Security in Software Posix, sanitizers, typical system programming errors, fuzzing

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- **■** POSIX and compilation systems
- Sanitizers
- Integer overflow
- Range types
- Contracts
- Buffer overflow
- Buffer overread
- Fuzzing
- Exercise 5

Portable Operating System Interface (POSIX)

- IEEE standard for operating systems compatibility
 - most major OSs apart from Windows support this standard
 - POSIX may be too extensive for microkernels:
 - Arduino does not support the POSIX standard
 - Magenta kernel of Google Fuchsia has POSIX compatibility features
 - POSIX contains for example standardized:
 - processes
 - threads
 - (a)synchronous I/O
 - command line interpretation (for instance: echo "hello" > file.txt)
 - C libraries
 - Segmentation / Memory Violations
 - command line tools (e.g. grep, kill, ls, sort, tail, vi)
 - Linux is largely POSIX compliant
 - Linux Standard Base: contains extensions that are not part of POSIX
 - MacOS is POSIX certified

POSIX based compiler systems

- collection of compilers, libraries and tools
 - GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) (1987)
 - **■** gcc/g++
 - The most common C/C++ compiler
 - Low Level Virtual Machine (LLVM) (2003)
 - clang/clang++
 - Standard in FreeBSD and MacOS
 - Windows supported, Chrome for Windows kompileres nå med clang++ (2018)
 - Used by the Rust compiler
 - Various support tools:
 - LLDB less resource-intensive debugger
 - Clang Static Analyzer more thorough static analysis
 - Various programs to format/tidy/analyze source code

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Sanitizers

- Runtime checks

- Address sanitizer keeps track of used memory when running the program, and interrupts the program with an error message when an invalid memory operation is performed
 - For example buffer overflow/overread
 - Valgrind more comprehensive program for finding such errors
 - Eksempler: buffer-overrun demonstrates use of address sanitizer and Valgrind
- Thread sanitizer detects data races
 - For example, when a variable is altered without using a mutex in two different threads
- Undefined behavior sanitizer finds for example
 - Signed/unsigned integer overflow
 - Conversion overflow
 - Division by 0
- Both GCC and LLVM contain sanitizers
- Sanitizers are activated solely during testing due to increased resource usage

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Integer overflow

- C/C++: prioritize more effective machine code

■ Integer overflow is one of many undefined behaviors that must be avoided in critical software

```
#include <iostream>
int main() {
  int num = 2147483647;
  num += 1;
  std::cout << num << std::endl; // What is the output here?
}</pre>
```

- Some simple integer overflows can be detected at compile time
- Can be detected through Undefined behaviour sanitizer at runtime

Integer overflow

- Rust: does not accept undefined behaviour

```
fn main() {
   let mut num: i32 = 2147483647;
   num += 1; // Program terminates
   println!("{}", num);
}
```

- Some simple integer overflows can be detected at compile time
- At runtime, the program terminates if an integer overflow occurs

Integer overflow

- Arbitrary-precision arithmetic

- Languages like Python avoid the problem through number types that can contain numbers of any size (memory is the only limitation)
- Most programming languages have library support for arbitrary-precision arithmetic.
 - In C++: Boost.Multiprecision
- Resource demanding

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Range types in Ada

- Ada: widely used programming language for critical software
 - Used for example in aircraft and flight control software, satellites and banking systems

Range type example in Ada:

Range types in C++

bounded::integer

■ "provides more safety than Ada range types and more efficiency than the C / C++ built-in integer types."

Example:

```
bounded::integer<0, 10> num(5);
num+=10; // Compile time error or runtime exception
```

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Contracts in Ada

■ In Ada, you can define contracts for functions in the form of *pre*- and *post-conditions*.

Example:

```
generic
   type Item is private;
package Stacks is
   type Stack is private;
   function Is_Empty(S: Stack) return Boolean;
   function Is_Full(S: Stack) return Boolean;
   procedure Push(S: in out Stack; X: in Item)
      with
         Pre => not Is_Full(S),
         Post => not Is_Empty(S);
   procedure Pop(S: in out Stack; X: out Item)
      with
         Pre => not Is_Empty(S),
         Post => not Is_Full(S);
private
end Stacks;
```

Contracts in C++

- Might arrive in the 2026 standard
 - Can be activated during testing, and deactivated in production (for less resource use)
 - Can already be tried out in Compiler Explorer

Example:

```
int f(int n)
  [[pre: n >= 0]]
  [[post r: n == r]]
{
  return n;
}
int main() {
  f(-2); // Contract violation
}
```

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```
char A[8] = \{\}; unsigned short B = 1979;
```

variable name	А							В		
value	[null string]							1979		
hex value	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	07	вв

strcpy(A, "excessive");

variable name	A								В	
value	'e'	'x'	'c'	'e'	's'	's'	'i'	'v'	25856	
hex	65	78	63	65	73	73	69	76	65	00

- editing data, the stack, example 1

```
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
int main() {
  char chr = 'a';
  char table[3] = \{1, 2, 3\};
  cout << "table starts at memory address "</pre>
       << &table << endl:
  cout << "chr starts at memory address "</pre>
       << (void *)&chr << endl;
  table[3] = 'b';
  cout << chr << endl;</pre>
Output e.g:
table starts at memory address 0x7fff51ed6b98
chr starts at memory address 0x7fff51ed6b9b
b
```

- Protection of objects in the stack
 - Use high-level programming if possible
 - Foreach loops or functional algorithms
 - Use support tools such as:
 - AddressSanitizer
 - Valgrind
 - The compiler may issue warnings/error messages

- editing data, the stack, example 2

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
char input[20];
int success;
int main() {
  success = 0;
 printf("Password: ");
                                        // Print to standard output
 fflush(stdout);
                                        // Flush standard output
  scanf("%s", input);
                                         // Read from standard input,
                                         // and store the data in the variable input
  if (strcmp(input, "PassWord213") == 0) // If input is equal to: PassWord213
    success = 1;
  if (success)
   printf("Logged in\n");
  else
   printf("Wrong password\n");
```

- editing data, the heap

```
#include <iostream>
#include <vector>
using namespace std;
int main() {
  vector<char> table = \{1, 2, 3\};
  char *chr = new char('a');
  cout << "table.data() starts at memory address "</pre>
       << (void *)table.data() << endl;
  cout << "chr starts at memory address "</pre>
       << (void *)chr << endl;
  table[16] = 'b';
  cout << *chr << endl;</pre>
Output e.g.:
table.data() starts at memory address 0x7f9929500000
chr starts at memory address 0x7f9929500010
b
```

- Protection of data in the heap
 - Use high-level programming if possible
 - Foreach loops or functional algorithms
 - Use support tools such as:
 - AddressSanitizer
 - Valgrind
 - Range check with exception possible
 - e.g. table.at(16)

- editing function pointers

IKKE KJØR DENNE KILDEKODEN

```
#include <iostream>
using namespace std;
void func1() {
                                                              Output from func1
  cout << "Output from func1" << endl;</pre>
                                                              Output from func2
void func2() {
  cout << "Output from func2" << endl;</pre>
int main() {
  cout << "The function func1 starts at memory address " << (void *)&func1 << endl;</pre>
  cout << "The function func2 starts at memory address " << (void *)&func2 << endl;</pre>
  auto f = &func1;
  char table[3] = \{1, 2, 3\};
  cout << "The pointer f starts at memory address " << (void *)&f << endl;</pre>
  cout << "The table starts at memory address " << (void *)&table << endl;</pre>
  f();
  table[3] = (size_t) \& func1 + 64;
  f();
```


The function func1 starts at memory address 0x10076ff90 The function func2 starts at memory address 0x10076ffd0 The pointer f starts at memory address 0x7fff5f490b80 The table starts at memory address 0x7fff5f490b7d

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Buffer overread

- Heartbleed (OpenSSL vulnerability for versions <1.0.1g)

HOW THE HEARTBLEED BUG WORKS:



Buffer overread

- Heartbleed-like example

```
#include <iostream>
#include <string>
using namespace std;
int main() {
  string secret_data="secret key!";
  string str;
  int length;
  cin >> str >> length;
  for(int c = 0; c < length; c++)
    cout << str[c];</pre>
  cout << endl;</pre>
Input:
hello 40
Output e.g.:
hello???????????? secret key!
```

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Fuzzing

- Automatic testing of functions through generated input parameters
 - Popular tool: libFuzzer
 - Have been used to find bugs in widely used software
 - Works together with sanitizers
 - Advanced functionality: "... the fuzzer then tracks which areas of the code are reached, and generates mutations on the corpus of input data in order to maximize the code coverage."
- See fuzzing-example

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Exercise 5

- Perform fuzzing with address sanitizer on the C function you created in exercise 4b)
 - Fix bugs you find through fuzzing, or introduce bugs that are discovered through fuzzing
 - **Voluntary**: Set up a CI (Continuous Integration) solution that performs *fuzzing* with *address sanitizer*
 - See instructions for running fuzzing in a terminal (note that you can limit the number of seconds libFuzzer will run with the -max_total_time argument)
 - Create tests, and run the tests as well in CI (fuzzing-example contains an example test)