Lecture 4

The B Method

Structuring Mechanisms for B Specifications - INCLUDES

Lecture Outline

- References
- Abstract Machine Notation (AMN)
- Generalised Substitution Language (GSL)
- Incremental Model Development
- Multiple Generalised Substitution
- The INCLUDES Mechanism

References

- [1] Abrial, J.-R., *The B Book Assigning Programs to Meanings*, Cambridge University Press, 1996. (chapter 7)
- [2] Schneider, S., The B-Method An Introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, Cornerstones of Computing series, 2001. (chapter 10)
- [3] Clearsy System Engineering, AtelierB home page http://www.atelierb.eu/en/
- [4] Clearsy System Engineering, B Method home page http://www.methode-b.com/en/

Abstract Machine Notation (AMN)

• Consists of a number of clauses allowing the definition of abstract machines: MACHINE, CONSTRAINTS, SETS, CONSTANTS, ...

```
MACHINE
 M(X,x)
CONSTRAINTS
SETS
 S:
 T = \{a, b\}
(ABSTRACT )CONSTANTS
PROPERTIES
DEFINITIONS
(CONCRETE )VARIABLES
INVARIANT
ASSERTIONS
INITIALIZATION
OPERATIONS
 u \leftarrow O(w)
 PRE
  THEN
  END;
END
```

Generalised Substitution Language (GSL)

- Consists of a number of generalised substitutions allowing the definition of abstract machine operations
- Generalised substitutions are an extension of the usual substitutions used in mathematics, the effect of which consists in the transformation of formulas on which they are applied
- A generalised substitution S is defined by the way it transforms an arbitrary predicate P, the meaning of the new predicate being axiomatized
 - $^{\circ}$ Notation [S]P, read "S establishes P"

Elementary Substitutions

Substitution (syntax)		Matching axiom (semantics)
v := E	(simple substitution)	$[v := E] R \Leftrightarrow R$ with all free
		occurrences of \boldsymbol{v} replaced by \boldsymbol{E}
skip	(no effect substitution)	$[skip]R \Leftrightarrow R$
$P \mid S$	(preconditioned substitution)	$[P \mid S] R \Leftrightarrow (P \land [S] R)$
$P \Longrightarrow R$	S (guarded substitution)	$[P \Longrightarrow S] R \Leftrightarrow (P \Rightarrow [S] R)$
$S\left[\right]T$	(bounded choice substitution)	$[S[]T]R \Leftrightarrow ([S]R \wedge [T]R)$
@x.S	(unbounded choice substitution)	$[@x.S]R \Leftrightarrow (\forall x.[S]R)$, if $x \backslash R$

Syntactic Extensions of Elementary Substitutions

Syntax	Definition
BEGIN S END	S
$x := E \mid\mid y := F$	x, y := E, F
PRE P THEN S END	$P \mid S$
IF P THEN S ELSE T END	$(P \Longrightarrow S) [] (\neg P \Longrightarrow T)$
IF P THEN S END	IF P THEN S ELSE skip END
CHOICE S OR \dots OR T END	$S\left[\right]\ldots\left[\right]T$
$VAR\;x\;IN\;S\;END$	@x.S
ANY x where P then S end	$@x.(P \Longrightarrow S)$
$x :\in E$	ANY z where $z \in E$ then $x := z$ end, if $z \backslash E$

Syntactic Extensions of Elementary Substitutions

Syntax	Definition
SELECT P THEN S	$\mathtt{CHOICE}\; P \Longrightarrow S$
WHEN Q THEN $T\dots$	OR $Q \Longrightarrow T \dots$
WHEN R THEN U	or $R \Longrightarrow U$
END	END
SELECT P THEN $S \dots$	SELECT P THEN $S \dots$
WHEN Q THEN T	WHEN Q THEN T
ELSE U	WHEN $\neg(P\lor\ldots\lor Q)$ THEN U
END	END

Incremental Model Development

- In order to control the complexity of the specification process, it is essential to have some sort of structuring mechanism allowing models to be developed in an incremental way
- B allows for the state information contained in a specification to be factored out in a number of separate machines, each responsible with operations working on its corresponding part of the state
- Advantages:
 - Conceptually distinct parts of a system are understood and described separately
 - Each machine has its consistency verified separately, its reuse involving also a reuse of the associated proof activity
 - A good structuring may reduce the proof effort by factoring proof obligations into appropriate machines
- Features enabling incremental specification in B
 - GSL: Multiple Generalised Substitution
 - AMN: INCLUDES/EXTENDS/PROMOTES, USES/SEES clauses

Multiple Generalised Substitution

- It is a generalisation of the || operator, introduced previously as a mere "syntactic sugar" for multiple simple substitutions
- It is the basic ingredient allowing to build large specifications
- Construct: S||T, read "S with T", where S and T are generalised substitutions supposed to work on two abstract machines M and N, working with the respective distinct variables x and y.
- There is no rule for calculating [S||T]P from [S]P and [T]P
- When occurring in proof obligations, the generalised substitution must be reduced to a form in which the parallel operator has been removed
- There are reduction rules (equivalences) used to move a parallel operator inside choices and conditionals, until reaching a point where it is only applied on simple assignments, which can be rewritten to remove it completely

Multiple Generalised Substitution (cont.)

Basic reduction rules

$$x := E \mid\mid y := F = x, y := E, F$$

$$S \mid\mid T = T \mid\mid S$$

$$S \mid\mid skip = S$$

$$S \mid\mid (P \mid T) = P \mid\mid (S \mid\mid T)$$

$$S \mid\mid (P \Longrightarrow T) = P \Longrightarrow (S \mid\mid T)$$

$$S \mid\mid (T \mid\mid U) = (S \mid\mid T) \mid\mid (S \mid\mid U)$$

$$S \mid\mid (@z.T) = @z.(S \mid\mid T), \text{ if } z \setminus S$$

 Similar rules apply when elementary substitutions are replaced by their syntactic extensions

The INCLUDES Mechanism


- Ensured by the AMN INCLUDES clause
 - A machine M2 may include a previously built and proved machine M1 by means of an INCLUDES M1 statement written inside the description of M2
- Terminology
 - Information declared in M2 = native information
 - Information from M1 = included information
- If M1 is parameterized, then its parameters should be instantiated upon inclusion in M2
 - The instantiation values should obey to the rules imposed by the CONSTRAINTS clause of M1 (proof obligation in M2)
- The sets and constants of M1 are visible to M2, as if they were declared in M2's SETS and CONSTANTS clauses
 - The properties of M2 can express constraints on included sets and constants (e.g. relations among its native and included sets and constants)

The INCLUDES Mechanism (cont.)

- The state of M1 is part of the state of M2
 - The invariant of M2 includes the invariant of M1
 - The invariant of M2 can impose restrictions on the state of M1 (e.g. properties relating its native and included variables)
- The operations of M2 may access M1's state in read mode in preconditions, guards and rhs of assignments
- The state of M1 can only be altered by calls to M1's operations from within M2's operations
 - M1 is the only responsible for preserving its invariant
 - Proof obligations are generated for M2, in order to ensure that the preconditions of called operations from M1 are respected
- M2 has complete control over M1 (M1 cannot be included into another machine)
 - Otherwise, the invariant of M2 that refers to the state of M1 may be broken

The INCLUDES Mechanism (cont.)

- The initialisation of M2 first initializes the included machines, then executes its own statement
- M1 should be defined independently from M2
- Graphical representation of the relationship between including and included machines [2]



Included Operations

- M2's operation bodies are allowed to make "calls" to operations of
 M1
- The syntax of such an operation call is

$$x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \leftarrow op(e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_m),$$

where e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_m are value expressions and x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n are distinct variables

Such operation calls involve substituting in a substitution

Promotion and Extension

- M1 is said to be completely under the control of M2: a state change in M1 only happens through call of an operation of M1 from within an operation of M2
- Operations of M1 are all available to M2, but they are not automatically available to the environment of M2 (they are not automatically part of the interface of M2)
- An operation of M1 can be made available through the interface of M2 by promotion (i.e. its name is listed in the PROMOTES clause of M2)
 - Promoted operations from M1 must preserve the invariant of M2 (proof obligation in M2)
- If all operations of M1 are promoted by M2, then M2 is said to be an extension of M1 and should be declared as such by means of an extends clause (e.g. MACHINE M2 EXTENDS M1 ...)
 - Extending a machine is equivalent to including it and promoting all its operations


Inclusion Example

- Problem: Specify a system controlling the opening and closing of doors to safes in a bank vault. Required features:
 - open and close the doors
 - allow them to be locked and unlocked
- Machines Doors and Locks

```
MACHINE
  Doors
SETS
  DOOR:
  POSITION = \{open, closed\}
VARIABLES
  position
INVARIANT
  position \in DOOR \rightarrow POSITION
INITIALISATION
  position := DOOR \times \{closed\}
OPERATIONS
  opening(dd) =
  PRE
     dd \in DOOR
  THEN
     position(dd) := open
  END:
  closedoor(dd) =
  PRE
     dd \in DOOR
  THEN
     position(dd) := closed
  END
END
```

```
MACHINE
  Locks
INCLUDES
  Doors
PROMOTES
  closedoor
SETS
  STATUS = \{locked, unlocked\}
VARIABLES
  status
INVARIANT
  status \in DOOR \rightarrow STATUS \land
  position^{-1} |\{open\}| \subseteq status^{-1} |\{unlocked\}|
INITIALISATION
  status := DOOR \times \{locked\}
OPERATIONS
  opendoor(dd) =
  PRE
     dd \in DOOR \land status(dd) = unlocked
  THEN
     opening(dd)
  END:
  lockdoor(dd) =
  PRE
     dd \in DOOR \land position(dd) = closed
  THEN
     status(dd) := locked
  END:
  unlockdoor(dd) =
  PRE
     dd \in DOOR
  THEN
     status(dd) := unlocked
  END
END
```

 Graphical representation of the relationship between Locks and Doors [2]



Multiple Inclusion

- A machine can include a number of other machines, which, at their turn, can include other machines
- The includes relation is transitive, sets, constants and variables visibility being preserved through any number of inclusion levels
 - If M3 includes M2, then M3 has access to both the native and included information of M2
- Access to operations is not transitive though, unpromoted operations of a machine being only accessible in the machine that directly includes it
- When a machine includes several other machines, it may simultaneously modify some of their state by calling operations from these machines in parallel. Operations called in parallel should necessarily be from distinct machines.

- Extension: Modify the previous example, so as to manage the locking and unlocking of doors by means of keys, with the following constraints
 - A key can only be inserted into a door whose lock it matches
 - A door should only be unlocked if there is a key present
- Machine Keys

```
\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{MACHINE} \\ & & Keys \\ & \mathbf{SETS} \\ & & KEY \\ & \mathbf{VARIABLES} \\ & & keys \\ & \mathbf{INVARIANT} \\ & keys \subseteq KEY \\ & \mathbf{INITIALISATION} \\ & keys := \emptyset \end{aligned}
```


```
\begin{aligned} & \text{OPERATIONS} \\ & \text{insertkey}(kk) = \\ & \text{PRE} \\ & kk \in KEY \\ & \text{THEN} \\ & keys := keys \cup \{kk\} \\ & \text{END}; \end{aligned}& \text{removekey}(kk) = \\ & \text{PRE} \\ & kk \in KEY \\ & \text{THEN} \\ & keys := keys - \{kk\} \\ & \text{END} \\ & \text{END} \end{aligned}
```

Machine Safes


```
MACHINE
  Safes
INCLUDES
  Locks, Keys
PROMOTES
  opendoor, closedoor, lockdoor
CONSTANTS
  unlocks
PROPERTIES
  unlocks \in KEY \rightarrow DOOR
INVARIANT
  status^{-1} [{unlocked}] \subseteq unlocks[keys]
OPERATIONS
  insert(kk, dd) =
  PRE
     kk \in KEY \land dd \in DOOR \land
     unlocks(kk) = dd
  THEN
     insertkey(kk)
  END;
```

```
extract(kk,dd) =
  PRE
     kk \in KEY \land dd \in DOOR \land
     unlocks(kk) = dd \wedge
     status(dd) = locked
  THEN
     removekey(kk)
  END;
  unlock(dd) =
  \mathbf{PRE}
     dd \in DOOR \land
     unlocks^{-1} (dd) \in keys
  THEN
     unlockdoor(dd)
  END;
  quicklock(dd) =
  PRE
     dd \in DOOR \land
     position(dd) = closed
  THEN
     lockdoor(dd) ||
     removekey(unlocks - 1 (dd))
  END
END
```

Machine relations [2]



Final specification architecture [2]




General Inclusion Pattern

MACHINE	MACHINE
$M_1(X_1, x_1)$	M(X,x)
CONSTRAINTS	CONSTRAINTS
C_1	C
SETS	SETS
S_1 ;	S;
$T_1 = \{a_1, b_1\}$	$T = \{a, b\}$
(ABSTRACT_)CONSTANTS	(ABSTRACT_)CONSTANTS
c_1	C
PROPERTIES	PROPERTIES
P_1	P
INCLUDES	(CONCRETE_)VARIABLES
M(N,n)	v
(CONCRETE_)VARIABLES	INVARIANT
v_1	1
INVARIANT	ASSERTIONS
I ₁	J ₁
ASSERTIONS	INITIALIZATION
J ₁ INITIALIZATION	U OPERATIONS
U ₁	
OPERATIONS	END
$u_1 \leftarrow O(w_1) \hat{=}$	END
PRE	
Q_1	
THEN	
V_1	
END;	
1775 1775 177	
END	

Inclusion Proof Obligations

- From top to bottom, the given POs ensure:
 - The parameter values provided for the included machine fulfill its constraints
 - 2. Assertions of the including machine may be appropriately deduced
 - 3. Initialization of the including machine ensures its invariant
 - 4. Operations of the including machine preserve its invariant



• Contextual abbreviations A, A_1 , B, B_1 are defined as in Lecture 2.

- Problem: Analyse for validity the proof obligation associated with the operation quicklock of Safes
- We should check the following proof obligation

```
C \land B \land I \land dd \in DOOR \land position(dd) = closed

\Rightarrow [lockdoor(dd) \parallel removekey(unlocks^{-1}(dd))]I_{Safes}
```

where C is the conjunction of all native and included constraints clauses (none available), B is the conjunction of all native and included property clauses, and I is the conjunction of all native and included invariant clauses.

We first expand and reduce the parallel operation calls

```
lockdoor(dd) || removekey(unlocks<sup>-1</sup>(dd))

= PRE dd ∈ DOOR ∧ position(dd) = closed

THEN status(dd) := locked END

|| PRE unlocks<sup>-1</sup>(dd) ∈ KEY

THEN keys := keys − {unlocks<sup>-1</sup>(dd)} END
```

```
= PRE dd ∈ DOOR ∧ position(dd) = closed ∧ unlocks<sup>-1</sup>(dd) ∈ KEY
THEN status(dd) := locked || keys := keys - {unlocks<sup>-1</sup>(dd)}
END
= PRE dd ∈ DOOR ∧ position(dd) = closed ∧ unlocks<sup>-1</sup>(dd) ∈ KEY
THEN status, keys:= status ← {dd → locked}, keys - {unlocks<sup>-1</sup>(dd)}
END
```

The consequent of our proof obligation becomes

```
dd \in DOOR \land position(dd) = closed \land unlocks^{-1}(dd) \in KEY
 \land [status, keys := status \lessdot \{dd \mapsto locked\}, keys - \{unlocks^{-1}(dd)\}]
 (status^{-1}[\{unlocked\}] \subseteq unlocks[keys])
```

 The first three conjuncts are ensured by the antecedent of our proof obligation, while the last is ensured by the invariant itself

```
status^{-1}[\{unlocked\}] \subseteq unlocks[keys]
\Rightarrow status^{-1}[\{unlocked\}] - \{dd\} \subseteq unlocks[keys] - \{dd\}
\Rightarrow (status \lessdot \{dd \mapsto locked\})^{-1}[\{unlocked\}]
\subseteq unlocks[keys - \{unlocks^{-1}(dd)\}]
= [status, keys := status \lessdot \{dd \mapsto locked\}, keys - \{unlocks^{-1}(dd)\}]
(status^{-1}[\{unlocked\}] \subseteq unlocks[keys])
```