MATRIX MULTIPLICATION I

NAIVE METHOD

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1. THE PROCESS

(1) The circuit operates over the finite field $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$, where p is an n-bit prime (typically, $n \approx 256$ in practice):

$$2^{n-1} .$$

(2) Let $A = [a_{ik}]$ and $B = [b_{kj}]$ be integer matrices of dimensions $\ell \times m$ and $m \times n$, respectively. Let U be an integer such that, for all i, k, j,

$$-U \leqslant a_{ik}, b_{kj} \leqslant U.$$

(3) Assume¹ that

$$mU^2 < \frac{p}{2}$$
.

In practice, typical values of m include 28, 256, and 1568, while typical values of U include 2^{16} , 2^{21} , and 2^{32} .

(4) Let $C = [c_{ij}]$ be an $\ell \times n$ integer matrix and assume² that, for all i, j,

$$-\frac{p}{2} < c_{ij} \leqslant \frac{p}{2}.$$

- (5) Convert each a_{ik} , b_{kj} , and c_{ij} to its least-residue modulo p, denoted a'_{ik} , b'_{kj} , and c'_{ij} , respectively. This conversion is necessary because frameworks typically do not support signed integers even in unconstrained environments.
- (6) For all i, j, impose the constraint [Algorithm 4.1, Listing 1]

$$c'_{ij} \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{m} a'_{ik} b'_{kj} \mod p.$$
 (1.1)

This is of course equivalent to the same congruence with c_{ij} , a_{ik} , b_{kj} .

(7) Assuming $|a_{ik}|, |b_{kj}| \le U$, $mU^2 < p/2$, and $-p/2 < c_{ij} \le p/2$, the constraint (1.1) ensures [Proposition 3.1] that

$$c_{ij} = \sum_{k=1}^{m} a_{ik} b_{kj}.$$

Therefore, if such a constraint is imposed for all i, j, we are assured that

$$AB = C$$
.

Remark 1.1 (Detection of Negative-to-Positive Substitution Attack). A dishonest prover might attempt to mask a negative matrix entry (e.g., -a for some a > 0) by providing its least-residue modulo p, namely p - a, in order to claim it is positive. However, by design the circuit enforces that all entries satisfy

$$-\frac{p}{2} < x \leqslant \frac{p}{2}.$$

Since p - a > p/2 (for any $0 < a \le U$, given that p > 2U), such a substitution would violate the range constraint. Hence, the circuit will detect any attempt to disguise a negative value in this manner.

² A similar remark to Footnote 1 applies.

Assuming that each a_{ik} and b_{kj} is stored as a 64-bit signed integer (i.e., 164), we set $U = 2^{63}$. Provided $m \le 2^{64}$, it follows that $mU^2 \le 2^{190}$, which is less than p/2 for any prime $p > 2^{191}$. If no such off-circuit reasoning applies, or if tighter bounds are desired, a range check is required.

2. PARAMETER ROLES: PUBLIC, PRIVATE, AND COMPUTED

For the circuit verifying matrix multiplication, we distinguish between public parameters, private inputs (the prover's witness), and values computed within the circuit. These roles are summarized as follows:

Public Parameters

- Field Modulus p: The prime p defining the finite field $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ is public and fixed during circuit setup.
- Matrix Dimensions ℓ , m, n: The dimensions of the matrices, with A of size $\ell \times m$, B of size $m \times n$, and C of size $\ell \times n$, are public. Hence, no in-circuit verification of these bounds is necessary.
- **Bound** U: The bound U on the absolute values of matrix entries (for example, $U = 2^{63}$ when using 64-bit signed integers) is public. This is used to ensure that $mU^2 < p/2$.

Private Inputs (Prover's Witness)

- **Matrices** A **and** B: These matrices are provided by the prover as private inputs. Their entries must be preprocessed into their least-residue representations modulo p (since the API does not allow signed integers).
- Matrix C: Typically, the prover also supplies the matrix C as the claimed product AB. Alternatively, if C is derived from other computations, it may be computed off-circuit and provided as input.

Computed Within the Circuit

- Matrix Product AB: The circuit computes the product $A \times B$ using the provided matrices A and B. This computed product is then compared against the supplied matrix C to verify correctness.
- **Derived Matrices:** In some applications (e.g., a neural network), one of the matrices (such as a weight matrix) may be computed within the circuit from other inputs rather than being provided directly.

In summary, public parameters such as p, the dimensions ℓ , m, n, and the bound U are fixed and known to all parties, while the matrices A, B, and C form the prover's private witness. The circuit uses these inputs to compute and verify the relation AB = C.

3. THE MATHS

Proposition 3.1. Let p be a positive integer (not necessarily a prime), and let a_{ik} , b_{kj} , and c_{ij} be integers satisfying

$$c_{ij} \equiv \sum_{k=1}^{m} a_{ik} b_{kj} \bmod p.$$

Assume there is a constant U such that $|a_{ik}| \le U$ and $|b_{kj}| \le U$ for all i,k, j, and also assume $|c_{ij}| \le p/2$. If $mU^2 < p/2$, then

$$c_{ij} = \sum_{k=1}^{m} a_{ik} b_{kj}.$$

The congruence guarantees that the computed sum and c_{ij} coincide as integers.

Consequently, interpreting the entries a_{ik} , b_{kj} , c_{ij} as the components of matrices A, B, C, we conclude that AB = C as integer matrices, not merely modulo p.

Proof. By the given congruence condition, there is an integer t such that

$$c_{ij} = tp + \sum_{k=1}^{m} a_{ik} b_{kj}.$$

We claim t = 0. Suppose not; then $|t| \ge 1$. We split into two cases:

(1) Case $t \ge 1$. Then

$$c_{ij} \ge p + \sum_{k=1}^{m} a_{ik} b_{kj} \ge p - mU^2 > p - \frac{p}{2} = \frac{p}{2},$$

hence $c_{ij} > p/2$. But this contradicts the bound $c_{ij} \le p/2$ (we assume $|c_{ij}| \le p/2$).

(2) Case $t \leq -1$. Then

$$c_{ij} \le -p + \sum_{k=1}^{m} a_{ik} b_{kj} \le -p + mU^2 < -p + \frac{p}{2} = -\frac{p}{2},$$

hence $c_{ij} < -p/2$. But this contradicts the bound $c_{ij} \ge -p/2$ (we assume $|c_{ij}| \le p/2$).

Since in either case we reach a contradiction, the only possibility is t = 0. This concludes the proof.

4. THE CODE

We assume that the bounds of Proposition 3.1 hold and that all matrix elements have been converted to their least-residue equivalents in preprocessing.

Algorithm 4.1 mat_mul: verify matrix multiplication

Require: Matrices A of size $(\ell \times m)$, B of size $(m \times n)$, and C of size $(\ell \times n)$. Each entry is represented by a circuit variable.

```
1: function MATRIX_PRODUCT(A, B)
                                                                                                                         \triangleright Compute A \times B in the circuit.
         P \leftarrow \text{new } (\ell \times n) \text{ matrix of circuit variables}
2:
3:
         for i ← 0 to \ell − 1 do
              for j \leftarrow 0 to n-1 do
4:
                   P[i][j] \leftarrow \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} \left( A[i][k] \times B[k][j] \right)
              end for
6:
7:
         end for
         return P
9: end function
10: function VERIFY_MAT_MUL(A, B, C)
11:
         P \leftarrow \text{matrix\_product}(A, B)
12:
         for i \leftarrow 0 to \ell - 1 do
13:
              for j \leftarrow 0 to n-1 do
                   assert_is_equal(C[i][j], P[i][j])
14:
15:
              end for
         end for
16:
17: end function
```

```
1 // Example dimension constants for A, B, and AB.
  const L: usize = 3; // Number of rows in A
  const M: usize = 4; // Number of columns in A (also rows in B)
  const N: usize = 2; // Number of columns in B
  declare_circuit!(Circuit {
      // A has shape (\ell x m)
      matrix_a: [[Variable; M]; L],
      // B has shape (m x n)
10
      matrix_b: [[Variable; N]; M],
      // AB has shape (\ell x n)
      matrix_product_ab: [[Variable; N]; L],
14
  });
15
16
  impl < C: Config > GenericDefine < C > for Circuit < Variable > {
      fn define < Builder: RootAPI < C >> (& self , api: & mut Builder) {
18
          // 'matrix_product' is a helper function that multiplies two
19
          // matrices within the circuit, returning a new (\ell x n) matrix.
20
          let computed_product = matrix_product(api, self.matrix_a, self.matrix_b);
          // For each entry (i, j) in the expected product, assert equality
          // with the corresponding computed entry in 'computed_product'.
          for i in 0..L {
               for j in 0..N {
                   api.assert_is_equal(
28
                       self.matrix_product_ab[i][j],
                       computed_product[i][j],
```

```
30 );
31 }
32 }
33 }
34 }
```

Listing 1: ECC Rust API: verify matrix multiplication

EXPANDER COMPILER COLLECTION [1]

REFERENCES

[1] Polyhedra Network. ExpanderCompilerCollection. https://github.com/PolyhedraZK/ExpanderCompilerCollection.git. GitHub repository. Accessed March 19, 2025.