

Internalizing Extensions in Lattices of Type Theories

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Abstract

While many proof assistants are founded upon common theoretical ground, they will also feature further extensions and axioms that augment their reasoning power. The individual theories based on each extension are individually sound, but how type checkers handle their interactions at compile time is not formally described. Furthermore, the way proof assistants currently enable extensions can be too coarse and imprecise when it comes to guarantees about the features a top-level definition may use. [Needs to be rewritten to reflect new introduction.]

A first step towards a framework of extensions could use the Dependent Calculus of Indistinguishability (DCOI) [Liu et al., 2024] to formalize granular and precise extension tracking. DCOI is a type system with dependency tracking, where terms and variables are assigned dependency levels alongside their types. These dependency levels form a lattice that describes which levels are permitted to access what. This report explores how extensions could correspond to dependency levels, and how the lattice would describe how extensions are permitted to interact.

1 Introduction

At the core of a proof assistant founded on the Curry–Howard correspondence is a type checker that validates a proof of a proposition—a term inhabiting a corresponding type in a dependent type theory. These type theories are typically based on some flavour of Martin-Löf Type Theory (MLTT) [Martin-Löf, 1972] or the Calculus of Inductive Constructions (CIC) [Pfenning and Paulin-Mohring, 1990]. In practice, a proof assistant doesn’t implement merely one type theory, but a whole host of them, as they will include language extensions that augment or modify its reasoning power.

These type theoretic extensions can consist of additional typing rules, constructs, and/or definitional equalities. Because each extension embodies semantically distinct reasoning principles, enabling an extension results in a separate theory altogether. Furthermore, there exist extensions that are mutually incompatible because together they violate logical consistency. For instance, *uniqueness of identity proofs*, which propositionally equates all proofs of the same equality, is incompatible with *univalence*, which adds additional and provably distinct proofs of equality. In Section 2, I describe these extensions and more found in select proof assistants, and the ways some combinations are incompatible.

Thus proof assistants are careful to track the usage of language extensions to rule out inconsistencies. However, the tracking done by their type checkers is *external* to the type system: within the language itself, one cannot assert that a definition is permitted to depend

on a particular extension, nor that it is prohibited from using an extension. Furthermore, given two incompatible extensions, a definition in one extension’s theory may not be used at all in the another extension’s theory, not even just in a type. This means one theory cannot be used as a metatheory to prove properties about definitions in the other theory if those theories are incompatible. For instance, considering classical axioms as a language extension, one would not be able to explore what is constructively proveable about classical principles.

Ultimately, what is missing is a framework for describing fine-grained control of proofs and programs across multiple type theories, where even incompatible theories can interact in interesting ways. These properties are reminiscent of type systems with *dependency analysis*. Here, terms are stratified by *dependency levels*, which can be thought of intuitively as permission levels tracking permitted usages. Even if we do not have access to a particular level, terms at that level can still be manipulated and reasoned about as long as they are not inspected or evaluated. [Is this too vague?]

I have worked on a type system with dependency tracking, the Dependent Calculus of Indistinguishability (DCOI) [Liu et al., 2024], along with its variant DCOI^ω [Liu et al., 2025], which is a logically consistent type theory. DCOI could potentially be used as a basis for a framework which internalizes extension tracking by stratifying their corresponding type theories into hierarchies of dependency levels, where compatibility between extensions maps to the intuitive notion of permission. I describe the key properties of DCOI relevant for this application in Section 3. I then speculate on the details of this mapping, lay out the objectives for such a framework, and list possible first steps towards accomplishing them in Section 4. There is much prior and related work that this project relies on and relates to, which I divide into work I have personally contributed to (Section 5) and other work in this space (Section 6).

2 Proof assistant extensions in practice

To look at extensions in practice, let us focus on three popular proof assistants: Rocq [Coq Development Team, 2022], Agda [Norell, 2007], and Lean [de Moura et al., 2015]. Broadly speaking, they are all based on variants of MLTT or CIC, and have dependent functions, type universes, and inductive types, which are sufficient to encode a wide variety of logical propositions and proofs.

2.1 Built-in features

Each of these proof assistants include features that extend the power of their foundations; below are a few notable extensions, some of which are hidden behind option flags.

Impredicativity. Rocq and Lean, being based on CIC, feature a universe `Prop` of propositions. This universe is *impredicative*, meaning that a universal quantification (*i.e.* dependent function type) $\forall(x : A). B$ is a proposition if B is a proposition, regardless of the universe in which A lives, which may be larger than `Prop`. Inductive types may also be defined in `Prop`, which permits its constructors to have argument types in universes larger than `Prop`. Such inductives are said to be *large*.

Impredicativity allows for self-referential propositions by quantifying over `Prop`. For instance, given a proof that all propositions imply their double negation,

$$dn : \forall(P : \text{Prop}). P \rightarrow \neg\neg P,$$

the double negation of this proposition itself holds as well by self-application.

$$dn (\forall (P : \text{Prop}). P \rightarrow \neg\neg P) \quad dn : \neg\neg(\forall (P : \text{Prop}). P \rightarrow \neg\neg P)$$

In contrast, in the predicative setting, a quantification over a universe $\text{Type}_0 : \text{Type}_1$ itself has type Type_1 , and in particular,

$$\Pi(A : \text{Type}_0). A \rightarrow \neg\neg A : \text{Type}_1,$$

so an element of this type may not be applied to the type itself.

Dually to universal quantification, we can define existential quantification $\exists(x : A). B$ over types A in larger universes as a large inductive proposition, *i.e.* a dependent pair type in Prop . This enables us to state, for example, the surjectivity of a function over the naturals as a predicate, even though the naturals are not a proposition.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{surj} &: (\text{Nat} \rightarrow \text{Nat}) \rightarrow \text{Prop} \\ \text{surj} &:= \lambda f. \forall (y : \text{Nat}). \exists (x : \text{Nat}). f \, x \equiv y \end{aligned}$$

Definitional proof irrelevance. A universe of propositions is said to be *strict* when the inhabitants of its propositions are definitionally equal (*i.e.* proof irrelevant) and thus treated as interchangeable during type checking. Lean’s Prop is always strict, while Rocq has a separate SProp universe of proof-irrelevant propositions, and Agda has a predicative hierarchy Prop_i of such universes [Gilbert et al., 2019]. To use strict Prop , Rocq requires the flag `Allow StrictProp`, while Agda requires the option `{-# OPTIONS --prop #-}`.

Definitional proof irrelevance is useful to avoid having to prove equalities explicitly. Consider a relation on two naturals asserting the usual less-than relation, along with a type of bounded naturals from which the natural contained can be recovered.

$$\begin{aligned} \cdot \leq \cdot &: \text{Nat} \rightarrow \text{Nat} \rightarrow \text{Prop} \\ \text{BNat} &: \text{Nat} \rightarrow \text{Type}_0 \\ \text{bNat} &: \Pi(n \, m : \text{Nat}). n \leq m \rightarrow \text{BNat} \, m \\ \text{getNat} &: \Pi(m : \text{Nat}). \text{BNat} \, m \rightarrow \text{Nat} \\ \text{getNat} \, m \, (\text{bNat} \, n \, m \, p) &\rightsquigarrow n \end{aligned}$$

A desirable property of bounded naturals is that two bounded naturals are equal if their contained naturals are equal.

$$\text{eqBNat} : \forall (m : \text{Nat}) (b_1 \, b_2 : \text{BNat} \, m). \text{getNat} \, m \, b_1 \equiv \text{getNat} \, m \, b_2 \rightarrow b_1 \equiv b_2$$

If we try to prove this by destructing b_1 and b_2 as $(\text{bNat} \, n_1 \, m \, p_1)$ and $(\text{bNat} \, n_2 \, m \, p_2)$, $\text{getNat} \, m \, b_1$ and $\text{getNat} \, m \, b_2$ reduce to n_1 and n_2 .

$$\text{eqBNat} \, m \, (\text{bNat} \, n_1 \, m \, p_1) \, (\text{bNat} \, n_2 \, m \, p_2) : n_1 \equiv n_2 \rightarrow \text{bNat} \, n_1 \, m \, p_1 \equiv \text{bNat} \, n_2 \, m \, p_2$$

While we have an equality $n_1 \equiv n_2$, we do *not* have a proof of $p_1 \equiv p_2$ ¹. Depending on how $\cdot \leq \cdot$ is implemented, it may be possible to prove propositionally that any two inequality proofs are equal. Alternatively, if propositions are definitionally proof irrelevant, the inequality proofs can be ignored. Then rewriting the goal by the given equality is sufficient for it to be proven by reflexivity.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{eqBNat} \, m \, (\text{bNat} \, n_1 \, m \, p_1) \, (\text{bNat} \, n_2 \, m \, p_2) \, e &: \text{bNat} \, n_1 \, m \, p_1 \equiv \text{bNat} \, n_2 \, m \, p_2 \\ &:= \text{rewrite } e \text{ in refl} \end{aligned}$$

¹Technically, this requires a proof of the equality where p_1 has been transported across the equality e so that it has the same type as p_2 .

Uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP). The *uniqueness of identity proofs* (UIP) asserts that inhabitants of the same propositional equality are themselves propositionally equal. It can be proven using *Axiom K* [Streicher, 1993], a computational eliminator for propositional equalities of type $a \equiv a$.

$$K : \forall (A : \text{Type}) (a : A) (P : a \equiv a \rightarrow \text{Prop}) (p : a \equiv a). P \text{ refl} \rightarrow P p$$

$$K A a P \text{ refl } d \rightsquigarrow d$$

Agda’s default pattern matching behaviour, which permits matching on an equality of $a \equiv a$ as reflexivity, admits a proof of UIP as well as defining Axiom K. While not inherently part of Rocq’s type theory, Axiom K is axiomatized in the standard library as `Logic.Eqdep.eq_rect_eq`.

UIP is similarly useful to avoid reasoning about equalities between equalities when the only canonical proof of an equality is reflexivity, especially in settings without proof irrelevance. While UIP augments the reasoning power of the type theory, there are inductive types whose equality proofs are already propositionally equal. In particular, if a type has decidable equality, *i.e.* $(x \equiv y) \vee \neg(x \equiv y)$ for any given x, y of that type, then its equalities are themselves equal [Hedberg, 1998].

Strong elimination. Destructing or eliminating an element of an inductive datatype into a type at a larger universe is known as *strong* or *large* elimination. That is, a term whose type is in Type_i is eliminated to return a term whose type is in Type_j for some $j > i$. For proofs of inductive propositions in Prop , this includes eliminating into any non-proposition type.

Strong elimination is a necessary ingredient in discriminating constructors of proof-relevant datatypes, such as the booleans. While `true` and `false` are syntactically distinct, proving their propositional inequivalence requires lifting the booleans to propositions truthhood \top and falsehood \perp .

$$\text{lift} : \text{Bool} \rightarrow \text{Prop}$$

$$\text{lift} := \lambda b. \text{if } b \text{ then } \top \text{ else } \perp$$

The branching expression is a strong elimination because it returns a type, or equivalently because its return type is Prop , a universe. Letting `cong f` be a proof of congruence of f over an equality, to complete the proof of $\text{true} \equiv \text{false} \rightarrow \perp$, the trivial proof of truthhood `tt` is rewritten by the lifted equality $\top \equiv \perp$.

$$\text{trueNotFalse} : \text{true} \equiv \text{false} \rightarrow \perp$$

$$\text{trueNotFalse} := \lambda e. \text{rewrite } (\text{cong lift } e) \text{ in tt}$$

2.2 Axioms

Rocq, Lean, and Agda all have mechanisms for defining axioms or postulates, which are declarations of constants without definitions. Although not all axioms are consistent, there are many well-studied additions commonly used in practice that are worth considering as extensions in their own right.

Extensional principles. Some models of type theory semantically equate things that are not syntactically (either definitionally or propositionally) equal; extensional principles adds semantic equalities as propositional equalities. Examples include *function extensionality*, which equates two functions if they are pointwise equal, and *propositional extensionality*, which equates two propositions if they are biimplicated. These axioms are found in the standard libraries of Lean as `funext` and `propext`, and of Rocq as `Logic.FunctionalExtensionality.functional_extensionality` and `Logic.PropExtensionality.propositional_extensionality`. A notable consequence of propositional extensionality is propositional proof irrelevance.

Another example is *univalence*, which asserts an equivalence between propositional equality and equivalence, *i.e.* given two types A, B , the equivalence $(A \equiv B) \simeq (A \simeq B)$ holds [Univalent Foundations Program, 2013]. There are several ways to define equivalence; the idea is that it captures a propositionally proof-irrelevant isomorphism. Univalence together with proof irrelevance implies propositional extensionality, since biimplicated propositions are isomorphic by irrelevance, and univalence gives an equality from the isomorphism. Univalence alone also implies function extensionality by a more complex argument [Univalent Foundations Program, 2013, Chapter 4.9].

One application of function and propositional extensionality is encountered when encoding a function as a relation whose functionality is proven *a posteriori*. This is a frequent pattern in proof assistants, as inductive relations often have better ergonomic support than dependently-typed reasoning over functions. For example, consider a two-place predicate over a representation of types Ty and terms Tm , which has the type $Ty \rightarrow Tm \rightarrow \text{Prop}$. If we have trouble defining this predicate recursively due to termination issues or inductively due to strict positivity issues, we can instead view it as a function from Ty to a predicate $Tm \rightarrow \text{Prop}$ and try encoding it as a relation:

$$R : Ty \rightarrow (Tm \rightarrow \text{Prop}) \rightarrow \text{Prop}.$$

Such a relation could be a *logical relation* [Tait, 1967] used to model typed lambda calculi, where a Ty is interpreted as a set of Tms . Functionality of R demonstrates that Tys have unique interpretations. To show that R is functional, *i.e.*

$$\forall(A : Ty)(P Q : Tm \rightarrow \text{Prop}). R A P \rightarrow R A Q \rightarrow P \equiv Q,$$

it suffices to show that $\forall(a : Tm). P a \leftrightarrow Q a$, since $\forall(a : Tm). P a \equiv Q a$ follows from propositional extensionality, and finally $P \equiv Q$ from function extensionality.

The disadvantage of axiomatic equalities is that rewriting by them does not reduce, which can make reasoning about terms rewritten by such equalities difficult. There are type theories beyond MLTT and CIC that are designed so that these principles are instead provable theorems, such as cubical type theories [Bezem et al., 2019; Cohen et al., 2018; Angiuli et al., 2017, 2021] and Cubical Agda [Vezzosi et al., 2019] for univalence, and observational type theory [Altenkirch and McBride, 2006; Altenkirch et al., 2007; Pujet and Tabareau, 2022, 2023, 2024] for function and propositional extensionality.

Classical principles. There are a number of classical axioms that do not hold intuitionistically. The most common is the principle of *excluded middle* (EM), which asserts that all propositions are either true (inhabited) or false (uninhabited). EM is equivalent to several other principles, including *double negation elimination* (DNE), $\forall(A : \text{Prop}). \neg\neg A \rightarrow A$, and *Peirce's law*, $\forall(A B : \text{Prop}). ((A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow A) \rightarrow A$. More powerful axioms which imply EM include the axiom of choice and the (in)definite description operators, which deal with

extracting a concrete piece of data out of merely knowing that such a piece of data exists without constructing it.

Because a large majority of mathematics is done classically, many communities mechanizing mathematics freely use classical principles. The axiom of excluded middle, for instance, is declared in Rocq as `Logic.Classical_Prop.classic`, and in Lean as `em`. The `Logic` subdirectory of Rocq’s standard library contains the classical axioms along with proofs about their properties. Similarly, Lean’s mathematical library `mathlib` [mathlib Community, 2020] contains proofs that rely on classical axioms, and tactics such as `tauto` automatically apply classical reasoning. [Not sure what the point I was trying to make about constructively implementing classical principles so I’ve commented that out for now...]

2.3 Extensions and inconsistencies

One has to be careful that a chosen set of features and axioms do not render the type theory logically inconsistent and thus useless for proving. A number of them are known to be incompatible with one another; below are a few such combinations.

- Strong elimination is inconsistent for large impredicative inductives. Hook and Howe [1986] show that impredicative dependent pairs with pair projections, which correspond to strong elimination, are inconsistent. Coquand [1992] also demonstrates the inconsistency with an inductive type U with a single constructor of type $\forall (X : \text{Prop}). (X \rightarrow U) \rightarrow U$.
- Strong elimination is also inconsistent for inductive propositions when `Prop` is proof irrelevant. As seen above, strong elimination suffices to show that $\neg(\text{true} \equiv \text{false})$. If `Bool` is defined in a proof-irrelevant `Prop`, $\text{true} \equiv \text{false}$ would hold by definition, which is a contradiction.
- Strong elimination is once again inconsistent for inductive propositions in the presence of impredicativity and classical principles such as excluded middle. A modern implementation of the construction by Barbanera and Berardi [1996], such as `Coq.Logic.Berardi` in Rocq’s standard library, uses excluded middle to derive propositional proof irrelevance, which can be used as above to derive a contradiction.
- UIP is inconsistent with univalence. Intuitively, univalence produces an equality between two types given an equivalence between them, and there are types that are equivalent in multiple, provably different ways, so there are equalities between them that are provably different, thus violating UIP. Concretely, `Bool` is equivalent to itself in two different ways, either by mapping booleans to themselves or to their negation, so there are distinct proofs of $\text{Bool} \equiv \text{Bool}$ [Univalent Foundations Program, 2013, Example 3.1.9].

Figure 1 illustrates some of these relationships between extensions. The arrows point from one theory to a strictly more expressive one; for instance, a theory with propositional extensionality extends the equalities of a theory with a universe of propositions, and a theory with univalence can derive function extensionality. At the top of the graph, the dotted arrows indicate the incompatibility of a theory that implies UIP with one that contains univalence: there is no possible encompassing theory.

To prevent inconsistencies, proof assistants hide features behind option flags, or disallow them entirely. Rocq, Lean, and Agda generally disallow strong elimination for inductive propositions in `Prop` and `SProp`. The exceptions are *syntactic subsingletons*, which are inductives that syntactically have at most one inhabitant, such as \top , \perp , and conjunction of propositions. While Rocq’s impredicative `Prop` universe is not proof irrelevant, Rocq still




Figure 1: A compatibility graph of theories with impredicative **Prop**, proof irrelevance (**SProp**), UIP, univalence (**UA**), function extensionality (**funext**), propositional extensionality (**propext**), and (in)compatible combinations.

forbids strong elimination even for inductives that are not large to allow the use of classical principles. Its compiler flag `-impredicative-set` enables impredicativity for **Set** while still allowing strong elimination of small impredicative inductives, but this flag is not well supported.² In Agda, the `--with-K` flag enables Axiom K and the `--without-K` flag disables it, while the features enabled by Cubical Agda using the `--cubical` flag prove univalence as a theorem. There is also a `--safe` flag which disallows, among other combinations, having both `--with-K` and `--cubical`.

Proof assistants also provide some limited ability in tracking the usage of features and axioms. In Rocq, the axioms and unsafe flags used by a definition can be listed using the command `Print Assumptions`, while in Lean, the axioms can be listed using `#print axioms`. In Agda, along with checking for inconsistent option combinations, `--safe` also ensures the absence of any **postulates**. Because option flags can be enabled at module-level granularity, Agda also has notion of *(co)infective* flags: an infective flag used in one module must be used by all modules that depend on that module, while a coinfective flag used in one module may only depend on modules that also use that flag.

While users of these proof assistants have been getting along fine with these compiler tools for tracking features and axioms for the past decade or more, there is plenty of room of improvement; I have identified three shortcomings these systems.

- There is no way of asserting against an extension; that is, there is no general mechanism to tell the type checker to fail if a particular definition uses some feature or axiom. Such an assertion would guarantee that definition safe to be used by others that use an incompatible extension. For instance, ensuring that a proof does not use Axiom K means that it may be used by another proof that does use univalence. In this specific case, Agda does have the `--without-K` flag for this purpose, but few options have a corresponding anti-option. Meanwhile, Rocq and Lean’s axiom printing mechanism does not modify type checking behaviour.
- The scope of feature flags is too coarse. They range from project-level compiler flags down to module-level option flags, but even this level of granularity is not the appropriate one: modules are intended for organizing definitions by semantic content,

²<https://github.com/coq/coq/issues/9458>

rather than by the collection of features they happen to all use. This prevents reuse of a definition in one module inside another module if they happen to have incompatible features, even if that particular definition does not depend on any features at all.

- Completely disallowing an incompatible extension is unnecessarily restrictive. For example, when both `--safe` and `--with-K` are enabled in Agda, nothing that uses `--cubical` can be mentioned anywhere. However, it should be acceptable to use a theory with UIP to state and prove the properties of univalence, while never eliminating an equality derived from univalence. To generalize, definitions from an incompatible extension should be permitted in the type of a term but restricted in the term itself, so that we can talk *about* an extension without *using* it.

An ideal system for enabling and disabling features and axioms, then, should track which ones are and aren't used, at least at the definition level, and distinguish between mentioning and using them. This suggests that a system for dependency tracking would be a good starting point. Therefore, the Dependent Calculus of Indistinguishability (DCOI) [Liu et al., 2024], a type system that incorporates dependency tracking and dependent types, could be a suitable framework for tracking the usage of extensions within type theories.

3 A primer on DCOI

DCOI is a Pure Type System (PTS) [Barendregt, 1991] augmented with dependency tracking [Abadi et al. 1999]. DCOI^ω [Liu et al., 2025] is a logically consistent instantiation of DCOI's PTS rules and axioms with a predicative universe hierarchy, making it suitable as a foundation for theorem proving. In a typing judgement, dependency tracking appears as annotations on both the variables in the context, to indicate how they may be used by the term being typed, and alongside the type of the term, to indicate how the term itself may be used. As an example, consider the following derivable typing judgement for a constant function.

$$A :^H \text{Type} \vdash \lambda x^L y^H. x :^L A^L \rightarrow A^H \rightarrow A$$

The concrete levels used here are low (L) and high (H) where $L < H$. In the context of information flow, these levels correspond to low- and high-security computations where low-security computations may not inspect the values of high-security ones. They can also be thought of in terms of computational irrelevance, where something marked as computationally irrelevant (H) must not play a part in the execution of relevant programs (L), and may even be erased away after compilation.

This constant function at low, which returns its first argument x and ignores its second argument y , must therefore mark x and its type as low to return it, and marking y and its type as high guarantees that it could not return it. While the body of the low function cannot return a high argument, its *type* can depend on a high term, demonstrated by the high-annotated type A in the context, which is used in the type of the function. The intuition is that A does not play a part in the run-time execution of the constant function, but is otherwise permitted to participate in compile-time type checking.

Though the example only uses two levels L and H, any instance of DCOI is parametrized over some meet-semilattice, from which its dependency levels are drawn. Rather than tracking relevance or information flow, the goal of this report is track extensions using a lattice that associates dependency levels to sets of added extensions. Before discussing this mapping in Section 4, I summarize shortly the relevant key aspects and properties of DCOI that highlight how dependency tracking interacts with terms and typing.

Relative relevance. The intuition of computational relevance and irrelevance is therefore not fixed to the low and high levels, but is a relative concept between any two ordered dependency levels. Suppose there is a super-high level S such that $L < H < S$. Then just as a low term may not meaningfully use a high term, a high term also may not meaningfully use a super-high term. The following derivable typing judgement demonstrates how these three levels can interact.

$$P :^H \text{Nat}^S \rightarrow \text{Prop}, n :^S \text{Nat} \vdash \lambda p^L. p :^L (P s^S)^L \rightarrow P (s + 1)^S$$

In the context, P is a high predicate which takes as argument a super-high natural, along with a super-high natural n . Once again, the term being typed is a low function, while higher terms are involved in its type. Although the function is an identity function, its domain and codomain types are syntactically different applications of P , but this judgement still holds due to *indistinguishability*.

Indistinguishability. In general, if $\ell_1 < \ell_2$, then at observer level ℓ_1 , the function application $f x^{\ell_2}$ must be equal to $f y^{\ell_2}$ regardless of what x and y are. We say that they are *indistinguishable* at level ℓ_1 . Indistinguishability plays the rôle of definitional equality when checking that two types are the same. This is why the above example type checks, since $P s^S$ is indistinguishable from $P (s + 1)^S$ at high, the level of P . Similarly, calling the low-level constant function above k , $k x^L y^H$ is indistinguishable from $k x^L z^H$ at low, which expresses the idea that k is truly constant in its second argument.

DCOI internalizes indistinguishability by indexing its propositional equality type with an observer level. In particular, the propositional equality $k x^L y^H \equiv^L k x^L z^H$ is provable by reflexivity since the two sides are already indistinguishable at low, the observer level of the equality.

Elimination of higher falsehoods. The principle that lower-level terms may not meaningfully depend on higher-level terms means that, just as lower-level functions may not return higher-level arguments, destructors that return lower-level terms may not destruct higher-level terms. This holds even if the term being destructed contains no inner information (such as \top or an equality proof), since reducing the destruction on a constructor requires knowing whether the term being destructed is a constructor at all.

The sole exception is the eliminator for \perp , since it has no constructors, so there is no information to reveal. The computational interpretation of having a proof of \perp to eliminate is that we have reached an impossible dead branch, so what we do with it will never matter since it will never execute. The ability of eliminate higher-level proofs of falsehood into lower-level terms is useful when the type of a function rules out a particular branch, and the function needs to be assigned a lower level than its type.

Subsumption and downgrading. While lower-level terms cannot inspect higher-level terms, higher-level terms can inspect lower-level terms. Furthermore, a lower-level term can be raised to a higher level by *subsumption*: if a term is well typed at level ℓ_1 , then it is also well typed with the same type at a higher level $\ell_2 > \ell_1$.

However, if two terms are indistinguishable by some observer level ℓ_2 , then they can be indistinguishable by a *lower* observer level ℓ_1 by *downgrading*. From a security flow perspective, the higher the observer level, the more secure values may be observed, so the more things are distinguishable, since securer values will need to be compared as well instead of being ignored. Going down an observer level means more things are being hidden away, so more values will appear to be indistinguishable from one another.

4 Lattices of type theories

To track extensions on top of a base type theory, we begin with a bottom dependency level corresponding to this base. Each new dependency level above bottom would contain one additional construct corresponding to a new feature or axiom. For instance, there could be a K eliminator that type checks only at a level for UIP and above, or a built-in excluded middle axiom that type checks only at a level for classical reasoning and above.

$$\text{K } P \text{ } p \text{ } d :^{\text{uip}} P \text{ } p \qquad \text{em } A :^{\text{cl}} A \vee \neg A$$

Because level annotations are part of contexts and typing judgements, when a particular definition is safe to use is specified with precision, guaranteeing that a particular definition never exploits an extension without permission. A definition that can be typed at the bottom level would be safe to use at all levels by subsumption, and guaranteed to never employ, say, classical reasoning. Indistinguishability reflects this guarantee, as it asserts the property that uses of values from higher forbidden theories can only be trivial, such as ignoring the value or passing it around uninspected.

As dependency levels form a meet-semilattice, any two theories must have a meet, which corresponds to only the constructs that they both have in common, and which are therefore safe to use in either theory. If the join of two theories exist, then the constructs introduced in either one can be used at the joined level. Crucially, not all joins exist; a UIP level cannot be joined with a univalence level, since their coexistence is contradictory. The shape of the lattice depends on the compatibilities between theories, as well as implication order of extensions, since one theory that encompasses the consequences of another can be placed above that other theory. The compatibility graph in [Figure 1](#) is an example of a concrete lattice of theories, where the arrows point towards the greater theory and indicate the direction in which definitions can be raised.

The property that the type of a term can itself be well typed at any other level permits proving propositions about an incompatible theory without causing an inconsistency. For example, we can assert the computational behaviour of the K eliminator even in a theory with univalence.

$$\text{refl} :^{\text{ua}} \text{K } P \text{ refl } d \equiv^{\text{uip}} d$$

Following the rules of DCOI, each individual theory must be logically consistent. If an inconsistency exists at any theory, by the elimination of higher falsehoods, the inconsistency will propagate to all lower theories, including the bottom theory. Then by subsumption, the inconsistency at the bottom theory can be raised to propagate to all higher theories, and the entire lattice will be inconsistent. This means that if eliminating falsehoods works exactly as in DCOI, any theory that features nontermination will not be permitted.

As the goal is to exclude incompatible extensions from a proof assistant, disallowing logically inconsistent theories is a desirable trait. Nevertheless, there may be a few ways to modify falsehood elimination to permit them. One way is to instead disallow eliminating falsehoods to lower levels, only to the same level. Another is to take ideas from works from the Trellys project, such as λ^θ [\[Casinghino et al., 2014\]](#) and Sep³ [\[Kimmell et al., 2012\]](#), and impose a value or termination restriction on falsehoods being eliminated. If the falsehood in an inconsistent theory is nonterminating or not a value, then it cannot be eliminated at all, preventing its propagating to lower theories.

One catch is that a theory whose extension is a new definitional equality (*i.e.* a new rule for indistinguishability) cannot be contained within its level. Even if that equality is defined for a given observer level, it will hold for all lower observer levels by downgrading,

and the extension will be available to all lower theories. This effect cannot be mitigated using restrictive premises, as violating downgrading will violate many other desirable properties, including transitivity of definitional equality [Liu et al., 2025]. [What does this mean for SProp??]

4.1 Objectives

This project should answer the following questions:

1. What kinds of extensions would fit within this framework? Some broad classifications of extensions might be ones that add new type universes (*e.g.* SProp), ones that expand the rules for existing constructs (*e.g.* impredicativity, strong elimination), ones that add new computational constructs with reduction rules (*e.g.* Axiom K), and ones that add new axiomatic constructs without reduction rules (*e.g.* function and propositional extensionality, excluded middle).
2. How would a particular lattice of theories be modelled to show logical consistency? Ideally, the technique used to model a particular lattice should be broadly applicable and sufficiently extensible to be applied to a different lattice without redoing all the work, so that adding more extensions remains sustainable.
3. What are useful applications of being able to freely refer to other theories? The previous example that referred to the K eliminator, while true, is stating a trivial fact that is already provable within the UIP theory. Are there meaningful theorems about one theory that cannot be proven in that theory, but can be proven in a different yet potentially incompatible theory?

To answer these questions, the project would be divided into two portions. The first is an implementation of a type checker for a specific lattice of type theories. The lattice should contain a sufficiently diverse set of labels and their orders to answer [Question 1](#). [Figure 1](#) is a good place to start, as it contains theories in different classifications with different interactions.

To evaluate the viability of such a type checker, a standard library would be implemented to exercise all levels of the lattice. The standard libraries of Rocq³, Agda⁴, and Lean⁵ are good sources for inspiration, as many of their files use the features and axioms mentioned in [Section 2](#). An implementation would also serve to verify which extensions are indeed invalid by demonstrating the inconsistencies they yield.

With an implementation, useability concerns can be explored, such as level inference. Annotating definitions and arguments with every single extension it uses is an unreasonable burden on a practical proof assistant user, and it may be possible to infer the annotations either based on the syntactic constructs used or on what set of features are required for successful type checking. [TODO: More details?? This should also answer [Question 3](#) by being able to write and type check proofs.]

The second portion is a formalized and ideally mechanized proof of consistency. Because consistency is a semantic property and depends on the strength of the metatheory used to model the type theory, the formalization should model a lattice with (at least at first) only

³<https://coq.inria.fr/distrib/current/stdlib/>

⁴<https://agda.github.io/agda-stdlib/master/>

⁵https://leanprover-community.github.io/mathlib4_docs/

one level above the base theory, the simplest nontrivial lattice. The focus would be on how to combine two different models of type theory, not on accommodating as many as possible from the outset.

A sensible starting point would be the mechanization of DCOI^ω [Liu et al., 2025], which proves consistency and normalization of what would be the base theory in the lattice, and picking a reasonable feature to extend it with. However, this mechanization uses a syntactic logical relation indexed by well-founded universe levels as its semantic model, which may limit its extensibility; it cannot be straightforwardly extended to accommodate impredicativity, nor to accommodate typed definitional equality. A viable solution to [Question 2](#) must overcome this limitation.

A possible alternative is to use *syntactic* modelling [Boulier et al., 2017], which would involve a type-preserving translation into another type theory whose consistency is well established, guaranteeing consistency of the original system. While there exist syntactic models of other type theories [Gilbert et al., 2019; Winterhalter, 2024] with notions of irrelevance, which is one application of indistinguishability, a syntactic model of dependency tracking with dependent types is unexplored.

5 Prior work

This project builds on prior work on DCOI [Liu et al., 2024] and DCOI^ω [Liu et al., 2025], on both of which I am second author. For the former paper, I implemented a prototype type checker for DCOI augmented with inductive types by extending the minimal dependent type checker `pi-forall` [Weirich, 2022], and wrote examples using the type checker and motivating examples for DCOI. I also proved a few of the lemmas in the mechanization. For the latter paper, I wrote about half of the prose, mostly for the earlier sections, and proved a few of the lemmas as well. As part of an investigation toward incorporating a relational model for DCOI, I mechanized a PER model for MLTT based on the logical relation used to prove consistency of DCOI^ω , but ultimately the gap between MLTT and DCOI could not be bridged, so this work does not appear in the final paper.

Outside of DCOI, I have worked on Stratified Type Theory (StratTT) [Chan and Weirich, 2025], which annotates typing judgements similarly to dependency tracking, but the annotations are universe levels. Instead of stratifying universes into a hierarchy, typing judgements themselves are stratified, and there is a single universe whose type is itself. To ensure consistency in the presence of type-in-type, dependent functions may only quantify over types at strictly lower levels, which enforces predicativity. Although StratTT is not a dependency tracking system in the same way DCOI is, it demonstrates that there may be multiple ways to retain usage information that enforces desired properties such as consistency or irrelevance. Even if the particular setup for DCOI turns out not to be suitable for this project, it may be reasonable to instead explore a more StratTT-like structure.

6 Related work

6.1 Multi-system frameworks

Two-level type theory. The most similar work to extension tracking is two-level type theory (2LTT) [Altenkirch et al., 2016; Annenkov et al., 2023]. It consists of an inner homotopical type theory with univalence and an outer intensional type theory with UIP,

along with a conversion operation $\uparrow \cdot$ from the inner theory to the outer. The inner and outer type theories have independent type formers, including separate inner (path) equality types $\cdot \equiv^p \cdot$ and outer (strict) equality types $\cdot \equiv^s \cdot$. Importantly, converting an inner equality does *not* yield the outer equality type; otherwise, univalence on inner equalities could be converted to univalence on outer equalities, which would contradict UIP of the outer equality.

These inner and outer levels are different from dependency levels in DCOI, where all levels share the same type formers, and a lower equality can be raised to a higher equality by subsumption. In particular, if a lattice of type theories includes one that supports UIP, then that level will prove that proofs of the same equality at *all* levels are themselves equal. Meanwhile, in 2LTT, UIP only holds for proofs the outer equality and not for converted proofs of the inner equality.

The conversion operator can be thought of as an explicit subsumption, and how it interacts with the inner and outer equalities is similar to how DCOI’s propositional equality interacts with indistinguishability at lower and higher levels. To demonstrate, given two inner terms x, y , the implication $\uparrow x \equiv^s \uparrow y \rightarrow x \equiv^p y$ holds in 2LTT while the converse generally does not. Similarly, in DCOI, $x \equiv^H y \rightarrow x \equiv^L y$ holds by downgrading while the converse also generally does not.

The Trellys project. Instead of combining multiple type theories, the Trellys project focussed on combining dependently-typed logical reasoning with (potentially nonterminating) functional programming. The main works within the project are λ^θ [Casinghino et al., 2014], which classifies typing judgements of a single language into logical and programmatic fragments; Sep³ [Kimmell et al., 2012], which syntactically separate proofs from programs; and Nax [Ahn, 2014], which augments dependent types with Mendler-style recursion schemes.

Of these three, DCOI is closest to λ^θ , whose logical and programmatic classifications are similar to DCOI’s dependency levels. Because the logical fragment is subsumed within the programmatic fragment, the additional features found in the programmatic fragment can be thought of as an extension of the logical one. Notable features of the extension include isorecursive types and unrestricted recursion, allowing for nonterminating programs. Normalization of the logical fragment is ensured by only allowing boxed programs to be applied to its functions, only allowing unboxing of values, and restricting reduction to call by value. While the boxing mechanism is similar to domain level annotations in DCOI, the value restrictions are specific to handling presence of potential divergence.

The proof of normalization uses a step-indexed logical relation, where stepping only occurs in the programmatic fragment. However, λ^θ only has a single type universe with no type polymorphism, which the logical relation takes advantage of, so this proof technique does not extend to DCOI or any variant with a universe hierarchy.

6.2 Other proof assistants

Section 2 broadly covers a number of optional features and common axioms in Rocq, Lean, and Agda. There are many other proof assistants of varying relevance not discussed above.

Idris 2 [Brady, 2021] is a dependently typed programming language with partiality. Definitions can be marked as **total**, **covering**, or **partial**; in principle, totality ensures consistency, covering ensures type safety while allowing divergence, and partiality does not ensure either. Because partiality subsumes covering subsumes totality, these modifiers can also be thought of as members of a lattice. Idris 2 is closer to λ^θ than to DCOI, especially

because it is also call by value, and the partiality modifier is designed so that diverging terms can appear in types and be reasoned about while not being reduced during type checking. Although Idris 2 is based on Quantitative Type Theory [Atkey, 2018], there is no formal description of its core type system that describes all of its features, especially as it is a rapidly evolving language.

F* [Swamy et al., 2016] is a proof assistant with dependency tracking for different effects. Its dependency levels include a Tot level for total programs, and a Dv level above it for potentially diverging programs. In contrast to λ^θ , the total fragment of F* may not refer to the diverging fragment, so the proof of weak normalization of the total fragment involves a logical relation that does not consider levels above Tot. All the effects in F* are implemented as indexed monads, which get compiled away to the new core calculus TotalF* [Rastogi et al., 2021]; divergence aside, effects do not extend the internal type system.

7 Conclusion

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