

GLOBAL
EDITION

Cryptography and Network Security

Principles and Practice

SEVENTH EDITION

William Stallings



Pearson



Chapter 1

Computer and Network Security Concepts

Cryptographic algorithms and protocols can be grouped into four main areas:

Symmetric encryption

- Used to conceal the contents of blocks or streams of data of any size, including messages, files, encryption keys, and passwords

Asymmetric encryption

- Used to conceal small blocks of data, such as encryption keys and hash function values, which are used in digital signatures

Data integrity algorithms

- Used to protect blocks of data, such as messages, from alteration

Authentication protocols

- Schemes based on the use of cryptographic algorithms designed to authenticate the identity of entities

The field of network and Internet security consists of:

measures to deter, prevent, detect, and correct security violations that involve the transmission of information



Computer Security

The NIST Computer Security Handbook defines the term computer security as:

“the protection afforded to an automated information system in order to attain the applicable objectives of preserving the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information system resources” (includes hardware, software, firmware, information/data, and telecommunications)

Computer Security Objectives

Confidentiality

- Data confidentiality
 - Assures that private or confidential information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals
- Privacy
 - Assures that individuals control or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored and by whom and to whom that information may be disclosed

Integrity

- Data integrity
 - Assures that information and programs are changed only in a specified and authorized manner
- System integrity
 - Assures that a system performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the system

Availability

- Assures that systems work promptly and service is not denied to authorized users





Figure 1.1 Essential Network and Computer Security Requirements

Breach of Security

Levels of Impact



Computer Security Challenges

- Security is not simple
- Potential attacks on the security features need to be considered
- Procedures used to provide particular services are often counter-intuitive
- It is necessary to decide where to use the various security mechanisms
- Requires constant monitoring
- Is too often an afterthought
- Security mechanisms typically involve more than a particular algorithm or protocol
- Security is essentially a battle of wits between a perpetrator and the designer
- Little benefit from security investment is perceived until a security failure occurs
- Strong security is often viewed as an impediment to efficient and user-friendly operation

OSI Security Architecture

- Security attack
 - Any action that compromises the security of information owned by an organization
- Security mechanism
 - A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that is designed to detect, prevent, or recover from a security attack
- Security service
 - A processing or communication service that enhances the security of the data processing systems and the information transfers of an organization
 - Intended to counter security attacks, and they make use of one or more security mechanisms to provide the service

Table 1.1

Threats and Attacks (RFC 4949)



Threat

A potential for violation of security, which exists when there is a circumstance, capability, action, or event that could breach security and cause harm. That is, a threat is a possible danger that might exploit a vulnerability.

Attack

An assault on system security that derives from an intelligent threat; that is, an intelligent act that is a deliberate attempt (especially in the sense of a method or technique) to evade security services and violate the security policy of a system.

Security Attacks

- A means of classifying security attacks, used both in X.800 and RFC 4949, is in terms of *passive attacks* and *active attacks*
- A *passive attack* attempts to learn or make use of information from the system but does not affect system resources
- An *active attack* attempts to alter system resources or affect their operation





Figure 1.2 Security Attacks

Passive Attacks

- Are in the nature of eavesdropping on, or monitoring of, transmissions
- Goal of the opponent is to obtain information that is being transmitted



- Two types of passive attacks are:
 - The release of message contents
 - Traffic analysis

Active Attacks

- Involve some modification of the data stream or the creation of a false stream
- Difficult to prevent because of the wide variety of potential physical, software, and network vulnerabilities
- Goal is to detect attacks and to recover from any disruption or delays caused by them



Masquerade

- Takes place when one entity pretends to be a different entity
- Usually includes one of the other forms of active attack

Replay

- Involves the passive capture of a data unit and its subsequent retransmission to produce an unauthorized effect

Modification of messages

- Some portion of a legitimate message is altered, or messages are delayed or reordered to produce an unauthorized effect

Denial of service

- Prevents or inhibits the normal use or management of communications facilities

Security Services

- Defined by X.800 as:
 - A service provided by a protocol layer of communicating open systems and that ensures adequate security of the systems or of data transfers
- Defined by RFC 4949 as:
 - A processing or communication service provided by a system to give a specific kind of protection to system resources

AUTHENTICATION

The assurance that the communicating entity is the one that it claims to be.

Peer Entity Authentication

Used in association with a logical connection to provide confidence in the identity of the entities connected.

Data-Origin Authentication

In a connectionless transfer, provides assurance that the source of received data is as claimed.

ACCESS CONTROL

The prevention of unauthorized use of a resource (i.e., this service controls who can have access to a resource, under what conditions access can occur, and what those accessing the resource are allowed to do).

DATA CONFIDENTIALITY

The protection of data from unauthorized disclosure.

Connection Confidentiality

The protection of all user data on a connection.

Connectionless Confidentiality

The protection of all user data in a single data block

Selective-Field Confidentiality

The confidentiality of selected fields within the user data on a connection or in a single data block.

Traffic-Flow Confidentiality

The protection of the information that might be derived from observation of traffic flows.

DATA INTEGRITY

The assurance that data received are exactly as sent by an authorized entity (i.e., contain no modification, insertion, deletion, or replay).

Connection Integrity with Recovery

Provides for the integrity of all user data on a connection and detects any modification, insertion, deletion, or replay of any data within an entire data sequence, with recovery attempted.

Connection Integrity without Recovery

As above, but provides only detection without recovery.

Selective-Field Connection Integrity

Provides for the integrity of selected fields within the user data of a data block transferred over a connection and takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified, inserted, deleted, or replayed.

Connectionless Integrity

Provides for the integrity of a single connectionless data block and may take the form of detection of data modification. Additionally, a limited form of replay detection may be provided.

Selective-Field Connectionless Integrity

Provides for the integrity of selected fields within a single connectionless data block; takes the form of determination of whether the selected fields have been modified.

NONREPUDIATION

Provides protection against denial by one of the entities involved in a communication of having participated in all or part of the communication.

Nonrepudiation, Origin

Proof that the message was sent by the specified party.

Nonrepudiation, Destination

Proof that the message was received by the specified party.

Table 1.2

Security Services (X.800)

(This table is found on page 12 in textbook)

Authentication

- Concerned with assuring that a communication is authentic
 - In the case of a single message, assures the recipient that the message is from the source that it claims to be from
 - In the case of ongoing interaction, assures the two entities are authentic and that the connection is not interfered with in such a way that a third party can masquerade as one of the two legitimate parties

Two specific authentication services are defined in X.800:

- Peer entity authentication
- Data origin authentication

Access Control


- The ability to limit and control the access to host systems and applications via communications links
- To achieve this, each entity trying to gain access must first be identified, or authenticated, so that access rights can be tailored to the individual



Data Confidentiality

- The protection of transmitted data from passive attacks
 - Broadest service protects all user data transmitted between two users over a period of time
 - Narrower forms of service includes the protection of a single message or even specific fields within a message
- The protection of traffic flow from analysis
 - This requires that an attacker not be able to observe the source and destination, frequency, length, or other characteristics of the traffic on a communications facility

Data Integrity



Can apply to a stream of messages, a single message, or selected fields within a message

Connection-oriented integrity service, one that deals with a stream of messages, assures that messages are received as sent with no duplication, insertion, modification, reordering, or replays

A connectionless integrity service, one that deals with individual messages without regard to any larger context, generally provides protection against message modification only

Nonrepudiation

- Prevents either sender or receiver from denying a transmitted message
- When a message is sent, the receiver can prove that the alleged sender in fact sent the message
- When a message is received, the sender can prove that the alleged receiver in fact received the message



Availability Service

- Protects a system to ensure its availability
- This service addresses the security concerns raised by denial-of-service attacks
- It depends on proper management and control of system resources and thus depends on access control service and other security services

Security Mechanisms (X.800)

Specific Security Mechanisms

- Encipherment
- Digital signatures
- Access controls
- Data integrity
- Authentication exchange
- Traffic padding
- Routing control
- Notarization

Pervasive Security Mechanisms

- Trusted functionality
- Security labels
- Event detection
- Security audit trails
- Security recovery

SPECIFIC SECURITY MECHANISMS

May be incorporated into the appropriate protocol layer in order to provide some of the OSI security services.

Encipherment

The use of mathematical algorithms to transform data into a form that is not readily intelligible. The transformation and subsequent recovery of the data depend on an algorithm and zero or more encryption keys.

Digital Signature

Data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery (e.g., by the recipient).

Access Control

A variety of mechanisms that enforce access rights to resources.

Data Integrity

A variety of mechanisms used to assure the integrity of a data unit or stream of data units.

Authentication Exchange

A mechanism intended to ensure the identity of an entity by means of information exchange.

Traffic Padding

The insertion of bits into gaps in a data stream to frustrate traffic analysis attempts.

Routing Control

Enables selection of particular physically secure routes for certain data and allows routing changes, especially when a breach of security is suspected.

Notarization

The use of a trusted third party to assure certain properties of a data exchange.

PERVASIVE SECURITY MECHANISMS

Mechanisms that are not specific to any particular OSI security service or protocol layer.

Trusted Functionality

That which is perceived to be correct with respect to some criteria (e.g., as established by a security policy).

Security Label

The marking bound to a resource (which may be a data unit) that names or designates the security attributes of that resource.

Event Detection

Detection of security-relevant events.

Security Audit Trail

Data collected and potentially used to facilitate a security audit, which is an independent review and examination of system records and activities.

Security Recovery

Deals with requests from mechanisms, such as event handling and management functions, and takes recovery actions.

Table 1.3

Security Mechanisms (X.800)

(This table is found on pages 14-15 in textbook)

Fundamental Security Design Principles

- Economy of mechanism
- Fail-safe defaults
- Complete meditation
- Open design
- Separation of privilege
- Least privilege
- Least common mechanism
- Psychological acceptability
- Isolation
- Encapsulation
- Modularity
- Layering
- Least astonishment

Fundamental Security Design Principles

Economy of mechanism

- Means that the design of security measures embodied in both hardware and software should be as simple and small as possible
- Relatively simple, small design is easier to test and verify thoroughly
- With a complex design, there are many more opportunities for an adversary to discover subtle weaknesses to exploit that may be difficult to spot ahead of time

Fail-safe defaults

- Means that access decisions should be based on permission rather than exclusion
- The default situation is lack of access, and the protection scheme identifies conditions under which access is permitted
- Most file access systems and virtually all protected services on client/server use fail-safe defaults

Fundamental Security Design Principles

Complete mediation

- Means that every access must be checked against the access control mechanism
- Systems should not rely on access decisions retrieved from a cache
- To fully implement this, every time a user reads a field or record in a file, or a data item in a database, the system must exercise access control
- This resource-intensive approach is rarely used

Open design

- Means that the design of a security mechanism should be open rather than secret
- Although encryption keys must be secret, encryption algorithms should be open to public scrutiny
- Is the philosophy behind the NIST program of standardizing encryption and hash algorithms

Fundamental Security Design Principles

Separation of privilege

- Defined as a practice in which multiple privilege attributes are required to achieve access to a restricted resource
- Multifactor user authentication is an example which requires the use of multiple techniques, such as a password and a smart card, to authorize a user

Least privilege

- Means that every process and every user of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to perform the task
- An example of the use of this principle is role-based access control; the system security policy can identify and define the various roles of users or processes and each role is assigned only those permissions needed to perform its functions

Fundamental Security Design Principles

Least common mechanism

- Means that the design should minimize the functions shared by different users, providing mutual security
- This principle helps reduce the number of unintended communication paths and reduces the amount of hardware and software on which all users depend, thus making it easier to verify if there are any undesirable security implications

Psychological acceptability

- Implies that the security mechanisms should not interfere unduly with the work of users, while at the same time meeting the needs of those who authorize access
- Where possible, security mechanisms should be transparent to the users of the system or, at most, introduce minimal obstruction
- In addition to not being intrusive or burdensome, security procedures must reflect the user's mental model of protection

Fundamental Security Design Principles

Isolation

- Applies in three contexts:
 - Public access systems should be isolated from critical resources to prevent disclosure or tampering
 - Processes and files of individual users should be isolated from one another except where it is explicitly desired
 - Security mechanisms should be isolated in the sense of preventing access to those mechanisms

Encapsulation

- Can be viewed as a specific form of isolation based on object-oriented functionality
- Protection is provided by encapsulating a collection of procedures and data objects in a domain of its own so that the internal structure of a data object is accessible only to the procedures of the protected subsystem, and the procedures may be called only at designated domain entry points

Fundamental Security Design Principles

Modularity

- Refers both to the development of security functions as separate, protected modules and to the use of a modular architecture for mechanism design and implementation

Layering

- Refers to the use of multiple, overlapping protection approaches addressing the people, technology, and operational aspects of information systems
- The failure or circumvention of any individual protection approach will not leave the system unprotected

Fundamental Security Design Principles

Least astonishment

- Means that a program or user interface should always respond in the way that is least likely to astonish the user
- The mechanism for authorization should be transparent enough to a user that the user has a good intuitive understanding of how the security goals map to the provided security mechanism

Attack Surfaces

- An attack surface consists of the reachable and exploitable vulnerabilities in a system
- Examples:
 - Open ports on outward facing Web and other servers, and code listening on those ports
 - Services available on the inside of a firewall
 - Code that processes incoming data, email, XML, office documents, and industry-specific custom data exchange formats
 - Interfaces, SQL, and Web forms
 - An employee with access to sensitive information vulnerable to a social engineering attack

Attack Surface Categories

- Network attack surface
 - Refers to vulnerabilities over an enterprise network, wide-area network, or the Internet
- Software attack surface
 - Refers to vulnerabilities in application, utility, or operating system code
- Human attack surface
 - Refers to vulnerabilities created by personnel or outsiders




Figure 1.3 Defense in Depth and Attack Surface

Attack Tree

- A branching, hierarchical data structure that represents a set of potential techniques for exploiting security vulnerabilities
- The security incident that is the goal of the attack is represented as the root node of the tree, and the ways that an attacker could reach that goal are represented as branches and subnodes of the tree
- The final nodes on the paths outward from the root, (leaf nodes), represent different ways to initiate an attack
- The motivation for the use of attack trees is to effectively exploit the information available on attack patterns




Figure 1.4 An Attack Tree for Internet Banking Authentication

Model for Network Security




Figure 1.5 Model for Network Security

Network Access Security Model




Figure 1.6 Network Access Security Model

Unwanted Access

- Placement in a computer system of logic that exploits vulnerabilities in the system and that can affect application programs as well as utility programs such as editors and compilers
- Programs can present two kinds of threats:
 - Information access threats
 - Intercept or modify data on behalf of users who should not have access to that data
 - Service threats
 - Exploit service flaws in computers to inhibit use by legitimate users



Standards

National Institute of Standards and Technology

- NIST is a U.S. federal agency that deals with measurement science, standards, and technology related to U.S. government use and to the promotion of U.S. private-sector innovation
- Despite its national scope, NIST Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) and Special Publications (SP) have a worldwide impact

Internet Society

- ISOC is a professional membership society with world-wide organizational and individual membership
- Provides leadership in addressing issues that confront the future of the Internet and is the organization home for the groups responsible for Internet infrastructure standards

ITU-T

- The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is an international organization within the United Nations System in which governments and the private sector coordinate global telecom networks and services
- The ITU Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T) is one of the three sectors of the ITU and whose mission is the development of technical standards covering all fields of telecommunications

ISO

- The International Organization for Standardization is a world-wide federation of national standards bodies from more than 140 countries
- ISO is a nongovernmental organization that promotes the development of standardization and related activities with a view to facilitating the international exchange of goods and services and to developing cooperation in the spheres of intellectual, scientific, technological, and economic activity

Summary

- Computer security concepts
 - Definition
 - Examples
 - Challenges
- The OSI security architecture
- Security attacks
 - Passive attacks
 - Active attacks
- Attack surfaces and attack trees
- Security services
 - Authentication
 - Access control
 - Data confidentiality
 - Data integrity
 - Nonrepudiation
 - Availability service
- Security mechanisms
- Fundamental security design principles
- Network security model
- Standards



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Chapter 2

Introduction to Number Theory

Divisibility

- We say that a nonzero b **divides** a if $a = mb$ for some m , where a , b , and m are integers
- b divides a if there is no remainder on division
- The notation $b \mid a$ is commonly used to mean b divides a
- If $b \mid a$ we say that b is a **divisor** of a

The positive divisors of 24 are 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 12, and 24
 $13 \nmid 182$; -5 | 30; 17 | 289; -3 | 33; 17 | 0

Properties of Divisibility

- If $a \mid 1$, then $a = \pm 1$
- If $a \mid b$ and $b \mid a$, then $a = \pm b$
- Any $b \neq 0$ divides 0
- If $a \mid b$ and $b \mid c$, then $a \mid c$

$$11 \mid 66 \text{ and } 66 \mid 198 \Rightarrow 11 \mid 198$$

- If $b \mid g$ and $b \mid h$, then $b \mid (mg + nh)$ for arbitrary integers m and n

Properties of Divisibility

- To see this last point, note that:
 - If $b \mid g$, then g is of the form $g = b * g_1$ for some integer g_1 ,
 - If $b \mid h$, then h is of the form $h = b * h_1$ for some integer h_1 ,
- So:
 - $mg + nh = mbg_1 + nbh_1 = b * (mg_1 + nh_1)$
and therefore b divides $mg + nh$

$$b = 7; g = 14; h = 63; m = 3; n = 2$$

$$7 \mid 14 \text{ and } 7 \mid 63.$$

$$\text{To show } 7(3 * 14 + 2 * 63),$$

$$\text{we have } (3 * 14 + 2 * 63) = 7(3 * 2 + 2 * 9),$$

$$\text{and it is obvious that } 7 \mid (7(3 * 2 + 2 * 9)).$$

Division Algorithm

- Given any positive integer n and any nonnegative integer a , if we divide a by n we get an integer quotient q and an integer remainder r that obey the following relationship:

$$a = qn + r \quad 0 \leq r < n; q = [a/n]$$





Figure 2.1 The Relationship $a = qn + r$; $0 \leq r < n$

Euclidean Algorithm



- One of the basic techniques of number theory
- Procedure for determining the greatest common divisor of two positive integers
- Two integers are **relatively prime** if their only common positive integer factor is 1

Greatest Common Divisor (GCD)

- The greatest common divisor of a and b is the largest integer that divides both a and b
- We can use the notation $\gcd(a,b)$ to mean the **greatest common divisor** of a and b
- We also define $\gcd(0,0) = 0$
- Positive integer c is said to be the gcd of a and b if:
 - c is a divisor of a and b
 - Any divisor of a and b is a divisor of c
- An equivalent definition is:

$$\gcd(a,b) = \max[k, \text{ such that } k \mid a \text{ and } k \mid b]$$

GCD

- Because we require that the greatest common divisor be positive,
 $\gcd(a,b) = \gcd(a,-b) = \gcd(-a,b) = \gcd(-a,-b)$
- In general, $\gcd(a,b) = \gcd(|a|, |b|)$

$$\gcd(60, 24) = \gcd(60, -24) = 12$$

- Also, because all nonzero integers divide 0, we have $\gcd(a,0) = |a|$
- We stated that two integers a and b are relatively prime if their only common positive integer factor is 1; this is equivalent to saying that a and b are relatively prime if $\gcd(a,b) = 1$

8 and 15 are relatively prime because the positive divisors of 8 are 1, 2, 4, and 8, and the positive divisors of 15 are 1, 3, 5, and 15. So 1 is the only integer on both lists.




Figure 2.2 Euclidean Algorithm




Figure 2.3 Euclidean Algorithm Example: $\gcd(710, 310)$

Table 2.1

Euclidean Algorithm Example

| Dividend | Divisor | Quotient | Remainder |
|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| $a = 1160718174$ | $b = 316258250$ | $q_1 = 3$ | $r_1 = 211943424$ |
| $b = 316258250$ | $r_1 = 211943424$ | $q_2 = 1$ | $r_2 = 104314826$ |
| $r_1 = 211943424$ | $r_2 = 104314826$ | $q_3 = 2$ | $r_3 = 3313772$ |
| $r_2 = 104314826$ | $r_3 = 3313772$ | $q_4 = 31$ | $r_4 = 1587894$ |
| $r_3 = 3313772$ | $r_4 = 1587894$ | $q_5 = 2$ | $r_5 = 137984$ |
| $r_4 = 1587894$ | $r_5 = 137984$ | $q_6 = 11$ | $r_6 = 70070$ |
| $r_5 = 137984$ | $r_6 = 70070$ | $q_7 = 1$ | $r_7 = 67914$ |
| $r_6 = 70070$ | $r_7 = 67914$ | $q_8 = 1$ | $r_8 = 2156$ |
| $r_7 = 67914$ | $r_8 = 2156$ | $q_9 = 31$ | $r_9 = 1078$ |
| $r_8 = 2156$ | $r_9 = 1078$ | $q_{10} = 2$ | $r_{10} = 0$ |

(This table can be found on page 34 in the textbook)

Modular Arithmetic

- The modulus

- If a is an integer and n is a positive integer, we define $a \bmod n$ to be the remainder when a is divided by n ; the integer n is called the **modulus**
- Thus, for any integer a :

$$a = qn + r \quad 0 \leq r < n; \quad q = [a/n]$$

$$a = [a/n] * n + (a \bmod n)$$

$$11 \bmod 7 = 4; -11 \bmod 7 = 3$$

Modular Arithmetic

- Congruent modulo n
 - Two integers a and b are said to be **congruent modulo n** if $(a \bmod n) = (b \bmod n)$
 - This is written as $a \equiv b \pmod{n}$
 - Note that if $a \equiv 0 \pmod{n}$, then $n \mid a$

$$73 \equiv 4 \pmod{23}; \quad 21 \equiv -9 \pmod{10}$$

Properties of Congruences

- Congruences have the following properties:
 1. $a = b \pmod{n}$ if $n | (a - b)$
 2. $a = b \pmod{n}$ implies $b = a \pmod{n}$
 3. $a = b \pmod{n}$ and $b = c \pmod{n}$ imply $a = c \pmod{n}$
- To demonstrate the first point, if $n | (a - b)$, then $(a - b) = kn$ for some k
 - So we can write $a = b + kn$
 - Therefore, $(a \pmod{n}) = (\text{remainder when } b + kn \text{ is divided by } n) = (\text{remainder when } b \text{ is divided by } n) = (b \pmod{n})$

$23 = 8 \pmod{5}$ because $23 - 8 = 15 = 5 * 3$

$-11 = 5 \pmod{8}$ because $-11 - 5 = -16 = 8 * (-2)$

$81 = 0 \pmod{27}$ because $81 - 0 = 81 = 27 * 3$

Modular Arithmetic

- Modular arithmetic exhibits the following properties:
 1. $[(a \text{ mod } n) + (b \text{ mod } n)] \text{ mod } n = (a + b) \text{ mod } n$
 2. $[(a \text{ mod } n) - (b \text{ mod } n)] \text{ mod } n = (a - b) \text{ mod } n$
 3. $[(a \text{ mod } n) * (b \text{ mod } n)] \text{ mod } n = (a * b) \text{ mod } n$
- We demonstrate the first property:
 - Define $(a \text{ mod } n) = r_a$ and $(b \text{ mod } n) = r_b$. Then we can write $a = r_a + jn$ for some integer j and $b = r_b + kn$ for some integer k
 - Then:
$$\begin{aligned}(a + b) \text{ mod } n &= (ra + jn + rb + kn) \text{ mod } n \\&= (ra + rb + (k + j)n) \text{ mod } n \\&= (ra + rb) \text{ mod } n \\&= [(a \text{ mod } n) + (b \text{ mod } n)] \text{ mod } n\end{aligned}$$

Remaining Properties:

- Examples of the three remaining properties:

$$11 \bmod 8 = 3; 15 \bmod 8 = 7$$

$$[(11 \bmod 8) + (15 \bmod 8)] \bmod 8 = 10 \bmod 8 = 2$$

$$(11 + 15) \bmod 8 = 26 \bmod 8 = 2$$

$$[(11 \bmod 8) - (15 \bmod 8)] \bmod 8 = -4 \bmod 8 = 4$$

$$(11 - 15) \bmod 8 = -4 \bmod 8 = 4$$

$$[(11 \bmod 8) * (15 \bmod 8)] \bmod 8 = 21 \bmod 8 = 5$$

$$(11 * 15) \bmod 8 = 165 \bmod 8 = 5$$

Table 2.2(a)

Arithmetic Modulo 8

| + | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

Table 2.2(b)

Multiplication Modulo 8

| \times | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 5 |
| 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 3 |
| 6 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| 7 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

Additive and Multiplicative Inverse Modulo 8

Table 2.2(c)

| w | $-w$ | w^{-1} |
|-----|------|----------|
| 0 | 0 | — |
| 1 | 7 | 1 |
| 2 | 6 | — |
| 3 | 5 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 | — |
| 5 | 3 | 5 |
| 6 | 2 | — |
| 7 | 1 | 7 |

Table 2.3

Properties of Modular Arithmetic for Integers in \mathbb{Z}_n

| Property | Expression |
|---------------------------|--|
| Commutative Laws | $(w + x) \bmod n = (x + w) \bmod n$ $(w \times x) \bmod n = (x \times w) \bmod n$ |
| Associative Laws | $[(w + x) + y] \bmod n = [w + (x + y)] \bmod n$ $[(w \times x) \times y] \bmod n = [w \times (x \times y)] \bmod n$ |
| Distributive Law | $[w \times (x + y)] \bmod n = [(w \times x) + (w \times y)] \bmod n$ |
| Identities | $(0 + w) \bmod n = w \bmod n$ $(1 \times w) \bmod n = w \bmod n$ |
| Additive Inverse ($-w$) | For each $w \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, there exists a z such that $w + z \equiv 0 \bmod n$ |

(This table can be found on page 38 in the textbook)

Table 2.4

Extended Euclidean Algorithm Example

| i | r_i | q_i | x_i | Y_i |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| -1 | 1759 | | 1 | 0 |
| 0 | 550 | | 0 | 1 |
| 1 | 109 | 3 | 1 | -3 |
| 2 | 5 | 5 | -5 | 16 |
| 3 | 4 | 21 | 106 | -339 |
| 4 | 1 | 1 | -111 | 355 |
| 5 | 0 | 4 | | |

Result: $d = 1$; $x = -111$; $y = 355$

(This table can be found on page 43 in the textbook)

Prime Numbers

- Prime numbers only have divisors of 1 and itself
 - They cannot be written as a product of other numbers
- Prime numbers are central to number theory
- Any integer $a > 1$ can be factored in a unique way as

$$a = p_1^{a_1} * p_2^{a_2} * \dots * p_{p_1}^{a_1}$$

where $p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_t$ are prime numbers and where each a_i is a positive integer

- This is known as the fundamental theorem of arithmetic

Table 2.5
Primes Under 2000

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 2 | 101 | 211 | 307 | 401 | 503 | 601 | 701 | 809 | 907 | 1009 | 1103 | 1201 | 1301 | 1409 | 1511 | 1601 | 1709 | 1801 | 1901 |
| 3 | 103 | 223 | 311 | 409 | 509 | 607 | 709 | 811 | 911 | 1013 | 1109 | 1213 | 1303 | 1423 | 1523 | 1607 | 1721 | 1811 | 1907 |
| 5 | 107 | 227 | 313 | 419 | 521 | 613 | 719 | 821 | 919 | 1019 | 1117 | 1217 | 1307 | 1427 | 1531 | 1609 | 1723 | 1823 | 1913 |
| 7 | 109 | 229 | 317 | 421 | 523 | 617 | 727 | 823 | 929 | 1021 | 1123 | 1223 | 1319 | 1429 | 1543 | 1613 | 1733 | 1831 | 1931 |
| 11 | 113 | 233 | 331 | 431 | 541 | 619 | 733 | 827 | 937 | 1031 | 1129 | 1229 | 1321 | 1433 | 1549 | 1619 | 1741 | 1847 | 1933 |
| 13 | 127 | 239 | 337 | 433 | 547 | 631 | 739 | 829 | 941 | 1033 | 1151 | 1231 | 1327 | 1439 | 1553 | 1621 | 1747 | 1861 | 1949 |
| 17 | 131 | 241 | 347 | 439 | 557 | 641 | 743 | 839 | 947 | 1039 | 1153 | 1237 | 1361 | 1447 | 1559 | 1627 | 1753 | 1867 | 1951 |
| 19 | 137 | 251 | 349 | 443 | 563 | 643 | 751 | 853 | 953 | 1049 | 1163 | 1249 | 1367 | 1451 | 1567 | 1637 | 1759 | 1871 | 1973 |
| 23 | 139 | 257 | 353 | 449 | 569 | 647 | 757 | 857 | 967 | 1051 | 1171 | 1259 | 1373 | 1453 | 1571 | 1657 | 1777 | 1873 | 1979 |
| 29 | 149 | 263 | 359 | 457 | 571 | 653 | 761 | 859 | 971 | 1061 | 1181 | 1277 | 1381 | 1459 | 1579 | 1663 | 1783 | 1877 | 1987 |
| 31 | 151 | 269 | 367 | 461 | 577 | 659 | 769 | 863 | 977 | 1063 | 1187 | 1279 | 1399 | 1471 | 1583 | 1667 | 1787 | 1879 | 1993 |
| 37 | 157 | 271 | 373 | 463 | 587 | 661 | 773 | 877 | 983 | 1069 | 1193 | 1283 | | 1481 | 1597 | 1669 | 1789 | 1889 | 1997 |
| 41 | 163 | 277 | 379 | 467 | 593 | 673 | 787 | 881 | 991 | 1087 | | 1289 | | 1483 | | 1693 | | | 1999 |
| 43 | 167 | 281 | 383 | 479 | 599 | 677 | 797 | 883 | 997 | 1091 | | 1291 | | 1487 | | 1697 | | | |
| 47 | 173 | 283 | 389 | 487 | | 683 | | 887 | | 1093 | | 1297 | | 1489 | | 1699 | | | |
| 53 | 179 | 293 | 397 | 491 | | 691 | | | | 1097 | | | | 1493 | | | | | |
| 59 | 181 | | | 499 | | | | | | | | | | 1499 | | | | | |
| 61 | 191 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 67 | 193 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 71 | 197 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 73 | 199 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 79 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 83 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 89 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 97 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Fermat's Theorem

- States the following:
 - If p is prime and a is a positive integer not divisible by p then
$$a^{p-1} = 1 \pmod{p}$$
- An alternate form is:
 - If p is prime and a is a positive integer then
$$a^p = a \pmod{p}$$

Table 2.6

Some Values of Euler's Totient Function $\phi(n)$

| n | $\phi(n)$ |
|-----|-----------|
| 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 1 |
| 3 | 2 |
| 4 | 2 |
| 5 | 4 |
| 6 | 2 |
| 7 | 6 |
| 8 | 4 |
| 9 | 6 |
| 10 | 4 |

| n | $\phi(n)$ |
|-----|-----------|
| 11 | 10 |
| 12 | 4 |
| 13 | 12 |
| 14 | 6 |
| 15 | 8 |
| 16 | 8 |
| 17 | 16 |
| 18 | 6 |
| 19 | 18 |
| 20 | 8 |

| n | $\phi(n)$ |
|-----|-----------|
| 21 | 12 |
| 22 | 10 |
| 23 | 22 |
| 24 | 8 |
| 25 | 20 |
| 26 | 12 |
| 27 | 18 |
| 28 | 12 |
| 29 | 28 |
| 30 | 8 |

Euler's Theorem

- States that for every a and n that are relatively prime:

$$a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

- An alternative form is:

$$a^{\phi(n)+1} \equiv a \pmod{n}$$

Miller-Rabin Algorithm


- Typically used to test a large number for primality
- Algorithm is:

TEST (n)

1. • Find integers k, q , with $k > 0, q$ odd, so that $(n - 1) = 2^k q$;
2. • Select a random integer a , $1 < a < n - 1$;
3. • **if** $a^q \text{ mod } n = 1$ **then** return ("inconclusive");
4. • **for** $j = 0$ **to** $k - 1$ **do**
5. • **if** $(a^{2^{j}q} \text{ mod } n = n - 1)$ **then** return ("inconclusive");
6. • **return** ("composite");

Deterministic Primality Algorithm

- Prior to 2002 there was no known method of efficiently proving the primality of very large numbers
- All of the algorithms in use produced a probabilistic result
- In 2002 Agrawal, Kayal, and Saxena developed an algorithm that efficiently determines whether a given large number is prime
 - Known as the AKS algorithm
 - Does not appear to be as efficient as the Miller-Rabin algorithm



Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT)

- Believed to have been discovered by the Chinese mathematician Sun-Tsu in around 100 A.D.
- One of the most useful results of number theory
- Says it is possible to reconstruct integers in a certain range from their residues modulo a set of pairwise relatively prime moduli
- Can be stated in several ways

Provides a way to manipulate (potentially very large) numbers mod M in terms of tuples of smaller numbers

- This can be useful when M is 150 digits or more
- However, it is necessary to know beforehand the factorization of M



Table 2.7
Powers of Integers, Modulo 19

| a | a^2 | a^3 | a^4 | a^5 | a^6 | a^7 | a^8 | a^9 | a^{10} | a^{11} | a^{12} | a^{13} | a^{14} | a^{15} | a^{16} | a^{17} | a^{18} |
|-----|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 4 | 8 | 16 | 13 | 7 | 14 | 9 | 18 | 17 | 15 | 11 | 3 | 6 | 12 | 5 | 10 | 1 |
| 3 | 9 | 8 | 5 | 15 | 7 | 2 | 6 | 18 | 16 | 10 | 11 | 14 | 4 | 12 | 17 | 13 | 1 |
| 4 | 16 | 7 | 9 | 17 | 11 | 6 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 16 | 7 | 9 | 17 | 11 | 6 | 5 | 1 |
| 5 | 6 | 11 | 17 | 9 | 7 | 16 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 6 | 11 | 17 | 9 | 7 | 16 | 4 | 1 |
| 6 | 17 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 11 | 9 | 16 | 1 | 6 | 17 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 11 | 9 | 16 | 1 |
| 7 | 11 | 1 | 7 | 11 | 1 | 7 | 11 | 1 | 7 | 11 | 1 | 7 | 11 | 1 | 7 | 11 | 1 |
| 8 | 7 | 18 | 11 | 12 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 18 | 11 | 12 | 1 | 8 | 7 | 18 | 11 | 12 | 1 |
| 9 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 16 | 11 | 4 | 17 | 1 | 9 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 16 | 11 | 4 | 17 | 1 |
| 10 | 5 | 12 | 6 | 3 | 11 | 15 | 17 | 18 | 9 | 14 | 7 | 13 | 16 | 8 | 4 | 2 | 1 |
| 11 | 7 | 1 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 11 | 7 | 1 |
| 12 | 11 | 18 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 12 | 11 | 18 | 7 | 8 | 1 | 12 | 11 | 18 | 7 | 8 | 1 |
| 13 | 17 | 12 | 4 | 14 | 11 | 10 | 16 | 18 | 6 | 2 | 7 | 15 | 5 | 8 | 9 | 3 | 1 |
| 14 | 6 | 8 | 17 | 10 | 7 | 3 | 4 | 18 | 5 | 13 | 11 | 2 | 9 | 12 | 16 | 15 | 1 |
| 15 | 16 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 11 | 13 | 5 | 18 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 10 | 17 | 8 | 6 | 14 | 1 |
| 16 | 9 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 17 | 6 | 1 | 16 | 9 | 11 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 17 | 6 | 1 |
| 17 | 4 | 11 | 16 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 1 | 17 | 4 | 11 | 16 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 9 | 1 |
| 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 | 18 | 1 |

Table 2.8

Tables of Discrete Logarithms, Modulo 19

(a) Discrete logarithms to the base 2, modulo 19

| a | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
|------------------|----|---|----|---|----|----|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| $\log_{2,19}(a)$ | 18 | 1 | 13 | 2 | 16 | 14 | 6 | 3 | 8 | 17 | 12 | 15 | 5 | 7 | 11 | 4 | 10 | 9 |

(b) Discrete logarithms to the base 3, modulo 19

| a | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
|------------------|----|---|---|----|---|---|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| $\log_{3,19}(a)$ | 18 | 7 | 1 | 14 | 4 | 8 | 6 | 3 | 2 | 11 | 12 | 15 | 17 | 13 | 5 | 10 | 16 | 9 |

(c) Discrete logarithms to the base 10, modulo 19

| a | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
|-------------------|----|----|---|----|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| $\log_{10,19}(a)$ | 18 | 17 | 5 | 16 | 2 | 4 | 12 | 15 | 10 | 1 | 6 | 3 | 13 | 11 | 7 | 14 | 8 | 9 |

(d) Discrete logarithms to the base 13, modulo 19

| a | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
|-------------------|----|----|----|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| $\log_{13,19}(a)$ | 18 | 11 | 17 | 4 | 14 | 10 | 12 | 15 | 16 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 13 | 8 | 2 | 9 |

(e) Discrete logarithms to the base 14, modulo 19

| a | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
|-------------------|----|----|---|---|----|---|---|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| $\log_{14,19}(a)$ | 18 | 13 | 7 | 8 | 10 | 2 | 6 | 3 | 14 | 5 | 12 | 15 | 11 | 1 | 17 | 16 | 4 | 9 |

(f) Discrete logarithms to the base 15, modulo 19

| a | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 |
|-------------------|----|---|----|----|---|----|----|----|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| $\log_{15,19}(a)$ | 18 | 5 | 11 | 10 | 8 | 16 | 12 | 15 | 4 | 13 | 6 | 3 | 7 | 17 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 9 |

Summary

- Divisibility and the division algorithm
- The Euclidean algorithm
 - Greatest Common Divisor
 - Finding the Greatest Common Divisor
- Modular arithmetic
 - The modulus
 - Properties of congruences
 - Modular arithmetic operations
 - Properties of modular arithmetic
 - Euclidean algorithm revisited
 - The extended Euclidean algorithm
- Prime numbers
- Fermat's Theorem
- Euler's totient function
- Euler's Theorem
- Testing for primality
 - Miller-Rabin algorithm
 - A deterministic primality algorithm
 - Distribution of primes
- The Chinese Remainder Theorem
- Discrete logarithms
 - Powers of an integer, modulo n
 - Logarithms for modular arithmetic
 - Calculation of discrete logarithms



Chapter 3

Block Ciphers and The Data
Encryption Standard

Motivation for the Feistel Cipher Structure

- What we need is a reversible mapping
- Ex

| PLAINTEXT | CIPHERTEXT |
|-----------|------------|
| 00 | 11 |
| 01 | 10 |
| 10 | 00 |
| 11 | 01 |

- Ex. of an irreversible mapping
- Note that decryption is not possible

| PLAINTEXT | CIPHERTEXT |
|-----------|------------|
| 00 | 11 |
| 01 | 00 |
| 10 | 00 |
| 11 | 01 |

How many reversible mappings do we have

- Let n be the block size
 - The number of plaintext blocks is 2^n
 - This is also the number of cipher text blocks
 - $2^n!$ is the number of reversible mapping
- N should be sufficiently large (remember the lesson from the Hill cipher)

A strongly ideal cipher

- Would choose an arbitrary reversible mapping for a large block size
- The problem with this is the large key size
 - The key would be the table (the second column only)
 - Therefore the key size is $n \cdot 2^n$ bits
 - Imagine $64 \cdot 2^{64}$

Shannon's proposal


- Shannon suggests two methods for frustrating statistical cryptanalysis:
Diffusion and Confusion
- Diffusion
 - The statistical structure of the plaintext is dissipated into long range statistics of the cipher text.
 - This is achieved by having each plaintext digit affect many ciphertext digits.
 - Remember the first lesson from the Hill cipher

- Confusion
 - Seeks to make the relationship between the statistics of the ciphertext and the value of the key used as complex as possible
 - This is to thwart attempts to discover the key.
 - This is achieved by the use of a complex substitution algorithm
 - Recall the second lesson of the Hill cipher.
 -

The Feistel Cipher



- A structure that is used by most significant symmetric block ciphers currently in use.
- A practical application of Shannon's proposal
- Alternates confusion and diffusion functions.
- Uses substitution and transposition techniques.

Feistel Cipher Structure



Feistel Encryption and Decryption

- Decryption is the same as encryption but uses the subkeys in reversed order.
 - This is good because it reduces the implementation cost.



- To see that the decryption of the cipher really produces the original plaintext, we need to show that the output of each decryption round is the same as the input of the corresponding encryption round.

- Note that
 - $LD0=RE2$ and
 - $RD0=LE2$
- So in order to show that the decryption phase really works we need to show that for the first decryption round
 - $LD1=RE1$ and
 - $RD1=LE1$
- and for the second decryption round we need to show that
 - $LD2=RE0$ and
 - $RD2=LE0$

The First decryption round

- Note that (from the encryption side)
 - $LE2 = RE1$
 - $RE2 = LE1 \oplus F(RE1, K2)$
- and on the decryption side
 - $LD1 = RD0 = LE2 = RE1$
 - $RD1 = LD0 \oplus F(RD0, K2)$
 - $= RE2 \oplus F(RE1, K2)$
 - $= (LE1 \oplus F(RE1, K2)) \oplus F(RE1, K2)$
 - $= LE1$

- This is true because the XOR operation has the following properties:
 1. $(X \oplus Y) \oplus Z = X \oplus (Y \oplus Z)$
 2. $(X \oplus X) = 0$
 3. $(X \oplus 0) = Y$


the second decryption round


- Now for the second decryption round, we need to show that:
 - $LD2 = RE0$
 - $RD2 = LE0$
- This is true because:
 - $LD2 = RD1 = LE1 = RE0$
- and
 - $RD2 = LD1 \oplus F(RD1, K1)$
 - $= RE1 \oplus F(LE1, K1)$
 - $= (LE0 \oplus F(LE1, K1)) \oplus F(LE1, K1)$
 - $= LE0$

Simplified DES

- Simplified DES was developed for educational purposes and it was not intended as a secure algorithm (Schaefer 96).
- It uses a small key size of 10 bits only.
- The block size is also small, 8 bits only. In other words, it encrypts 8 plaintext bits at a time.
- Therefore, the degree of diffusion achieved is quite limited.
- More importantly, the small key size makes it very vulnerable to brute-force attack.
- Minimal number of rounds (2)

- S-DES encryption performs 5 main steps.
- It starts by performing an initial permutation (IP),
- followed by a complex function f_k .
- Next, the left and right halves are switched before applying the function f_k once again.
- Finally, another permutation step (IP-1) which is the inverse of the initial permutation is applied.





Feistel Cipher Design Elements

- block size
 - DES 64 bits SDES=8 bits
 - diffusion
- key size
 - DES 56 bits SDES= 10 bits
 - Brute force attack
 - 16 subkeys each with 48 bits
 - Better confusion: more bits in the subkeys which means we have more bits to make the relationship between the values taken from the sboxes and the key complex

- number of rounds
 - DES 16 rounds → better diffusion and confusion
- subkey generation algorithm
 - We need substantially different subkeys
- round function
 - An important part of which is the s-boxes
- Other considerations
 - fast software en/decryption
 - ease of analysis
 - Of the algorithm
 - To earn user confidence
 - We discover any weakness point

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- most widely used block cipher in world
- adopted in 1977 by NBS (now NIST)
 - as FIPS PUB 46
- encrypts 64-bit data using 56-bit key
- has widespread use
- has been considerable controversy over its security


DES History

- IBM developed Lucifer cipher
 - by team led by Feistel in late 60's
 - used 64-bit data blocks with 128-bit key
- then redeveloped as a commercial cipher with input from NSA and others
- in 1973 NBS issued request for proposals for a national cipher standard
- IBM submitted their revised Lucifer which was eventually accepted as the DES

DES Design Controversy

- although DES standard is public
- was considerable controversy over design
 - in choice of 56-bit key (vs Lucifer 128-bit)
 - and because design criteria were classified
- subsequent events and public analysis show in fact design was appropriate
- use of DES has flourished
 - especially in financial applications
 - still standardised for legacy application use

DES Encryption Overview



Initial Permutation IP

- first step of the data computation
- IP reorders the input data bits
- even bits to LH half, odd bits to RH half
- quite regular in structure (easy in h/w)
- example:

IP (675a6967 5e5a6b5a) = (ffb2194d
004df6fb)

DES Round Structure


- uses two 32-bit L & R halves
- as for any Feistel cipher can describe as:

$$L_i = R_{i-1}$$

$$R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus F(R_{i-1}, K_i)$$

- F takes 32-bit R half and 48-bit subkey:
 - expands R to 48-bits using perm E
 - adds to subkey using XOR
 - 8 S-boxes, each is a 4*16 matrix
 - Each S-box produces a 4-bit binary value
 - passes through 8 S-boxes to get 32-bit result
 - finally permutes using 32-bit perm P

DES Round Structure



Substitution Boxes S

- have eight S-boxes which map 6 to 4 bits
- each S-box is actually 4 little 4 bit boxes
 - outer bits 1 & 6 (**row** bits) select one row of 4
 - inner bits 2-5 (**col** bits) are substituted
 - result is 8 lots of 4 bits, or 32 bits
- row selection depends on both data & key
 - feature known as autoclaving (autokeying)
- example:
 - $S(18 \ 09 \ 12 \ 3d \ 11 \ 17 \ 38 \ 39) = 5fd25e03$

DES Key Schedule

- forms subkeys used in each round
 - initial permutation of the key (PC1) which selects 56-bits in two 28-bit halves
 - 16 stages consisting of:
 - rotating **each half** separately either 1 or 2 places depending on the **key rotation schedule K**
 - selecting 24-bits from each half & permuting them by PC2 for use in round function F
- note practical use issues in h/w vs s/w

DES Decryption

- decrypt must unwind steps of data computation
- with Feistel design, do encryption steps again using subkeys in reverse order (SK16 ... SK1)
 - IP undoes final FP step of encryption
 - 1st round with SK16 undoes 16th encrypt round
 -
 - 16th round with SK1 undoes 1st encrypt round
 - then final FP undoes initial encryption IP
 - thus recovering original data value

Avalanche Effect

- key desirable property of encryption alg
- where a change of **one** input or key bit results in changing approx **half** output bits
- making attempts to “home-in” by guessing keys impossible
- DES exhibits strong avalanche

The Strength of DES

- The Use of 56-bit keys
 - The 1977 proposal to build a machine that could cryptanalyse DES in less than 10 hours
 - The cost \$20 million
 - In 1998 EFF announced that it built a machine that broke DES in less than 3 days
 - The cost \$25,000
 - There is more to brute force attack than just a powerful machine

- Timing Attacks
 - Given how long it takes a particular to perform decryption of various ciphertexts, some information about the key or the plaintext is obtained.
 - Could determine the number of bits equal to 1 of the secret key
 - Along way from knowing the key

- Differential Cryptanalysis
 - Requires 2^{47} chosen plaintexts
- Linear Cryptanalysis
 - Requires 2^{47} known plaintexts
 - Slightly easier than Diff cryptanalysis

Block Cipher Design Principles

- as reported by Coppersmith in [COPP94]
- 7 criteria for S-boxes provide for
 - non-linearity
 - resistance to differential cryptanalysis
 - good confusion
- 3 criteria for permutation P provide for
 - increased diffusion
- Number of rounds
 - Known cryptanalysis takes more effort than brute force attack
 - Diff cryptanalysis requires $2^{55.1}$ operations

Block Cipher Modes of Operations

- Electronic code book mode
- Cipher Block Chaining Mode
- Cipher Feedback Mode
- Output Feedback Mode
- Counter Mode
 - +ve
 - Hardware efficiency (multiprocessor machines)
 - Software efficiency
 - Random Access
 - Provable security
 - Simplicity
 - Preprocessing

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Chapter 3

Classical Encryption Techniques

Definitions

Plaintext

- An original message

Ciphertext

- The coded message

Enciphering/encryption

- The process of converting from plaintext to ciphertext

Deciphering/decryption

- Restoring the plaintext from the ciphertext

Cryptography

- The area of study of the many schemes used for encryption

Cryptographic system/cipher

- A scheme

Cryptanalysis

- Techniques used for deciphering a message without any knowledge of the enciphering details

Cryptology

- The areas of cryptography and cryptanalysis




Figure 3.1 Simplified Model of Symmetric Encryption

Symmetric Cipher Model

- There are two requirements for secure use of conventional encryption:
 - A strong encryption algorithm
 - Sender and receiver must have obtained copies of the secret key in a secure fashion and must keep the key secure






Figure 3.2 Model of Symmetric Cryptosystem

Cryptographic Systems

- Characterized along three independent dimensions:

The type of operations used for transforming plaintext to ciphertext

Substitution

Transposition

The number of keys used

Symmetric,
single-key, secret-key,
conventional
encryption

Asymmetric, two-key,
or public-key
encryption

The way in which the plaintext is processed

Block cipher

Stream cipher

Cryptanalysis and Brute-Force Attack

Cryptanalysis

- Attack relies on the nature of the algorithm plus some knowledge of the general characteristics of the plaintext
- Attack exploits the characteristics of the algorithm to attempt to deduce a specific plaintext or to deduce the key being used

Brute-force attack


- Attacker tries every possible key on a piece of ciphertext until an intelligible translation into plaintext is obtained
- On average, half of all possible keys must be tried to achieve success

Table 3.1
Types of Attacks on Encrypted Messages

| Type of Attack | Known to Cryptanalyst |
|-------------------|--|
| Ciphertext Only | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption algorithm • Ciphertext |
| Known Plaintext | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption algorithm • Ciphertext • One or more plaintext-ciphertext pairs formed with the secret key |
| Chosen Plaintext | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption algorithm • Ciphertext • Plaintext message chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding ciphertext generated with the secret key |
| Chosen Ciphertext | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption algorithm • Ciphertext • Ciphertext chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding decrypted plaintext generated with the secret key |
| Chosen Text | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption algorithm • Ciphertext • Plaintext message chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding ciphertext generated with the secret key • Ciphertext chosen by cryptanalyst, together with its corresponding decrypted plaintext generated with the secret key |


Encryption Scheme Security

- Unconditionally secure
 - No matter how much time an opponent has, it is impossible for him or her to decrypt the ciphertext simply because the required information is not there
 - Computationally secure
 - The cost of breaking the cipher exceeds the value of the encrypted information
 - The time required to break the cipher exceeds the useful lifetime of the information




Brute-Force Attack

Involves trying every possible key until an intelligible translation of the ciphertext into plaintext is obtained



On average, half of all possible keys must be tried to achieve success



To supplement the brute-force approach, some degree of knowledge about the expected plaintext is needed, and some means of automatically distinguishing plaintext from garble is also needed

Substitution Technique

- Is one in which the letters of plaintext are replaced by other letters or by numbers or symbols
- If the plaintext is viewed as a sequence of bits, then substitution involves replacing plaintext bit patterns with ciphertext bit patterns





Caesar Cipher

- Simplest and earliest known use of a substitution cipher
- Used by Julius Caesar
- Involves replacing each letter of the alphabet with the letter standing three places further down the alphabet
- Alphabet is wrapped around so that the letter following Z is A

plain: meet me after the toga party

cipher: PHHW PH DIWHU WKH WRJD SDUWB

Caesar Cipher Algorithm

- Can define transformation as:

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z A B C

- Mathematically give each letter a number

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

- Algorithm can be expressed as:

$$c = E(3, p) = (p + 3) \bmod (26)$$

- A shift may be of any amount, so that the general Caesar algorithm is:

$$C = E(k, p) = (p + k) \bmod 26$$

- Where k takes on a value in the range 1 to 25; the decryption algorithm is simply:

$$p = D(k, C) = (C - k) \bmod 26$$

Figure 3.3

Brute-Force Cryptanalysis of Caesar Cipher

(This chart can be found on page 75 in the textbook)

| KEY | PHHW PH DIWHU WKH WRJD SDUWB |
|-----|-------------------------------|
| 1 | oggv og chvgt vjg vqic rctva |
| 2 | nffu nf bgufs uif uphb qbsuz |
| 3 | meet me after the toga party |
| 4 | ldds ld zesdq sgd snfz ozqsx |
| 5 | kccr kc ydrcc rfc rmey nyprw |
| 6 | jbbq jb xcqbo qeb qldx mxoqv |
| 7 | iaap ia wbpan pda pkcw lwnpu |
| 8 | hzzo hz vaozm ocz ojbv kvmot |
| 9 | gyyn gy uznyl nby niau julns |
| 10 | fxxm fx tymxk max mhzt itkmr |
| 11 | ewwl ew sxlwj lzw lgys hsjlq |
| 12 | dvvk dv rwkvi kyv kfxr grikp |
| 13 | cuuj cu qvjuh jxu jewq fqhjo |
| 14 | btti bt puitg iwt idvp epgin |
| 15 | assh as othsf hvs hcuo dofhm |
| 16 | zrrg zr nsgre gur gbtn cnegl |
| 17 | yqqf yq mrfqd ftq fasm bmdfk |
| 18 | xppe xp lqepc esp ezrl alcej |
| 19 | wood wo kpdob dro dyqk zkbdi |
| 20 | vnnnc vn jocna cqn cxpj yjach |
| 21 | ummb um inbmz bpm bwoi xizbg |
| 22 | tlla tl hmaly aol avnh whyaf |
| 23 | skkz sk glzkx znk zumg vgxze |
| 24 | rjjy rj fkyjw ymj ytlf ufwyd |
| 25 | qiix qi ejxiv xli xske tevxc |

Sample of Compressed Text

Monoalphabetic Cipher

- Permutation
 - Of a finite set of elements S is an ordered sequence of all the elements of S , with each element appearing exactly once
- If the “cipher” line can be any permutation of the 26 alphabetic characters, then there are $26!$ or greater than 4×10^{26} possible keys
 - This is 10 orders of magnitude greater than the key space for DES
 - Approach is referred to as a *monoalphabetic substitution cipher* because a single cipher alphabet is used per message






Figure 3.5 Relative Frequency of Letters in English Text

Monoalphabetic Ciphers

- Easy to break because they reflect the frequency data of the original alphabet
- Countermeasure is to provide multiple substitutes (homophones) for a single letter
- Digram
 - Two-letter combination
 - Most common is *th*
- Trigram
 - Three-letter combination
 - Most frequent is *the*



Playfair Cipher

- Best-known multiple-letter encryption cipher
- Treats digrams in the plaintext as single units and translates these units into ciphertext digrams
- Based on the use of a 5×5 matrix of letters constructed using a keyword
- Invented by British scientist Sir Charles Wheatstone in 1854
- Used as the standard field system by the British Army in World War I and the U.S. Army and other Allied forces during World War II

Playfair Key Matrix

- Fill in letters of keyword (minus duplicates) from left to right and from top to bottom, then fill in the remainder of the matrix with the remaining letters in alphabetic order
- Using the keyword MONARCHY:

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|-----|---|
| M | O | N | A | R |
| C | H | Y | B | D |
| E | F | G | I/J | K |
| L | P | Q | S | T |
| U | V | W | X | Z |




Figure 3.6 Relative Frequency of Occurrence of Letters

Hill Cipher

- Developed by the mathematician Lester Hill in 1929
- Strength is that it completely hides single-letter frequencies
 - The use of a larger matrix hides more frequency information
 - A 3×3 Hill cipher hides not only single-letter but also two-letter frequency information
- Strong against a ciphertext-only attack but easily broken with a known plaintext attack

Polyalphabetic Ciphers

- Polyalphabetic substitution cipher
 - Improves on the simple monoalphabetic technique by using different monoalphabetic substitutions as one proceeds through the plaintext message

All these techniques have the following features in common:

- A set of related monoalphabetic substitution rules is used
- A key determines which particular rule is chosen for a given transformation

Vigenère Cipher

- Best known and one of the simplest polyalphabetic substitution ciphers
- In this scheme the set of related monoalphabetic substitution rules consists of the 26 Caesar ciphers with shifts of 0 through 25
- Each cipher is denoted by a key letter which is the ciphertext letter that substitutes for the plaintext letter a

Example of Vigenère Cipher

- To encrypt a message, a key is needed that is as long as the message
- Usually, the key is a repeating keyword
- For example, if the keyword is *deceptive*, the message “we are discovered save yourself” is encrypted as:

key: deceptivedeceptivedeceptive

plaintext: wearediscoveredsaveyourself

ciphertext: ZICVTWQNGRZGVTWAVZHCQYGLMGJ

Vigenère Autokey System

- A keyword is concatenated with the plaintext itself to provide a running key
- Example:

key: deceptivewearediscoveredsav

plaintext: wearediscoveredsaveyourself

ciphertext: ZICVTWQNGKZEIIGASXSTSLVVWLA

- Even this scheme is vulnerable to cryptanalysis
 - Because the key and the plaintext share the same frequency distribution of letters, a statistical technique can be applied

Vernam Cipher




Figure 3.7 Vernam Cipher

One-Time Pad

- Improvement to Vernam cipher proposed by an Army Signal Corp officer, Joseph Mauborgne
- Use a random key that is as long as the message so that the key need not be repeated
- Key is used to encrypt and decrypt a single message and then is discarded
- Each new message requires a new key of the same length as the new message
- Scheme is unbreakable
 - Produces random output that bears no statistical relationship to the plaintext
 - Because the ciphertext contains no information whatsoever about the plaintext, there is simply no way to break the code



Difficulties

- The one-time pad offers complete security but, in practice, has two fundamental difficulties:
 - There is the practical problem of making large quantities of random keys
 - Any heavily used system might require millions of random characters on a regular basis
 - Mammoth key distribution problem
 - For every message to be sent, a key of equal length is needed by both sender and receiver
- Because of these difficulties, the one-time pad is of limited utility
 - Useful primarily for low-bandwidth channels requiring very high security
- The one-time pad is the only cryptosystem that exhibits *perfect secrecy* (see Appendix F)

Rail Fence Cipher

- Simplest transposition cipher
- Plaintext is written down as a sequence of diagonals and then read off as a sequence of rows
- To encipher the message “meet me after the toga party” with a rail fence of depth 2, we would write:

m e m a t r h t g p r y
e t e f e t e o a a t

Encrypted message is:

MEMATRHTGPRYETEFETEOAAT



Row Transposition Cipher

- Is a more complex transposition
- Write the message in a rectangle, row by row, and read the message off, column by column, but permute the order of the columns
 - The order of the columns then becomes the key to the algorithm

Key: 4 3 1 2 5 6 7

Plaintext:
a t t a c k p
o s t p o n e
d u n t i l t
w o a m x y z

Ciphertext: TTNAAPMTSUOAODWCOIXKNLYPETZ




Figure 3.8 Three-Rotor Machine With Wiring Represented by Numbered Contacts

Steganography

3rd March

Dear George,

Greetings to all at Oxford. Many thanks for your letter and for the Summer examination package. All Entry Forms and Fees Forms should be ready for final despatch to the Syndicate by Friday 20th or at the very latest, I'm told, by the 21st. Admin has improved here, though there's room for improvement still; just give us all two or three more years and we'll really show you! Please don't let these wretched 16+ proposals destroy your basic O and A pattern. Certainly this sort of change, if implemented immediately, would bring chaos.

Sincerely yours,

A Puzzle for Inspector Morse
(from *The Silent World of Nicholas Quinn*, by Colin Dexter)

Other Steganography Techniques



- Character marking
 - Selected letters of printed or typewritten text are over-written in pencil
 - The marks are ordinarily not visible unless the paper is held at an angle to bright light
- Invisible ink
 - A number of substances can be used for writing but leave no visible trace until heat or some chemical is applied to the paper
- Pin punctures
 - Small pin punctures on selected letters are ordinarily not visible unless the paper is held up in front of a light
- Typewriter correction ribbon
 - Used between lines typed with a black ribbon, the results of typing with the correction tape are visible only under a strong light

Steganography vs. Encryption

- Steganography has a number of drawbacks when compared to encryption
 - It requires a lot of overhead to hide a relatively few bits of information
 - Once the system is discovered, it becomes virtually worthless

- The advantage of steganography
 - It can be employed by parties who have something to lose should the fact of their secret communication (not necessarily the content) be discovered
 - Encryption flags traffic as important or secret or may identify the sender or receiver as someone with something to hide

Summary

- Symmetric Cipher Model
 - Cryptography
 - Cryptanalysis and Brute-Force Attack
- Transposition techniques
- Rotor machines
- Substitution techniques
 - Caesar cipher
 - Monoalphabetic ciphers
 - Playfair cipher
 - Hill cipher
 - Polyalphabetic ciphers
 - One-time pad
- Steganography



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Chapter 4

Block Ciphers and the Data Encryption Standard

Stream Cipher

Encrypts a digital data stream one bit or one byte at a time

Examples:

- Autokeyed Vigenère cipher
- Vernam cipher

In the ideal case, a one-time pad version of the Vernam cipher would be used, in which the keystream is as long as the plaintext bit stream

If the cryptographic keystream is random, then this cipher is unbreakable by any means other than acquiring the keystream


- Keystream must be provided to both users in advance via some independent and secure channel
- This introduces insurmountable logistical problems if the intended data traffic is very large


For practical reasons the bit-stream generator must be implemented as an algorithmic procedure so that the cryptographic bit stream can be produced by both users

It must be computationally impractical to predict future portions of the bit stream based on previous portions of the bit stream


The two users need only share the generating key and each can produce the keystream

Block Cipher





(a) Stream Cipher Using Algorithmic Bit Stream Generator



(b) Block Cipher

Figure 4.1 Stream Cipher and Block Cipher




Figure 4.2 General n -bit- n -bit Block Substitution (shown with $n = 4$)

Table 4.1

Encryption and Decryption Tables for Substitution Cipher of Figure

4.2

| Plaintext | Ciphertext |
|-----------|------------|
| 0000 | 1110 |
| 0001 | 0100 |
| 0010 | 1101 |
| 0011 | 0001 |
| 0100 | 0010 |
| 0101 | 1111 |
| 0110 | 1011 |
| 0111 | 1000 |
| 1000 | 0011 |
| 1001 | 1010 |
| 1010 | 0110 |
| 1011 | 1100 |
| 1100 | 0101 |
| 1101 | 1001 |
| 1110 | 0000 |
| 1111 | 0111 |

| Ciphertext | Plaintext |
|------------|-----------|
| 0000 | 1110 |
| 0001 | 0011 |
| 0010 | 0100 |
| 0011 | 1000 |
| 0100 | 0001 |
| 0101 | 1100 |
| 0110 | 1010 |
| 0111 | 1111 |
| 1000 | 0111 |
| 1001 | 1101 |
| 1010 | 1001 |
| 1011 | 0110 |
| 1100 | 1011 |
| 1101 | 0010 |
| 1110 | 0000 |
| 1111 | 0101 |

Feistel Cipher

- Feistel proposed the use of a cipher that alternates substitutions and permutations

Substitutions

- Each plaintext element or group of elements is uniquely replaced by a corresponding ciphertext element or group of elements

Permutation

- No elements are added or deleted or replaced in the sequence, rather the order in which the elements appear in the sequence is changed

- Is a practical application of a proposal by Claude Shannon to develop a product cipher that alternates confusion and diffusion functions
- Is the structure used by many significant symmetric block ciphers currently in use

Diffusion and Confusion

- Terms introduced by Claude Shannon to capture the two basic building blocks for any cryptographic system
 - Shannon's concern was to thwart cryptanalysis based on statistical analysis

Diffusion

- The statistical structure of the plaintext is dissipated into long-range statistics of the ciphertext
- This is achieved by having each plaintext digit affect the value of many ciphertext digits

Confusion

- Seeks to make the relationship between the statistics of the ciphertext and the value of the encryption key as complex as possible
- Even if the attacker can get some handle on the statistics of the ciphertext, the way in which the key was used to produce that ciphertext is so complex as to make it difficult to deduce the key





Figure 4.3 Feistel Encryption and Decryption (16 rounds)

Feistel Cipher Design Features

- Block size
 - Larger block sizes mean greater security but reduced encryption/decryption speed for a given algorithm
- Key size
 - Larger key size means greater security but may decrease encryption/decryption speeds
- Number of rounds
 - The essence of the Feistel cipher is that a single round offers inadequate security but that multiple rounds offer increasing security
- Subkey generation algorithm
 - Greater complexity in this algorithm should lead to greater difficulty of cryptanalysis
- Round function F
 - Greater complexity generally means greater resistance to cryptanalysis
- Fast software encryption/decryption
 - In many cases, encrypting is embedded in applications or utility functions in such a way as to preclude a hardware implementation; accordingly, the speed of execution of the algorithm becomes a concern
- Ease of analysis
 - If the algorithm can be concisely and clearly explained, it is easier to analyze that algorithm for cryptanalytic vulnerabilities and therefore develop a higher level of assurance as to its strength

Feistel Example

Encryption round



Decryption round




Figure 4.4 Feistel Example

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- Issued in 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards (now NIST) as Federal Information Processing Standard 46
- Was the most widely used encryption scheme until the introduction of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in 2001
- Algorithm itself is referred to as the Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA)
 - Data are encrypted in 64-bit blocks using a 56-bit key
 - The algorithm transforms 64-bit input in a series of steps into a 64-bit output
 - The same steps, with the same key, are used to reverse the encryption




Figure 4.5 General Depiction of DES Encryption Algorithm

Table 4.2

DES Example

(Table can be found on page 114 in textbook)

| Round | K_i | L_i | R_i |
|-------|------------------|----------|----------|
| IP | | 5a005a00 | 3cf03c0f |
| 1 | 1e030f03080d2930 | 3cf03c0f | bad22845 |
| 2 | 0a31293432242318 | bad22845 | 99e9b723 |
| 3 | 23072318201d0c1d | 99e9b723 | 0bae3b9e |
| 4 | 05261d3824311a20 | 0bae3b9e | 42415649 |
| 5 | 3325340136002c25 | 42415649 | 18b3fa41 |
| 6 | 123a2d0d04262a1c | 18b3fa41 | 9616fe23 |
| 7 | 021f120b1c130611 | 9616fe23 | 67117cf2 |
| 8 | 1c10372a2832002b | 67117cf2 | c11bfc09 |
| 9 | 04292a380c341f03 | c11bfc09 | 887fbc6c |
| 10 | 2703212607280403 | 887fbc6c | 600f7e8b |
| 11 | 2826390c31261504 | 600f7e8b | f596506e |
| 12 | 12071c241a0a0f08 | f596506e | 738538b8 |
| 13 | 300935393c0d100b | 738538b8 | c6a62c4e |
| 14 | 311e09231321182a | c6a62c4e | 56b0bd75 |
| 15 | 283d3e0227072528 | 56b0bd75 | 75e8fd8f |
| 16 | 2921080b13143025 | 75e8fd8f | 25896490 |
| IP-1 | | da02ce3a | 89ecac3b |

Note: DES subkeys are shown as eight 6-bit values in hex format

| Round | | δ | Round | | δ |
|-------|--------------------------------------|----------|-------|---------------------------------------|----------|
| | 02468aceeca86420 12468aceeca86420 | 1 | 9 | c11bf09887fb0c6c 99f911532eed7d94 | 32 |
| 1 | 3cf03c0fbad22845 3cf03c0fbad32845 | 1 | 10 | 887fb0c6c600f7e8b 2eed7d94d0f23094 | 34 |
| 2 | bad2284599e9b723 bad3284539a9b7a3 | 5 | 11 | 600f7e8bf596506e d0f23094455da9c4 | 37 |
| 3 | 99e9b7230bae3b9e 39a9b7a3171cb8b3 | 18 | 12 | f596506e738538b8 455da9c47f6e3cf3 | 31 |
| 4 | 0bae3b9e42415649 171cb8b3ccaca55e | 34 | 13 | 738538b8c6a62c4e 7f6e3cf34bc1a8d9 | 29 |
| 5 | 4241564918b3fa41 ccaca55ed16c3653 | 37 | 14 | c6a62c4e56b0bd75 4bc1a8d91e07d409 | 33 |
| 6 | 18b3fa419616fe23 d16c3653cf402c68 | 33 | 15 | 56b0bd7575e8fd8f 1e07d4091ce2e6dc | 31 |
| 7 | 9616fe2367117cf2 cf402c682b2cefbc | 32 | 16 | 75e8fd8f25896490 1ce2e6dc365e5f59 | 32 |
| 8 | 67117cf2c11bf09 2b2cefbc99f91153 | 33 | IP-1 | da02ce3a89ecac3b 057cde97d7683f2a | 32 |

Table 4.3 Avalanche Effect in DES: Change in Plaintext

| Round | | δ | Round | | δ |
|-------|--------------------------------------|----------|-------|---------------------------------------|----------|
| | 02468aceeca86420 02468aceeca86420 | 0 | 9 | c11bfc09887fb6c 548f1de471f64dfd | 34 |
| 1 | 3cf03c0fbad22845 3cf03c0f9ad628c5 | 3 | 10 | 887fb6c6c600f7e8b 71f64df4279876c | 36 |
| 2 | bad2284599e9b723 9ad628c59939136b | 11 | 11 | 600f7e8bf596506e 4279876c399fdc0d | 32 |
| 3 | 99e9b7230bae3b9e 9939136b768067b7 | 25 | 12 | f596506e738538b8 399fdc0d6d208dbb | 28 |
| 4 | 0bae3b9e42415649 768067b75a8807c5 | 29 | 13 | 738538b8c6a62c4e 6d208dbbb9bdeeeaa | 33 |
| 5 | 4241564918b3fa41 5a8807c5488dbe94 | 26 | 14 | c6a62c4e56b0bd75 b9bdeeaad2c3a56f | 30 |
| 6 | 18b3fa419616fe23 488dbe94aba7fe53 | 26 | 15 | 56b0bd7575e8fd8f d2c3a56f2765c1fb | 33 |
| 7 | 9616fe2367117cf2 aba7fe53177d21e4 | 27 | 16 | 75e8fd8f25896490 2765c1fb01263dc4 | 30 |
| 8 | 67117cf2c11bfc09 177d21e4548f1de4 | 32 | IP-1 | da02ce3a89ecac3b ee92b50606b62b0b | 30 |

Table 4.4 Avalanche Effect in DES: Change in Key

Table 4.5

Average Time Required for Exhaustive Key Search

| Key size (bits) | Cipher | Number of Alternative Keys | Time Required at 10^9 decryptions/s | Time Required at 10^{13} decryptions/s |
|--------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| 56 | DES | $256 \approx 7.2 \times 10^{16}$ | $255 \text{ ns} = 1.125 \text{ years}$ | 1 hour |
| 128 | AES | $2128 \approx 3.4 \times 10^{38}$ | $2127 \text{ ns} = 5.3 \times 10^{21} \text{ years}$ | $5.3 \times 10^{17} \text{ years}$ |
| 168 | Triple DES | $2168 \approx 3.7 \times 10^{50}$ | $2167 \text{ ns} = 5.8 \times 10^{33} \text{ years}$ | $5.8 \times 10^{29} \text{ years}$ |
| 192 | AES | $2192 \approx 6.3 \times 10^{57}$ | $2191 \text{ ns} = 9.8 \times 10^{40} \text{ years}$ | $9.8 \times 10^{36} \text{ years}$ |
| 256 | AES | $2256 \approx 1.2 \times 10^{77}$ | $2255 \text{ ns} = 1.8 \times 10^{60} \text{ years}$ | $1.8 \times 10^{56} \text{ years}$ |
| 26 characters (permutation) | Monoalphabetic | $26! = 4 \times 10^{26}$ | $2 \times 10^{26} \text{ ns} = 6.3 \times 10^9 \text{ years}$ | $6.3 \times 10^6 \text{ years}$ |

Strength of DES

- Timing attacks
 - One in which information about the key or the plaintext is obtained by observing how long it takes a given implementation to perform decryptions on various ciphertexts
 - Exploits the fact that an encryption or decryption algorithm often takes slightly different amounts of time on different inputs
 - So far it appears unlikely that this technique will ever be successful against DES or more powerful symmetric ciphers such as triple DES and AES



Block Cipher Design Principles: Number of Rounds

The greater the number of rounds, the more difficult it is to perform cryptanalysis

In general, the criterion should be that the number of rounds is chosen so that known cryptanalytic efforts require greater effort than a simple brute-force key search attack

If DES had 15 or fewer rounds, differential cryptanalysis would require less effort than a brute-force key search

Block Cipher Design Principles: Design of Function F

- The heart of a Feistel block cipher is the function F
- The more nonlinear F, the more difficult any type of cryptanalysis will be
- The SAC and BIC criteria appear to strengthen the effectiveness of the confusion function

The algorithm should have good avalanche properties

Strict avalanche criterion (SAC)

States that any output bit j of an S-box should change with probability $1/2$ when any single input bit i is inverted for all i, j

Bit independence criterion (BIC)

States that output bits j and k should change independently when any single input bit i is inverted for all i, j , and k

Block Cipher Design Principles: Key Schedule Algorithm

- With any Feistel block cipher, the key is used to generate one subkey for each round
- In general, we would like to select subkeys to maximize the difficulty of deducing individual subkeys and the difficulty of working back to the main key
- It is suggested that, at a minimum, the key schedule should guarantee key/ciphertext Strict Avalanche Criterion and Bit Independence Criterion

Summary

- Traditional Block Cipher Structure
 - Stream ciphers
 - Block ciphers
 - Motivation for the Feistel cipher structure
 - Feistel cipher
- The Data Encryption Standard (DES)
 - Encryption
 - Decryption
 - Avalanche effect
- The strength of DES
 - Use of 56-bit keys
 - Nature of the DES algorithm
 - Timing attacks
- Block cipher design principles
 - Number of rounds
 - Design of function F
 - Key schedule algorithm



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William Stallings



Pearson



Chapter 5

Finite Fields




Figure 5.1 Groups, Rings, and Fields

Groups

- A set of elements with a binary operation denoted by \bullet that associates to each ordered pair (a,b) of elements in G an element $(a \bullet b)$ in G , such that the following axioms are obeyed:
 - (A1) Closure:
 - If a and b belong to G , then $a \bullet b$ is also in G
 - (A2) Associative:
 - $a \bullet (b \bullet c) = (a \bullet b) \bullet c$ for all a, b, c in G
 - (A3) Identity element:
 - There is an element e in G such that $a \bullet e = e \bullet a = a$ for all a in G
 - (A4) Inverse element:
 - For each a in G , there is an element a^1 in G such that $a \bullet a^1 = a^1 \bullet a = e$
 - (A5) Commutative:
 - $a \bullet b = b \bullet a$ for all a, b in G

Cyclic Group

- Exponentiation is defined within a group as a repeated application of the group operator, so that $a^3 = a \bullet a \bullet a$
- We define $a^0 = e$ as the identity element, and $a^{-n} = (a')^n$, where a' is the inverse element of a within the group
- A group G is **cyclic** if every element of G is a power a^k (k is an integer) of a fixed element $a \in G$
- The element a is said to **generate** the group G or to be a **generator** of G
- A cyclic group is always abelian and may be finite or infinite

Rings

- A **ring** R , sometimes denoted by $\{R, +, *\}$, is a set of elements with two binary operations, called *addition* and *multiplication*, such that for all a, b, c in R the following axioms are obeyed:

(A1–A5)

R is an abelian group with respect to addition; that is, R satisfies axioms A1 through A5. For the case of an additive group, we denote the identity element as o and the inverse of a as $-a$.

(M1) Closure under multiplication:

If a and b belong to R , then ab is also in R .

(M2) Associativity of multiplication:

$a(bc) = (ab)c$ for all a, b, c in R

(M3) Distributive laws:

$a(b+c) = ab + ac$ for all a, b, c in R

$(a+b)c = ac + bc$ for all a, b, c in R

- In essence, a ring is a set in which we can do addition, subtraction [$a - b = a + (-b)$], and multiplication without leaving the set.

Rings (cont.)

- A ring is said to be commutative if it satisfies the following additional condition:

(M4) Commutativity of multiplication:

$$ab = ba \text{ for all } a, b \text{ in } R$$

- An *integral domain* is a commutative ring that obeys the following axioms.

(M5) Multiplicative identity:

There is an element 1 in R such that $a1 = 1a = a$ for all a in R

(M6) No zero divisors:

If a, b in R and $ab = 0$, then either $a = 0$ or $b = 0$

Fields

- A **field F** , sometimes denoted by $\{F, +, *\}$, is a set of elements with two binary operations, called *addition* and *multiplication*, such that for all a , b , c in F the following axioms are obeyed:

(A1–M6)

F is an integral domain; that is, F satisfies axioms A1 through A5 and M1 through M6

(M7) Multiplicative inverse:

For each a in F , except 0, there is an element a^{-1} in F such that $aa^{-1} = (a^{-1})a = 1$

- In essence, a field is a set in which we can do addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division without leaving the set. Division is defined with the following rule: $a/b = a(b^{-1})$

Familiar examples of fields are the rational numbers, the real numbers, and the complex numbers. Note that the set of all integers is not a field, because not every element of the set has a multiplicative inverse.




Figure 5.2 Properties of Groups, Rings, and Fields




Figure 5.3 Types of Fields

Finite Fields of the Form GF(p)

- Finite fields play a crucial role in many cryptographic algorithms
- It can be shown that the order of a finite field must be a power of a prime p^n , where n is a positive integer
 - The finite field of order p^n is generally written $\text{GF}(p^n)$
 - GF stands for Galois field, in honor of the mathematician who first studied finite fields

Table 5.1(a)

| + | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 6 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 7 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |

(a) Addition modulo 8

Table 5.1(b)

| x | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 |
| 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 7 | 2 | 5 |
| 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| 5 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 3 |
| 6 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 2 | 0 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| 7 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

(b) Multiplication modulo 8

Table 5.1(c)

| w | $-w$ | w^{-1} |
|-----|------|----------|
| 0 | 0 | — |
| 1 | 7 | 1 |
| 2 | 6 | — |
| 3 | 5 | 3 |
| 4 | 4 | — |
| 5 | 3 | 5 |
| 6 | 2 | — |
| 7 | 1 | 7 |

(c) Additive and multiplicative
inverses modulo 8

Table 5.1(d)

| + | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 0 |
| 2 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 1 |
| 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5 | 5 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 6 | 6 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |

(d) Addition modulo 7

Table 5.1(e)

| x | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 4 |
| 4 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 6 | 3 |
| 5 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 2 |
| 6 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 |

(e) Multiplication modulo 7

Table 5.1(f)

| w | $-w$ | w^{-1} |
|-----|------|----------|
| 0 | 0 | — |
| 1 | 6 | 1 |
| 2 | 5 | 4 |
| 3 | 4 | 5 |
| 4 | 3 | 2 |
| 5 | 2 | 3 |
| 6 | 1 | 6 |

(f) Additive and multiplicative
inverses modulo 7

In this section,
we have shown
how to construct
a finite field of
order p , where p
is prime.

GF(p) is defined
with the
following
properties:

- 1. GF(p) consists of p elements
- 2. The binary operations + and * are defined over the set. The operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division can be performed without leaving the set. Each element of the set other than 0 has a multiplicative inverse
- We have shown that the elements of GF(p) are the integers $\{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$ and that the arithmetic operations are addition and multiplication mod p




Figure 5.4 Treatment of Polynomials

$$\begin{array}{r}
 x^3 + x^2 + 2 \\
 + (x^2 - x + 1) \\
 \hline
 x^3 + 2x^2 - x + 3
 \end{array}$$

(a) Addition

$$\begin{array}{r}
 x^3 + x^2 + 2 \\
 - (x^2 - x + 1) \\
 \hline
 x^3 + x + 1
 \end{array}$$

(b) Subtraction

$$\begin{array}{r}
 x^3 + x^2 + 2 \\
 \times (x^2 - x + 1) \\
 \hline
 x^3 + x^2 + 2 \\
 - x^4 - x^3 - 2x \\
 \hline
 x^5 + x^4 + 2x^2 \\
 \hline
 x^5 + 3x^2 - 2x + 2
 \end{array}$$

(c) Multiplication

$$\begin{array}{r}
 x + 2 \\
 \overline{)x^3 + x^2 + 2} \\
 x^3 - x^2 + x \\
 \hline
 2x^2 - x + 2 \\
 \hline
 2x^2 - 2x + 2 \\
 \hline
 x
 \end{array}$$

(d) Division

Figure 5.5 Examples of Polynomial Arithmetic

Polynomial Arithmetic With Coefficients in \mathbb{Z}_p

- If each distinct polynomial is considered to be an element of the set, then that set is a ring
- When polynomial arithmetic is performed on polynomials over a field, then division is possible
 - Note: this does not mean that exact division is possible
- If we attempt to perform polynomial division over a coefficient set that is not a field, we find that division is not always defined
 - Even if the coefficient set is a field, polynomial division is not necessarily exact
 - With the understanding that remainders are allowed, we can say that polynomial division is possible if the coefficient set is a field

Polynomial Division

- We can write any polynomial in the form:
$$f(x) = q(x) g(x) + r(x)$$
 - $r(x)$ can be interpreted as being a remainder
 - So $r(x) = f(x) \bmod g(x)$
- If there is no remainder we can say $g(x)$ **divides** $f(x)$
 - Written as $g(x) | f(x)$
 - We can say that $g(x)$ is a **factor** of $f(x)$
 - Or $g(x)$ is a **divisor** of $f(x)$
- A polynomial $f(x)$ over a field F is called **irreducible** if and only if $f(x)$ cannot be expressed as a product of two polynomials, both over F , and both of degree lower than that of $f(x)$
 - An irreducible polynomial is also called a **prime polynomial**

Example of Polynomial Arithmetic Over GF(2)

(Figure 5.6 can be found on page 137 in the textbook)

$$\begin{array}{r} x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \\ + (x^3 + x + 1) \\ \hline x^7 + x^5 + x^4 \end{array}$$

(a) Addition

$$\begin{array}{r} x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \\ - (x^3 + x + 1) \\ \hline x^7 + x^5 + x^4 \end{array}$$

(b) Subtraction

$$\begin{array}{r} x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \\ \times (x^3 + x + 1) \\ \hline x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 \\ x^8 + x^6 + x^5 + x^4 + x^2 + x \\ x^{10} + x^8 + x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + x^3 \\ \hline x^{10} + x^4 + x^2 + 1 \end{array}$$

(c) Multiplication

$$\begin{array}{r} x^4 + 1 \\ \hline x^3 + x + 1 \sqrt{x^7 + x^5 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1} \\ x^7 + x^5 + x^4 \\ \hline x^3 + x + 1 \\ x^3 + x + 1 \\ \hline \end{array}$$

(d) Division

Figure 5.6 Examples of Polynomial Arithmetic over GF(2)

Polynomial GCD

- The polynomial $c(x)$ is said to be the greatest common divisor of $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ if the following are true:
 - $c(x)$ divides both $a(x)$ and $b(x)$
 - Any divisor of $a(x)$ and $b(x)$ is a divisor of $c(x)$
- An equivalent definition is:
 - $\gcd[a(x), b(x)]$ is the polynomial of maximum degree that divides both $a(x)$ and $b(x)$
- The Euclidean algorithm can be extended to find the greatest common divisor of two polynomials whose coefficients are elements of a field

Table 5.2(a)
Arithmetic in GF(2³)

| | | 000 | 001 | 010 | 011 | 100 | 101 | 110 | 111 | |
|-----|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|---|
| | | + | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | |
| 001 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | |
| 010 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 5 | |
| 011 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | |
| 100 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | |
| 101 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 2 | |
| 110 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 1 | |
| 111 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | |

(a) Addition

Table 5.2(b)

Arithmetic in GF(2³)

| | x | 000 | 001 | 010 | 011 | 100 | 101 | 110 | 111 |
|-----|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 001 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
| 010 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 7 | 5 |
| 011 | 3 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 2 |
| 100 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 7 | 6 | 2 | 5 | 1 |
| 101 | 5 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 3 | 6 |
| 110 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 7 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4 |
| 111 | 7 | 0 | 7 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 3 |

(b) Multiplication

Table 5.2(c)

Arithmetic in GF(2³)

| | w | $-w$ | w^{-1} |
|---|-----|------|----------|
| 0 | 0 | — | — |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| 2 | 2 | 5 | 5 |
| 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 |
| 4 | 4 | 7 | 7 |
| 5 | 5 | 2 | 2 |
| 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 |
| 7 | 7 | 4 | 4 |

(c) Additive and multiplicative inverses

Table 5.3 (page 144 in textbook)
Polynomial Arithmetic Modulo ($x^3 + x + 1$)

| | | 000 | 001 | 010 | 011 | 100 | 101 | 110 | 111 |
|-----|---------------|---------------|-----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| + | | 0 | 1 | x | $x + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ |
| 000 | 0 | 0 | 1 | x | $x + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ |
| 001 | 1 | 1 | 0 | $x + 1$ | x | $x^2 + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ |
| 010 | x | x | $x + 1$ | 0 | 1 | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + 1$ |
| 011 | $x + 1$ | $x + 1$ | x | 1 | 0 | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + 1$ | x^2 |
| 100 | x^2 | x^2 | $x^2 + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ | 0 | 1 | x | $x + 1$ |
| 101 | $x^2 + 1$ | $x^2 + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | 1 | 0 | $x + 1$ | x |
| 110 | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + 1$ | x | $x + 1$ | 0 | 1 | |
| 111 | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + 1$ | x^2 | $x + 1$ | x | 1 | 0 | |

(a) Addition

| | | 000 | 001 | 010 | 011 | 100 | 101 | 110 | 111 |
|-----|---------------|-----|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| × | | 0 | 1 | x | $x + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ |
| 000 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 001 | 1 | 0 | 1 | x | $x + 1$ | x^2 | $x^2 + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ |
| 010 | x | 0 | x | x^2 | $x^2 + x$ | $x + 1$ | 1 | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x^2 + 1$ |
| 011 | $x + 1$ | 0 | $x + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + 1$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ | x^2 | 1 | x |
| 100 | x^2 | 0 | x^2 | $x + 1$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ | x | $x^2 + 1$ | 1 |
| 101 | $x^2 + 1$ | 0 | $x^2 + 1$ | 1 | x^2 | x | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x + 1$ | $x^2 + x$ |
| 110 | $x^2 + x$ | 0 | $x^2 + x$ | $x^2 + x + 1$ | 1 | $x^2 + 1$ | $x + 1$ | x | x^2 |
| 111 | $x^2 + x + 1$ | 0 | $x^2 + x + 1$ | $x^2 + 1$ | x | 1 | $x^2 + x$ | x^2 | $x + 1$ |

(b) Multiplication

Table 5.4

Extended Euclid $[(x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1), (x^7 + x + 1)]$

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| Initialization | $a(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1; v_{-1}(x) = 1; w_{-1}(x) = 0$ $b(x) = x^7 + x + 1; v_0(x) = 0; w_0(x) = 1$ |
| Iteration 1 | $q_1(x) = x; r_1(x) = x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$ $v_1(x) = 1; w_1(x) = x$ |
| Iteration 2 | $q_2(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1; r_2(x) = x$ $v_2(x) = x^3 + x^2 + 1; w_2(x) = x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ |
| Iteration 3 | $q_3(x) = x^3 + x^2 + x; r_3(x) = 1$ $v_3(x) = x^6 + x^2 + x + 1; w_3(x) = x^7$ |
| Iteration 4 | $q_4(x) = x; r_4(x) = 0$ $v_4(x) = x^7 + x + 1; w_4(x) = x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1$ |
| Result | $d(x) = r_3(x) = \gcd(a(x), b(x)) = 1$ $w(x) = w_3(x) = (x^7 + x + 1)^{-1} \bmod (x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1) = x^7$ |

(Table 5.4 can be found on page 146 in textbook)

Computational Considerations

- Since coefficients are 0 or 1, they can represent any such polynomial as a bit string
- Addition becomes XOR of these bit strings
- Multiplication is shift and XOR
 - cf long-hand multiplication
- Modulo reduction is done by repeatedly substituting highest power with remainder of irreducible polynomial (also shift and XOR)

Using a Generator

- A **generator** g of a finite field F of order q (contains q elements) is an element whose first $q-1$ powers generate all the nonzero elements of F
 - The elements of F consist of $0, g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{q-2}$
- Consider a field F defined by a polynomial $f(x)$
 - An element b contained in F is called a **root** of the polynomial if $f(b) = 0$
- Finally, it can be shown that a root g of an irreducible polynomial is a generator of the finite field defined on that polynomial

Table 5.5

Generator for GF(2³) using x³ + x + 1

| Power Representation | Polynomial Representation | Binary Representation | Decimal (Hex) Representation |
|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 0 | 0 | 000 | 0 |
| $g^0 (= g^7)$ | 1 | 001 | 1 |
| g^1 | g | 010 | 2 |
| g^2 | g^2 | 100 | 4 |
| g^3 | $g + 1$ | 011 | 3 |
| g^4 | $g^2 + g$ | 110 | 6 |
| g^5 | $g^2 + g + 1$ | 111 | 7 |
| g^6 | $g^2 + 1$ | 101 | 5 |

Table 5.6 (page 150 in textbook)

GF(2³) Arithmetic Using Generator for the Polynomial (x³ + x + 1)

| | 000 | 001 | 010 | 100 | 011 | 110 | 111 | 101 |
|-----------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| + 0 | 0 | 1 | G | g^2 | g^3 | g^4 | g^5 | g^6 |
| 000 0 | 0 | 1 | G | g^2 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ |
| 001 1 | 1 | 0 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ | g | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | g^2 |
| 010 g | g | $g + 1$ | 0 | $g^2 + g$ | 1 | g^2 | $g^2 + 1$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ |
| 100 g^2 | g^2 | $g^2 + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | 0 | $g^2 + g + 1$ | g | $g + 1$ | 1 |
| 011 g^3 | $g + 1$ | g | 1 | $g^2 + g + 1$ | 0 | $g^2 + 1$ | g^2 | $g^2 + g$ |
| 110 g^4 | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ | g^2 | g | $g^2 + 1$ | 0 | 1 | $g + 1$ |
| 111 g^5 | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + 1$ | $g + 1$ | g^2 | 1 | 0 | g |
| 101 g^6 | $g^2 + 1$ | g^2 | $g^2 + g + 1$ | 1 | $g^2 + g$ | $g + 1$ | g | 0 |

(a) Addition

| | 000 | 001 | 010 | 100 | 011 | 110 | 111 | 101 |
|-----------|-----|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| × 0 | 0 | 1 | G | g^2 | g^3 | g^4 | g^5 | g^6 |
| 000 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 001 1 | 0 | 1 | G | g^2 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ |
| 010 g | 0 | g | g^2 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ | 1 |
| 100 g^2 | 0 | g^2 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ | 1 | g |
| 011 g^3 | 0 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ | 1 | g | g^2 |
| 110 g^4 | 0 | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ | 1 | g | g^2 | $g + 1$ |
| 111 g^5 | 0 | $g^2 + g + 1$ | $g^2 + 1$ | 1 | g | g^2 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ |
| 101 g^6 | 0 | $g^2 + 1$ | 1 | g | g^2 | $g + 1$ | $g^2 + g$ | $g^2 + g + 1$ |

(b) Multiplication

Summary

- Groups
 - Abelian group
 - Cyclic group
- Finite fields of the form $GF(p)$
 - Finite fields of Order p
 - Finding the multiplicative inverse in $GF(p)$
- Polynomial arithmetic
 - Ordinary polynomial arithmetic
 - Polynomial arithmetic with coefficients in Z_p
 - Finding the greatest common divisor
- Rings
- fields
- Finite fields of the form $GF(2^n)$
 - Motivation
 - Modular polynomial arithmetic
 - Finding the multiplicative inverse
 - Computational considerations
 - Using a generator



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William Stallings



Pearson




Chapter 6


Advanced Encryption Standard

Finite Field Arithmetic

- In the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) all operations are performed on 8-bit bytes
- The arithmetic operations of addition, multiplication, and division are performed over the finite field $\text{GF}(2^8)$
- A field is a set in which we can do addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division without leaving the set
- Division is defined with the following rule:
 - $a/b = a(b^{-1})$
- An example of a finite field (one with a finite number of elements) is the set \mathbb{Z}_p consisting of all the integers $\{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$, where p is a prime number and in which arithmetic is carried out modulo p


Finite Field Arithmetic





| No. of rounds | Key Length (bytes) |
|---------------|--------------------|
| 10 | 16 |
| 12 | 24 |
| 14 | 32 |

Figure 6.1 AES Encryption Process



(a) Input, state array, and output



(b) Key and expanded key

Figure 6.2 AES Data Structures

Table 6.1

AES Parameters

| | | | |
|--|----------|----------|----------|
| Key Size (words/bytes/bits) | 4/16/128 | 6/24/192 | 8/32/256 |
| Plaintext Block Size (words/bytes/bits) | 4/16/128 | 4/16/128 | 4/16/128 |
| Number of Rounds | 10 | 12 | 14 |
| Round Key Size (words/bytes/bits) | 4/16/128 | 4/16/128 | 4/16/128 |
| Expanded Key Size (words/bytes) | 44/176 | 52/208 | 60/240 |




Figure 6.3 AES Encryption and Decryption

Detailed Structure

- Processes the entire data block as a single matrix during each round using substitutions and permutation
- The key that is provided as input is expanded into an array of forty-four 32-bit words, $w[i]$

Four different stages are used:

- Substitute bytes – uses an S-box to perform a byte-by-byte substitution of the block
- ShiftRows – a simple permutation
- MixColumns – a substitution that makes use of arithmetic over $GF(2^8)$
- AddRoundKey – a simple bitwise XOR of the current block with a portion of the expanded key

- The cipher begins and ends with an AddRoundKey stage
- Can view the cipher as alternating operations of XOR encryption (AddRoundKey) of a block, followed by scrambling of the block (the other three stages), followed by XOR encryption, and so on
- Each stage is easily reversible
- The decryption algorithm makes use of the expanded key in reverse order, however the decryption algorithm is not identical to the encryption algorithm
- State is the same for both encryption and decryption
- Final round of both encryption and decryption consists of only three stages






Figure 6.4 AES Encryption Round



(a) Substitute byte transformation



(b) Add round key Transformation

Figure 6.5 AES Byte-Level Operations

Table 6.2

| | <i>y</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | A | B | C | D | E | F | |
| <i>x</i> | 0 | 63 | 7C | 77 | 7B | F2 | 6B | 6F | C5 | 30 | 01 | 67 | 2B | FE | D7 | AB | 76 |
| | 1 | CA | 82 | C9 | 7D | FA | 59 | 47 | F0 | AD | D4 | A2 | AF | 9C | A4 | 72 | C0 |
| | 2 | B7 | FD | 93 | 26 | 36 | 3F | F7 | CC | 34 | A5 | E5 | F1 | 71 | D8 | 31 | 15 |
| | 3 | 04 | C7 | 23 | C3 | 18 | 96 | 05 | 9A | 07 | 12 | 80 | E2 | EB | 27 | B2 | 75 |
| | 4 | 09 | 83 | 2C | 1A | 1B | 6E | 5A | A0 | 52 | 3B | D6 | B3 | 29 | E3 | 2F | 84 |
| | 5 | 53 | D1 | 00 | ED | 20 | FC | B1 | 5B | 6A | CB | BE | 39 | 4A | 4C | 58 | CF |
| | 6 | D0 | EF | AA | FB | 43 | 4D | 33 | 85 | 45 | F9 | 02 | 7F | 50 | 3C | 9F | A8 |
| | 7 | 51 | A3 | 40 | 8F | 92 | 9D | 38 | F5 | BC | B6 | DA | 21 | 10 | FF | F3 | D2 |
| | 8 | CD | 0C | 13 | EC | 5F | 97 | 44 | 17 | C4 | A7 | 7E | 3D | 64 | 5D | 19 | 73 |
| | 9 | 60 | 81 | 4F | DC | 22 | 2A | 90 | 88 | 46 | EE | B8 | 14 | DE | 5E | 0B | DB |
| | A | E0 | 32 | 3A | 0A | 49 | 06 | 24 | 5C | C2 | D3 | AC | 62 | 91 | 95 | E4 | 79 |
| | B | E7 | C8 | 37 | 6D | 8D | D5 | 4E | A9 | 6C | 56 | F4 | EA | 65 | 7A | AE | 08 |
| | C | BA | 78 | 25 | 2E | 1C | A6 | B4 | C6 | E8 | DD | 74 | 1F | 4B | BD | 8B | 8A |
| | D | 70 | 3E | B5 | 66 | 48 | 03 | F6 | 0E | 61 | 35 | 57 | B9 | 86 | C1 | 1D | 9E |
| | E | E1 | F8 | 98 | 11 | 69 | D9 | 8E | 94 | 9B | 1E | 87 | E9 | CE | 55 | 28 | DF |
| | F | 8C | A1 | 89 | 0D | BF | E6 | 42 | 68 | 41 | 99 | 2D | 0F | B0 | 54 | BB | 16 |

(a) S-box


(Table can be found on page 163 in textbook)

Table 6.2


| | <i>y</i> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | A | B | C | D | E | F | |
| x | 0 | 52 | 09 | 6A | D5 | 30 | 36 | A5 | 38 | BF | 40 | A3 | 9E | 81 | F3 | D7 | FB |
| | 1 | 7C | E3 | 39 | 82 | 9B | 2F | FF | 87 | 34 | 8E | 43 | 44 | C4 | DE | E9 | CB |
| | 2 | 54 | 7B | 94 | 32 | A6 | C2 | 23 | 3D | EE | 4C | 95 | 0B | 42 | FA | C3 | 4E |
| | 3 | 08 | 2E | A1 | 66 | 28 | D9 | 24 | B2 | 76 | 5B | A2 | 49 | 6D | 8B | D1 | 25 |
| | 4 | 72 | F8 | F6 | 64 | 86 | 68 | 98 | 16 | D4 | A4 | 5C | CC | 5D | 65 | B6 | 92 |
| | 5 | 6C | 70 | 48 | 50 | FD | ED | B9 | DA | 5E | 15 | 46 | 57 | A7 | 8D | 9D | 84 |
| | 6 | 90 | D8 | AB | 00 | 8C | BC | D3 | 0A | F7 | E4 | 58 | 05 | B8 | B3 | 45 | 06 |
| | 7 | D0 | 2C | 1E | 8F | CA | 3F | 0F | 02 | C1 | AF | BD | 03 | 01 | 13 | 8A | 6B |
| | 8 | 3A | 91 | 11 | 41 | 4F | 67 | DC | EA | 97 | F2 | CF | CE | F0 | B4 | E6 | 73 |
| | 9 | 96 | AC | 74 | 22 | E7 | AD | 35 | 85 | E2 | F9 | 37 | E8 | 1C | 75 | DF | 6E |
| | A | 47 | F1 | 1A | 71 | 1D | 29 | C5 | 89 | 6F | B7 | 62 | 0E | AA | 18 | BE | 1B |
| | B | FC | 56 | 3E | 4B | C6 | D2 | 79 | 20 | 9A | DB | C0 | FE | 78 | CD | 5A | F4 |
| | C | 1F | DD | A8 | 33 | 88 | 07 | C7 | 31 | B1 | 12 | 10 | 59 | 27 | 80 | EC | 5F |
| | D | 60 | 51 | 7F | A9 | 19 | B5 | 4A | 0D | 2D | E5 | 7A | 9F | 93 | C9 | 9C | EF |
| | E | A0 | E0 | 3B | 4D | AE | 2A | F5 | B0 | C8 | EB | BB | 3C | 83 | 53 | 99 | 61 |
| | F | 17 | 2B | 04 | 7E | BA | 77 | D6 | 26 | E1 | 69 | 14 | 63 | 55 | 21 | 0C | 7D |

(b) Inverse S-box

(Table can be found on page 163 in textbook)



(a) Calculation of byte at row y , column x of S-box




(a) Calculation of byte at row y , column x of IS-box


Figure 6.6 Construction of S-Box and IS-Box

S-Box Rationale

- The S-box is designed to be resistant to known cryptanalytic attacks
- The Rijndael developers sought a design that has a low correlation between input bits and output bits and the property that the output is not a linear mathematical function of the input
- The nonlinearity is due to the use of the multiplicative inverse



(a) Shift row transformation



(b) Mix column transformation

Figure 6.7 AES Row and Column Operations

Shift Row Rationale

- More substantial than it may first appear
- The State, as well as the cipher input and output, is treated as an array of four 4-byte columns
- On encryption, the first 4 bytes of the plaintext are copied to the first column of State, and so on
- The round key is applied to State column by column
 - Thus, a row shift moves an individual byte from one column to another, which is a linear distance of a multiple of 4 bytes
- Transformation ensures that the 4 bytes of one column are spread out to four different columns

Mix Columns Rationale

- Coefficients of a matrix based on a linear code with maximal distance between code words ensures a good mixing among the bytes of each column
- The mix column transformation combined with the shift row transformation ensures that after a few rounds all output bits depend on all input bits

AddRoundKey Transformation

- The 128 bits of State are bitwise XORed with the 128 bits of the round key
- Operation is viewed as a columnwise operation between the 4 bytes of a State column and one word of the round key
 - Can also be viewed as a byte-level operation

Rationale:

Is as simple as possible and affects every bit of State

The complexity of the round key expansion plus the complexity of the other stages of AES ensure security






Figure 6.8 Inputs for Single AES Round

AES Key Expansion

- Takes as input a four-word (16 byte) key and produces a linear array of 44 words (176) bytes
 - This is sufficient to provide a four-word round key for the initial AddRoundKey stage and each of the 10 rounds of the cipher
- Key is copied into the first four words of the expanded key
 - The remainder of the expanded key is filled in four words at a time
- Each added word $w[i]$ depends on the immediately preceding word, $w[i - 1]$, and the word four positions back, $w[i - 4]$
 - In three out of four cases a simple XOR is used
 - For a word whose position in the w array is a multiple of 4, a more complex function is used



(a) Overall algorithm



(b) Function g

Figure 6.9 AES Key Expansion

Key Expansion Rationale

- The Rijndael developers designed the expansion key algorithm to be resistant to known cryptanalytic attacks
- Inclusion of a round-dependent round constant eliminates the symmetry between the ways in which round keys are generated in different rounds

The specific criteria that were used are:

- Knowledge of a part of the cipher key or round key does not enable calculation of many other round-key bits
- An invertible transformation
- Speed on a wide range of processors
- Usage of round constants to eliminate symmetries
- Diffusion of cipher key differences into the round keys
- Enough nonlinearity to prohibit the full determination of round key differences from cipher key differences only
- Simplicity of description

Table 6.3

AES Example

Key Expansion

(Table is located on page 175
in textbook)

| Key Words | Auxiliary Function |
|--|---|
| w0 = 0f 15 71 c9 w1 = 47 d9 e8 59 w2 = 0c b7 ad d6 w3 = af 7f 67 98 | RotWord(w3)= 7f 67 98 af = x1 SubWord(x1)= d2 85 46 79 = y1 Rcon(1)= 01 00 00 00 y1 ⊕ Rcon(1)= d3 85 46 79 = z1 |
| w4 = w0 ⊕ z1 = dc 90 37 b0 w5 = w4 ⊕ w1 = 9b 49 df e9 w6 = w5 ⊕ w2 = 97 fe 72 3f w7 = w6 ⊕ w3 = 38 81 15 a7 | RotWord(w7)= 81 15 a7 38 = x2 SubWord(x4)= 0c 59 5c 07 = y2 Rcon(2)= 02 00 00 00 y2 ⊕ Rcon(2)= 0e 59 5c 07 = z2 |
| w8 = w4 ⊕ z2 = d2 c9 6b b7 w9 = w8 ⊕ w5 = 49 80 b4 5e w10 = w9 ⊕ w6 = de 7e c6 61 w11 = w10 ⊕ w7 = e6 ff d3 c6 | RotWord(w11)= ff d3 c6 e6 = x3 SubWord(x2)= 16 66 b4 8e = y3 Rcon(3)= 04 00 00 00 y3 ⊕ Rcon(3)= 12 66 b4 8e = z3 |
| w12 = w8 ⊕ z3 = c0 af df 39 w13 = w12 ⊕ w9 = 89 2f 6b 67 w14 = w13 ⊕ w10 = 57 51 ad 06 w15 = w14 ⊕ w11 = b1 ae 7e c0 | RotWord(w15)= ae 7e c0 b1 = x4 SubWord(x3)= e4 f3 ba c8 = y4 Rcon(4)= 08 00 00 00 y4 ⊕ Rcon(4)= ec f3 ba c8 = 4 |
| w16 = w12 ⊕ z4 = 2c 5c 65 f1 w17 = w16 ⊕ w13 = a5 73 0e 96 w18 = w17 ⊕ w14 = f2 22 a3 90 w19 = w18 ⊕ w15 = 43 8c dd 50 | RotWord(w19)= 8c dd 50 43 = x5 SubWord(x4)= 64 c1 53 1a = y5 Rcon(5)= 10 00 00 00 y5 ⊕ Rcon(5)= 74 c1 53 1a = z5 |
| w20 = w16 ⊕ z5 = 58 9d 36 eb w21 = w20 ⊕ w17 = fd ee 38 7d w22 = w21 ⊕ w18 = 0f cc 9b ed w23 = w22 ⊕ w19 = 4c 40 46 bd | RotWord(w23)= 40 46 bd 4c = x6 SubWord(x5)= 09 5a 7a 29 = y6 Rcon(6)= 20 00 00 00 y6 ⊕ Rcon(6)= 29 5a 7a 29 = z6 |
| w24 = w20 ⊕ z6 = 71 c7 4c c2 w25 = w24 ⊕ w21 = 8c 29 74 bf w26 = w25 ⊕ w22 = 83 e5 ef 52 w27 = w26 ⊕ w23 = cf a5 a9 ef | RotWord(w27)= a5 a9 ef cf = x7 SubWord(x6)= 06 d3 df 8a = y7 Rcon(7)= 40 00 00 00 y7 ⊕ Rcon(7)= 46 d3 df 8a = z7 |
| w28 = w24 ⊕ z7 = 37 14 93 48 w29 = w28 ⊕ w25 = bb 3d e7 f7 w30 = w29 ⊕ w26 = 38 d8 08 a5 w31 = w30 ⊕ w27 = f7 7d a1 4a | RotWord(w31)= 7d a1 4a f7 = x8 SubWord(x7)= ff 32 d6 68 = y8 Rcon(8)= 80 00 00 00 y8 ⊕ Rcon(8)= 7f 32 d6 68 = z8 |
| w32 = w28 ⊕ z8 = 48 26 45 20 w33 = w32 ⊕ w29 = f3 1b a2 d7 w34 = w33 ⊕ w30 = cb c3 aa 72 w35 = w34 ⊕ w32 = 3c be 0b 38 | RotWord(w35)= be 0b 38 3c = x9 SubWord(x8)= ae 2b 07 eb = y9 Rcon(9)= 1b 00 00 00 y9 ⊕ Rcon(9)= b5 2b 07 eb = z9 |
| w36 = w32 ⊕ z9 = fd 0d 42 cb w37 = w36 ⊕ w33 = 0e 16 e0 1c w38 = w37 ⊕ w34 = c5 d5 4a 6e w39 = w38 ⊕ w35 = f9 6b 41 56 | RotWord(w39)= 6b 41 56 f9 = x10 SubWord(x9)= 7f 83 b1 99 = y10 Rcon(10)= 36 00 00 00 y10 ⊕ Rcon(10)= 49 83 b1 99 = z10 |
| w40 = w36 ⊕ z10 = b4 8e f3 52 w41 = w40 ⊕ w37 = ba 98 13 4e w42 = w41 ⊕ w38 = 7f 4d 59 20 w43 = w42 ⊕ w39 = 86 26 18 76 | |

Table 6.4

AES Example

(Table is located on page 177
in textbook)

| Start of round | After SubBytes | After ShiftRows | After MixColumns | Round Key |
|--|--|--|--|--|
| 01 89 fe 76 23 ab dc 54 45 cd ba 32 67 ef 98 10 | | | | 0f 47 0c af 15 d9 b7 7f 71 e8 ad 67 c9 59 d6 98 |
| 0e ce f2 d9 36 72 6b 2b 34 25 17 55 ae b6 4e 88 | ab 8b 89 35 05 40 7f f1 18 3f f0 fc e4 4e 2f c4 | ab 8b 89 35 40 7f f1 05 f0 fc 18 3f c4 e4 4e 2f | b9 94 57 75 e4 8e 16 51 47 20 9a 3f c5 d6 f5 3b | dc 9b 97 38 90 49 fe 81 37 df 72 15 b0 e9 3f a7 |
| 65 0f c0 4d 74 c7 e8 d0 70 ff e8 2a 75 3f ca 9c | 4d 76 ba e3 92 c6 9b 70 51 16 9b e5 9d 75 74 de | 4d 76 ba e3 c6 9b 70 92 9b e5 51 16 de 9d 75 74 | 8e 22 db 12 b2 f2 dc 92 df 80 f7 c1 2d c5 1e 52 | d2 49 de e6 c9 80 7e ff 6b b4 c6 d3 b7 5e 61 c6 |
| 5c 6b 05 f4 7b 72 a2 6d b4 34 31 12 9a 9b 7f 94 | 4a 7f 6b bf 21 40 3a 3c 8d 18 c7 c9 b8 14 d2 22 | 4a 7f 6b bf 40 3a 3c 21 c7 c9 8d 18 22 b8 14 d2 | b1 c1 0b cc ba f3 8b 07 f9 1f 6a c3 1d 19 24 5c | c0 89 57 b1 af 2f 51 ae df 6b ad 7e 39 67 06 c0 |
| 71 48 5c 7d 15 dc da a9 26 74 c7 bd 24 7e 22 9c | a3 52 4a ff 59 86 57 d3 f7 92 c6 7a 36 f3 93 de | a3 52 4a ff 86 57 d3 59 c6 7a f7 92 de 36 f3 93 | d4 11 fe 0f 3b 44 06 73 cb ab 62 37 19 b7 07 ec | 2c a5 f2 43 5c 73 22 8c 65 0e a3 dd f1 96 90 50 |
| f8 b4 0c 4c 67 37 24 ff ae a5 c1 ea e8 21 97 bc | 41 8d fe 29 85 9a 36 16 e4 06 78 87 9b fd 88 65 | 41 8d fe 29 9a 36 16 85 78 87 e4 06 65 9b fd 88 | 2a 47 c4 48 83 e8 18 ba 84 18 27 23 eb 10 0a f3 | 58 fd 0f 4c 9d ee cc 40 36 38 9b 46 eb 7d ed bd |
| 72 ba cb 04 1e 06 d4 fa b2 20 bc 65 00 6d e7 4e | 40 f4 1f f2 72 6f 48 2d 37 b7 65 4d 63 3c 94 2f | 40 f4 1f f2 6f 48 2d 72 65 4d 37 b7 2f 63 3c 94 | 7b 05 42 4a 1e d0 20 40 94 83 18 52 94 c4 43 fb | 71 8c 83 cf c7 29 e5 a5 4c 74 ef a9 c2 bf 52 ef |
| 0a 89 c1 85 d9 f9 c5 e5 d8 f7 f7 fb 56 7b 11 14 | 67 a7 78 97 35 99 a6 d9 61 68 68 0f b1 21 82 fa | 67 a7 78 97 99 a6 d9 35 68 0f 61 68 fa b1 21 82 | ec 1a c0 80 0c 50 53 c7 3b d7 00 ef b7 22 72 e0 | 37 bb 38 f7 14 3d d8 7d 93 e7 08 a1 48 f7 a5 4a |
| db a1 f8 77 18 6d 8b ba a8 30 08 4e ff d5 d7 aa | b9 32 41 f5 ad 3c 3d f4 c2 04 30 2f 16 03 0e ac | b9 32 41 f5 3c 3d f4 ad 30 2f c2 04 ac 16 03 0e | b1 1a 44 17 3d 2f ec b6 0a 6b 2f 42 9f 68 f3 b1 | 48 f3 cb 3c 26 1b c3 be 45 a2 aa 0b 20 d7 72 38 |
| f9 e9 8f 2b 1b 34 2f 08 4f c9 85 49 bf bf 81 89 | 99 1e 73 f1 af 18 15 30 84 dd 97 3b 08 08 0c a7 | 99 1e 73 f1 18 15 30 af 97 3b 84 dd a7 08 08 0c | 31 30 3a c2 ac 71 8c c4 46 65 48 eb 6a 1c 31 62 | fd 0e c5 f9 0d 16 d5 6b 42 e0 4a 41 cb 1c 6e 56 |
| cc 3e ff 3b a1 67 59 af 04 85 02 aa a1 00 5f 34 | 4b b2 16 e2 32 85 cb 79 f2 97 77 ac 32 63 cf 18 | 4b b2 16 e2 85 cb 79 32 77 ac f2 97 18 32 63 cf | 4b 86 8a 36 b1 cb 27 5a fb f2 f2 af cc 5a 5b cf | b4 ba 7f 86 8e 98 4d 26 f3 13 59 18 52 4e 20 76 |
| ff 08 69 64 0b 53 34 14 84 bf ab 8f 4a 7c 43 b9 | | | | |

Table 6.5

Avalanche Effect in AES:

Change in Plaintext

(Table is located on page 178 in textbook)

| Round | | Number of Bits that Differ |
|-------|---|----------------------------|
| | 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 0023456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 | 1 |
| 0 | 0e3634aece7225b6f26b174ed92b5588 0f3634aece7225b6f26b174ed92b5588 | 1 |
| 1 | 657470750fc7ff3fc0e8e8ca4dd02a9c c4a9ad090fc7ff3fc0e8e8ca4dd02a9c | 20 |
| 2 | 5c7bb49a6b72349b05a2317ff46d1294 fe2ae569f7ee8bb8c1f5a2bb37ef53d5 | 58 |
| 3 | 7115262448dc747e5cdac7227da9bd9c ec093dfb7c45343d689017507d485e62 | 59 |
| 4 | f867aee8b437a5210c24c1974cfffeabc 43efdb697244df808e8d9364ee0ae6f5 | 61 |
| 5 | 721eb200ba06206dcbd4bce704fa654e 7b28a5d5ed643287e006c099bb375302 | 68 |
| 6 | 0ad9d85689f9f77bc1c5f71185e5fb14 3bc2d8b6798d8ac4fe36a1d891ac181a | 64 |
| 7 | db18a8ffa16d30d5f88b08d777ba4eaa 9fb8b5452023c70280e5c4bb9e555a4b | 67 |
| 8 | f91b4fbfe934c9bf8f2f85812b084989 20264e1126b219aef7feb3f9b2d6de40 | 65 |
| 9 | cca104a13e678500ff59025f3bafaa34 b56a0341b2290ba7dfdfbddcd8578205 | 61 |
| 10 | ff0b844a0853bf7c6934ab4364148fb9 612b89398d0600cde116227ce72433f0 | 58 |

Table 6.6

Avalanche Effect in AES: Change in Key

(Table is located on page 179
in textbook)

| Round | | Number of Bits that Differ |
|-------|---|-------------------------------|
| | 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 0123456789abcdeffedcba9876543210 | 0 |
| 0 | 0e3634aece7225b6f26b174ed92b5588 0f3634aece7225b6f26b174ed92b5588 | 1 |
| 1 | 657470750fc7ff3fc0e8e8ca4dd02a9c c5a9ad090ec7ff3fc1e8e8ca4cd02a9c | 22 |
| 2 | 5c7bb49a6b72349b05a2317ff46d1294 90905fa9563356d15f3760f3b8259985 | 58 |
| 3 | 7115262448dc747e5cdac7227da9bd9c 18aeb7aa794b3b66629448d575c7cebf | 67 |
| 4 | f867aee8b437a5210c24c1974cfffeabc f81015f993c978a876ae017cb49e7eec | 63 |
| 5 | 721eb200ba06206dcbd4bce704fa654e 5955c91b4e769f3cb4a94768e98d5267 | 81 |
| 6 | 0ad9d85689f9f77bc1c5f71185e5fb14 dc60a24d137662181e45b8d3726b2920 | 70 |
| 7 | db18a8ffa16d30d5f88b08d777ba4eaa fe8343b8f88bef66cab7e977d005a03c | 74 |
| 8 | f91b4fbfe934c9bf8f2f85812b084989 da7dad581d1725c5b72fa0f9d9d1366a | 67 |
| 9 | cca104a13e678500ff59025f3bafaa34 0ccb4c66bbfd912f4b511d72996345e0 | 59 |
| 10 | ff0b844a0853bf7c6934ab4364148fb9 fc8923ee501a7d207ab670686839996b | 53 |

Equivalent Inverse Cipher

- AES decryption cipher is not identical to the encryption cipher
 - The sequence of transformations differs although the form of the key schedules is the same
 - Has the disadvantage that two separate software or firmware modules are needed for applications that require both encryption and decryption

Two separate changes are needed to bring the decryption structure in line with the encryption structure

The first two stages of the decryption round need to be interchanged

The second two stages of the decryption round need to be interchanged

Interchanging InvShiftRows and InvSubBytes

- InvShiftRows *affects the sequence of bytes in State but does not alter byte contents and does not depend on byte contents to perform its transformation*
- InvSubBytes *affects the contents of bytes in State but does not alter byte sequence and does not depend on byte sequence to perform its transformation*

Thus, these two operations commute
and can be interchanged

Interchanging AddRoundKey and InvMixColumns

The transformations AddRoundKey and InvMixColumns do not alter the sequence of bytes in State

If we view the key as a sequence of words, then both AddRoundKey and InvMixColumns operate on State one column at a time

These two operations are linear with respect to the column input




Figure 6.10 Equivalent Inverse Cipher

Implementation Aspects

- AES can be implemented very efficiently on an 8-bit processor
- AddRoundKey is a bytewise XOR operation
- ShiftRows is a simple byte-shifting operation
- SubBytes operates at the byte level and only requires a table of 256 bytes
- MixColumns requires matrix multiplication in the field $\text{GF}(2^8)$, which means that all operations are carried out on bytes

Implementation Aspects

- Can efficiently implement on a 32-bit processor
 - Redefine steps to use 32-bit words
 - Can precompute 4 tables of 256-words
 - Then each column in each round can be computed using 4 table lookups + 4 XORs
 - At a cost of 4Kb to store tables
- Designers believe this very efficient implementation was a key factor in its selection as the AES cipher

Summary

- Finite field arithmetic
- AES structure
 - General structure
 - Detailed structure
- AES key expansion
 - Key expansion algorithm
 - Rationale
- AES transformation functions
 - Substitute bytes
 - ShiftRows
 - MixColumns
 - AddRoundKey
- AES implementation
 - Equivalent inverse cipher
 - Implementation aspects

