

Automated Worm Fingerprinting

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
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Presentation Organization

- ▶ What are computer worms?
- ▶ Need for efficient worm detection techniques
- ▶ Solution approach: Dynamic signature generation
- ▶ Experimental results of Earlybird
- ▶ Related work and assessment

Problem: Worms

- ▶ Standalone computer program
- ▶ Designated as a *malware*
- ▶ Replicates itself in order to spread
- ▶ Can use network to spread to connected hosts
- ▶ Can be malicious or useful (very rare)



Malicious Activities

- ▶ Increase in network traffic
- ▶ Can open backdoors and install rootkits
- ▶ Zombie for botnets
- ▶ Delete files
- ▶ Reboot systems

Worm Out-breaks in Recent Times

- ▶ Software homogeneity and unrestricted internet access
- ▶ Code Red worm took fourteen hours to infect vulnerable population (360,000 hosts)
- ▶ Slammer worm infected same number of hosts in under 10 minutes

Need for Efficient Detection Techniques

- ▶ Signature based
- ▶ Anomaly based
- ▶ Challenges in detection: Need to quickly generate signatures

Detection Techniques

Three methods for worm detection:

- ▶ Scan detection (telescopes)
- ▶ Honeypots
- ▶ Behavioural techniques at end hosts

Solution Approach: Earlybird

- ▶ Detects anomalies to generate signatures
- ▶ Invariant content in worms used as signatures
- ▶ Spreading mechanism of worms atypical of internet applications
- ▶ Frequently repeated and widely dispersed content treated as signature

A Priori Signature Creation

- ▶ Characterization is the process of analysing and identifying a new worm
- ▶ Using a priori vulnerability signatures from already know worms
- ▶ New worms exploiting known vulnerabilities
- ▶ Traffic content compared with known database of attack signatures
- ▶ Can only be used for well-known vulnerabilities

Signature Extraction

- ▶ Use decoys programs/systems in a controlled environment to get infected
- ▶ Extract infected regions
- ▶ Apply heuristics and techniques to identify invariant code strings
- ▶ Refine set of signatures by comparing them against known infections

Defining Worm Behaviour

- ▶ Behaviour different from normal applications
- ▶ Content invariance
- ▶ Content prevalence
- ▶ Address dispersion
- ▶ Extensive traffic generation

Content Invariance and Content Prevalence

- ▶ Existing worm signatures invariant across all copies
- ▶ Can make use of polymorphism methods
- ▶ Encrypting the actual worm code
- ▶ Decryption routines are still invariant
- ▶ Invariant portion of the worm will appear frequently on network

Address Dispersion

- ▶ Number of infected hosts will grow over time
- ▶ Packets containing worms will reflect varied source and destination addresses


Experimental Testing and Results

- ▶ Algorithm must have small processing requirements
- ▶ Ideally can be parallelized
- ▶ Should not depend on a symmetric vantage point in the network

Estimating Content Prevalence

- ▶ Find packet payloads appearing at least x times among N packets
- ▶ Instead of storing packet payload, hash of payload is stored
- ▶ Collision probability in hash table can be reduced by using a suitably large range
- ▶

Multi-Stage Filter




Estimating Address Dispersion

- ▶ Count distinct source IP and destination IP addresses
- ▶ Different from estimating only repetitions of a distinct string
- ▶ Trading between accuracy and memory requirements
- ▶ Using bitmaps


Parameter Tuning

- ▶ Content prevalence threshold set to 3
- ▶ Address dispersion threshold set to 30 source and 30 destination addresses

CDF of Signatures



Distinct Signatures Detected Over Time



Earliest Automation System

- ▶ By Kephart and Arnold
- ▶ Used decoy programs in controlled environment
- ▶ Allows decoys to get infected
- ▶ Extraction of infected regions and used as signatures





Autograph

- ▶ By Kim and Karp
- ▶ Uses network-level data to infer worm signatures
- ▶ Rabin fingerprints to index counters of content sub-strings
- ▶ Compared to Earlybird cannot detect a large number of worms

Assessment

- ▶ Depends on invariant code or strings
- ▶ Cannot detect truly polymorphic worms
- ▶ Works well for older worms but may will not be able to adapt to polymorphic behaviour

References

-  S. Singh, C. Estan, G. Varghese, and S. Savage, “Automated worm fingerprinting,” in *OSDI*, pp. 45–60, 2004.
-  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system.
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