



## **Lyra SFP Spot Feed Audit**

Lyra, 27 February 2024

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# 1. Introduction

iosiro was commissioned by Lyra (<https://www.lyra.finance/>) to conduct a smart contract audit of Lyra's SFP Price Feed contracts. The audit was performed by 2 auditors between 26 and 27 February and 2024, using 1 resource day.

This report is organized into the following sections.

- **Section 2 - Executive summary:** A high-level description of the findings of the audit.
- **Section 3 - Audit details:** A description of the scope and methodology of the audit.
- **Section 4 - Design specification:** An outline of the intended functionality of the smart contracts.
- **Section 5 - Detailed findings:** Detailed descriptions of the findings of the audit.

The information in this report should be used to understand the smart contracts' risk exposure better and as a guide to improving the security posture of the smart contracts by remediating the issues identified. The results of this audit reflect the in-scope source code reviewed at the time of the audit.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security flaws.
- Ensure that the smart contracts function according to the documentation provided.

Assessing the off-chain functionality associated with the contracts, for example, backend web application code, was outside of the scope of this audit.

Due to the unregulated nature and ease of transfer of cryptocurrencies, operations that store or interact with these assets are considered high risk from cyber attacks. As such, the highest level of security should be observed when interacting with these assets. This requires a forward-thinking approach, which takes into account the new and experimental nature of blockchain technologies. Strategies that should be used to encourage secure code development include:

- Security should be integrated into the development lifecycle, and the level of perceived security should not be limited to a single code audit.
- Defensive programming should be employed to account for unforeseen circumstances.

Current best practices should be followed where possible.

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## 2. Executive summary

This report presents the findings of an audit performed by iosiro on Lyra's SFP Price Feed smart contract.

### **Audit findings**

iosiro noted two informational findings: centralization risk and a missing event in an administrative function.

### **Recommendations**

At a high level, the security posture of the Lyra Protocol could be further strengthened by:

- Remediating the issues identified in this report and performing a review to ensure that the issues were correctly addressed.
- Performing additional audits at regular intervals, as security best practices, tools, and knowledge change over time. Additional audits throughout the project's lifespan ensure the longevity of the codebase.
- Continue their bug bounty program encouraging the responsible disclosure of security vulnerabilities in the system.

## 3. Audit details

### 3.1 Scope

The source code considered in-scope for the assessment is described below. Code from all other files was considered to be out-of-scope. Out-of-scope code that interacts with in-scope code was assumed to function as intended and not introduce any functional or security vulnerabilities for the purposes of this audit.

#### 3.1.1 Smart contracts

- **Project name:** Lyra V2
- **Commits:** [3bdbd4d](#)
- **Files:** SFPSpotFeed.sol

### 3.2 Methodology

The audit was conducted using a variety of techniques described below.

#### 3.2.1 Code review

The source code was manually inspected to identify potential security flaws. Code review is a useful approach for detecting security flaws, discrepancies between the specification and implementation, design improvements, and high-risk areas of the system.

#### 3.2.2 Dynamic analysis

The contracts were compiled, deployed, and tested in a test environment, both manually and through the test suite provided. Manual analysis was used to confirm that the code was functional and discover security issues that could be exploited.

#### 3.2.3 Automated analysis

Tools were used to automatically detect the presence of several types of security vulnerabilities, including reentrancy, timestamp dependency bugs, and transaction-ordering dependency bugs. Static analysis results were reviewed manually and any false positives were removed. Any true positive results are included in this report.

Static analysis tools commonly used include Slither, Securify, and MythX. Tools such as the Remix IDE, compilation output, and linters could also be used to identify potential areas of concern.

### 3.3 Risk ratings

Each issue identified during the audit has been assigned a risk rating. The rating is determined based on the criteria outlined below.

- **High risk:** The issue could result in a loss of funds for the contract owner or system users.
- **Medium risk:** The issue resulted in the code specification being implemented incorrectly.
- **Low risk:** A best practice or design issue that could affect the security of the contract.
- **Informational:** A lapse in best practice or a suboptimal design pattern that has a minimal risk of affecting the security of the contract.
- **Closed:** The issue was identified during the audit and has since been satisfactorily addressed, removing the risk it posed.

## 4. Design specification

*The following section outlines the intended functionality of the system at a high level. This specification is based on the implementation in the codebase. Any perceived points of conflict should be highlighted with the auditing team to determine the source of the discrepancy.*

The goal of the SFP Spot Feed module is to integrate support for Strands Finance's API tokens and SFP Vault Shares (SFP Tokens) into the Lyra V2 system, offering traders a new collateral option besides the current stablecoins, which aims to reduce the risk of insolvency typically associated with these stablecoins.

Each Strand's API token is equivalent to \$1 USD, backed by funds in an off-chain Segregated Funds Account. To efficiently distribute the account's yield, the tokens are placed into an ERC4646 vault.

Given the anticipated yield, the Lyra Spot Feed sets a price cap of 2% above or below the price of the system's quote asset (USDC) to avoid significant price deviations. While the Lyra system owner has the ability to adjust these limits to reflect any long-term yield changes, these short-term measures are designed to protect against inflation attacks.

## **5. Detailed findings**

The following section details the findings of the audit.

### **5.1 High-risk findings**

No high-risk issues were discovered during the audit.

### **5.2 Medium-risk findings**

No medium-risk issues were discovered during the audit.

### **5.3 Low-risk findings**

No low-risk issues were discovered during the audit.



## 5.4 Informational findings

### 5.4.1 Centralization risk

#### *General*

#### **Description**

The supply of Strands API token could be manipulated by addresses with the token's MINTER\_ROLE through minting and burning. Addresses with this role can mint arbitrary amounts of API token at any time and deposit these holdings into the StrandsSFP vault to receive SFP tokens, which can be used as collateral for the Lyra protocol.

While Lyra's SFPSpotFeed contract has controls in place for ensuring that the SFP token maintains an exchange rate with the API token that is approximately 1:1, there is no control in place to verify whether either of these tokens maintain the same exchange rate with the US dollar.

For the SFP token to maintain the expected value of \$1, additional controls beyond the scope of the contracts reviewed in the SFP Pilot codebase must be imposed by Strands Finance. These controls must ensure that minters can only mint API tokens equivalent to their deposited fiat USD amounts.

#### **Recommendation**

Mechanisms for ongoing verification of the proof of reserves for Strands Finance tokens should be well defined and integrated into management of the Lyra protocol. An emergency procedure should be in place for decommissioning the use SFP token as collateral in the event that its value is compromised.

### 5.4.2 Missing event

[SFPSpotFeed.sol#30-36](#)

#### Description

The admin setter function `SFPSpotFeed.setPriceBounds(...)` did not emit an event to indicate when the feed's price bounds were changed.

#### Recommendation

For maximum transparency, the `setPriceBounds(...)` function should emit an event showing that the price bounds were changed and recording their new values. For example:

```
event SFPPriceBoundsSet(uint minPrice, uint maxPrice)
```

## **5.5 Closed findings**

No findings were closed at the conclusion of the assessment.

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