### **Fair Division**

Cake Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair if You Can

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#### Overview I

- 1. Introduction to Fair Division
- 2. Cut and Choose
- 3. Fair Division for n
  - 3.1 Banach-Knaster Last Diminisher
  - 3.2 Dubins-Spanier Moving Knife
  - 3.3 Even-Paz Divide and Conquer

#### 4. Other Fair and Envy-Free Schemes

- 4.1 Stromquist Envy-Free Moving Knife
- 4.2 Austin's Perfect Division for n=2
- 4.3 Aziz-Mackenzie Envy-Free Procedure

#### 5. Paper Reading

- 5.1 Intentions
- 5.2 Structure
- 5.3 Illustrated Guide to PhD Matt Might

#### 6. Unequal Division

### **Overview II**

- 6.1 Anecdote
- 6.2 Naïve Method
- 6.3 Cutting Ones
- 6.4 Ramsey
- 6.5 Halving

### 7. Disagreement

#### 8. Other Interpretations

8.1 Strong Fair Division

## Meeting 1

#### Agenda

- Introduction
- Fair Division for n Players
  - Banach Knaster
  - Dubins Spanier
  - Even Paz

### Introduction

Imagine two people want to share this cake.



#### Introduction

- The cake is complicated
- The two people may value different parts of the cake differently

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- The two people may value different parts of the cake differently
- Can we come up with an algorithm where both people are happy?

# **Cut and Choose**

- 1. Player 1 cuts the cake into what they believe is half
- 2. Player 2 chooses the piece which they think is better

#### **Proof of Correctness**

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- Player 2 recieved the piece which they thought was better
- Player 2 must value their piece to be at least  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the cake

# Banach-Knaster Last Diminisher

- 1. Player 1 cuts  $\frac{1}{n}$  of the cake
- 2. Player 2 through n
  - If they believe the piece is worth  $> \frac{1}{n}$  of the cake, they may trim it
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- 4. Repeat until no players remain

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  - 1. Person 1 cuts 98% of the cake, with the goal of taking it for themselves.
  - 2. After passing the cake around, the last diminisher has only cut the piece down to 97% of the value of the cake
  - 3. Person 1 now cannot receive more than 3% of the cake.

## **Dubins-Spanier Moving Knife**

- Rather than having many cuts, a "moving knife" can be used to allocate chunks of cake.
  - 1. A knife moves over the cake continuously from one side to the opposite side (for example from left to right)
  - 2. When a person thinks that the portion remaining from the starting side/previous cut is worth  $\frac{1}{n}$ , then they may say "Cut", and they will take the portion on the left side.

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- The same person who said "Cut" at any given point would have been the last diminisher in in the Banach-Knaster Last Diminisher Method.
- On a surface level, this seems to take n-1 cuts, but this is incorrect. Instead, it takes an infinite number of cuts perpendicular to the direction of movement.

## **Even-Paz Divide and Conquer**

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- 3. Player n and the players on the side n chose repeat the procedure on that side
- 4. The remaining players repeat the procedure on the other side

## Meeting 2

#### Agenda

- Stromquist Envy-Free Moving Knife
- Austin's Perfect Division for n=2
- Aziz-Mackenzie Envy-Free Procedure

# Stromquist Envy Free Moving Knife

## Austin's Perfect Division for n=2

### **Defining Perfect Division**

Perfect Division is the allocation where

$$\forall_i V_i(A_i) = \frac{1}{n}$$

No bounded algorithm exists for perfect division

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- 6. Assign pieces arbitrarily

# Aziz-Mackenzie Envy-Free Procedure

### Aziz-Mackenzie Envy-Free Procedure for n

https://youtu.be/fvM8ow6zNw4?si=AGrOGF7vSZSGt4QK&t=711

## Meeting 3

#### Agenda

- HOWTO: Reading Papers
- Unequal Division Naïvely
- Cutting into 1-sized parts
- Ramsey Partitions
- Halving

Next Week: Finish Chapter 3 & Chapter 4

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So why read papers?

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Fundamentally, we are learning: But what are we trying to learn?

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Our goal when reading a paper is to contextualize that paper's findings in the field.

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Parts of a Paper

• Title & Authors

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- Content
- Discussion/Conclusion

#### PhD

https://matt.might.net/articles/phd-school-in-pictures/ IllustratedGuidePhD-Matt-Might.pdf

# **Dividing Camels**



First son gets  $\frac{1}{2}$ . Second son gets  $\frac{1}{3}$ . Third son gets  $\frac{1}{9}$ 

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- We will say that
  - Player 1 recieves A<sub>1</sub> allocation
  - Player 2 recieves A<sub>2</sub> allocation
- Using the Even-Paz method,  $\theta((\sum A)\log(\sum A))$  cuts are required.
- We can do better!

# **Cutting Ones**

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- Player 1 divides the cake into 1-sized parts
- Player 2 chooses  $A_2$  of the 1-sized parts

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- We can observe this finding R(3,3)
- The same property seen in Ramsey Theory can also be used to help partition

- Assume  $A_1 < A_2$
- Player 1 cuts what they percieve to be  $A_1$  of the cake.
- The smaller piece can be called  $X_1$  and the larger piece can be called  $X_2$
- If  $\mu_2(X_2) < A_2$  (If the person thinks they got less than they were supposed to)
- Player 2 takes  $X_1$  and division continues in the ratio  $A_2 A_1 : A_1$  until no cake remains

- This can be simplified using ramsey partitions
- Person 1 cuts the Ramsey Partitions of  $\sum A$
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  - 1. If the sum of a subset of the marked pieces =  $A_2$ , we can give those pieces to Player 2 and give the rest to Player 1
  - 2. Otherwise, Player 1 may choose pieces summing to  $A_1$  of the unmarked pieces.
  - 3. This works because of the Ramsey Partitioning!

### Meeting 4

#### Agenda

- Review
- Halving
- The Serendipity of Disagreement
- Summer

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- They allow us to allocate more of the cake at once
- We can get rid of more of the cake at once by cutting closer to  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the cake at once.

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- Let's draw the tree

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- It can be shown that this is at least as good as Ramsey Partitioning.

#### Disagreement

- Sometimes it may feel as if differences of opinion cause conflict
- But through the existence of envy-free division, we can see this may actually lead to more social good

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- Each person can receive a piece of cake which they think is at least  $\frac{1}{n}$

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- Each person divides the cake into n parts (n-1 lines)
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- If at least 1 person disagrees, there will be a way to allocate with excess

## Meeting 5

#### Agenda

- The Serendipity of Disagreement
- Strong Fair Division
- Classes of Fair Division

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- It is clear to see that there may not always exist a strongly fair allocation
- If  $\exists_{i,j}\mu_i \neq \mu_j$ , we can always create a strongly fair allocation

This is the value of disagreement!

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  - Let  $\mu_1(A) = a$
  - Let  $\mu_2(A) = b$
- Let X A = B

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- $\exists_i \ \mu_2(A_i) < \frac{1}{q} \land \exists_j \ \mu_1(B_j) < \frac{1}{q}$ 
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- Cut and choose all other piece of cake  $(X A_i B_i)$
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- Cut and choose all other piece of cake  $(X A_i B_i)$
- Give  $A_i$  to 1 and  $B_j$  to 2
- q-1 cuts

- We will take a bottom-up approach to adding a 3<sub>rd</sub> person
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- Without loss of generality, we want  $\frac{2k-1}{3k-1}*\mu_1(X_1)>\frac{1}{3}$
- Remember what we did for the bottom-up method: We cut the  $X_1$  into 3k-1 equal pieces
- Player 3 chooses *k* pieces

• 
$$1 - \frac{2k-1}{3k-1} = \frac{k}{3k-1}$$

- Player 1 must be content
- Player 3 must also be content

Let's look at the number of cuts needed -

- The number of cuts is dependent on k
- $\bullet \ \ \tfrac{1}{2} + \tfrac{\epsilon}{2} \quad \ 0 < \epsilon < 1$
- We must find k s.t  $\frac{(2k-1)}{2}*(1+\epsilon) > \frac{3k-1}{3}$
- $\epsilon(6k-1) > 1$
- k can grow to become quite large depending on  $\epsilon$ . Since we do not know  $\epsilon$  beforehand, we must choose a large number of cuts.

#### **Classes of Fair Division**

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  - Irrational Unequal Shares

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- Finite vs Infinite
  - Irrational Unequal Shares
- Bounded vs Unbounded (Upper Bounding)
- Continuous vs Discrete (Moving Knife?)