

PHIL 609. Handout 10. BOOK VI

Virtue is the disposition, the “existential readiness,” to perform well. It can occur in regard to the passions, and then it is called moral virtue. It can also occur in regard to thinking, and then it is called intellectual virtue.

In book I chapter 13 we divided the parts of the soul into rational and nonrational, and distinguished two parts of the nonrational. In book VI chapter 1 we distinguish two sections of the rational part, depending on the objects to which each section is directed. The rational part of the soul can be directed toward *invariable* things (which have to be the way they are and are always the same) or toward *variable* things (which can change and can exist in different ways).

PARTS OF THE SOUL:

RATIONAL:	–scientific (<i>epistēmonikon</i>)	(concerns invariable things)	we now discuss this part
	–calculative (<i>logistikōn</i>), deliberative	(concerns variable things)	
NONRATIONAL:	–affected by reason	we looked especially at this part in I 13 and in VII 1-10	
	–not affected by reason		

THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN AGENCY, HUMAN CHOICE:

Sensation (<i>aisthēsis</i>)	this alone does not generate action (<i>praxis</i>), but it can be involved in desire.
Speculative or scientific intellect (<i>nous</i>)	this by itself moves nothing, initiates no action, makes no choice, is concerned with invariables; nothing we do can change them; they are beyond our scope of action.
Intellect must be blended with desire (<i>orexis</i>)	to bring about choice and motion; then it is the practical intellect. Chapter 2: regarding the blend of intellect and desire, Aristotle says: “such an origin [of action] is man; <i>hē toiautē archē anthrōpos</i> ” (man is not desire alone or mind alone; man is essentially the combination of the two).

THE FIVE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES:

<u>Science</u> (<i>epistēmē</i>):	knowledge of what is eternal, invariable, necessary, but known by way of proof, whether inductive or deductive; it involves reasoning. Chapter 3.
<u>Art, skill</u> (<i>technē</i>):	the thoughtful ability to make something or bring something into being (whether an independent thing like a table or a change of state like health). Chapter 4.
<u>Prudence, practical wisdom</u> (<i>phronēsis</i>):	the ability to think clearly, to deliberate well, about living in a way that is worth living, and to act accordingly. Prudence is a virtue, not an art (the attainment of a skill or art does not as such give us the ability to use that skill or art well). Prudence is the link between intellect and moral virtue. Chapter 5.
<u>Insight, intuitive reason, understanding</u> (<i>nous</i>):	the ability to grasp the ultimate premises of science. The ability to see necessities that cannot be proved by prior premises. Chapter 6.
<u>Wisdom</u> (<i>sophia</i>):	insight plus science, concerning the most important things, higher than human things. Chapter 7.

[The five intellectual virtues can be folded into two, wisdom and prudence, because *nous* and science can become ingredient in wisdom, and art or skill must ultimately be governed by prudence; note the contrast of both on p. 108 top.]

Chapter 8:	Young people might be good at mathematics but not prudence and wisdom. The latter require experience, which young people don’t yet have.		
Chapters 9 & 12:	a.	<u>Excellence in deliberation</u> (<i>euboulia</i>) is a moral virtue; distinguished from . . .	p. 111
	b.	<u>cleverness</u> (<i>hē deinotēs, ho deinos</i>), simple facility in practical thinking, & . . .	p. 115
	c.	<u>knavery</u> (<i>panourgia, panourgos</i>), cleverness toward bad ends.	P. 116
Chapter 10:	<u>Understanding, sagacity (conscience?)</u> (<i>sunesis</i>): ability to judge well what others say about practical matters.		