



REVIEW DRAFT

FIDO NFC Protocol Specification v1.0

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Abstract

The FIDO U2F framework was designed to be able to support multiple authenticator form factors. This document describes the communication protocol with authenticators over Near Field Communication (NFC).

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Table of Contents

- 1. [Notation](#)
 - 1.1 [Key Words](#)
- 2. [Protocol](#)
- 3. [Framing](#)
- 4. [APDU Length](#)
- 5. [Applet selection](#)
- 6. [Implementation Considerations](#)
- A. [References](#)
 - A.1 [Normative references](#)

1. Notation

Type names, attribute names and element names are written as `code`.

String literals are enclosed in “”, e.g. “UAF-TLV”.

In formulas we use “|” to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

DOM APIs are described using the ECMAScript [ECMA-262] bindings for WebIDL [WebIDL].

UAF specific terminology used in this document is defined in [FIDOGlossary].

1.1 Key Words

The key words “**must**”, “**must not**”, “**required**”, “**shall**”, “**shall not**”, “**should**”, “**should not**”, “**recommended**”, “**may**”, and “**optional**” in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

2. Protocol

The general protocol between a FIDO client and authenticator over NFC is as follows:

1. Client sends an applet selection command
2. Authenticator replies with success
3. Client sends a command for an operation (register / authenticate)
4. Authenticator replies with response data or error

The Authenticator **must** reply to all commands within 800ms.

3. Framing


The NFC protocol **shall not** use any additional framing (unlike the USB HID protocol, for example). Instead, messages sent to an NFC authenticator **shall** follow the U2F raw

message format as defined in [U2FRawMsgs] in the bibliography. In the NFC protocol, either **short** or **extended length** APDU encoding is allowed.

4. APDU Length

Some responses may not fit into a short APDU response. For this reason, U2F authenticators **must** respond in the following way:

- If the request was encoded using **extended length** APDU encoding, the authenticator **must** respond using the extended length APDU response format.
- If the request was encoded using **short** APDU encoding, the authenticator **must** respond using ISO 7816-4 APDU chaining (see Section A.4). See below for an example:



5. Applet selection

A FIDO client **shall** always send an applet selection command to begin interaction with a FIDO authenticator via NFC. The structure of the applet selection command **shall** follow the same APDU structure as in the raw message format mentioned above.

The FIDO U2F AID consists of the following fields:

Field	Value
RID	0xA0000000647
AC	0x2F
AX	0x0001

As a result, the command for selecting the applet using the FIDO U2F AID is:

Field	Value
CLA	0x00
INS	0xA4
P1	0x04
P2	0x00

LEN	0x08
DATA	0xA0000006472F0001

In response to the applet selection command, the FIDO authenticator **shall** reply with its version string in the successful response. In this writing, the version string is "U2F_V2", hence a successful response to the applet selection command would consist of the following bytes:

0x5532465F56329000

6. Implementation Considerations

Correct and reliable functioning of the NFC U2F authenticator requires a reliable contactless communication between the NFC U2F authenticator and the contactless reader device. However, there are currently several relevant specifications describing the contactless proximity interface often summarized under the term "NFC".

In order to guarantee interoperability, the contactless interface of the NFC U2F authenticators and the various implementations of contactless readers should follow one of the following standards:

- a. NFC U2F authenticators should be designed according to ISO/IEC 14443 or ISO/IEC 18092. These standards are commonly used for FIDO authenticators, eID, passports, public transport fare media etc. It is highly recommended to test and certify the conformance of the authenticator to ISO/IEC 14443 or ISO/IEC 18092 by an independent party.
- b. For mobile use of FIDO authentication, the reader functionality of NFC-enabled mobile devices will typically be used for NFC U2F authenticators. Mobile devices should be designed according to NFC Forum Analog specification v2.0 or later. NFC Forum also offers testing and certification.

The testing and certification for the above listed specifications will ensure interoperability of NFC U2F authenticators and NFC mobile devices. Generally, all reader devices that may be used with unspecific types of NFC U2F authenticators (see a.) should be conformant to NFC Forum analog specification.

A. References

A.1 Normative references

[ECMA-262]

ECMAScript Language Specification. URL: <https://tc39.github.io/ecma262/>

[FIDOGlossary]

R. Lindemann, D. Baghdasaryan, B. Hill, J. Hodges, *FIDO Technical Glossary*.

FIDO Alliance Proposed Standard. URLs:

HTML: [fido-glossary-v1.1-rd-20160915.html](https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/fido-u2f-v1.1-rd-20160915.html)

PDF: [fido-glossary-v1.1-rd-20160915.pdf](https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/fido-u2f-v1.1-rd-20160915.pdf)

[RFC2119]

S. Bradner. *Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels* March 1997. Best Current Practice. URL: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119>

[U2FRawMsgs]

D. Balfanz, *FIDO U2F Raw Message Formats v1.0* FIDO Alliance Review Draft (Work in progress.) URL: [.fido-u2f-raw-message-formats-v1.1-rd-20160915.pdf](https://fidoalliance.org/specifications/fido-u2f-v1.1-rd-20160915.pdf)

[WebIDL]

Cameron McCormack; Boris Zbarsky. *WebIDL Level 1*. 15 September 2016. W3C Proposed Recommendation. URL: <https://www.w3.org/TR/WebIDL-1/>