

THE DEFINITION OF VIRTUE:

1. The GENUS for the definition of virtue (Chapter 5):
 - a. *–pathos* is the genus found in passion (emotion, inclination)? NO
 - b. *–dunamis* is the genus the simple potential to have an emotion or inclination? NO
 - c. *–hexis* is the genus the formed disposition to undergo an emotion in a certain way? YES.

–pathos is a good starting point for this definition because no one can deny that we experience it; and virtue will be found in the way that we form ourselves to be disposed to *pathos*. Such disposition will be the genus for the definition of virtue.

–the first two options, (a) passion and (b) the simple power to have emotion, aren't adequate as a genus for virtue: they don't deserve praise or blame; they don't show the result of our earlier choices.
2. The SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE for the definition of virtue (Chapter 6):
 - the range of emotion is continuous and divisible;
 - finding the middle; the difference between the middle in itself & the middle for us;
 - the middle is not duplicated;
 - so the specific difference for virtue is found to be related to this “middle between extremes”; virtue will be the ability to determine and achieve the middle between extremes in our actions and emotions.

DEFINITION (Chapter 6): Virtue is a disposition dealing with choice, [GENUS]
 regarding the middle for us, [DIFFERENCE]
 –the middle as determined by reason,
 –as the virtuous agent would determine it.

- a. *this* is the logos, the reason, that the virtuous agent has
 - b. you cannot avoid using the virtuous agent as the measure of virtue; it's an embodied reason
 - c. thus, virtue is “relative,” but objectively so, not in a relativistic manner, not arbitrary
3. we are dealing with both passion and actions (Chapter 6); the virtuous agent does feel pleasure or fear or anger, but feels them correctly
 4. examples; note the great variety (Chapter 7)
 5. the view from either side and from the middle (Chapter 8) [you must know who is talking; the vicious person would see the middle as belonging to the other extreme]
 6. the interplay of extremes & middle (Chapter 8); usually one of the extremes is the greater problem; sometimes there is no name for an extreme or a middle if it is not a common phenomenon in human affairs
 7. it's hard to find the middle; it must be seen in the concrete, when we grasp the full situation [“the decision rests with perception”]; pleasure and pain are distorting factors (Chapter 9)

CHAPTERS 1–4

NATURE, HABIT AND ACTION:

1. the actual and potential in nature and habit (Chapter 1); by making choices and forming character we shape ourselves; the crucial importance of early upbringing;
2. middle & extreme actions as causing dispositions (Chapter 2); that which causes the disposition is also the sphere of actualization;
3. two important remarks on method and actual performance (Chapter 4 last ¶; Chapter 2 end of first ¶)

HOW THE AGENT MUST PERFORM IN ORDER TO PERFORM WELL:

1. the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their opposites; to kalon, sumpheron, hēdu (Chapter 3)
2. how the virtuous agent must perform virtuous actions: knowingly, by choice and for the action itself, and from his character (Chapter 4). If these features are not there, the action is not really virtuous.