrow String$

with the important property that given a string  $s$ ,

forall  $x$  in (Parse  $s$ ), Linearize  $x == s$

And given an AST  $a$ , we can Parse . Linearize  $a$  belongs to AST

Now we should explore why the linearizations are interesting. In part, this is because they have arisen from the role of grammars have played in the intersection and interaction between computer science and linguistics at least since Chomsky in the 50s, and they have different understandings and utilities in the respective disciplines. These two disciplines converge in GF, which allows us to talk about natural languages (NLs) from programming languages (PLs) perspective. GF captures languages more expressive than Chomsky's Context Free Grammars (CFGs) but is still decideable with parsing in (cubic?) polynomial time, which means it still is quite domain specific and leaves a lot to be desired as far as turing complete languages or those capable of general recursion are concerned.

We can should note that computa

given a string  $s$ , perhaps a phrase map Linearize (Parse  $s$ )

is understood as the set of translations of a phrase of one language to possibly grammatical phrases in the other languages connected by a mutual abstract syntax. So we could denote these  $L^{English}, L^{Bantu}, L^{Swedish}$  for  $L^{English}_{American}$  vs  $L^{English}_{English}$  or  $L$

One could also further elaborate these  $L^{English}_0 L^{English}_1$  to varying degrees of granularity, like  $L^{English}$

$L_0 < L_1 - > L_{English_0} < L_{English_1}$

But this would be similar to a set of expressions translatable between programming languages, like  $Logic^{English}, Logic^{L_{atex}}, Logic^{Agda}, Logic^{Coq}$ , etc

where one could extend the

$Logic_{Core}^{English} Logic_{Extended}^{English}$

whereas in the PL domain

$Logic_{Core}^{Agda} Logic_{Extended}^{Agda}$  may collapse at certain points, but also in some way extend beyond our Language

or Mathematics = Logic + domain specific  $Mathematics^{English} Mathematics^{Agda}$

where we could have further refinements, via, for instance, the module system, the concrete and linear designs like

$Mathematics^{English} I - - Something about$

The Functor (in the module sense familiar to ML programmers)

break down to different classifications of

- Something about

The Functor (in the module sense familiar to ML programmers)

break down to different classifications of

The indexes here, while seemingly arbitrary,

One could also further elaborate these  $L^{English_0} L^{English_1}$  to varying degrees of granularity, like  $L^{English_2}$

because Chomsky may say something like "I was stoked" and Partee may only say something analogous "I was really excited" or whatever the individual nuances come with how speakers say what they mean with different surface syntax, and also

Given a set of categories, we define the functions  $\square: (c_1, \dots, c_n) \rightarrow c_t$  over the categories which will serve

## Some preliminary observations and considerations

There are many ways to skin a cat. While in some sense GF offers the user a limited palette with which to paint, she nonetheless has quite a bit of flexibility in her decision making when designing a GF grammar for a specific domain or application. These decisions are not binary, but rest in the spectrum of considerations varying between :

\* immediate usability and long term sustainability \* prototyping and production readiness \* dependency on external resources liable to change \* research or application oriented \* sensitivity and vulnerability to errors \* scalability and maintainability

Many answers to where on the spectrum a Grammar lies will only become clear a posteriori to code being written, which often contradicts prior decisions which had been made and requires significant efforts to refactor. General best practices that apply to all programming languages, like effective use of modularity, can and should be applied by the GF programmer out of the box, whereas the strong type system also promotes a degree of rigidity with which the programmer is forced to stay in a certain safety boundary. Nonetheless, a grammar is in some sense a really large program, which brings a whole series of difficulties.

When designing a GF grammar for a given application, the most immediate question that will come to mind is separation of concerns as regards the spectrum of

[Abstract  $\leftrightarrow$  Concrete] syntax

Have your cake and eat it ?



## A grammar for basic arithmetic

**Abstract Judgments** The core syntax of GF is quite simple. The abstract syntax specification, denoted mathematically above as *and in GF as 'Arith.gf' is given by :*

```
abstract Arith = { ... }
```

Please note all GF files end with the '.gf' file extension. More detailed information about abstract, concrete, modules, etc. relevant for GF is specified internal to a '\*.gf' file

The abstract specification is simple, and reveals GF's power and elegance. The two primary abstract judgments are :

1. 'cat' : denoting a syntactic category
2. 'fun' : denoting a n-ary function over categories. This is essentially a labeled context-free rewrite rule with (non-)terminal string information suppressed

While there are more advanced abstract judgments, for instance 'def' allows one to incorporate semantic information, discussion of these will be deferred to other resources. These core judgments have different interpretations in the natural and formal language settings. Let's see the spine of the 'Arith' language, where we merely want to be able to write expressions like '( 3 + 4 ) \* 5' in a myriad of concrete syntaxes.

```
cat Exp ;
```

```
fun Add : Exp -> Exp -> Exp ; Mul : Exp -> Exp -> Exp ; EInt : Int -> Exp ;
```

To represent this abstractly, we merely have two binary operators, labeled 'Add' and 'Mul', whose intended interpretation is just the operator names, and the 'EInt' function which coerces a predefined 'Int', natively supported numerical strings "'0","1","2",..." into arithmetic expressions. We can now generate our first abstract syntax tree, corresponding to the above expression, 'Mul (Add (EInt 3) (EInt 4)) (EInt 5)', more readable perhaps with the tree structure expanded :

```
Mul Add EInt 3 EInt 4 EInt 5
```

The trees nodes are just the function names, and the leaves, while denoted above as numbers, are actually function names for the built-in numeric strings which happen to be linearized to the same piece of syntax, i.e. 'linearize 3 == 3', where the left-hand 3 has type 'Int' and the right-hand 3 has type 'Str'. GF has support

for very few, but important categories. These are ‘Int’, ‘Float’, and ‘String’. It is my contention and that adding user defined builtin categories would greatly ease the burden of work for people interested in using GF to model programming languages, because ‘String’ makes the grammars notoriously ambiguous.

In computer science terms, to judge ‘Foo’ to be a given category ‘cat Foo;’ corresponds to the definition of a given Algebraic Datatypes (ADTs) in Haskell, or inductive definitions in Agda, whereas the function judgments ‘fun’ correspond to the various constructors. These connections become explicit in the PGF embedding of GF into Haskell, but examining the Haskell code below makes one suspect there is some equivalence lurking in the corner:

```
data Exp = Add Exp Exp | Mul Exp Exp | EInt Int
```

In linguistics we can interpret the judgments via alternatively simple and standard examples:

1. ‘cat’ : these could be syntactic categories like Common Nouns ‘CN’, Noun Phrases ‘NP’, and determiners ‘Det’
2. ‘fun’ : give us ways of combining words or phrases into more complex syntactic units

For instance, if

```
fun Car_CN : CN ; The_Det : Det ; DetCN : Det -> CN -> NP ;
```

Then one can form a tree ‘DetCN The<sub>Det</sub>Car<sub>CN</sub>’ which should linearize to “the car” in English, *bilen* in Swedish.

While there was an equivalence suggested Haskell ADTs should be careful not to treat these as the same as the GF judgments. Indeed, the linguistic interpretation breaks this analogy, because linguistic categories aren’t stable mathematical objects in the sense that they evolved and changed during the evolution of language, and will continue to do so. Since GF is primarily concerned with parsing and linearization of languages, the full power of inductive definitions in Agda, for instance, doesn’t seem like a particularly natural space to study and model natural language phenomena.

**Arith.gf** Below we recapitulate, for completeness, the whole ‘Arith.gf’ file with all the pieces from above glued together, which, the reader should start to play with.

```
abstract Arith = {
```

```

flags startcat = Exp ;

-- a judgement which says "Exp is a category" cat Exp ;

fun Add : Exp -> Exp -> Exp ; -- "+" Mul : Exp -> Exp -> Exp ; --
"*" EInt : Int
-> Exp ; -- "33"

}

```

The astute reader will recognize some code which has not yet been described. The comments, delegated with ‘-’, can have their own lines or be given at the end of a piece of code. It is good practice to give example linearizations as comments in the abstract syntax file, so that it can be read in a stand-alone way.

The ‘flags startcat = Exp ;’ line is not a judgment, but piece of metadata for the compiler so that it knows, when generating random ASTs, to include a function at the root of the AST with codomain ‘Exp’. If I hadn’t included ‘flags startcat = \*some cat\*’, and ran ‘gr’ in the gf shell, we would get the following error, which can be incredibly confusing but simple bug to fix if you know what to look for!

```

Category S is not in scope CallStack (from HasCallStack):
error, called at src/compiler/GF/Command/Commands.hs:881:38 in
gf-3.10.4-BNI84g7Cbh1LvYlghrRU0G:GF.Command.Commands

```

**Concrete Judgments** We now append our abstract syntax GF file ‘Arith.gf’ with our first concrete GF syntax, some pigdin English way of saying our same expression above, namely ‘the product of the sum of 3 and 4 and 5’. Note that ‘Mul’ and ‘Add’ both being binary operators preclude this reading : ‘product of (the sum of 3 and 4 and 5)’ in GF, despite the fact that it seems the more natural English interpretation and it doesn’t admit a proper semantic reading.

Reflecting the tree around the ‘Mul’ root, ‘Mul (EInt 5) (Add (EInt 3) (EInt 4))’, we get a reading where the ‘natural interpretation’ matches the actual syntax : ‘the product of 5 and the sum of 3 and 4’. Let’s look at the concrete syntax which allow us to simply specify the linearization rules corresponding to the above ‘fun’ function judgments.

Our concrete syntax header says that ‘ArithEng1’ is constrained by the fact that the concrete syntaxes must share the same prefix with the abstract syntax, and extend it with one or more characters, i.e. ‘Arith+.gf’.

```

concrete ArithEng1 of Arith = { ... }

```

We now introduce the two concrete syntax judgments which compliment those above, namely :

\* ‘cat’ is dual to ‘lincat’ \* ‘fun’ is dual to ‘lin’

Here is the first pass at an English linearization :

```
lincat Exp = Str ;
```

```
lin Add e1 e2 = "the sum of" ++ e1 ++ "and" ++ e2 ; Mul e1 e2 = "the product of"
++ e1 ++ "and" ++ e2 ; EInt i = i.s ;
```

The ‘lincat’ judgement says that ‘Exp’ category is given a linearization type ‘Str’, which means that any expression is just evaluated to a string. There are more expressive linearization types, records and tables, or products and coproducts in the mathematician’s lingo. For instance, ‘EInt i = i.s’ that we project the s field from the integer i (records are indexed by numbers but rather by names in PLs). We defer a more extended discussion of linearization types for later examples where they are not just useful but necessary, producing grammars more expressive than CFGs called Parallel Multiple Context Free Grammars (PMCFGs).

The linearization of the ‘Add’ function takes two arguments, ‘e1’ and ‘e2’ which must necessarily evaluate to strings, and produces a string. Strings in GF are denoted with double quotes “my string” and concatenation with ‘++’. This resulting string, “the sum of” ++ e1 ++ “and” ++ e2’ is the concatenation of “the sum of”, the evaluated string ‘e1’, “and”, and the string of a linearized ‘e2’. The linearization of ‘EInt’ is almost an identity function, except that the primitive Integer’s are strings embedded in a record for scalability purposes.

Here is the relationship between ‘fun’ and ‘lin’ from a slightly higher vantage point. Given a ‘fun’ judgement

$$f:C_0 \rightarrow C_1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow C_n$$

in the ‘abstract’ file, the GF user provides a corresponding ‘lin’ judgement of the form

$$f\ c_0\ c_1\ \dots\ c_n = t_0\ ++\ t_1\ ++\ \dots\ ++\ t_m$$

in the ‘concrete’ file. Each  $c_i$  must have the linearization type given in the ‘lincat’ of  $C_i$ , e.g. if ‘lincat  $C_i = T$ ;’ then ‘ $c_i : T$ ’.

We step through the example above to see how the linearization recursively evaluates, noting that this may not be the actual reduction order GF internally performs. The relation ‘ $\rightarrow^*$ ’ informally used but not defined here expresses the step function after zero or more steps of evaluating an expression. This is the reflexive transitive closure of the single step relation ‘ $\rightarrow$ ’ familiar in operational semantics.

```

linearize (Mul (Add (EInt 3) (EInt 4)) (EInt 5)) ->* "the
product of" ++ linearize (Add (EInt 3) (EInt 4)) ++ "and" ++ linearize (EInt 5)
->* "the product of" ++ ("the sum of" ++ (EInt 3) ++ (EInt 4)) ++ "and" ++ ({ s
= "5"} . s) ->* "the product of" ++ ("the sum of" ++ ({ s = "3"} . s) ++ ({ s =
"4"} . s)) ++ "and" ++ "5" ->* "the product of" ++ ("the sum of" ++ "3" ++ "and"
++ "4") ++ "and" ++ "5" ->* "the product of" ++ ("the sum of" ++ "3" ++ "and" ++
"4") ++ "and" ++ "5" ->* "the product of the sum of 3 and 4 and 5"

```

The PMCFG class of languages is still quite tame when compared with, for instance, Turing complete languages. Thus, the ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ coupling tight, the evaluation is quite simple, and the programs tend to write themselves once the correct types are chosen. This is not to say GF programming is easier than in other languages, because often there are unforeseen constraints that the programmer must get used to, limiting the palette available when writing code. These constraints allow for fast parsing, but greatly limit the types of programs one often thinks of writing. We touch upon this in a [previous section](some-preliminary-observations-and-considerations).

Now that the basics of GF have been described, we will augment our grammar so that it becomes slightly more interesting, introduce a second ‘concrete’ syntax, and show how to run these in the GF shell in order to translate between our two languages.

## The GF shell

So now that we have a GF ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ syntax pair, one needs to test the grammars.

Once GF is [installed](<https://www.grammaticalframework.org/download/index-3.10.html>), one can open both the ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ with the ‘gf’ shell command applied to the ‘concrete’ syntax, assuming the ‘abstract’ syntax is in the same directory :

```
$ gf ArithEng1.gf
```

I’ll forego describing many important details and commands, please refer to the [official shell reference](<https://www.grammaticalframework.org/doc/gf-shell-reference.html>) and Inari Listenmaa’s post on [tips and gotchas](<https://inariksit.github.io/gf/2018/08/28/gf-gotchas.html>) for a more nuanced take than I give here.

The ‘ls’ of the gf repl is ‘gr’. What does ‘gr’ do? Lets try it, as well as ask gf what it does:

```
Arith> gr Add (EInt 999) (Mul (Add (EInt 999) (EInt 999)) (EInt
999))
```

```
0 msec Arith> help gr gr, generate_random generate random trees in the current
abstract syntax
```

We see that the tree generated isn't random - '999' is used exclusively, and obviously if the trees were actually random, the probability of such a small tree might be exceedingly low. The depth of the trees is cut-off, which can be modified with the '-depth=n' flag for some number n, and the predefined categories, 'Int' in this case, are annoyingly restricted. Nonetheless, 'gr' is a quick first pass at testing your grammar.

Listed in the repl, but not shown here, are (some of the) additional flags that 'gr' command can take. The 'help' command reveals other possible commands, included is the linearization, the 'l' command. We use the pipe '|' to compose gf functions, and the '-tr' to trace the output of 'gr' prior to being piped :

```
Arith> gr -tr | l Add (Mul (Mul (EInt 999) (EInt 999)) (Add
(EInt 999) (EInt 999))) (Add (Add (EInt 999) (EInt 999)) (Add (EInt 999) (EInt
999)))
```

the sum of the product of the product of 999 and 999 and the sum of 999 and 999  
and the sum of the sum of 999 and 999 and the sum of 999 and 999

Clearly this expression is too complex to say out loud and retain a semblance of meaning. Indeed, most grammatical sentences aren't meaningful. Dealing with semantics in GF is advanced, and we won't touch that here. Nonetheless, our grammar seems to be up and running.

Let's try the sanity check referenced at the beginning of this post, namely, observe that  $linearize \circ parse$  preserves an AST, and vice versa,  $parse \circ linearize$  preserves a string. Parse is denoted 'p'.

```
Arith> gr -tr | l -tr | p -tr | l Add (EInt 999) (Mul (Add
(EInt 999) (EInt 999)) (Add (EInt 999) (EInt 999)))
```

the sum of 999 and the product of the sum of 999 and 999 and the sum of 999 and  
999

Add (EInt 999) (Mul (Add (EInt 999) (EInt 999)) (Add (EInt 999) (EInt 999)))

the sum of 999 and the product of the sum of 999 and 999 and the sum of 999 and  
999

Phew, that's a relief. Note that this is an unambiguous grammar, so when I said 'preserves', I only meant it up to some notion of relatedness. This relation is indeed equality for unambiguous grammars. Unambiguous grammars are degenerate cases, however, so I expect this is the last time you'll see such tame behavior when the GF parser is involved. Now that all the main ingredients have been introduced, the reader

Exercises

**\*\*Exercise 1.1 : \*\*** Extend the 'Arith' grammar with variables. Specifically, modify both 'Arith.gf' and 'ArithEng1.gf' arithmetic with two additional unique variables, 'x' and 'y', such that the string 'product of x and y' parses uniquely : .notice-danger

**\*\*Exercise 1.2 : \*\*** Extend \*Exercise 1.1\* with unary predicates, so that '3 is prime' and 'x is odd' parse. Then include binary predicates, so that '3 equals 3' parses. : .notice-danger

**\*\*Exercise 2 : \*\*** Write concrete syntax in your favorite language, 'ArithFaveLang.gf' : .notice-danger

**\*\*Exercise 3 : \*\*** Write second English concrete syntax, 'ArithEng2.gf', that mimics how children learn arithmetic, i.e. "3 plus 4" and "5 times 5". Observe the ambiguous parses in the gf shell. Substitute 'plus' with '+', 'times' with '\*', and remedy the ambiguity with parentheses : .notice-danger

**\*\*Thought Experiment : \*\*** Observe that parentheses are ugly and unnecessary: sophisticated folks use fixity conventions. How would one go about remedying the ugly parentheses, at either the abstract or concrete level? Try to do it! : .notice-warning

## Solutions

### \*Exercise 1.1\*

This warm-up exercise is to get use to GF syntax. Add a new category 'Var' for variables, two lexical variable names 'VarX' and 'VarY', and a coercion function (which won't show up on the linearization) from variables to expressions. We then augment the 'concrete' syntax which is quite trivial.

```
""haskell - Add the following between "" in 'Arith.gf' cat Var ; fun VExp : Var -> Exp
; VarX : Var ; VarY : Var ; "" ""haskell - Add the following between "" in 'ArithEng1.gf'
lincat Var = Str ; lin VExp v = v ; VarX = "x" ; VarY = "y" ; ""
```

### \*Exercise 1.2\*

This is a similar augmentation as was performed above.

```
""haskell - Add the following between "" in 'Arith.gf' flags startcat = Prop ;
```

```
cat Prop ;
```

```
fun Odd : Exp -> Prop ; Prime : Exp -> Prop ; Equal : Exp -> Exp -> Prop ; ""
""haskell - Add the following between "" in 'ArithEng1.gf' lincat Prop = Str ; lin Odd
e = e ++ "is odd"; Prime e = e ++ "is prime"; Equal e1 e2 = e1 ++ "equals" ++ e2
; "" The main point is to recognize that we also need to modify the 'startcat' flag to
'Prop' so that 'gr' generates numeric predicates rather than just expressions. One
may also use the category flag to generate trees of any expression 'gr-cat=Exp'.
```

\*Exercise 2\*

\*Exercise 3\*

We simply change the strings that get linearized to what follows :

```
“haskell lin Add e1 e2 = e1 ++ "plus" ++ e2 ; Mul e1 e2 = e1 ++ "times" ++ e2 ; “
```

With these minor modifications in place, we make the follow observation in the GF shell, noting that for a given number of binary operators in an expression, we get the [Catalan number]([https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catalan<sub>n</sub>umber](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catalan_number)) of parses!

```
“haskell Arith> gr -tr | l -tr | p -tr | l Add (Mul (VExp VarX) (Mul (EInt 999) (VExp VarX))) (EInt 999)
```

x times 999 times x plus 999

```
Add (Mul (VExp VarX) (Mul (EInt 999) (VExp VarX))) (EInt 999) Add (Mul (Mul (VExp VarX) (EInt 999)) (VExp VarX)) (EInt 999) Mul (VExp VarX) (Add (Mul (EInt 999) (VExp VarX)) (EInt 999)) Mul (VExp VarX) (Mul (EInt 999) (Add (VExp VarX) (EInt 999))) Mul (Mul (VExp VarX) (EInt 999)) (Add (VExp VarX) (EInt 999))
```

x times 999 times x plus 999 x times 999 times x plus 999 x times 999 times x plus 999 x times 999 times x plus 999 “

```
“haskell Arith> gr -tr | l -tr | p -tr Add (EInt 999) (Mul (VExp VarY) (Mul (EInt 999) (EInt 999)))
```

( 999 + ( y \* ( 999 \* 999 ) ) )

```
Add (EInt 999) (Mul (VExp VarY) (Mul (EInt 999) (EInt 999))) “
```

...Blog post...

## Agda

Agda is an attempt to formalize Martin-Löf's intensional type theory (reference 1984). For our purposes, we will only look at what can in some sense be seen as the kernel of Agda.

## Natural Language and Mathematics



## Natural Number Proofs

Here we open with the perhaps the most natural kind of proof one would expect, that of laws over the inductively defined natural numbers.

# HoTT Proofs

## Why HoTT for natural language?

We note that all natural language definitions, theorems, and proofs are copied here verbatim from the HoTT book. This decision is admittedly arbitrary, but does have some benefits. We list some here :

- As the HoTT book was a collaborative effort, it mixes the language of many individuals and editors, and can be seen as more “linguistically neutral”
- By its very nature HoTT is interdisciplinary, conceived and constructed by mathematicians, logicians, and computer scientists. It therefore is meant to interface with all these disciplines, and much of the book was indeed formalized before it was written
- It has become canonical reference in the field, and therefore benefits from wide familiarity
- It is open source, with publically available Latex files free for modification and distribution

The genesis of higher type theory is a somewhat elementary observation : that the identity type, parameterized by an arbitrary type  $A$  and indexed by elements of  $A$ , can actually be built iteratively from previous identities. That is,  $A$  may actually already be an identity defined over another type  $A'$ , namely  $A \equiv x =_{A'} y$  where  $x, y : A'$ . The key idea is that this iterating identities admits a homotopical interpretation :

- Types are topological spaces
- Terms are points in these space
- Equality types  $x =_A y$  are paths in  $A$  with endpoints  $x$  and  $y$  in  $A$
- Iterated equality types are paths between paths, or continuous path deformations in some higher path space. This is, intuitively, what mathematicians call a homotopy.

To be explicit, given a type  $A$ , we can form the homotopy  $p =_{x=_A y} q$  with endpoints  $p$  and  $q$  inhabiting the path space  $x =_A y$ .

Let's start out by examining the inductive definition of the identity type. We present this definition as it appears in section 1.12 of the HoTT book.

**Definition 5** *The formation rule says that given a type  $A : \mathcal{U}$  and two elements  $a, b : A$ , we can form the type  $(a =_A b) : \mathcal{U}$  in the same universe. The basic way to construct an element of  $a = b$  is to know that  $a$  and  $b$  are the same. Thus, the introduction rule is a dependent function*

$$\text{refl} : \prod_{a:A} (a =_A a)$$

called **reflexivity**, which says that every element of  $A$  is equal to itself (in a specified way). We regard  $\text{refl}_a$  as being the constant path at the point  $a$ .

We recapitulate this definition in Agda, and treat :

```
data _≡'_ {A : Set} : (a b : A) → Set where
  r : (a : A) → a ≡' a
```

## An introduction to equality

There is already some tension brewing : most mathematicians have an intuition for equality, that of an identification between two pieces of information which intuitively must be the same thing, i.e.  $2+2=4$ . They might ask, what does it mean to “construct an element of  $a=b$ ”? For the mathematician use to thinking in terms of sets  $\{a=b \mid a, b \in \mathbb{N}\}$  isn’t a well-defined notion. Due to its use of the axiom of extensionality, the set theoretic notion of equality is, no surprise, extensional. This means that sets are identified when they have the same elements, and equality is therefore external to the notion of set. To inhabit a type means to provide evidence for that inhabitation. The reflexivity constructor is therefore a means of providing evidence of an equality. This evidence approach is distinctly constructive, and a big reason why classical and constructive mathematics, especially when treated in an intuitionistic type theory suitable for a programming language implementation, are such different beasts.

In Martin-Löf Type Theory, there are two fundamental notions of equality, propositional and definitional. While propositional equality is inductively defined (as above) as a type which may have possibly more than one inhabitant, definitional equality, denoted  $- \equiv -$  and perhaps more aptly named computational equality, is familiarly what most people think of as equality. Namely, two terms which compute to the same canonical form are computationally equal. In intensional type theory, propositional equality is a weaker notion than computational equality : all propositionally equal terms are computationally equal. However, computational equality does not imply propositional equality - if it does, then one enters into the space of extensional type theory.

Prior to the homotopical interpretation of identity types, debates about extensional and intensional type theories centred around two features or bugs : extensional type theory sacrificed decidable type checking, while intensional type theories required extra bureaucracy when dealing with equality in proofs. One approach in intensional type theories treated types as setoids, therefore leading to so-called “Setoid Hell”. These debates reflected Martin-Löf’s flip-flopping on the issue. His seminal 1979 *Constructive Mathematics and Computer Programming*, which took an extensional view, was soon betrayed by lectures he gave soon thereafter in Padova in 1980. Martin-Löf was a born again intensional type theorist. These Padova lectures were later published in the “Bibliopolis Book”, and went on to

inspire the European (and Gothenburg in particular) approach to implementing proof assistants, whereas the extensionalists were primarily emanating from Robert Constable's group at Cornell.

This tension has now been at least partially resolved, or at the very least clarified, by an insight Voevodsky was apparently most proud of : the introduction of h-levels. We'll delegate these details for a later section, it is mentioned here to indicate that extensional type theory was really "set theory" in disguise, in that it collapses the higher path structure of identity types. The work over the past 10 years has elucidated the intensional and extensional positions. HoTT, by allowing higher paths, is unashamedly intentional, and admits a collapse into the extensional universe if so desired. We now examine the structure induced by this propositional equality.

## All about Identity

We start with a slight reformulation of the identity type, where the element determining the equality is treated as a parameter rather than an index. This is a matter of convenience more than taste, as it delegates work for Agda's typechecker that the programmer may find a distraction. The reflexivity terms can generally have their endpoints inferred, and therefore cuts down on the beauracry which often obscures code.

```
data _≡_ {A : Set} (a : A) : A → Set where
  r : a ≡ a
infix 20 _≡_
```

It is of particular concern in this thesis, because it highlights a fundamental difference between the linguistic and the formal approach to proof presentation. While the mathematician can whimsically choose to include the reflexivity argument or ignore it if she believes it can be inferred, the programmer can't afford such a laxidassical attitude. Once the type has been defined, the argument structure is fixed, all future references to the definition carefully adhere to its specification. The advantage that the programmer does gain however, that of Agda's powerful inferential abilities, allows for the insides to be seen via interaction window.

Perhaps not of much interest up front, this is incredibly important detail which the mathematician never has to deal with explicitly, but can easily make type and term translation infeasible due to the fast and loose nature of the mathematician's writing. Conversely, it may make Natural Language Generation (NLG) incredibly clunky, adhering to strict rules when created sentences out of programs.

[ToDo, give a GF example]

A prime source of beauty in constructive mathematics arises from Gentzen's recognition of a natural duality in the rules for introducing and using logical connectives.

The mutually coherence between introduction and elimination rules form the basis of what has since been labeled harmony in a deductive system. This harmony isn't just an artifact of beauty, it forms the basis for cuts in proof normalization, and correspondingly, evaluation of terms in a programming language.

The idea is simple, each new connective, or type former, needs a means of constructing its terms from its constituent parts, yielding introduction rules. This however, isn't enough - we need a way of dissecting and using the terms we construct. This yields an elimination rule which can be uniquely derived from an inductively defined type. These elimination forms yield induction principles, or a general notion of proof by induction, when given an interpretation in mathematics. In the non-dependent case, this is known as a recursion principle, and corresponds to recursion known by programmers far and wide. The proof by induction over natural numbers familiar to mathematicians is just one special case of this induction principle at work—the power of induction has been recognized and brought to the fore by computer scientists.

We now elaborate the most important induction principle in HoTT, namely, the induction of an identity type.

**Definition 6 (Version 1)** *Moreover, one of the amazing things about homotopy type theory is that all of the basic constructions and axioms—all of the higher groupoid structure—arises automatically from the induction principle for identity types. Recall from [section 1.12] that this says that if*

- *for every  $x, y : A$  and every  $p : x =_A y$  we have a type  $D(x, y, p)$ , and*
- *for every  $a : A$  we have an element  $d(a) : D(a, a, \text{refl}_a)$ ,*

*then*

- *there exists an element  $\text{ind}_{=_A}(D, d, x, y, p) : D(x, y, p)$  for every two elements  $x, y : A$  and  $p : x =_A y$ , such that  $\text{ind}_{=_A}(D, d, a, a, \text{refl}_a) \equiv d(a)$ .*

The book then reiterates this definition, with basically no natural language, essentially in the raw logical framework devoid of anything but dependent function types.

**Definition 7 (Version 2)** *In other words, given dependent functions*

$$D : \prod_{(x, y : A)} (x = y) \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$$

$$d : \prod_{a : A} D(a, a, \text{refl}_a)$$

*there is a dependent function*

$$\text{ind}_{=_A}(D, d) : \prod_{(x, y : A)} \prod_{(p : x = y)} D(x, y, p)$$

such that

$$\text{ind}_{=A}(D, d, a, a, \text{refl}_a) \equiv d(a) \quad (1)$$

for every  $a : A$ . Usually, every time we apply this induction rule we will either not care about the specific function being defined, or we will immediately give it a different name.

Again, we define this, in Agda, staying as true to the syntax as possible.

```
J : {A : Set}
  → (D : (x y : A) → (x ≡ y) → Set)
  → ((a : A) → (D a a r)) -- → (d : (a : A) → (D a a r))
  → (x y : A)
  → (p : x ≡ y)
  -----
  → D x y p
J D d x .x r = d x
```

It should be noted that, for instance, we can choose to leave out the  $d$  label on the third line. Indeed minimizing the amount of dependent typing and using vanilla function types when dependency is not necessary, is generally considered “best practice” Agda, because it will get desugared by the time it typechecks anyways. For the writer of the text; however, it was convenient to define  $d$  once, as there are not the same constraints on a mathematician writing in latex. It will again, serve as a nontrivial exercise to deal with when specifying the grammar, and will be dealt with later [ToDo add section]. It is also of note that we choose to include Martin-Löf’s original name  $J$ , as this is more common in the computer science literature.

Once the identity type has been defined, it is natural to develop an “equality calculus”, so that we can actually use it in proof’s, as well as develop the higher groupoid structure of types. The first fact, that propositional equality is an equivalence relation, is well motivated by needs of practical theorem proving in Agda and the more homotopically minded mathematician. First, we show the symmetry of equality—that paths are reversible.

**Lemma 1** *For every type  $A$  and every  $x, y : A$  there is a function*

$$(x = y) \rightarrow (y = x)$$

denoted  $p \mapsto p^{-1}$ , such that  $\text{refl}_x^{-1} \equiv \text{refl}_x$  for each  $x : A$ . We call  $p^{-1}$  the **inverse** of  $p$ .

**Proof 1 (First proof)** Assume given  $A : \mathcal{U}$ , and let  $D : \prod_{(x,y:A)} (x = y) \rightarrow \mathcal{U}$  be the type family defined by  $D(x, y, p) := (y = x)$ . In other words,  $D$  is a function assigning

to any  $x, y : A$  and  $p : x = y$  a type, namely the type  $y = x$ . Then we have an element

$$d := \lambda x. \text{refl}_x : \prod_{x:A} D(x, x, \text{refl}_x).$$

Thus, the induction principle for identity types gives us an element  $\text{ind}_{=A}(D, d, x, y, p) : (y = x)$  for each  $p : (x = y)$ . We can now define the desired function  $(-)^{-1}$  to be  $\lambda p. \text{ind}_{=A}(D, d, x, y, p)$ , i.e. we set  $p^{-1} := \text{ind}_{=A}(D, d, x, y, p)$ . The conversion rule [missing reference] gives  $\text{refl}_x^{-1} \equiv \text{refl}_x$ , as required.

The Agda code is certainly more brief:

```

 $^{-1} : \{A : \text{Set}\} \{x\ y : A\} \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow y \equiv x$ 
 $^{-1} \{A\} \{x\} \{y\} p = \text{J } D\ d\ x\ y\ p$ 
where
  D : (x y : A) → x ≡ y → Set
  D x y p = y ≡ x
  d : (a : A) → D a a r
  d a = r
infixr 50  $^{-1}$ 

```

While first encountering induction principles can be scary, they are actually more mechanical than one may think. This is due to the the fact that they uniquely complement the introduction rules of an inductive type, and are simply a means of showing one can “map out”, or derive an arbitrary type dependent on the type which has been inductively defined. The mechanical nature is what allows for Coq’s induction tactic, and perhaps even more elegantly, Agda’s pattern matching capabilities. It is always easier to use pattern matching for the novice Agda programmer, which almost feels like magic. Nonetheless, for completeness sake, the book uses the induction principle for much of Chapter 2. And pattern matching is unique to programming languages, its elegance isn’t matched in the mathematicians’ lexicon.

Here is the same proof via “natural language pattern matching” and Agda pattern matching:

**Proof 2 (Second proof)** We want to construct, for each  $x, y : A$  and  $p : x = y$ , an element  $p^{-1} : y = x$ . By induction, it suffices to do this in the case when  $y$  is  $x$  and  $p$  is  $\text{refl}_x$ . But in this case, the type  $x = y$  of  $p$  and the type  $y = x$  in which we are trying to construct  $p^{-1}$  are both simply  $x = x$ . Thus, in the “reflexivity case”, we can define  $\text{refl}_x^{-1}$  to be simply  $\text{refl}_x$ . The general case then follows by the induction principle, and the conversion rule  $\text{refl}_x^{-1} \equiv \text{refl}_x$  is precisely the proof in the reflexivity case that we gave.

```

 $^{-1}' : \{A : \text{Set}\} \{x\ y : A\} \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow y \equiv x$ 

```

```
_-1 : {A} {x} {y} r = r
```

Next is trasitivity-concatenation of paths-and we omit the natural language presentation, which is a slightly more sophisticated arguement than for symmetry.

```
_•_ : {A : Set} → {x y : A} → (p : x ≡ y) → {z : A} → (q : y ≡ z) → x ≡ z
_•_ {A} {x} {y} p {z} q = J D d x y p z q
  where
    D : (x1 y1 : A) → x1 ≡ y1 → Set
    D x y p = (z : A) → (q : y ≡ z) → x ≡ z
    d : (z1 : A) → D z1 z1 r
    d = λ v z q → q

infixl 40 _•_
```

Putting on our spectacles, the reflexivity term serves as evidence of a constant path for any given point of any given type. To the category theorist, this makes up the data of an identity map. Likewise, conctanation of paths starts to look like function composition. This, along with the identity laws and associativity as proven below, gives us the data of a category. And we have not only have a category, but the symmetry allows us to prove all paths are isomorphisms, giving us a groupoid. This isn't a coincidence, it's a very deep and fascinating articulation of power of the machinery we've so far built. The fact the path space over a type naturally must satisfies coherence laws in an even higher path space gives leads to this notion of types as higher groupoids.

As regards the natural language—at this point, the bookkeeping starts to get hairy. Paths between paths, and paths between paths between paths, these ideas start to lose geometric intuition. And the mathematician often fails to express, when writing  $p = q$ , that she is already reasoning in a path space. While clever, our brains aren't wired to do too much book-keeping. Fortunately Agda does this for us, and we can use implicit arguments to avoid our code getting too messy. [ToDo, add example]

We now proceed to show that we have a groupoid, where the objects are points, the morphisms are paths. The isomorphisms arise from the path reversal. Many of the proofs beyond this point are either routinely made via the induction principle, or even more routinely by just pattern matching on equality paths, we omit the details which can be found in the HoTT book, but it is expected that the GF parser will soon cover such examples.

```
i1 : {A : Set} {x y : A} (p : x ≡ y) → p ≡ r • p
i1 {A} {x} {y} p = J D d x y p
  where
    D : (x y : A) → x ≡ y → Set
    D x y p = p ≡ r • p
    d : (a : A) → D a a r
    d a = r
```



$\text{ir} : \{A : \text{Set}\} \{x\ y : A\} (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow p \equiv p \bullet r$

$\text{ir} \{A\} \{x\} \{y\} p = \text{J } D \text{ d } x\ y\ p$

where

$D : (x\ y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$D\ x\ y\ p = p \equiv p \bullet r$

$d : (a : A) \rightarrow D\ a\ a\ r$

$d\ a = r$

$\text{leftInverse} : \{A : \text{Set}\} \{x\ y : A\} (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow p^{-1} \bullet p \equiv r$

$\text{leftInverse} \{A\} \{x\} \{y\} p = \text{J } D \text{ d } x\ y\ p$

where

$D : (x\ y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$D\ x\ y\ p = p^{-1} \bullet p \equiv r$

$d : (x : A) \rightarrow D\ x\ x\ r$

$d\ x = r$

$\text{rightInverse} : \{A : \text{Set}\} \{x\ y : A\} (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow p \bullet p^{-1} \equiv r$

$\text{rightInverse} \{A\} \{x\} \{y\} p = \text{J } D \text{ d } x\ y\ p$

where

$D : (x\ y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$D\ x\ y\ p = p \bullet p^{-1} \equiv r$

$d : (a : A) \rightarrow D\ a\ a\ r$

$d\ a = r$

$\text{doubleInv} : \{A : \text{Set}\} \{x\ y : A\} (p : x \equiv y) \rightarrow p^{-1}^{-1} \equiv p$

$\text{doubleInv} \{A\} \{x\} \{y\} p = \text{J } D \text{ d } x\ y\ p$

where

$D : (x\ y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$D\ x\ y\ p = p^{-1}^{-1} \equiv p$

$d : (a : A) \rightarrow D\ a\ a\ r$

$d\ a = r$

$\text{associativity} : \{A : \text{Set}\} \{x\ y\ z\ w : A\} (p : x \equiv y) (q : y \equiv z) (r' : z \equiv w) \rightarrow p \bullet (q \bullet r') \equiv p \bullet q \bullet r'$

$\text{associativity} \{A\} \{x\} \{y\} \{z\} \{w\} p\ q\ r' = \text{J } D_1\ d_1\ x\ y\ p\ z\ w\ q\ r'$

where

$D_1 : (x\ y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$D_1\ x\ y\ p = (z\ w : A) (q : y \equiv z) (r' : z \equiv w) \rightarrow p \bullet (q \bullet r') \equiv p \bullet q \bullet r'$

--  $d_1 : (x : A) \rightarrow D_1\ x\ x\ r$

--  $d_1\ x\ z\ w\ q\ r' = r$  -- why can it infer this

$D_2 : (x\ z : A) \rightarrow x \equiv z \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$D_2\ x\ z\ q = (w : A) (r' : z \equiv w) \rightarrow r \bullet (q \bullet r') \equiv r \bullet q \bullet r'$

$D_3 : (x\ w : A) \rightarrow x \equiv w \rightarrow \text{Set}$

$D_3\ x\ w\ r' = r \bullet (r \bullet r') \equiv r \bullet r \bullet r'$

$d_3 : (x : A) \rightarrow D_3\ x\ x\ r$

$d_3\ x = r$

$d_2 : (x : A) \rightarrow D_2\ x\ x\ r$

$d_2\ x\ w\ r' = \text{J } D_3\ d_3\ x\ w\ r'$

$d_1 : (x : A) \rightarrow D_1\ x\ x\ r$

$d_1\ x\ z\ w\ q\ r' = \text{J } D_2\ d_2\ x\ z\ q\ w\ r'$

When one starts to look at structure above the groupoid level, i.e., the paths between paths level, some interesting and nonintuitive results emerge. If one defines a path space that is seemingly trivial, namely, taking the same starting and end points, the higherdimensional structure yields non-trivial structure. We now arrive at the first “interesting” result in this book, the Eckmann-Hilton Argument. It says that composition on the loop space of a loop space, the second loop space, is commutative.

**Definition 8** *Thus, given a type  $A$  with a point  $a : A$ , we define its **loop space**  $\Omega(A, a)$  to be the type  $a =_A a$ . We may sometimes write simply  $\Omega A$  if the point  $a$  is understood from context.*

**Definition 9** *It can also be useful to consider the loop space of the loop space of  $A$ , which is the space of 2-dimensional loops on the identity loop at  $a$ . This is written  $\Omega^2(A, a)$  and represented in type theory by the type  $\text{refl}_a =_{(a=_A a)} \text{refl}_a$ .*

**Theorem 1 (Eckmann-Hilton)** *The composition operation on the second loop space*

$$\Omega^2(A) \times \Omega^2(A) \rightarrow \Omega^2(A)$$

*is commutative:  $\alpha \cdot \beta = \beta \cdot \alpha$ , for any  $\alpha, \beta : \Omega^2(A)$ .*

**Proof 3** *First, observe that the composition of 1-loops  $\Omega A \times \Omega A \rightarrow \Omega A$  induces an operation*

$$\star : \Omega^2(A) \times \Omega^2(A) \rightarrow \Omega^2(A)$$

*as follows: consider elements  $a, b, c : A$  and 1- and 2-paths,*

$$\begin{array}{ll} p : a = b, & r : b = c \\ q : a = b, & s : b = c \\ \alpha : p = q, & \beta : r = s \end{array}$$

*as depicted in the following diagram (with paths drawn as arrows).*

*[TODO Finish Eckmann Hilton Argument]*

[Todo, clean up code so that its more tightly correspondent to the book proof] The corresponding agda code is below :

```
-- whiskering
_•r_ : {A : Set} → {b c : A} {a : A} {p q : a ≡ b} (α : p ≡ q) (r' : b ≡ c) → p • r' ≡ q • r'
_•r_ {A} {b} {c} {a} {p} {q} α r' = J D d b c r' a α
where
  D : (b c : A) → b ≡ c → Set
  D b c r' = (a : A) {p q : a ≡ b} (α : p ≡ q) → p • r' ≡ q • r'
```

```

d : (a : A) → D a a r
d a a' {p} {q} α = ir p-1 • α • ir q

-- ir == rup

_•_ : {A : Set} → {a b : A} (q : a ≡ b) {c : A} {r' s : b ≡ c} (β : r' ≡ s) → q • r' ≡ q • s
_•_ {A} {a} {b} q {c} {r'} {s} β = J D d a b q c β
  where
    D : (a b : A) → a ≡ b → Set
    D a b q = (c : A) {r' s : b ≡ c} (β : r' ≡ s) → q • r' ≡ q • s
    d : (a : A) → D a a r
    d a a' {r'} {s} β = il r'-1 • β • il s

_★_ : {A : Set} → {a b c : A} {p q : a ≡ b} {r' s : b ≡ c} (α : p ≡ q) (β : r' ≡ s) → p • r' ≡
_★_ {A} {q = q} {r' = r'} α β = (α •r r') • (q •l β)

_★'_ : {A : Set} → {a b c : A} {p q : a ≡ b} {r' s : b ≡ c} (α : p ≡ q) (β : r' ≡ s) → p • r' ≡
_★'_ {A} {p = p} {s = s} α β = (p •l β) • (α •r s)

Ω : {A : Set} (a : A) → Set
Ω {A} a = a = a ≡ a

Ω2 : {A : Set} (a : A) → Set
Ω2 {A} a = _≡_ {a ≡ a} r r

lem1 : {A : Set} → (a : A) → (α β : Ω2 {A} a) → (α ★ β) ≡ (ir r-1 • α • ir r) • (il r-1 • β • il r)
lem1 a α β = r

lem1' : {A : Set} → (a : A) → (α β : Ω2 {A} a) → (α ★' β) ≡ (il r-1 • β • il r) • (ir r-1 • α • ir r)
lem1' a α β = r

-- ap\_
apf : {A B : Set} → {x y : A} → (f : A → B) → (x ≡ y) → f x ≡ f y
apf {A} {B} {x} {y} f p = J D d x y p
  where
    D : (x y : A) → x ≡ y → Set
    D x y p = {f : A → B} → f x ≡ f y
    d : (x : A) → D x x r
    d = λ x → r

ap : {A B : Set} → {x y : A} → (f : A → B) → (x ≡ y) → f x ≡ f y
ap f r = r

lem20 : {A : Set} → {a : A} → (α : Ω2 {A} a) → (ir r-1 • α • ir r) ≡ α
lem20 α = ir (α)-1

lem21 : {A : Set} → {a : A} → (β : Ω2 {A} a) → (il r-1 • β • il r) ≡ β
lem21 β = ir (β)-1

lem2 : {A : Set} → (a : A) → (α β : Ω2 {A} a) → (ir r-1 • α • ir r) • (il r-1 • β • il r) ≡ (α • β)
lem2 {A} a α β = apf (λ - → - • (il r-1 • β • il r)) (lem20 α) • apf (λ - → α • -) (lem21 β)

lem2' : {A : Set} → (a : A) → (α β : Ω2 {A} a) → (il r-1 • β • il r) • (ir r-1 • α • ir r) ≡ (β • α)

```

```

lem2' {A} a  $\alpha$   $\beta$  = apf ( $\lambda$  -  $\rightarrow$  -  $\bullet$  ( $i_r r^{-1} \bullet \alpha \bullet i_r r$ )) (lem21  $\beta$ )  $\bullet$  apf ( $\lambda$  -  $\rightarrow$   $\beta \bullet$  -) (lem20  $\alpha$ )
-- apf ( $\lambda$  -  $\rightarrow$  -  $\bullet$  ( $i_l r^{-1} \bullet \beta \bullet i_l r$ ) ) (lem20  $\alpha$ )  $\bullet$  apf ( $\lambda$  -  $\rightarrow$   $\alpha \bullet$  -) (lem20  $\beta$ )

 $\star \equiv \bullet$  : {A : Set}  $\rightarrow$  (a : A)  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha \beta$  :  $\Omega^2$  {A} a)  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha \star \beta$ )  $\equiv$  ( $\alpha \bullet \beta$ )
 $\star \equiv \bullet$  a  $\alpha$   $\beta$  = lem1 a  $\alpha$   $\beta$   $\bullet$  lem2 a  $\alpha$   $\beta$ 

-- proven simlairly to above
 $\star' \equiv \bullet$  : {A : Set}  $\rightarrow$  (a : A)  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha \beta$  :  $\Omega^2$  {A} a)  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha \star' \beta$ )  $\equiv$  ( $\beta \bullet \alpha$ )
 $\star' \equiv \bullet$  a  $\alpha$   $\beta$  = lem1' a  $\alpha$   $\beta$   $\bullet$  lem2' a  $\alpha$   $\beta$ 

--eckmannHilton : {A : Set}  $\rightarrow$  (a : A)  $\rightarrow$  ( $\alpha \beta$  :  $\Omega^2$  {A} a)  $\rightarrow$   $\alpha \bullet \beta \equiv \beta \bullet \alpha$ 
--eckmannHilton a r r = r

```

[TODO, fix without k errors]

## A Spectrum of GF Grammars for types

We now discuss the various iterations of code which experimented with NL aspects

We should again emphasize the role of, in particular, Rantas two grammars, one formalizing logic, and the other working with a case study of a real text[19]

We now discuss the GF implementation, capable of parsing both natural language and Agda syntax. The parser was appropriated from the cubicaltt BNFC parser, de-cubified and then gf-ified. The languages are tightly coupled, so the translation is actually quite simple. Some main differences are:

- GF treats abstract and concrete syntax separately. This allows GF to support many concrete syntax implementation of a given grammar
- Fixity is dealt with at the concrete syntax layer in GF. This allows for more refined control of fixity, but also results in difficulties : during linearization there can be the insertion of extra parens.
- GF supports dependent types and higher order abstract syntax, which makes it suitable to typecheck at the parsing stage. It would very interesting to see if this is interoperable with the current version of this work in later iterations [Todo - add github link referncing work I've done in this direction]
- GF also is enhanced by a PGF back-end, allowing an embedding of grammars into, among other languages, Haskell.

While GF is targeted towards natural language translation, there's nothing stopping it from being used as a PL tool as well, like, for instance, the front-end of a compiler. The innovation of this thesis is to combine both uses, thereby allowing translation between Controlled Natural Languages and programming languages.

Example expressions the grammar can parse are seen below, which have been verified by hand to be isomorphic to the corresponding cubicaltt BNFC trees:

```
data bool : Set where true | false
data nat  : Set where zero | suc ( n : nat )
caseBool ( x : Set ) ( y z : x ) : bool -> Set = split false -
> y || true -> z
indBool ( x : bool -> Set ) ( y : x false ) ( z : x true ) : ( b : bool ) -
> x b = split false -> y || true -> z
funExt ( a : Set ) ( b : a -> Set ) ( f g : ( x : a ) -
> b x ) ( p : ( x : a ) -> ( b x ) ( f x ) == ( g x ) ) : ( ( y : a ) -
> b y ) f == g = undefined
foo ( b : bool ) : bool = b
```

[Todo] add use cases

## Goals and Challenges

The parser is still quite primitive, and needs to be extended extensively to support natural language ambiguity in mathematics as well as other linguistic nuance that GF captures well, like tense and aspect. This can follow a method expored in Aarne's paper : "Translating between Language and Logic: What Is Easy and What Is Difficult" where one develops a denotational semantics for translating between natural language expressions with the desired AST. The bulk of this work will be writing a Haskell back-end implementing this AST transformation. The extended syntax, designed for linguistic nuance, will be filtered into the core syntax, which is essentially what I have done.

The Resource Grammar Library (RGL) is designed for out-of-the box grammar writing, and therefore much of the linearization nuance can be outsourced to this robust and well-studied library. Nonetheless, each application grammar brings its own unique challenges, and the RGL will only get one so far. My linearization may require extensive tweaking.

Thus far, our parser is only able to parse non-cubical fragments of the cubicalTT standard library. Dealing with Agda pattern matching, it was realized, is outside the theoretical boundaries of GF (at least, if one were to do it in a non ad-hoc way) due to its inability to pass arbitrary strings down the syntax tree nodes during linearization. Pattern matching therefore needs to be dealt with via pre and post processing. Additionally, cubicaltt is weaker at dealing with telescopes than Agda, and so a full generalization to Agda is not yet possible. Universes are another feature future iterations of this Grammar would need to deal with, but as they aren't present in most mathematician's vernacular, it is not seen as relevant for the state of this project.

Records should also be added, but because this grammar supports sigma types, there is no rush. The Identity type is so far deeply embedded in our grammar, so the first code fragment may just be for explanatory purposes. The degree to which the library is extended to cover domain specific information is up to debate, but for now the grammar is meant to be kept as minimal as possible.

One interesting extension, time dependnet, would be to allow for a bidirectional feedback between GF and Agda : thereby allowing ad hoc extensions to GF's ASTs to allow for newly defined Agda functions to be treated with more care, i.e. have an arguement structure rather than just treating everything as variables. This may be too ambitious for the time being.

Category theory in agda paper, differences in formalization

\* my agda hott library \* escardo's hott library - if successful on mine, with universe support - mix of latex, agda code , and natural language \* dummy example for non-hott math (spivak et al, type-in-type) \* alternatively, trying digging in the mountain at the other end, and try extedning ad-hoc grammar with various syntactic nuance \* Latex Unicode support - \* Degenerate cases - find examples which are unable to be supported by this grammar, explain why and offer future possible patches

Talk about all the things that need to be done

Pattern Matching, additional parser vs internal to GF

How to decide an optimal phrase (this seems like it'd be some rule based) from agda program

\* Support for cs math - e.g. specifications of algorithms and their actual implementations \* Alternative syntaxes - graphical languages like grasshopper \* user interface - QA - Hoogle for proofs \* NL semantics (the semantic content is precisely the formal statements) \* Comparison / integration with ML approaches \* studies in concrete syntax -Harper psychology programming

Testing, with particular reference to the pgf grammar I developed

## Code

GF Parser

Additional Agda Hott Code



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## Appendices