Second Edition

Critical Discourse Analysis

The Critical Study of Language

Norman Fairclough



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Series editor's preface

Critical Discourse Analysis, in its first edition in 1995, along with its predecessor *Language in Power*, created in the world of applied linguistics and discourse analysis a way and a means of systematically approaching the relationships between language and social structure which has now not only extended across those worlds but also had its impact across social science more generally. It would be no exaggeration to say that those two books, along with Norman Fairclough's other key texts, notably *Discourse and Social Change*, and his numerous papers and edited collections, changed the face of the social analysis of language.

Critical Discourse Analysis in its first edition offered a range of students of linguistics, applied linguistics and language study, as well as communication research in professions and organisations more generally, a framework and a means of exploring the imbrications between language and social-institutional practices, and beyond these, the intimate links between language as discourse and broader social and political structures. A key innovation at that time was to critique some of the premises and the constructs underpinning mainstream studies in sociolinguistics, conversation analysis and pragmatics to demonstrate the need of these disciplines to engage with issues of power and hegemony in a dynamic and historically informed manner, while at the same time insisting on the dynamic and polysystemic description of language variation. Indeed, the focus on the dynamics of discourse has proved especially productive for students of professional discourses such as those of law, politics, social work, healthcare, language and literacy education. This is very much a consequence of his viewing critical discourse analysis as *relational* research. Indeed, making interrelations matter (whether among, and within, institutions of the social order and between them, or the social formation more generally) links

serendipitously with applied linguistic calls in recent years for just such connections. Indeed, Norman Fairclough has offered those practitioners whose work is most obviously discoursed and languaged a means whereby they, now often in collaboration with critical discourse analysts, can describe, interpret and proffer explanations how their practices are discursively accomplished, suggesting a way of clarifying the ideologically informed bases of the purposes and methods of the professions themselves. At the same time, his focus on the *dialectics* of discourse does not just provide a motivation for intellectual debate, but also directly engages the understanding of *interdiscursivity* and its relation to those semiotic modalities within and through which interdiscursivity is realised, highlighting what he calls the two-way 'flow' of discourse to and from sociological/political constructs such as hegemony and power. Here again, his formulations speak directly to applied linguists engaged in understanding the focal themes of contemporary social institutions. His discussion in this new edition of how participants, in his terms, construe their worlds, and how they reflexively seek to change aspects of such worlds, to reconstruct them, offers considerable backing to those researchers and participants intent on pursuing a reflexive and critical agenda. Workers in the fields of communication in healthcare, social work, language and literacy education, restorative justice, political agency, have come to rely on his formulations and theorising almost as a manifesto for action. I use the word 'manifesto' in its true sense; as a statement of commitment to principle but also as a blueprint for practical action. This is important if we are not to regard critical discourse analysis, as Norman Fairclough manifestly does *not*, as merely a politically inspired approach to analysing language, as it were, reading and seeking to change society 'off the page'. Nothing could be further from the truth as this new edition, greatly expanded with more recent papers and new sections, makes abundantly clear.

The papers in this collection represent a formidable treatise on critical discourse analysis from perhaps its leading exponent. To strike a personal note, they go back to the early days of the formulation of such ideas when we were colleagues at Lancaster; but now greatly enhanced both in terms of their scope, their theoretical base, and also their influence. They provide the basis for understanding the theoretical underpinnings of critical discourse analysis but also the substance and warrant of its immense influence on research practice.

What are the key elements of this new edition for applied linguists engaged with the critical exploration of discourse? Readers will discover many. For me, firstly, it is the insistence throughout on what Norman refers to as *transdisciplinary* research. This is not merely to be seen, however, as forging links between discourse study and sociology, politics, anthropology, *inter alia*, central though that is to his theme, it is also *trans-professional* in enabling discourse workers to collaborate with workers in other fields and disciplines

in a programme of exploring praxis. There are now rather many examples of just such transdisciplinary work. Secondly, it is the engagement of structure with strategy – again not necessarily at all focused on the macro contexts of the social formation, though clearly Norman's work speaks to that directly, but also in the exploration of the micro interactional order, addressing how strategic actions always are imbued with the influences of the institutional structural order, however naturalised. Here Norman Fairclough comes closest to the work of Bourdieu and of Cicourel, though with a distinctive engagement: one might venture to say this is the key trio underpinning current work in applied linguistics. Readers of the first edition of *Critical Discourse Analysis* will have found expression there, as they will do now even more substantially in this much expanded new edition, of his abiding concern for the relevance of critical discourse analytical research as an contributive agent for social change; in education, in the media, in the political order, and in respect of the economic drivers of contemporary society. It is this which has both raised hopes and stimulated action; it is also, we must acknowledge, a central focus of contention within the linguistic and applied linguistic community. Here we can emphasise a shift over time, from negative to positively motivated critique. That also derives from a broader understanding of 'critical' than has often been advanced in discussions of his work. Critical after all is not just even primarily, *criticism*, neither is it only a matter of focusing on *critical* moments in interaction (although that for many is a mainspring of engaging with discourse analysis at all); it is primarily, for me at least, a seeking of the means of explaining data in the context of social and political and institutional analysis, and in terms of *critiquing* ideologically invested modes of explaining and interpreting, but always with the sights set on positively motivated change. In this way, text analysis (however multimodal), interaction analysis (however framed), ethnographic study (however voiced) have always to be seen as each interpenetrating the other in the context of a historically and politically engaged understanding of the social order.

Such a picturing of critical discourse analysis is not as it were *sui generis*; it has its intellectual antecedents as Norman Fairclough amply displays in this new edition. More than that, however, it provides a foundation for, and a practically motivated reasoning for, the aspirations of a socially committed applied linguistics across a range of domains, sites and focal themes.

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for Our Country: A New Contract for Welfare (Green Paper on Welfare Reform); Chapter 18, pp. 469–70, extract from article 'Police prepare to make thousands of arrests at G8', *Daily Telegraph*, 12 June 2005; Chapter 18, p. 472 and Chapter 22, pp. 546–7, extracts from MacDonald, R. (1994) 'Fiddly jobs, undeclared working and something for nothing society', *Work, Employment and Society*, 8(4); Appendix 20.1 from *A Strategic Goal for the Next Decade, Lisbon Declaration* (*European Councils*), reproduced with permission from the European Communities.

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Norman Fairclough would also like to warmly thank the co-authors of papers included in this book (Eve Chiapello, Phil Graham, Bob Jessop, Simon Pardoe, Andrew Sayer, Bron Szerszynski) for the contribution which these various collaborations have made to the development of his thinking about critical discourse analysis.

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General introduction

This book is a collection of twenty-three papers in critical discourse analysis (CDA) which I have written, or in the case of four of them co-authored, over a period of 25 years, between 1983 and 2008. It is a substantial revision of the much shorter first edition of *Critical Discourse Analysis* which was published in 1995 and contained just ten papers. I have retained six of these, and added seventeen new ones. I have grouped the papers in seven sections of which three (*Language*, *Ideology and Power*; *Discourse and Social Change*; *Language and Education*) correspond to sections in the first edition, while the other four (*Dialectics of Discourse: Theoretical Developments*; *Methodology*; *Political Discourse*; *Globalisation and 'Transition'*) reflect ways in which my work has developed since 1995. Although these sections do I think give a reasonable sense of main elements and emphases, there are inevitably some thematic overlaps between them.

My original formulation of the broad objective of my work in CDA still holds: to develop ways of analysing language which address its involvement in the workings of contemporary capitalist societies. The focus on capitalist societies is not only because capitalism is the dominant economic system internationally as well in Britain (where I have spent most of life), but also because the character of the economic system affects all aspects of social life. I am not suggesting a mechanical 'economic determinism', but the main areas of social life are interdependent and have effects on each other, and because of the dominance of the economy in contemporary societies its effects are particularly strong and pervasive. For instance, the 'neo-liberal' version of capitalism which has been dominant for the past thirty years is widely recognised to have entailed major changes in politics, in the nature of work, education and healthcare, in social and moral values, in lifestyles, and so forth.

I am working within a tradition of critical social research which is focused on better understanding of how and why contemporary capitalism prevents or limits, as well as in certain respects facilitating, human well-being and flourishing. Such understanding may, in favourable circumstances, contribute to overcoming or at least mitigating these obstacles and limits. This possibility follows from a property of the social world which differentiates it from the natural world: the meanings and concepts through which people interpret it and the knowledge they have of it are part of the social world and can contribute to transforming the rest of it (Bhaskar 1979).

My objective in publishing this book also remains the same as for the first edition: to bring together in a single place papers which have appeared in diverse and sometimes rather inaccessible locations in order to show continuities, developments and changes in one line of work within CDA. Other books I have published are also part of this picture, and I shall indicate some of the relationships between them and the papers in this volume in separate introductions to each of the sections, which summarise the papers and identify salient themes. I have kept the title *Critical Discourse Analysis* despite being conscious that it might seem misleading (and even more so in 2009 than in 1995) to use the name of what has become a substantial and diverse international field of teaching and research as the title for a collection of papers representing one line of work and tendency within this greater whole – though I think it is true to say that it has been an influential one. So let me stress that this is no more than my own particular view, changing over the years, of the field of CDA. But of course, in choosing to take this view rather than others I am suggesting that it is preferable in certain respects to others, so it is also *no less* than my own view of what CDA should be!

Colleagues in and beyond the field of CDA have contributed a great deal to the development of my views. Some of them are present in the book as co-authors (Eve Chiapello, Phil Graham, Bob Jessop, Simon Pardoe, Andrew Sayer, Bron Szerszynski), the many others include, within the field of CDA, Lilie Chouliaraki, Romy Clark, Isabela Ieţcu-Fairclough, Roz Ivanič, Jay Lemke, Gunther Kress, Ron Scollon, Teun van Dijk, Theo van Leeuwen and Ruth Wodak, as well as my former research students and members of the Lancaster 'Language, Ideology and Power' research group over a period of some twenty years, and more recently the Bucharest 'Re-scaling Romania' research group. My considerable debts to past and present researchers in CDA and other areas of study that I have not worked with so directly are partially indicated in the references at the end of the book.

I shall begin by giving my views on *discourse* and on what critical discourse analysis should be analysis *of*, on what should count as *analysis*, and what

critical analysis should be. In doing so I shall be taking a position not only *on* CDA but also *in* CDA: in suggesting what discourse, analysis and critique are I will also be suggesting what they are not, and differentiating my position from that of others. I also suggest certain general measures to determine what research and analysis counts as CDA or does not count as CDA. I then discuss how CDA including my own work has contributed to critical social research on the 'neo-liberal' form of capitalism which has been internationally dominant over the past thirty years or so. This will lead to a 'manifesto' for CDA in the changing circumstances at the time of writing: a financial and economic crisis which promises to be severe in its effects and serious in its consequences. I shall discuss what role CDA can have, what it should be trying to achieve, and in particular how it might contribute to responses to the crisis which seek to tackle the difficulties and dangers that face us and enhance human well-being.

1 Discourse, analysis, critique

In my view CDA has these three basic properties: it is relational, it is dialectical, and it is transdisciplinary. It is a *relational* form of research in the sense that its primary focus in not on entities or individuals (in which I include both things and persons) but on social relations (see further Paper 12, pages 301–40). Social relations are very complex, and they are also 'layered' in the sense that they include 'relations between relations'. For example, 'discourse' might be seen as some sort of entity or 'object', but it is itself a complex set of relations including relations of communication between people who talk, write and in other ways communicate with each other, but also, for example, describe relations between concrete communicative events (conversations, newspaper articles etc.) and more abstract and enduring complex discursive 'objects' (with their own complex relations) like languages, discourses and genres. But there are also relations between discourse and other such complex 'objects' including objects in the physical world, persons, power relations and institutions, which are interconnected elements in social activity or praxis. The main point for present purposes is that we cannot answer the question 'what is discourse' except in terms of both its 'internal' relations and its 'external' relations with such other 'objects'. Discourse is not simply an entity we can define independently: we can only arrive at an understanding of it by analysing sets of relations. Having said that, we can say what it is in particular that discourse brings into the complex relations which constitute social life: meaning, and making meaning.

These relations are in my view *dialectical*, and it is the dialectical character of these relations that really makes it clear why simply defining 'discourse' as a

separate 'object' is not possible. Dialectical relations are relations between objects which are different from one another but not what I shall call 'discrete', not fully separate in the sense that one excludes the other. This sounds paradoxical, and indeed in a certain sense it is. Let us consider 'external' relations between discourse and other 'objects'. Think of power and discourse. The power of, for instance, the people who control a modern state (the relation of power between them and the rest of the people) is partly discursive in character. For example, it depends on sustaining the 'legitimacy' of the state and its representatives, which is largely achieved in discourse. Yet state power also includes the capacity to use physical force and violence. So power is not simply discourse, it is not reducible to discourse; 'power' and 'discourse' are different elements in the social process (or in a dialectical terminology, different 'moments'). Yet power is partly discourse, and discourse is partly power – they are different but not discrete, they 'flow into' each other; discourse can be 'internalised' in power and vice-versa; the complex realities of power relations are 'condensed' and simplified in discourses (Harvey 1996). Social activity or praxis consists in complex articulations of these and other objects as its elements or moments; its analysis is analysis of dialectical relations between them, and no one object or element (such as discourse) can be analysed other than in terms of its dialectical relations with others.

What then is CDA analysis *of*? It is *not* analysis of discourse 'in itself' as one might take it to be, but analysis of dialectical *relations between* discourse and other objects, elements or moments, as well as analysis of the 'internal relations' of discourse. And since analysis of such relations cuts across conventional boundaries between disciplines (linguistics, politics, sociology and so forth), CDA is an interdisciplinary form of analysis, or as I shall prefer to call it a *transdisciplinary* form. What this term entails is that the 'dialogues' between disciplines, theories and frameworks which take place in doing analysis and research are a source of theoretical and methodological developments within the particular disciplines, theories and frameworks in dialogue – including CDA itself (see Section D, Methodology in CDA research).

Note that this is a *realist* approach which claims that there is a real world, including the social world, which exists irrespective of whether or how well we know and understand it. More specifically it is a 'critical realist' approach (see Papers 8 and 13), which means among other things a recognition that the natural and social worlds differ in that the latter but not the former depends upon human action for its existence and is 'socially constructed'. The socially constructive effects of discourse are thus a central concern, but a distinction is drawn between *construal* and *construction*: the world is discursively construed (or represented) in many and various ways, but which construals come

to have socially constructive effects depends upon a range of conditions which include for instance power relations but also properties of whatever parts or aspects of the world are being construed. We cannot transform the world in any old way we happen to construe it; the world is such that some transformations are possible and others are not. So CDA is a 'moderate' or 'contingent' form of social constructivism.

So much for 'discourse' and what CDA is analysis of. Let me come to 'analysis'. Given that CDA should be transdisciplinary analysis, it should have a transdisciplinary methodology (see Section D and especially Paper 9). I use 'methodology' rather than 'method', because I see analysis as not just the selection and application of pre-established methods (including methods of textual analysis), but a theory-driven process of constructing *objects of research* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) for research topics, i.e., for research themes as they initially present themselves to us (for instance, the current financial and economic crisis). Constructing an object of research for a research topic is converting it into a 'researchable object': cogent, coherent and researchable research questions. For instance, faced with the topic of the current financial and economic crisis which I discuss further below, we have to ask: what are the best, or the right, or the primary research questions to try to answer? Objects of research are constructed in a transdisciplinary way on the basis of theorising research topics in terms of the categories and relations of not only a theory of discourse (such as that of the version of CDA I work with) but also other relevant theories. These may be, depending on the topic, political, sociological, political–economic, educational, media and/or other theories.

Objects of research constructed in this transdisciplinary way allow for various 'points of entry' for the discourse analyst, the sociologist, the political economist and so forth, which focus upon different elements or aspects of the object of research. For instance the discourse analyst will focus on discourse, but never in isolation, always in its relations with other elements, and always in ways which accord with the formulation of the common object of research. For example, one object of research for the topic of 'the crisis' could be the emergence of different and competing strategies for overcoming the crisis, and the processes through which and the conditions under which certain strategies can be implemented and can transform existing systems and structures. This formulation is based upon a theory of crisis which among other things sees crises as events which arise from the character of structures, and sees strategies and structures as in a relationship such that the effects of structures give rise to strategies oriented to changing structures. If it also sees strategies as having a partly discursive character, one 'point of entry' for research could be focused

on discursive features of strategies and how they may contribute to their success or failure. This might include for instance analysis of explanations of the crisis and attributions of blame, justifications for and legitimations of particular lines of action and policy, and value claims and assumptions in explanations, justifications and legitimations.

Bringing diverse theories or frameworks together to co-construct transdisciplinary objects of research gives rise to issues of 'translation' between the concepts, categories and relations of CDA and of other theories or frameworks. Let's take the case of theories of and frameworks for analysing relations of power. Since research will be concerned with dialectical relations between discourse and power, the challenge is to find ways of coherently connecting categories and relations such as 'discourse', 'genre', 'recontextualisation' and 'argumentation' (from discourse theory) with categories and relations such as 'power', 'hegemony', 'ideology' and 'legitimacy' (from political theory). Given a particular theory of power, how can we coherently articulate its categories and relations with those of a theory of discourse so as to analyse ways in which discourse is internalised in power and power is internalised in discourse, that is, so as to be able to analyse dialectical relations between discourse and power for the particular topic and object of research? It is not a matter of substituting discourse-analytical categories and relations for political ones, or vice-versa. It is a matter of recognising the need for them to be separate (power is not *just* discourse, discourse is not *just* power) yet avoiding incoherent eclecticism. It is a matter of the translatability or *commensurability* (Jessop and Sum 2006) of concepts, categories and relations: a concern in transdisciplinary research is to both assess how good the match is between concepts, categories and relations from different theories and frameworks, and move towards increasing it. (An example is the category of 'recontextualisation' which was developed in sociology (Bernstein 1990) but interpreted in terms of CDA categories (including 'genre') in a way that increased the commensurability between the two (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999. See further below.) In doing so we are achieving an aim of transdisciplinary research which I mentioned above – using the dialogue between different disciplines or theories as the source of the theoretical or methodological development of each.

For CDA, analysis of course includes analysis of texts. Many methods of textual analysis have been developed in linguistics (phonetics, phonology, grammar, semantics, lexicology), pragmatics, stylistics, sociolinguistics, argumentation analysis, literary criticism, anthropology, conversation analysis and so forth. In principle any such methods might be recontextualised within CDA, though note that this implies that they may need to be adapted to fit in

with CDA's principles and purposes. The particular selection of methods for a particular research project depends upon the object of research which is constructed for the research topic. But the version of CDA I work with has a general method: textual analysis has a dual character. It is firstly *interdiscursive* analysis, analysis of which discourses, genres and styles are drawn upon in a text and how they are articulated together. This mode of analysis is based on the view that texts can and generally do draw upon and articulate together multiple discourses, multiple genres, and multiple styles. And it is secondly *linguistic* analysis or, for many texts, *multimodal* analysis of the different semiotic 'modes' (including language, visual images, body language, music and sound effects) and their articulation. The level of interdiscursive analysis is a mediating 'interlevel': on the one hand, discourses, genres and styles are realised in the more concrete form of linguistic and multimodal features of texts; on the other hand, discourses, genres and styles are categories not only of textual analysis but also of analysis of orders of discourse, which are the discoursal element or moment of social practices, social organisations and social institutions. Analysis in terms of these categories therefore helps to link 'micro-analysis' of texts to various forms of social (sociological, political and so forth) analysis of practices, organisations and institutions.

Let me turn to the third question, what is critique, what is *critical* discourse analysis? Critique brings a normative element into analysis (on normative social research, see Sayer 2005). It focuses on what is wrong with a society (an institution, an organisation etc.), and how 'wrongs' might be 'righted' or mitigated, from a particular normative standpoint. Critique is grounded in values, in particular views of the 'good society' and of human well-being and flourishing, on the basis of which it evaluates existing societies and possible ways of changing them. For instance, many people (though not all) would agree that societies ought to be just or fair, ought to ensure certain freedoms, and ought to provide for certain basic needs of their members (for food, shelter, healthcare etc.). The devil of course is in the detail: people have very different ideas of justice, freedom and need, and critical social research is necessarily involved in debates over the meaning of these and other value-related concepts. The crucial point, however, is that critique assesses what exists, what might exist and what should exist on the basis of a coherent set of values. At least to some extent this is a matter of highlighting gaps between what particular societies claim to be ('fair', 'democratic', 'caring' etc.) and what they are. We can distinguish between *negative critique*, which is analysis of how societies produce and perpetuate social wrongs, and *positive critique*, which is analysis of how people seek to remedy or mitigate them, and identification of further possibilities for righting or mitigating them.

A primary focus of CDA is on the effect of power relations and inequalities in producing social wrongs, and in particular on discursive aspects of power relations and inequalities: on dialectical relations between discourse and power, and their effects on other relations within the social process and their elements. This includes questions of *ideology*, understanding ideologies to be 'meaning in the service of power' (Thompson 1984): ways of representing aspects of the world, which may be operationalised in ways of acting and interacting and in 'ways of being' or identities, that contribute to establishing or sustaining unequal relations of power (see Section A). This focuses on the function of ideologies (in serving power), but ideologies are also open to critique on the grounds that they represent or explain aspects of the world inadequately. This leads to another way of answering the question 'what is critique?' with radical implications for CDA: it identifies critique of discourse as an inherent part of *any* application of critical method in social research.

Critical analysis aims to produce interpretations and explanations of areas of social life which both identify the causes of social wrongs and produce knowledge which could (in the right conditions) contribute to righting or mitigating them. But interpretations and explanations already exist – inevitably, because a necessary part of living and acting in particular social circumstances is interpreting and explaining them. So along with and as part of the areas of social life which critical researchers research, they find interpretations and explanations of them. These interpretations and explanations moreover include not only those of the people who live and act in particular circumstances, but also of those who seek to govern or regulate the ways in which they do so, including politicians and managers. And critical researchers will almost certainly find not only these interpretations and explanations but also prior interpretations and explanations of social researchers, historians, philosophers etc. Furthermore, it is a feature of the social world that interpretations and explanations of it can have effects upon it, can transform it in various ways. A critique of some area of social life must therefore be in part a critique of interpretations and explanations of social life. And since interpretations and explanations are discourse, it must be in part a critique of discourse.

But the critical analyst, in producing different interpretations and explanations of that area of social life, is also producing discourse. On what grounds can we say that this critical discourse is superior to the discourse which its critique is partly a critique of? The only basis for claiming superiority is providing explanations which have greater explanatory power. The explanatory power of a discourse (or a theory, which is a special sort of discourse) is its ability to provide justified explanations of as many features of the area of social life in focus as possible. So we can say that it is a matter of both quantity (the

number or range of features) and quality (justification). One aspect of the matter of quantity is the extent to which existing lay and non-lay interpretations and explanations are themselves explained, as well as their effects on social life, in terms of what it is or was about this area of social life that lead to these interpretations and explanations emerging, becoming dominant and being implemented. This is where ideology comes into the picture: interpretations and explanations can be said to be ideological if they can be shown to be not just inadequate but also necessary – necessary to establish and keep in place particular relations of power. On the matter of quality (justification), explanations are better than others if they are more consistent with whatever evidence exists, including what events take place or have taken place, how people act or have acted, what the effects of their actions are, and so forth. The relative explanatory power of different explanations, discourses and theories is of course an issue which is constantly in contention. A final point is that the explanatory power of a theory and an analysis informed by it contributes to its capacity to transform aspects of social life, which brings us back to dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements with respect to the aims of critique to not merely interpret the world but contribute to changing it.

This is a complex argument, but I think it is a strong one for CDA. Let me sum up its strengths. First, it repeats from a somewhat different vantage point my emphasis earlier on dialectical relations between discourse and other elements as a necessary part of social life. Second, it claims that critical analysis of discourse is a necessary part of any critical social analysis. Third, it provides a basis for determining which discourses (interpretations, explanations) are ideological. Fourth, it presents critical analysis as itself discourse which is dialectically related to other elements of social life. On this view of critique see Paper 12, and also Bhaskar (1979) and Marsden (1999).

The approach I have summarised in this section is based on a *transformational model* of social activity which is essentially Aristotelian in nature, 'in which the paradigm is that of the sculptor at work, fashioning a product out of the material and with the tools available' (Bhaskar 1979). Social activity is a form of production or work which both depends upon and transforms the material and tools available. Or to put it in different terms: in which society is both a condition for and an outcome of social activity, and social activity is both the production (which is transformative, effects changes) and the reproduction of the conditions of production (i.e., society). Moreover as I have suggested above social activity understood in this way consists in dialectical relations between different elements or moments including discourse. The view of discourse above conforms with the transformational model in that it fashions products (texts) out of available material and tools (languages, orders

of discourse, discourses, genres, styles etc.) which are its condition of possibility and which it both transforms and reproduces. What we might call *texturing*, producing text out of available material and tools, is one moment of social activity as work or production. But what must be emphasised is its dialectical interconnection with other moments in a process of production whose character we might sum up as material-semiotic. Analysis must seek to elucidate the complex interpenetration of material and semiotic (discoursal) moments, and resist treating text and texturing as having an existence independently of these dialectical relations.

2 What is CDA, and what is not CDA

Interest in CDA has increased quite remarkably since the publication of the first edition of *Critical Discourse Analysis*. It has spread to new areas of the world, and to a great many disciplines and areas of study (Fairclough, Graham, Lemke and Wodak 2001). The proliferation of researchers who are using CDA is very pleasing and very welcome. CDA has also become more institutionalised, in the sense that there are many more academic posts and programmes of study and research, and it has become more mainstream, and certainly more 'respectable' than it was in the early days.

I have the impression that, perhaps as a consequence of these developments, work is sometimes identified as 'CDA' which is arguably not CDA. If CDA becomes too ill-defined, or the answer to the question 'what is CDA?' becomes too vague, its value in social research and its appeal to researchers may be weakened. So I think it is important to discuss the question of what counts as CDA and what doesn't. My purpose in doing so is emphatically not to advocate conformity. On the contrary, the vitality of the field depends upon people taking CDA in different and new directions, and indeed the view of transdisciplinary research as a source of theoretical and methodological development amounts to advocating a continuing process of change. But I think it is possible to draw from the discussion above of discourse, analysis and critique a few general characteristics which can differentiate CDA from other forms of research and analysis. I suggest that research and analysis counts as CDA in so far as it has all of the following characteristics.

1. It is not just analysis of discourse (or more concretely texts), it is part of some form of systematic transdisciplinary analysis of relations between discourse and other elements of the social process.
2. It is not just general commentary on discourse, it includes some form of systematic analysis of texts.

3. It is not just descriptive, it is also normative. It addresses social wrongs in their discursive aspects and possible ways of righting or mitigating them.

I have tried to make these measures for determining what is and what is not CDA tight enough to work as measures, but loose enough to encompass and allow for many different existing and new versions of CDA. They are, and are designed to be, open to various interpretations. They are not 'rules': they should not be seen or used as regulative devices; they are designed to be helpful in drawing important distinctions. I hope others will take them up as suggestions which are, of course, open to modification. They do not exclude the possibility of making use of certain CDA categories and relations (e.g., interdiscursive analysis) in work which does not itself count as CDA – on the contrary, the transdisciplinary approach to research which I have suggested entails a way of developing theory and methodology through recontextualising categories and relations from other theories and frameworks. For example, *recontextualisation* itself is a relation which originates in Bernstein's 'social of pedagogy' (Bernstein 1990) but has been 'translated' into a relation within CDA by incorporating it into the system of categories and relations of the theory of CDA (see Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) for details).

3 CDA and neo-liberal capitalism

I have presented CDA above as a form of critical research which seeks to understand how contemporary capitalism in some respects enables but in other respects prevents or limits human well-being and flourishing, with a view to overcoming or mitigating these obstacles and limits. Much recent research has centred upon the 'new capitalism' (now not so new – indeed some commentators are beginning to call it 'old') which has been internationally dominant for the past thirty years or so, a restructuring of capitalism which emerged in response to the crisis in 'Fordist' economies and 'welfare states' in the 1970s. The capitalism of what we can call the 'neo-liberal' era has been characterised by, among other things, 'free markets' (the freeing of markets from state intervention and regulation), and attempts at reducing the state's responsibility for providing social welfare. It has involved a *restructuring* of relations between the economic, political, and social domains, including the extension of markets into social domains such as education, and focusing the role of the state and government on strengthening markets and competitiveness. It has also involved the *re-scaling* of relations between different scales of social life – the global, the regional (e.g., European Union), the national, and the local – which has facilitated the emergence of global markets.

Governments formed by mainstream parties of both left and right have embraced 'neo-liberalism', a political project (and ideology) for facilitating the restructuring and re-scaling of social relations in accord with the demands of an unrestrained global capitalism (Bourdieu 1998a). It has led to radical attacks on social welfare provision and the reduction of the protections that 'welfare states' provided for people against the effects of markets. It has also led to an increasing gap in income and wealth between rich and poor, increasing economic insecurity and stress, and an intensification of the exploitation of labour. The unrestrained emphasis on 'growth' also poses major threats to the environment. It has also produced a new imperialism in which international agencies under the tutelage of the US and its rich allies have imposed restructuring ('the Washington Consensus'), and which has more recently taken an increasingly military form (notably the invasion of Iraq). But there have been positive achievements in this period: for instance, there is truth in the claim of apologists for neo-liberalism that millions of people have been pulled out of absolute poverty during the neo-liberal era, though to what extent that is due to the specifically neo-liberal features of the era is open to question.

The lifespan of CDA (though not of critical analysis of discourse *per se*, which has a much longer history – see, for instance, Paper 12) matches quite closely the lifespan of this new form of capitalism, and it has made quite a substantial contribution to critical research on neo-liberal capitalism. A number of the papers in this book are part of this contribution, as are publications by many other CDA researchers (e.g., Graham 2000, 2001, 2002, forthcoming, Lemke 1995, Language in New Capitalism website, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/inc/). What has been the role of and the justification for a significant focus on discourse and language in this research? I have answered the question of justification in general terms above: because the relations which constitute the social process of neo-liberal capitalism include dialectical relations between its discursive and 'extra-discursive' elements – no account of it (or any of its elements and relations) which neglects discourse can be adequate. This is self-evidently so given the argument above, but it would also be self-evidently so for any social analysis, and it is the most general case for a discourse-analytical dimension of (or a 'discourse turn' in) social research. But there are certain more particular features of the neo-liberal era which make the case for a focus on discourse especially clear.

One irony of neo-liberalism is that at the time when most of the 'doctrinaire' socialist societies were imploding and the 'end of ideology' was being confidently predicted, a restructuring of capitalism clearly driven by explicit pre-constructed doctrine – which means driven by discourse – was taking

place. There was manifestly an 'imaginary' for neo-liberalism, a discourse of neo-liberalism, before strategies to operationalise and implement this imaginary and discourse in practice started to be effective. A liberal 'counter-revolution' against broadly social-democratic and 'statist' forms of capitalism had long been imagined and prepared by Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and their followers. Moreover, this imaginary, discourse and ideology of neo-liberalism has continued to be crucial in justifying and legitimising neo-liberalism in its moments of crisis (such as the East Asian crisis of the late 1990s and its spread to other regions) and in its mission to internationalise and 'globalise' this form of capitalism (to extend and in principle universalise the 'Washington Consensus' – which it has not succeeded in doing). And, to anticipate the discussion of the current crisis, now that neo-liberal capitalism has come into what may be a terminal crisis, the crisis is clearly in part a crisis of its discourse. Furthermore, the imaginary for and partial reality of a 'knowledge-based economy' which came to be closely interwoven with the imaginary and partial reality of the 'global economy' in the neo-liberal era implies a more generally heightened significance for discourse in the dialectical relations of that form of capitalism. Much is 'discourse-driven'. For instance, the proliferation of ever new theories, models, imaginaries and discourses in the management of not only private organisations but also public organisations, not only in the economy but in many other spheres of social life (government, education, healthcare, social welfare, the arts), which are selectively and more or less effectively operationalised and implemented in new practices, identities and material forms (e.g., the design of built space).

Various aspects of the dialectical relations between discursive and non-discursive elements of neo-liberal capitalism and of its 'discourse-driven' character are addressed in papers in this book. A number of papers deal with New Labour in Britain, treating the politics of New Labour as a form of neo-liberalism and its discourse as a form of neo-liberal discourse (Papers 7, 9, 11 and 14). The focus is not only on the political discourse and ideology of the 'Third Way' but also political identities and styles, and on new forms of governance which accord with shifts in the role of the state in the neo-liberal era and whose discursive moment involves changes in the genres and 'genre chains' of governing. Papers 18 and 19 deal with what has become the internationally most powerful strategy for steering globalisation and the 'global economy', which I call 'globalism', and specifically its discourse. At the core of globalism is the strategic objective of spreading neo-liberal capitalism and neo-liberal discourse to all areas of the world, including, for instance, the formerly socialist 'transitional' countries of central and eastern Europe (the focus of Paper 20), a project which is widely identified with the 'Washington

Consensus' and the activities of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Paper 19 focuses on the increasingly military character of the strategy of globalism and its connection to the 'war on terror'. Paper 4 deals with the imposition of markets in Higher Education in Britain, focusing again on its discourse moment and the marketisation of discourses, genres and styles, which is an illustration of the wider tendency for neo-liberal capitalism to incorporate more and more areas of social life into the market economy. Paper 10 is a transdisciplinary study of the new management ideology associated with neo-liberal capitalism, bringing together CDA and the 'New Sociology of Capitalism' developed in France. Paper 12 is also oriented towards CDA research on the new form of capitalism. It suggests that Marx's analytical method includes an element of critical discourse analysis *avant la lettre*, and considers what CDA research on neo-liberal capitalism might learn from it. Finally, Paper 22 discusses the development of 'critical language awareness' in education in relation to the 'global economy'.

4 Manifesto for CDA in a time of crisis

I come now to a 'manifesto' for CDA in the time of crisis which it appears (in December 2008) that we shall be living in for some time to come. I shall give an assessment of the role, purpose and possible contribution of CDA in the financial and economic crisis and ask: what should CDA be trying to achieve; what contribution can it make? A manifesto is generally understood to be a public declaration of purposes, principles and objectives and the means for achieving them, and it is usually political in character. So: why a 'manifesto' for CDA? My argument below will be that in this time of crisis the priority for critical research including CDA should shift from critique of structures to critique of *strategies* – of attempts, in the context of the failure of existing structures, to transform them in particular directions. But the business of critical research is not just descriptive analysis of these emerging and competing strategies but also normative evaluation of them, and another relative shift of priority in the present context is from negative critique of existing structures to *positive* critique which seeks possibilities for transformations which can overcome or mitigate limits on human well-being. So I use 'manifesto' to highlight the contribution that CDA might make to the political struggle for a way out of the crisis which can transform social forms and social life in ways which advance human well-being. But this will bring us back again to the question 'what is critique?' and particularly to this issue: if critical research is 'knowledge-for-action', how does the purpose of advancing knowledge connect with the purpose of supporting action for a better world?

I am writing a few months into an acute phase of a crisis which became apparent to many in the summer of 2007, and to a few earlier than that, but took a dramatic turn in the autumn of 2008 with a series of calamities (e.g., the bankruptcy of the US investment bank Lehman Brothers) which brought the banking and credit system close to collapse. Nobody can say with certainty how the crisis will develop, how long it will go on, or where it will take us. But many economists and other commentators are predicting that it is going to be severe, and far-reaching in its effects, and the crisis may well be the primary determinant of 'the state we are in', and the primary factor shaping the agenda for CDA for some time to come. Of course, that agenda is now very diverse, and includes adopting a discourse perspective on issues as different as racism, war, European identity and organisational change, but I suspect that there are few areas of it which will not be affected or coloured by the crisis.

What does it mean to say that this is a 'crisis'? It means that the institutional structures and mechanisms which allowed the financial and economic systems to continue doing what they were designed and claimed to do – to provide credit for businesses and households, to produce 'growth', dividends and profits, to keep people in employment, to maintain certain levels of prosperity and consumption, to provide certain levels of social support and welfare, and so forth – are manifestly no longer capable of doing so. There is general recognition that the these structures and mechanisms need to be either repaired or replaced, that it will take enormous efforts and resources to do so, and that the chances of success are at present uncertain. It is also generally expected that meanwhile people in many positions and circumstances all over the world will suffer in various ways – losing their jobs, losing their savings and having to face smaller pensions than they expected, having a lower standard of living, in some cases suffering more severe effects of poverty and other forms of social deprivation, and so forth. There is general agreement that three features together differentiate this from other crises since the 1970s: it is a crisis centred in the richest and most powerful capitalist countries, especially the USA, rather than in the periphery; it is a global crisis which affects virtually all countries; and it is more severe. It began as a crisis of a financial system built upon public and private debt on a stupendous scale running into many trillions of dollars; nobody is sure at this stage how many trillions, or where much of the debt is hidden (who owes what to whom); there is a general and proliferating indeterminacy of asset values, aversion to extending credit, and contraction of expenditure and demand. The crisis in finance has extended into a general economic crisis which is accentuated by pre-existing structural weaknesses in economies which the crisis exposes (including a growing problem of

overproduction e.g., in the car industry, and major international imbalances in balance of payments, lending and borrowing etc.).

What is in crisis? Optimists tend to view it as a crisis in the particular form of the neo-liberal form of capitalism discussed above, suggesting or implying that we can get 'back to normal' after an indeterminate period of pain. At the other extreme is the view that it is a crisis of capitalism itself. The view I take, like many others, is that it seems to be a crisis not in neo-liberal capitalism but *of* neo-liberal capitalism – 'seems to be' because much is uncertain, and we are condemned to act and react (as we usually are) under conditions of uncertainty. But if this interpretation is right, as many analysts and commentators think, it means that we cannot expect to 'get back to normal', that some new form of capitalism must be sought for, some restructuring of capitalism, with the proviso that although capitalism has historically shown a remarkable capacity to remake itself out of the most extreme circumstances, there is nothing that guarantees that it will be able to this time. So alternatives to capitalism may come back onto the agenda, but at present it is not clear what these might be.

There is a great deal of public anger in the heartland of this form of capitalism, the USA, and in Britain and other countries, which is variously directed at speculators, bankers, politicians or others, and amounts to a sense of having been badly misled, mismanaged and let down. People were promised the earth – increasing prosperity without limits, an ever-expanding wealth of choice, possibility and opportunity, security and comfort in old age, and so forth – but the promises have proved to be largely hollow. Some people say we are all to blame, that we should not have believed the promises. Many realise now what was rarely publicly acknowledged: that the whole edifice was built upon bubbles (the dot.com bubble, the housing bubble etc.) that now appear finally to have burst, i.e., the possibility of simply moving on to the next bubble is now in serious doubt, as is the credibility of that 'solution' even if it were possible. There is nothing new about this sort of disillusion and outrage. Histories of the Great Depression and earlier crises (see, for instance, Galbraith 1955) show that the cycle of false hopes and promises followed by catastrophic failure and recriminations is part of the rhythm of capitalism, despite the hubristic claims of politicians and others in the neo-liberal age to have ended the cycle of 'boom and bust'.

We should be cautious about predicting the future consequences of the present crisis, but we can say with some confidence that it entails a range of risks which could extend far beyond the economy as such. There are political risks: a feature of the neo-liberal age has been consensus between the main political parties and governments of different hues in many countries over the

main directions of economic policy, which means that mainstream politicians with few exceptions are complicit in the false promises and failures, and may in the absence of a coherent progressive alternative in many countries offer openings to a resurgent extreme right. There are self-evidently social risks associated with and arising from people losing their homes, their jobs, their pensions, and for young people their prospects, but also risks that the already fragile relations between different cultural and religious groups in many countries may deteriorate further and lead to conflicts. There are risks too that the actions essential to avoid ecological disasters which have been to a large extent evaded in times of relative plenty will be further delayed in the face of supposedly more urgent problems.

I want to suggest a change in priorities for critical research generally including CDA: a partial shift in focus from structures to strategies (on structures and strategies, see Jessop 2002). While neo-liberal capitalism was relatively securely in place, the priority was a critique of established, institutionalised and partly naturalised and normalised systems, structures, logics and discourses. This is not to say that strategies were irrelevant: it was a dynamic system seeking to extend itself, and it had to face a number of lesser but still serious crises, both of which entailed the proliferation of strategies to achieve particular changes and trajectories. Nevertheless, for a time the priority for critical research and CDA was to gain greater knowledge and understanding of it as a system. To an extent that agenda is being overtaken by events. Aspects of the character, flaws, fallacies, contradictions etc. of neo-liberalism which had largely been ignored except by its critics have come to be widely recognised, and even conceded by former apologists for 'free markets', and this applies too to its discourse. For instance, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said in a New Year speech that 2008 would be remembered as the year in which 'the old era of unbridled free market dogma was finally ushered out' (*Guardian*, 1 January 2009), just over a year after a speech at the Mansion House in the City of London (June 2007) which was unstinting in its praise for 'free markets' and for 'the talents, innovations and achievements' of the City of London. Those 'innovations' are now acknowledged to have been at the origin of the financial crisis. The turn-about among such formerly ardent free-marketeers in the last months of 2008 has been remarkably rapid. But shifting the priority to strategies does not mean we can ignore the structures of neo-liberal capitalism: they will not disappear overnight, and they may prove to be more resilient than seems likely at present.

Two main sorts of strategy are emerging at present: strategies to deal with and try to mitigate the more immediate effects and consequences of the crisis, and strategies for the longer term repair and modification of neo-liberal

capitalism or its replacement with a different form of capitalism. Strategies for achieving changes of a particular sort are pursued in a more or less systematic and organised ways by groups of social agents in different positions, with different interests, or with different objectives. Crises lead to a proliferation of strategies which may be in competitive as well as in complementary relationships, leading to processes of strategic struggle. One set of questions is: what strategies are emerging, what are their origins, and what groups of social agents are promoting them? A second is: which strategies are emerging as 'winners' from strategic struggles; which strategies are coming to be 'selected' at the expense of others, becoming dominant, or hegemonic? A third is: which strategies get to be implemented and actually shape social transformations and, potentially, changes in structures and systems? But there is also a fourth question of a normative character: which strategies are, or are not, likely to lead to a progressive way out of the crisis which can bring real improvements in human well-being, and tackle major obstacles to human well-being in neo-liberal capitalism, including huge and growing inequalities of wealth and income, reduction of stability and security for many millions of people, ecologically unsustainable levels and forms of growth, and so forth?

CDA has an important role in critical research focused on strategies because strategies have a strongly discursive character: they include imaginaries for change and for new practices and systems, and they include discourses, narratives and arguments which interpret, explain and justify the area of social life they are focused upon – its past, its present, and its possible future. These discursive features of strategies are crucial in assessing and establishing both their practical adequacy to the state we are in and the world as it is and their feasibility, and their desirability with respect of particular ideas of human well-being.

In thinking about a role and agenda for CDA, we can draw upon the critical method I described at the end of the section *Discourse, analysis, critique*, pages 9–10 above, though we need to reformulate it to some extent because my initial formulation was oriented to critique of systems rather than critique of strategies. Critical analysis seeks to provide explanations of the causes and development of the crisis, identify possible ways of mitigating its effects and to transform capitalism in less crisis-prone, more sustainable and more socially just directions. The analysis is partly analysis of discourse, of dialectical relations between discourse and other elements: of lay and non-lay interpretations and explanations of the causes and character of the crisis and possible remedies and their association with diverse strategies, of how they construe and potentially contribute to constructing political-economic realities. It also seeks to develop theories and analytical frameworks which allow it to explain

why it is that a particular range of strategies and discourses are emerging, why particular ones tend to become dominant, what effects they are having on the way the crisis develops, and how they may further contribute to social transformations. Its concerns here are partly normative: how adequate are particular strategies as responses to the crisis given its nature as established through analysis? can particular discourses be seen as not only inadequate in this sense but also 'necessary' to establish and sustain power relations, and therefore ideological? and, above all, which strategies and discourses are, or are not, likely to lead to a path out of crisis which advances human well-being?

CDA can contribute a specifically discursive or semiotic 'point of entry' to such critical analysis, maintaining a relational focus on dialectical relations between discourse and other social elements, but highlighting properties and features of discourse. It can particularly bring such a specifically semiotic focus to analysis of the proliferation of strategies, strategic struggle, the dominance of certain strategies, and their implementation in social transformations. We might formulate an agenda in broad terms as follows:

- *Emergence of discourses*. Identify the range of discourses that emerge and their link to emerging strategies. Show how the range of discourses changes over time as the crisis develops. Identify differences and commonalities between discourses in terms of a range of features such as: how they represent events and actions and the social agents, objects, institutions etc. that they involve; how they narrate past and present events and action and link these narratives to imaginaries for future practices, institutions and systems; how they explain events and actions; how they justify actions and policy proposals and legitimise imagined changed practices and systems. Show the origins of discourses: for instance, how they are formed through articulating together (features of) existing discourses. Such analysis needs to be coloured by and integrated into transdisciplinary critical analysis oriented to an object of research constructed in a transdisciplinary way, and particularly the explanation of why and how particular strategies and discourses emerge in particular social circumstances.
- *Relations of dialogue, contestation and dominance between discourses*. Show how different discourses are brought into dialogue and contestation within processes of strategic struggle, for instance in the manoeuvring for position that goes on between political parties. Show how particular discourses gain prominence or become marginalised over time, and how particular discourses emerge as dominant or hegemonic. CDA can provide particular insights into the struggle between different strategies for transforming society in different directions through rhetorically oriented analysis of

how strategic differences are fought out in dialogue, debate, polemic etc. But again such analysis must be informed by and integrated within transdisciplinary critique which seeks to explain the success of certain strategies and the failure of others, and is also 'positive' critique which seeks to identify strategies which are, as we might put it, both desirable (in that they may advance human well-being) and feasible.

- *Recontextualisation of discourses*. Show, as part of the analysis of how particular discourses become dominant or hegemonic, their dissemination across structural boundaries (between different social fields, such as education and politics) and across scalar boundaries (e.g., between local and national scales), and their recontextualisation within different fields and at different scales.
- *Operationalisation of discourses*. Show how and subject to what conditions discourses are operationalised as strategies and implemented: enacted in changed ways (practices) of acting and interacting; inculcated in changed ways of being (identities); materialised in changes in material reality. Operationalisation is partly a process *within* discourse or semiosis: discourses are enacted as changed genres, and inculcated as changed styles. But again while there is clearly a discourse-analytical dimension to analysing these ways in which discourse contributes to social transformation, the concern is largely with relations between discourse and other social elements (as well as partly relations within discourse/semiosis) and therefore a matter for transdisciplinary critical analysis. Moreover, the operationalisation of discourses is always subject to conditions which are partly extra-discursive. So we are always pushed back towards articulating together different forms of critical social analysis (of which CDA is one) to analyse relations between discourse and other elements.

Critique as I have presented it is committed to producing and deepening certain forms of knowledge and understanding: to producing theories and analyses with the explanatory power to cogently interpret and explain, in this case, the crisis in, and as I have suggested more likely of, the neo-liberal form of capitalism, as well as the process of restructuring capitalism that it seems likely to give rise to. This includes explanation of lay and non-lay interpretations and explanations of the crisis, strategies for social transformation, and the discourses associated with them. This form of knowledge production is value-driven: it is based upon certain conceptions of human well-being, and aims to explain why and how particular social forms like those of neo-liberal capitalism on the one hand enhance well-being but on the other hand place systemic limits on it, and to identify possible and feasible changes in social

forms which can overcome or mitigate those limits. While it is not in itself a political praxis and strategy for achieving such social changes, it can be a part of and contribute to such a praxis and strategy in that praxis requires theory, knowledge and understanding to achieve its strategic goals. What is currently underdeveloped but needs to be developed in this time of crisis is a political strategy and movement to ensure that the social transformations which will result from it address the fundamental problems and dangers facing us which neo-liberal capitalism has either failed adequately to address or contributed to exacerbating: poverty, gross inequality, injustice, insecurity, ecological hazard. CDA can contribute.

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Section A

Language, ideology and power

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Introduction

The first two papers in this section, written 1983–87 and published in 1985 and 1989, come from my earliest work in CDA when I was developing a framework for studying connections between language and power. This work culminated in the publication of my first book *Language and Power* (Longman 1989, second edition 2001).

Ideology was a central concept and category in this early work on CDA, and although its salience in my later work has varied as new themes and categories have been brought in, it has been and continues to be a major concern throughout. Yet during these past twenty-five years, ideology has become much less of an issue in social research, and the number of social researchers who work with the category or indeed treat it as a necessary category has declined. This is clearly associated with the simultaneous decline in salience of *social class* as a theme and a category, for ideology as a theoretical category has developed within theories of capitalist societies as class societies, dominated by a ruling class and characterised by struggle between classes. And these changes in academic theory and analysis are just as clearly linked to radical social and political changes affecting social classes and social class relations: changes in economic production, the relative decline of traditional manufacturing industries and the industrial working class as part of the workforce, the decrease in trade union membership and the weakening of trade unions, the weakening link between political parties and social classes, and so forth. Largely in response to these changes, many social researchers now question whether either social class or ideology are significant or useful categories (Sayer 2005).

My view is that capitalist societies like Britain are still class societies, although their class structure and class relations have changed substantially

since the 1970s, and that analysis of power and class relations requires the category of ideology because ideologies are a significant element of processes through which relations of power are established, maintained, enacted and transformed. Of course, power relations in societies like Britain are not *just* class relations, they are also relations between ethnically and culturally different groups, between women and men, between adults and young people, people of working age and retired people, managers and other workers, and so forth. Power differences and inequalities arise from all of these relations and others, and from complex combinations of these relations, and ideologies are significant for these various power relations, not just for social class relations. Given that analysis of ideology requires analysis of discourse, as I argue in the papers of this section, ideology therefore continues to be a significant theme and category for CDA. For instance, in the General Introduction I discussed what CDA can contribute to critical analysis of the financial and economic crisis which is unfolding as I write, and I suggested approaching this through a form of critique which includes a way of assessing whether discourses circulating in this time of crisis have an ideological character.

Paper 1, 'Critical and descriptive goals in discourse analysis' distinguishes critical discourse analysis from the dominant non-critical, descriptive trend within discourse analysis which was establishing itself within Linguistics departments at the time. The latter is criticised for its lack of concern with explanation – with how discursive practices are socially shaped, or their social effects. I also criticise the concept of 'background knowledge' as an obfuscation of ideological processes in discourse, the preoccupation with 'goals' as based upon an untenable theory of the subject, and the neglect of relations of power manifested for instance in the elevation of conversation between equals to the status of an idealised archetype for linguistic interaction in general.

The critical alternative claims that naturalised implicit propositions of an ideological character are pervasive in discourse, contributing to the positioning of people as social subjects. These include not only aspects of ideational meaning (e.g., implicit propositions needed to infer coherent links between sentences) but also for instance assumptions about social relations underlying interactional practices (e.g., turn-taking systems, or pragmatic politeness conventions). Such assumptions are quite generally naturalised, and people are generally unaware of them and of how they are subjected by/to them. The emphasis in this paper is upon discourse within the social reproduction of relations of domination. The paper suggests a view of critique as embedded within oppositional practice. Opposition and struggle are built into the view of the 'orders of discourse' of social institutions as 'pluralistic', each involving a configuration of potentially antagonistic 'ideological-discursive formations'

(IDFs), which are ordered in dominance. The dominance of one IDF over others within an order of discourse results in the naturalisation of its (ideological) meanings and practices. Resistance is most likely to come from subjects whose positioning within *other* institutions and orders of discourse provides them with the resources to resist.

The paper does take a dialectical view of the relationship between structure and action. But the emphasis, under the influence of Althusser and French discourse analysis (Althusser 1971, Pêcheux 1982), is upon the determination of action by structures, social reproduction, and the ideological positioning of subjects. Later papers have increasingly emphasised agency and change. The concept of IDF did not survive this paper; it gave an overly monolithic view of ideological diversity and struggle – well-defined forces in clear relations of opposition. Another characteristic of this early work is the centrality of social class in its view of power.

I would highlight three themes of the paper as particularly significant for later work. First, the claim that ideologies are primarily located in the 'unsaid' (implicit propositions). I later draw upon French discourse analysis for an intertextual account of presuppositions as the 'already-said' or 'preconstructed' (Pêcheux 1982, Fairclough 1989a). The second theme is that norms of interaction involving aspects of the interpersonal meaning and forms (e.g., turn-taking systems) may be ideological, in addition to the more widely discussed case of ideational meanings and forms – the 'content' of texts. The third theme is the theorisation of power as in part 'ideological/discoursal', the power to shape orders of discourse, to order discursive practices in dominance. Even casual conversation has its conditions of possibility within relations of ideological/discoursal power.

Paper 2 'Language and ideology' suggests that the language–ideology relation should be conceptualised within the framework of research on discoursal and sociocultural change. Following Gramsci (Forgacs 1988), the conception of ideology here focuses upon the effects of ideologies rather than questions of truth, and features of texts are seen as ideological in so far as they affect (sustain, undermine) power relations. Ideology is seen as 'located' in both structures (discourse conventions) and events. On the one hand, the conventions drawn upon in actual discursive events, which are structured together within 'orders of discourse' associated with institutions, are ideologically invested in particular ways. On the other hand, ideologies are generated and transformed in actual discursive events – the example I refer to is of ideological creativity in a Margaret Thatcher radio interview. An order of discourse may incorporate in Gramscian terms an 'ideological complex', a configuration of ideologies, and both the ideological complex and the order of discourse may

be reconstructed in the course of discursive events. These possible discursive restructurings arise from contradictions in social practice which generate dilemmas for people, which they try to resolve through mixing available discourse conventions in new ways the mixtures being realised in heterogeneities of form and meaning in texts. Orders of discourse are viewed as domains of hegemony and hegemonic (ideological) struggle, within institutions such as education as well as within the wider social formation. In this process the ideological investments of particular discursive practices may change – for instance, the genre of counselling may operate, now counter-hegemonically within resistance to impersonal institutions, now hegemonically as a personalising stratagem within such institutions. The paper concludes by identifying a role for ideological analysis and critique of discourse within social struggles.

Certain features of the discussion of ideology are worth noting: the idea that discourse may be ideologically creative and productive, the concept of ideological complex, the question of whether discursive practices may be reinvested ideologically, and the broad sweep of features of texts that are seen as potentially ideological.

Paper 3 ('Semiosis, ideology and mediation. A dialectical view'), published in 2006, is a more recent return to the question of ideology which focuses upon CDA as a resource in researching the imbrications of media and mediation in ideological processes. Ideologies are initially defined as representations which contribute to constituting, reproducing and transforming social relations of power and domination, a view of ideology which is identified as *critical* in contrast with *descriptive* views of ideology, and is associated with power as *hegemony* rather than as force or violence. *Mediation* is understood in Silverstone's (1999) sense as the movement and transformation of meaning, and is associated with the CDA category of *recontextualisation*. Processes of recontextualisation and mediation may be ideological, and the paper follows Bernstein (1990) in emphasising the importance of recontextualisation in ideological representation. It also interprets ideology in terms of the *dialectics of discourse* (see Papers 7, 8 and 9). That is to say, ideologies are first representations and discourses within relations of power, but dialectical processes of *enacting* such discourses as ways of (inter)acting, *inculcating* them as ways of being (or identities), and *materialising* them in the physical world entail that actions and their social relations including genres, persons (or *subjects*) including styles, and aspects of the material world can also have an ideological character. Moreover, ideology is first a relation between texts and power, but also a relation between orders of discourse and power and between languages and power, because meanings of texts can achieve relative stability and durability in social practices and social structures. What therefore distinguishes

this paper from my earlier treatments of ideology is that it incorporates ideology into the dialectical view of relations between discourse and non-discursive elements of social processes (and of relations between discourses, genres and styles within discourse in its most general sense) which I have developed in my more recent work. This view of ideology and its relation to mediation as a form of recontextualisation is used in the paper to analyse processes of re-scaling, changing relations between the national scale and international scales, in the '*transition*' of formerly socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe towards being market economies and western-style democracies. The particular examples analysed are Romanian.

1. Critical and descriptive goals in discourse analysis

Abstract

I view social institutions as containing diverse 'ideological-discursive formations' (IDFs) associated with different groups within the institution. There is usually one IDF which is clearly dominant. Each IDF is a sort of 'speech community' with its own discourse norms but also, embedded within and symbolised by the latter, its own 'ideological norms'. Institutional subjects are constructed, in accordance with the norms of an IDF, in subject positions whose ideological underpinnings they may be unaware of. A characteristic of a dominant IDF is the capacity to 'naturalise' ideologies, i.e., to win acceptance for them as non-ideological 'common sense'.

It is argued that the orderliness of interactions depends in part upon such naturalised ideologies. To 'denaturalise' them is the objective of a discourse analysis which adopts 'critical' goals. I suggest that denaturalisation involves showing how social structures determine properties of discourse, and how discourse in turn determines social structures. This requires a 'global' (macro/micro) explanatory framework which contrasts with the non-explanatory or only 'locally' explanatory frameworks of 'descriptive' work in discourse analysis. I include a critique of features of such work which follow from its limited explanatory goals (its concept of 'background knowledge', 'speaker-goal' explanatory models, and its neglect of power), and discuss the social conditions under which critical discourse analysis might be an effective practice of intervention, and a significant element in mother-tongue education.

1 Introduction: orderliness and naturalisation

In this section of the paper I shall distinguish in a preliminary way between 'critical' and 'descriptive' goals in discourse analysis. Data extracts are used to show (i) how the orderliness of interactions depends upon taken-for-granted 'background knowledge' (BGK for short), and (ii) how BGK subsumes 'naturalised' ideological representations, i.e., ideological representations which come to be seen as non-ideological 'common sense'. Adopting critical goals means aiming to elucidate such naturalisations, and more generally to make clear social determinations and effects of discourse which are characteristically opaque to participants. These concerns are absent in currently predominant 'descriptive' work on discourse. The critical approach has its theoretical underpinnings in views of the relationship between 'micro' events (including verbal events) and 'macro' structures which see the latter as both the conditions for and the products of the former, and which therefore reject rigid barriers between the study of the 'micro' (of which the study of discourse is a part) and the study of the 'macro'. I shall discuss these theoretical issues at the end of this section of the paper.

When I refer to the 'orderliness' of an interaction, I mean the feeling of participants in it (which may be more or less successfully elicited, or inferred from their interactive behaviour) that things are as they should be, i.e., as one would normally expect them to be. This may be a matter of coherence of an interaction, in the sense that individual speaker turns fit meaningfully together, or a matter of the taking of turns at talking in the expected or appropriate way, or the use of the expected markers of deference or politeness, or of the appropriate lexicon. (I am of course using the terms 'appropriate' and 'expected' here from the perspective of the participant, not analytically.)

Text 1 gives an example of 'orderliness' in the particular sense of coherence within and between turns, and its dependence on naturalised ideologies. It is an extract from an interview between two male police officers (*B* and *C*), and a woman (*A*) who has come to the police station to make a complaint of rape.[1]

Text 1

1. *C*: you do realise that when we have you medically examined . . . and
2. *B*: they'll come up with nothing
3. *C*: the swabs are taken . . . it'll show . . . if you've had sexual intercourse with three men this afternoon . . .
4. *A*: it'll [show / it'll show each one]

5. *C*: it'll [show each one . . .
   B: [hmm
6. *A*: yeah I [know
7. *C*: [alright . . . so . . .
8. *A*: so it would show [(indist.)
9. *C*: [it'll confirm that you've had
   [sex . . . or
   B: [hm
   C: not with three men alright . . . so we can confirm it's happened . . . that you've had sex with three men . . . if it does confirm it . . . then I would go so far as to say . . . that you went to that house willingly . . . there's no struggle . . . you could have run away quite easily . . . when you got out of the car . . . to go to the house . . . you could have got away quite easily . . . you're well known . . . in Reading . . . to the uniformed . . . lads for being a nuisance in the streets shouting and bawling . . . couple of times you've been arrested . . . for under the Mental Health Act . . . for shouting and screaming in the street . . . haven't you . . .
10. *A*: when I was ill yeah
11. *C*: yeah . . . right . . . so . . . what's to stop you . . . shouting and screaming in the street . . . when you think you're going to get raped . . . you're not frightened at all . . . you walk in there . . . quite blasé you're not frightened at all . . .
12. *A*: I was frightened
13. *C*: you weren't . . . you're showing no signs of emotion every now and again you have a little tear . . .
14. *B*: (indist.) if you were frightened . . . and you came at me I think I would dive . . . I wouldn't take you on
    [you frighten me
15. *C*: [(indist.)
16. *A*: why would I frighten [you (indist.) only a little (indist.)
    [you you just it doesn't
17. *B*: matter . . . you're female and you've probably got a hell of a temper . . . if you were to [go
    [I haven't got a temper
18. *A*: (indist.) a hell of [a temper
    [oh I don't know . . .
19. *C*:
20. *B*: I think if things if if things were up against a a wall . . . I think you'd fight and fight very hard . . .

I imagine that for most readers the most striking instance of ideologically-based coherence in this text is in 17 (*you're female and you've probably got a hell of a temper*), with the implicit proposition 'women tend to have bad tempers' which, with a further implicit proposition ('people in bad tempers are frightening to others') and certain principles of inference, allows 16 and 17 to be heard as a coherent question–answer and complaint–rejection pair. There are other, perhaps rather less obvious instances, including the following (I have taken the example in 17 as 'case' (1)).

(2) It is taken as given (as mutually assumed background knowledge) that fear or its absence, and perhaps affective states in general, can be 'read off' from behavioural 'symptoms' or their absence. The orderliness of *C*'s talk in 9 (from *there's no struggle*) and 11, i.e., its coherence as the drawing of a conclusion (*you're not frightened at all*) from pieces of evidence (*there's no struggle*, *A* could have got away but didn't, *A* has a proven capacity for creating public scenes but did not do so in this case), depends upon this implicit proposition. Similar comments apply to 13.

(3) It is taken as given that persons have, or do not have, capacities for particular types of behaviour irrespective of changes in time, place, or conditions. This is a version of the doctrine of the 'unified and consistent subject' (Coward and Ellis 1977: 7). Thus, again in 9 and 11, evidence of *A*'s capacity for creating a public scene in the past, and when she was suffering from some form of mental illness, is taken, despite 10, as evidence for her capacity to do so in this instance. As in the case of (2), the coherence of *C*'s line of argument depends upon the taken-as-given proposition.

(4) It is taken as given that if a woman willingly places herself in a situation where sexual intercourse 'might be expected to occur' (whatever that means), that is tantamount to being a willing partner, and rules out rape. *C*'s apparent objective in this extract is to establish that *A* went willingly to the house where the rape is alleged to have occurred. But this extract is coherently connected with the rest of the interview only on the assumption that what is really at issue is *A*'s willingness to have sexual intercourse. To make this connection, we need the above implicit proposition.

The four implicit propositions which I have identified represent BGK of a rather particular sort, which is distinct from, say, the assumed BGK that there is some identifiable door which is closed when some speaker asks some addressee to 'open the door'. I argue below (Section 3.1) that the tendency in the literature to conflate all of the 'taken-for-granted' under the rubric of 'knowledge' is an unacceptable reduction. For present purposes, I propose to refer to

these four propositions as 'ideological', by which I mean that each is a particular representation of some aspect of the world (natural or social; what is, what can be, what ought to be) which might be (and may be) alternatively represented, and where any given representation can be associated with some particular 'social base' (I am aware that this is a rather crude gloss on a complex and controversial concept. On ideology, see Althusser (1971) and Therborn (1980)).

These propositions differ in terms of the degree to which they are 'naturalised' (Hall 1982: 75). I shall assume a scale of naturalisation, whose 'most naturalised' (theoretical) terminal point would be represented by a proposition which was taken as commonsensically given by all members of some community, and seen as vouched for by some generally accepted rationalisation (which referred it, for instance, to 'human nature').

Cases (1) and (4) involve only limited naturalisation. The proposition 'women tend to have bad tempers' could, one imagines, be taken as given only within increasingly narrow and embattled social circles – one achievement of the women's movement has been precisely the denaturalisation of many formerly highly naturalised sexist ideologies. Case (4) corresponds to traditional judicial views (in English law) of rape as well as having something of a base outside the law, but it is also under pressure from feminists.

The degree of naturalisation in cases (2) and (3) is by contrast rather high, and they are correspondingly more difficult to recognise as ideological representations rather than 'just common sense'. Such ideological propositions are both open to lay rationalisation in terms of 'what everyone knows' about human behaviour and 'human nature', and traceable in social scientific theories of human behaviour and the human subject.

Texts 2–4 illustrate other ways in which orderliness may depend upon ideological BGK. My aim here is merely to indicate some of the range of phenomena involved, so my comments on these texts will be brief and schematic.

Text 2

1. *T*: Now, let's just have a look at these things here. Can you tell me, first of all, what's this?
2. *P*: Paper.
3. *T*: Piece of paper, yes. And, hands up, what cutter will cut this?
4. *P*: The pair of scissors.
5. *T*: The pair of scissors, yes. Here we are, the pair of scissors. And, as you can see, it's going to cut the paper. Tell me what's this?
6. *P*: Cigarette box.
7. *T*: Yes. What's it made from?

(Sinclair and Coulthard 1975: 96)

The orderliness in this instance is a matter of conformity on the part of both teacher and pupils to a framework of discoursal and pragmatic rights and obligations, involving the taking of turns, the control of topic, rights to question and obligations to answer, rights over metacommunicative acts and so forth (see Sinclair and Coulthard (1975) and Stubbs (1983: 40–46) for a detailed discussion of these properties of classroom discourse). The implicit ideological propositions identified in text 1 appertain to language in its 'ideational' function, whereas the discoursal and pragmatic norms of text 2 appertain to the 'interpersonal' function of language (Halliday 1978: 45–46). Moreover, while in text 1 ideologies are formulated in (implicit) propositions, in text 2 ideological representations of social relationships are symbolised in norms of interaction. Michael Halliday's claim that the linguistic system functions as a 'metaphor' for social processes as well as an 'expression' of them, which he formulated in the context of a discussion of the symbolisation of social relationships in dialectal and registerial variants (Halliday 1978: 3) also applies here. In these respects, text 3 is similar to text 2:

Text 3

1. *X*: oh hel*lǒ* Mrs Norton
2. *Y*: oh hel*lǒ* Súsan
3. *X*: yès erm wèll I'm afraid I've got ˆ afraid I've got a bit of a *prò*blem
4. *Y*: you mean about tomorrow *nìght*
5. *X*: yès ˆ erm you [knów I
6. *Y*: oh dèar]
7. *X*: *knòw* that that you said
8. *Y*: yéah
9. *X*: er you *wàn*ted me tomorrow night
10. *Y*: uhúh yéah
11. *X*: well I just thought erm (clears throat) I've got something else on which I just didn't think about when I arranged it with you you know and er
12. *Y*: (sighs) yés
13. *X*: I'm just wondering if I could possibly back dòwn on tomorrow

(Edmondson 1981: 119–120)[2]

Again, this is a matter of orderliness arising from conformity with interactive norms, though in this case pragmatic norms of politeness and mitigation: *X* uses a range of politeness markers, including a title + surname mode of address (in 1), 'hedges' (e.g., *a bit of a* in 3), and indirect speech acts (as in 13). These markers are 'appropriate' given the status asymmetry between *X* and

Y (*Y* is *X*'s employer, and no doubt older than *X*), and given the 'face-threatening' act which *X* is engaged in (Brown and Levinson 1978: 81).

The interactive norms exemplified in texts 2 and 3 can be seen in terms of degrees of naturalisation like the implicit propositions of text 1, though in this case it is a matter of the naturalisation of practices which symbolise particular ideological representations of social relationships, i.e., relationships between teachers and pupils, and between babysitters and their employers. The more dominant some particular representation of a social relationship, the greater the degree of naturalisation of its associated practices. I will use the expression 'ideological practices' to refer to such practices.

Texts 1–3 are partial exemplifications of the substantial range of BGK which participants may draw upon in interactions. We can very roughly differentiate four dimensions of participants' 'knowledge base', elaborating Winograd (1982: 14) who distinguishes only the first, third and fourth:

knowledge of language codes,
knowledge of principles and norms of language use,
knowledge of situation, and
knowledge of the world.

I wish to suggest that all four dimensions of the 'knowledge base' include ideological elements. I will assume without further discussion that the examples I have given so far illustrate this for all except the first of these dimensions, 'knowledge of language code'. Text 4 shows that this dimension is no exception. It is a summary by Benson and Hughes (1983: 10–11) of one of the case studies of Aaron Cicourel from his work on the constitution and interpretation of written records which are generated in the juvenile judicial process (Cicourel 1976).

Text 4

The probation officer was aware of a number of incidents at school in which Robert was considered to be 'incorrigible'. The probation file contained mention of 15 incidents at school prior to his court appearance, ranging from 'smoking' to 'continued defiance'. The probation officer's assessment and recommendation for Robert contained a fairly detailed citation of a number of factors explaining Robert's 'complete lack of responsibility toward society' with the recommendation that he be placed in a school or state hospital. Among the factors mentioned were his mother's 'severe depression', divorced parents, unstable marriage, and his inability to comprehend his environment:

the kind of factors, we should note, assembled in conventional sociological reasoning explaining the causes of delinquency.

Cicourel is concerned to show 'how "delinquents get that way" as a process managed and negotiated through the socially organised activities that constitute "dealing with crime" ' (Benson and Hughes 1983: 11). What I want to highlight is the role which the lexicon itself plays in this process. Let us focus on just four items among the many of interest in the text: *incorrigible, defiance, lack of responsibility, deliquency*. These belong to a particular lexicalisation of 'youth', or more specifically of young people who do not 'fit' in their families, their schools, or their neighbourhoods. The 'conditions of use' of this lexicon as we may call them, are focused upon by Cicourel – the unwritten and unspoken conventions for the use of a particular word or expression in connection with particular events or behaviours, which are operative and taken for granted in the production and interpretation of written records. But the lexicon itself, as code, is only one among indefinitely many possible lexicalisations; one can easily create an 'anti-language' (Halliday 1978: 164–182) equivalent of this part of the lexicon – *irrepressible* for *incorrigible*, *debunking* for *defiance*, *refusal to be sucked in by society* for *lack of responsibility toward society*, and perhaps *spirit* for *delinquency*. Alternative lexicalisations are generated from divergent ideological positions. And lexicalisations, like the implicit propositions and pragmatic discoursal practices of the earlier texts, may be more or less naturalised: a lexicalisation becomes naturalised to the extent that 'its' IDF achieves dominance, and hence the capacity to win acceptance for it as 'the lexicon', the neutral code.

It may be helpful for me to sum up what I have said so far before moving to a first formulation of 'critical' goals in discourse analysis. I am suggesting (a) that ideologies and ideological practices may become dissociated to a greater or lesser extent from the particular social base, and the particular interests, which generated them – that is, they may become to a greater or lesser extent 'naturalised', and hence be seen to be commonsensical and based in the nature of things or people, rather than in the interests of classes or other groupings; (b) that such naturalised ideologies and practices thereby become part of the 'knowledge base' which is activated in interaction, and hence the 'orderliness' of interaction may depend upon them, and (c) that in this way the orderliness of interactions as 'local', 'micro' events comes to be dependent upon a higher 'orderliness', i.e., an achieved consensus in respect of ideological positions and practices.

This brings me to certain theoretical assumptions which underpin the proposed adoption of critical goals in discourse analysis. Firstly, that verbal

interaction is a mode of social action, and that like other modes of social action it presupposes a range of what I shall loosely call 'structures' – which are reflected in the 'knowledge base' – including social structures, situational types, language codes, norms of language use. Secondly, and crucially, that these structures are not only presupposed by, and necessary conditions for, action, but are also the *products* of action; or, in a different terminology, actions *reproduce* structures. Giddens (1981) develops this view from a sociological perspective in terms of the notion of 'duality of structure'.

The significance of the second assumption is that 'micro' actions or events, including verbal interaction, can in no sense be regarded as of merely 'local' significance to the situations in which they occur, for any and every action contributes to the reproduction of 'macro' structures. Notice that one dimension of what I am suggesting is that language codes are reproduced in speech, a view which is in accordance with one formulation in Saussure's *Cours*: 'Language and speaking are thus interdependent; the former is both the instrument and the product of the latter' (1966: 19). My concern here, however, is with the reproduction of social structures in discourse, a concern which is evident in Halliday's more recent work:

> By their everyday acts of meaning, people act out the social structure, affirming their own statuses and roles, and establishing and transmitting the shared systems of value and of knowledge. (Halliday 1978: 2)

But if this is the case, then it makes little sense to study verbal interactions *as if* they were unconnected with social structures: 'there can be no theoretical defence for supposing that the personal encounters of day-to-day life can be conceptually separated from the long-term institutional development of society' (Giddens 1981: 173). Yet that seems to be precisely how verbal interactions have in fact been studied for the most part in the currently predominant 'descriptive' work on discourse. Thus the adoption of critical goals means, first and foremost, investigating verbal interactions with an eye to their determination by, and their effects on, social structures. However, as I have suggested in discussing the texts, neither determinations nor effects are necessarily apparent to participants; opacity is the other side of the coin of naturalisation. The goals of critical discourse analysis are also therefore 'denaturalising'. I shall elaborate on this preliminary formulation in the following sections.

My use of the term 'critical' (and the associated term 'critique') is linked on the one hand to a commitment to a dialectical theory and method 'which grasps things . . . essentially in their interconnection, in their concatenation, their motion, their coming into and passing out of existence' (Engels 1976:

27), and on the other hand to the view that, in human matters, interconnections and chains of cause and effect may be distorted out of vision. Hence 'critique' is essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things; for a review of senses of 'critique', see Connerton (1976: 11–39). In using the term 'critical', I am also signalling a connection (though by no means an identity of views) between my objectives in this paper and the 'critical linguistics' of a group of linguists and sociologists associated with Roger Fowler (Fowler *et al.* 1979, Kress and Hodge 1979).

2 Social institutions and critical analysis

The above sketch of what I mean by 'critical goals' in discourse analysis gives rise to many questions. For instance: how can it be that people are standardly unaware of how their ways of speaking are socially determined, and of what social effects they may cumulatively lead to? What conception of the social subject does such a lack of awareness imply? How does the naturalisation of ideologies come about? How is it sustained? What determines the degree of naturalisation in a particular instance? How may this change?

I cannot claim to provide answers to these questions in this paper. What I suggest, however, is that we can begin to formulate answers to these and other questions, and to develop a theoretical framework which will facilitate researching them, by focusing attention upon the 'social institution' and upon discourses which are clearly associable with particular institutions, rather than on casual conversation, as has been the fashion (see further Section 3.3 below). My reasoning is in essence simply that (a) such questions can only be broached within a framework which integrates 'micro' and 'macro' research, and (b) we are most likely to be able to arrive at such an integration if we focus upon the institution as a 'pivot' between the highest level of social structuring, that of the 'social formation',[3] and the most concrete level, that of the particular social event or action. The argument is rather similar to Fishman's case for the 'domain' (Fishman 1972): the social institution is an intermediate level of social structuring, which faces Janus-like 'upwards' to the social formation, and 'downwards' to social actions.

Social actions tend very much to cluster in terms of institutions; when we witness a social event (e.g., a verbal interaction), we normally have no difficulty identifying it in institutional terms, i.e., as appertaining to the family, the school, the workplace, church, the courts, some department of government, or some other institution. And from a developmental point of view, institutions are no less salient: the socialisation of the child (in which process discourse is both medium and target) can be described in terms of the child's

progressive exposure to institutions of primary socialisation (family, peer group, school, etc.). Given that institutions play such a prominent role, it is not surprising that, despite the concentration on casual conversation in recent discourse analysis referred to above, a significant amount of work is on types of discourse which are institutionally identified, such as classroom discourse (e.g., Sinclair and Coulthard 1975); courtroom discourse (e.g., Atkinson and Drew 1979, O'Barr 1982), or psychotherapeutic discourse (e.g., Labov and Fanshel 1977). However, most of this work suffers from the inadequacies characteristic of descriptive discourse analysis, which I detail in Section 3 of this paper.

One can envisage the relationship between the three levels of social phenomena I have indicated – the social formation, the social institution, and social action – as one of determination from 'top' to 'bottom': social institutions are determined by the social formation, and social action is determined by social institutions. While I would accept that this direction of determination is the fundamental one, this formulation is inadequate in that it is mechanistic (or undialectical): that is, it does not allow that determination may also be 'upwards'. Let us take education as an example. I would want to argue that features of the school as an institution (e.g., the ways in which schools define relationship between teachers and pupils) are ultimately determined at the level of the social formation (e.g., by such factors as the relationship between the schools and the economic system and between the schools and the state), and that the actions and events that take place in the schools are in turn determined by institutional factors. However, I would also wish to insist that the mode of determination is not mechanical determination, and that changes may occur at the level of concrete action which may reshape the institution itself, and changes may occur in the institution which may contribute to the transformation of the social formation. Thus the process of determination works dialectically.

A social institution is (among other things) an apparatus of verbal interaction, or an 'order of discourse'. (I suggest later in this section that this property only *appears* to belong to the institution itself.) In this perspective, we may regard an institution as a sort of 'speech community', with its own particular repertoire of speech events, describable in terms of the sorts of 'components' which ethnograhic work on speaking has differentiated – settings, participants (their identities and relationships), goals, topics, and so forth (Hymes 1972). Each institution has its own set of speech events, its own differentiated settings and scenes, its cast of participants, and its own norms for their combination – for which members of the cast may participate in which speech events, playing which parts, in which settings, in the pursuit of which topics or goals, for

which institutionally recognised purposes. It is, I suggest, necessary to see the institution as simultaneously facilitating and constraining the social action (here, specifically, verbal interaction) of its members: it provides them with a frame for action, without which they could not act, but it thereby constrains them to act within that frame.[4] Moreover, every such institutional frame includes formulations and symbolisations of a particular set of ideological representations: particular ways of talking are based upon particular 'ways of seeing' (see further below in this section).

I shall use the terms 'subject', 'client', and '(member of) public' for the parties to verbal interaction, rather than the more familiar term 'participant'. I use 'subject' for 'members' of an institution – those who have institutional roles and identities acquired in a defined acquisition period and maintained as long-term attributes. The 'client' is an outsider rather than a member, who nevertheless takes part in certain institutional interactions in accordance with norms laid down by the institution, but without a defined acquisition period or long-term maintenance of attributes (though attribute-maintenance is no doubt a matter of degree). Examples would be a patient in a medical examination, or a lay witness in a court hearing. Finally, some institutions have a 'public' to whom messages are addressed, whose members are sometimes assumed to interpret these messages according to norms laid down by the institution, but who do not interact with institutional subjects directly. The primary concept is 'subject': 'client' and 'public' might be defined as special and relatively peripheral types of subject.

The term 'subject' is used in preference to 'participant' (or 'member') because it has the double sense of agent ('the subjects of history') and affected ('the Queen's subjects'); this captures the concept of the subject as qualified to act through being constrained – 'subjected' – to an institutional frame (see above). I shall refer to 'social subjects' as well as 'institutional subjects': the social subject is the whole social person, and social subjects occupy subject positions in a variety of institutions. The choice of terms here is not a trivial matter: I suspect the term 'participant' tends to imply an essential, integral 'individual' who 'participates' in various institutionally defined types of interaction without that individuality being in any way shaped or modified thereby. In preferring 'subject', I am emphasising that discourse makes people, as well as people make discourse.

We may usefully distinguish various facets of the subject (either 'institutional' or 'social'), and talk of 'economic', 'political', 'ideological' and 'discoursal' subjects. What I have been suggesting above can be summed up by saying that institutions construct their ideological and discoursal subjects; they construct them in the sense that they impose ideological and discoursal

constraints upon them as a condition for qualifying them to act as subjects. For instance, to become a teacher, one must master the discursive and ideological norms which the school attaches to that subject position – one must learn to talk like a teacher and 'see things' (i.e., things such as learning and teaching) like a teacher. (Though, as I shall show in Section 1.4, these are not mechanically deterministic processes.) And, as I have suggested above, these ways of talking and ways of seeing are inseparably intertwined in that the latter constitute a part of the taken-for-granted 'knowledge base' upon which the orderliness of the former depends. This means that in the process of acquiring the ways of talking which are normatively associated with a subject position, one necessarily acquires also its ways of seeing, or ideological norms. And just as one is typically unaware of one's ways of talking unless for some reason they are subjected to conscious scrutiny, so also is one typically unaware of what ways of seeing, what ideological representations, underlie one's talk. This is a crucial assumption which I return to below.

However, social institutions are not as monolithic as the account so far will have suggested: as ideological and discursive orders, they are pluralistic rather than monistic, i.e., they provide alternative sets of discoursal and ideological norms. More accurately, they are pluralistic to an extent which varies in time and place, and from one institution to another in a given social formation, in accordance with factors including the balance of power between social classes at the level of the social formation, and the degree to which institutions in the social formation are integrated or, conversely, autonomous.[5] The significance of the first of these factors is that pluralism is likely to flourish when non-dominant classes are relatively powerful; the significance of the second is that a relatively autonomous institution may be relatively pluralistic even when non-dominant classes are relatively powerless.

I shall say that, as regards the ideological facet of pluralism, a given institution may house two or more distinguishable 'ideological formations' (Althusser 1971), i.e., distinct ideological positions which will tend to be associated with different forces within the institution. This diversity of ideological formations is a consequence of, and a condition for, struggles between different forces within the institution: that is, conflict between forces results in ideological barriers between them, and ideological struggle is part of that conflict. These institutional struggles are connected to class struggle, though the relationship is not necessarily a direct or transparent one; and ideological and discoursal control of institutions is itself a stake in the struggle between classes (see below on 'ideological and discoursal power').

I propose to use for talking about institutional pluralism Pêcheux's term 'discursive formation' as well as Althusser's 'ideological formation'. Pêcheux

defines a discursive formation as 'that which in a given ideological formation, i.e., from a particular position in a given conjuncture determined by the state of the class struggle, determines "*what can and should be said*"' (Pêcheux 1982: 111). I shall refer to 'ideologicaldiscursive formations' (IDFs for short), in accordance with what I have said above about the inseparability of 'ways of talking' and 'ways of seeing'. In so doing, I shall make the simplifying assumption, which further work may well challenge, that there is a one-to-one relationship between ideological formations and discursive formations.

I have referred above to the social institution itself as a sort of speech community and (to extend the image) ideological community; and I have claimed that institutions construct subjects ideologically and discoursally. Institutions do indeed give the appearance of having these properties – but only in cases where one IDF is unambiguously dominant (see below). I suggest that these properties are properly attributed to the IDF, not the social institution: it is the IDF that positions subjects in relation to its own sets of speech events, participants, settings, topics, goals and, simultaneously, ideological representations.

As I have just indicated, IDFs are ordered in dominance: it is generally possible to identify a 'dominant' IDF and one or more 'dominated' IDFs in a social institution. The struggle between forces within the institution which I have referred to above can be seen as centring upon maintaining a dominant IDF in dominance (from the perspective of those in power) or undermining a dominant IDF in order to replace it. It is when the dominance of an IDF is unchallenged to all intents and purposes (i.e., when whatever challenges there are do not constitute any threat), that the norms of the IDF will become most naturalised, and most opaque (see Section 1), and may come to be seen as the norms of the institution itself. The interests of the dominant class at the level of the social formation require the maintenance in dominance in each social institution of an IDF compatible with their continued power. But this is never given – it must be constantly fought for, and is constantly at risk through a shift in relations of power between forces at the level of the social formation and in the institutions. I shall refer to the capacity to maintain an IDF in dominance (or, at the level of the social formation, a network of IDFs) as 'ideological/discoursal power', which exists alongside economic and political power, and can normally be expected to be held in conjunction with them. I shall use 'power' in this sense in contrast with 'status': the latter relates to the relationship between subjects in interactions, and their status is registered in terms of (symmetrical or asymmetrical) interactional rights and obligations, which are manifested in a range of linguistic, pragmatic and discoursal features. The

group which has ideological and discoursal power in an institution may or may not be clearly status-marked.

We are now in a position to develop what has been said so far about the naturalisation of ideologies, and what I described at the end of Section 1 as 'the other side of the coin of naturalisation', their opacity to participants in interactions; since the case for a discourse analysis with critical goals (which it is the primary objection of this paper to argue) rests upon the assumption that the naturalisation and opacity of ideologies is a significant property of discourse, it is important to be as clear as possible about these effects and their origins.

Naturalisation gives to particular ideological representations the status of common sense, and thereby makes them opaque, i.e., no longer visible as ideologies. These effects can be explained given (a) the process of subject-construction referred to above, and (b) the notion of a dominant IDF. I have argued that in the construction of the subject, the acquisition of normative 'ways of talking' associated with a given subject position must simultaneously be the acquisition of the associated 'ways of seeing' (ideological norms); that is, since any set of discursive norms entails a certain knowledge base, and since any knowledge base includes an ideological component, in acquiring the discursive norms one simultaneously acquires the associated ideological norms.

If, moreover, the process of acquisition takes place under conditions of the clear dominance of a given IDF in an institution, such that other IDFs are unlikely to be evident (at least to the outsider or novice), there is no basis internal to the institution for the relativisation of the norms of the given IDF. In such cases, these norms will tend to be perceived first as norms of the institution itself, and second as merely skills or techniques which must be mastered in order for the status of competent institutional subjects to be achieved. These are the origins of naturalisation and opacity.

If it is also the case (as it typically is) that those who undergo the process of subjection are unaware of the functioning of the institution concerned in the social formation as a whole, then the institution will tend to be seen in isolation and there will be no basis external to the institution, either, for the relativisation and rationalisation of the norms of the given IDF.

Subjects, then, are typically unaware of the ideological dimensions of the subject positions they occupy. This means of course that they are in no reasonable sense 'committed' to them, and it underlines the point that ideologies are not to be equated with views or beliefs. It is quite possible for a social subject to occupy institutional subject positions which are ideologically incompatible, or to occupy a subject position incompatible with his or her overt political or social beliefs and affiliations, without being aware of any contradiction.[6]

3 Critical and descriptive goals

I am using the term 'descriptive' primarily to characterise approaches to discourse analysis whose goals are either non-explanatory, or explanatory within 'local' limits, in contrast to the 'global' explanatory goals of critical discourse analysis outlined above. Where goals are non-explanatory, the objective is to describe without explaining: if for instance a speaker in some interaction uses consistently indirect forms of request, one points this out without looking for causes. Where goals are explanatory but 'local', causes are looked for in the immediate situation (e.g., in the 'goals' of the speaker – see below), but not beyond it: that is, not at the higher levels of the social institution and the social formation, which would figure in critical explanation. Moreover, although 'locally' explanatory descriptive work may seek to identify at least local determinants of features of particular discourses, descriptive work generally has been little concerned with the *effects* of discourse. And it has certainly not concerned itself with effects which go beyond the immediate situation. For critical discourse analysis, on the other hand, the question of how discourse cumulatively contributes to the reproduction of macro structures is at the heart of the explanatory endeavour.

Descriptive work in discourse analysis tends to share other characteristics which can be seen as following from its at best limited explanatory goals. These include a reliance upon the concept of 'background knowledge', adoption of a 'goal-driven' local explanatory model, and neglect of power in discourse and, to an extent, status; all of these are discussed below. I shall refer for convenience to 'a descriptive approach' which has these characteristics in addition to descriptive goals in the above sense, but this is to be understood as a generalised characterisation of a tendency within discourse analysis and not as a characterisation of the work of any particular discourse analyst. Thus I would regard all of the following as basically descriptive in approach, diverse though they are in other respects: Sinclair and Coulthard (1975), Labov and Fanshel (1977), Atkinson and Drew (1979), Brown and Yule (1983), Stubbs (1983). But this does not mean that I am attributing to each of them all the descriptive (or, indeed, none of the critical) characteristics.

3.1 Background knowledge[7]

My primary contention in this sub-section is that the undifferentiated concept of BGK which has such wide currency in descriptive discourse analysis places discourse analysis in the position of ('uncritically') reproducing certain ideological effects.

The concept of BGK reduces diverse aspects of the 'backgrounded material' which is drawn upon in interaction – beliefs, values, ideologies, as well as knowledge properly so called – to 'knowledge'. 'Knowledge' implies facts to be known, facts coded in propositions which are straightforwardly and transparently related to them. But 'ideology', as I have argued above, involves the representation of 'the world' from the perspective of a particular interest, so that the relationship between proposition and fact is not transparent, but mediated by representational activity. So ideology cannot be reduced to 'knowledge' without distortion.[8]

I suggested in Section 2 that where an IDF has undisputed dominance in an institution, its norms tend to be seen as highly naturalised, and as norms of the institution itself. In such instances, a particular ideological representation of some reality may come to appear as merely a transparent reflection of some 'reality' which is given in the same way to all. In this way, ideology creates 'reality' as an effect (see Hall 1982: 75). The undifferentiated concept of BGK mirrors, complements and reproduces this ideological effect: it treats such 'realities' as objects of knowledge, like any other reality.

It also contributes to the reproduction of another ideological effect, the 'autonomous subject' effect. The autonomous subject effect is a particular manifestation of the general tendency towards opacity which I have taken to be inherent to ideology: ideology produces subjects which appear not to have been 'subjected' or produced, but to be 'free, homogeneous and responsible for (their) actions' (Coward and Ellis 1977: 77). That is, metaphorically speaking, ideology endeavours to cover its own traces. The autonomous subject effect is at the bottom of theories of the 'individual' of the sort I referred to in Section 2.

Seeing all background material as 'knowledge' is tantamount to attributing it to each participating person in each interaction as a set of attributes of that person ('what that person knows'). Interactions can then be seen as the coming-together of so many constituted, autonomous persons, 'of their own free will', whose 'knowledge bases' are mobilised in managing and making sense of discourse. This conception is cognitive and psychological at the expense of being asociological; the sociological is reduced to the cognitive through the 'competence' metaphor, so that social factors do not themselves figure, only the 'social competence' of persons. The 'competent' subject of cognitive conceptions of interaction is the autonomous subject of ideology.

I am not of course suggesting that descriptive discourse analysts are consciously conspiring to give social scientific credence to ideological effects. The point is rather that unless the analyst differentiates ideology from knowledge, i.e., unless s/he is aware of the ideological dimensions of discourse, the chances are that s/he will be unconsciously implicated in the reproduction of

ideologies, much as the lay subject is. To put the point more positively and more contentiously, the concept of ideology is essential for a scientific understanding of discourse, as opposed to a mode of understanding which emulates that of the partially unsighted discourse subject. But the concept of ideology is incompatible with the limited explanatory goals of the descriptive approach, for it necessarily requires reference outside the immediate situation to the social institution and the social formation in that ideologies are by definition representations generated by social forces at these levels.

3.2 Goals[9]

'Goal-driven' explanatory models of interaction tend, I suggest, to exaggerate the extent to which actions are under the conscious control of subjects. In referring to goal-driven models, I mainly have in mind 'speaker goal' models which set out to explain the strategies adopted by speakers, and the particular linguistic, pragmatic and discoursal choices made, in terms of speakers' goals (e.g., Winograd 1982: 13–20, Leech 1983: 35–44). But I shall also comment on what one might call an 'activity-goal' model, which claims that features of the 'activity type' are explicable by reference to its 'goal', i.e., 'the function or functions that members of the society see the activity as having' (Levinson 1979: 369). I include activity-goals because Levinson also suggests that there might be a connection between them and speaker-goals: in essence, the former determine the latter. Atkinson and Drew (1979) attribute analogous explanatory value to activity-goals.

My objection to the 'activity-goal' model is that it regards properties of a particular type of interaction as determined by the *perceived* social functions of that type of interaction (its 'goal'), thus representing the relationship between discourse and its determinants as transparent to those taking part. The properties which Levinson sees as so determined broadly correspond to what I have called 'ideological practices' (see Section 1), i.e., discoursal practices which vary between IDFs, and which are explicable immediately in terms of the ideological facets of IDFs and indirectly in terms of the social determinants of these ideologies. An example of ideological practices is the unequal distribution of discoursal and pragmatic rights and obligations in classroom discourse, illustrated in text 2. A distinction needs to be made between the ideologies which underlie such practices, and *rationalisations* of such practices which institutional subjects may generate; rationalisations may radically distort the ideological bases of such practices. Yet the activity type model portrays such rationalisations – the function(s) which these practices are *seen* (Levinson's term) as having – as *determinants* of these practices.