



REVIEW DRAFT

# FIDO Bluetooth Specification v1.0

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## Abstract

The FIDO U2F framework was designed to be able to support multiple Authenticator form factors. This document describes the communication protocol with Authenticators over Bluetooth Smart (referred to in this document as *Bluetooth Low Energy* or *BLE*).

There are multiple form factors possible for Authenticators. Some might be low cost, low power devices, and others might be implemented as an additional feature of a more powerful device, such as a smartphone. The design proposed here is meant to support multiple form factors, including but not necessarily limited to these two examples.

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## A.1 Normative references

### 1. Notation

Type names, attribute names and element names are written as **code**.

String literals are enclosed in `"`, e.g. `"UAF-TLV"`.

In formulas we use `|` to denote byte wise concatenation operations.

DOM APIs are described using the ECMAScript [\[ECMA-262\]](#) bindings for WebIDL [\[WebIDL\]](#).

UAF specific terminology used in this document is defined in [\[FIDO Glossary\]](#).

#### 1.1 Key Words

The key words **"must"**, **"must not"**, **"required"**, **"shall"**, **"shall not"**, **"should"**, **"should not"**, **"recommended"**, **"may"**, and **"optional"** in this document are to be interpreted as described in [\[RFC2119\]](#).

### 2. Conformance

Authenticator and Client devices using BLE **shall** conform to Bluetooth Core Specification 4.0 or later [\[BTCORE\]](#)

Bluetooth(tm) SIG specified UUID values **shall** be found on the Assigned Numbers website [\[BTASSNUM\]](#)

### 3. Pairing

BLE is a long-range wireless protocol and thus has several implications for privacy, security, and overall user-experience. Because it is wireless, BLE may be subject to monitoring, injection, and other network-level attacks.

For these reasons, Clients and Authenticators **must** create and use a long-term link key (LTK) and **shall** encrypt all communications. Authenticator **must** never use short term keys.

Because BLE has poor ranging (i.e., there is no good indication of proximity), it may not be clear to a FIDO Client with which BLE Authenticator it should communicate. Pairing is the only mechanism defined in this protocol to ensure that FIDO Clients are interacting with the expected BLE Authenticator. As a result, Authenticator manufacturers **should** instruct users to avoid performing Bluetooth pairing in a public space such as a cafe, shop or train station.

One disadvantage of using standard Bluetooth pairing is that the pairing is "system-wide" on most operating systems. That is, if an Authenticator is paired to a FIDO Client which resides on an operating system where Bluetooth pairing is "system-wide", then any application on that device might be able to interact with an Authenticator. This issue is discussed further in Implementation Considerations.

### 4. Link Security

For BLE connections, the Authenticator **shall** enforce **Security Mode 1, Level 2** (unauthenticated pairing with encryption) or **Security Mode 1, Level 3** (authenticated pairing with encryption) before any U2F messages are exchanged.

### 5. Framing

Conceptually, framing defines an encapsulation of U2F raw messages responsible for correct transmission of a single request and its response by the transport layer.

All requests and their responses are conceptually written as a single frame. The format of the requests and responses is given first as complete frames. Fragmentation is discussed next for each type of transport layer.

## 5.1 Request from Client to Authenticator

Request frames must have the following format

Offset	Length	Mnemonic	Description
0	1	<b>CMD</b>	Command identifier
1	1	<b>HLEN</b>	High part of data length
2	1	<b>LLEN</b>	Low part of data length
3	s	<b>DATA</b>	Data (s is equal to the length)

Supported commands are **PING** and **MSG**. The constant values for them are described below.

The data format for the **MSG** command is defined in [U2FRawMsgs]. For the U2F over Bluetooth protocol, U2F raw messages are encoded using **extended length** APDU encoding.

## 5.2 Response from Authenticator to Client

Response frames must have the following format, which share a similar format to the request frames:

Offset	Length	Mnemonic	Description
0	1	<b>STAT</b>	Response status
1	1	<b>HLEN</b>	High part of data length
2	1	<b>LLEN</b>	Low part of data length
3	s	<b>DATA</b>	Data (s is equal to the length)

When the status byte in the response is the same as the command byte in the request, the response is a successful response. The value **ERROR** indicates an error, and the response data contains an error code as a variable-length, big-endian integer. The constant value for **ERROR** is described below.

Note that the errors sent in this response are errors at the encapsulation layer, e.g., indicating an incorrectly formatted request, or possibly an error communicating with the Authenticator's U2F message processing layer. Errors reported by the U2F message processing layer itself are considered a success from the encapsulation layer's point of view, and are reported as a complete **MSG** response.

Data format is defined in [U2FRawMsgs]. Note that as per [U2FRawMsgs] (and unlike the NFC transport specification), all communication **shall** be done using extended length APDU format.

## 5.3 Command, Status, and Error constants

The COMMAND constants and values are:

Command Constant	Value
PING	0x81
KEEPALIVE	0x82
MSG	0x83
ERROR	0xbf

The KEEPALIVE command contains a single byte with the following possible values:

Status Constant	Value
PROCESSING	0x01
TUP_NEEDED	0x02
RFU	0x00, 0x03-0xFF

The ERROR constants and values are:

Error Constant	Value	Meaning
ERR_INVALID_CMD	0x01	The command in the request is unknown/invalid
ERR_INVALID_PAR	0x02	The parameter(s) of the command is/are invalid or missing
ERR_INVALID_LEN	0x03	The length of the request is invalid
ERR_INVALID_SEQ	0x04	The sequence number is invalid
ERR_REQ_TIMEOUT	0x05	The request timed out
NA	0x06	Value reserved (HID)
NA	0x0a	Value reserved (HID)
NA	0x0b	Value reserved (HID)
ERR_OTHER	0x7f	Other, unspecified error

## 6. GATT Service Description

This profile defines two roles: FIDO Authenticator and FIDO Client.

- The FIDO Client shall be a GATT Client
- The FIDO Authenticator shall be a GATT Server

The [following figure](#) illustrates the mandatory services and characteristics that **shall** be offered by a FIDO Authenticator as part of its GATT server:




Fig. 1 Mandatory GATT services and characteristics that **must** be offered by a FIDO Authenticator. Note that the Generic Access Service (GAS) is not present as it is already mandatory for any BLE compliant device.

The table below summarizes additional GATT sub-procedure requirements for a FIDO Authenticator (GATT Server) beyond those required by all GATT Servers.

GATT Sub-Procedure	Requirements
Write Characteristic Value	Mandatory
Notifications	Mandatory
Read Characteristic Descriptors	Mandatory
Write Characteristic Descriptors	Mandatory

The table below summarizes additional GATT sub-procedure requirements for a FIDO Client (GATT Client) beyond those required by all GATT Clients.

GATT Sub-Procedure	Requirements
Discover All Primary Services	(*)
Discover Primary Services by Service UUID	(*)
Discover All Characteristics of a Service	(**)
Discover Characteristics by UUID	(**)
Discover All Characteristic Descriptors	Mandatory
Read Characteristic Value	Mandatory
Write Characteristic Value	Mandatory
Notification	Mandatory
Read Characteristic Descriptors	Mandatory
Write Characteristic Descriptors	Mandatory

(\*): Mandatory to support at least one of these sub-procedures.

(\*\*): Mandatory to support at least one of these sub-procedures.



Other GATT sub-procedures may be used if supported by both client and server.

Specifics of each service are explained below. In the following descriptions: all values are big-endian coded, all strings are in UTF-8 encoding, and any characteristics not mentioned explicitly are optional.

## 6.1 U2F Service

An Authenticator **shall** implement the U2F Service described below. The UUID for the FIDO U2F GATT service is **0xFFFD**, it shall be declared as a Primary Service. The service contains the following characteristics:

Characteristic Name	Mnemonic	Property	Length	UUID
U2F Control Point	<b>u2fControlPoint</b>	Write	Defined by Vendor (20-512 bytes)	F1D0FFF1-DEAA-ECEE-B42F-C9BA7ED623BB
U2F Status	<b>u2fStatus</b>	Notify	N/A	F1D0FFF2-DEAA-ECEE-B42F-C9BA7ED623BB
U2F Control Point Length	<b>u2fControlPointLength</b>	Read	2 bytes	F1D0FFF3-DEAA-ECEE-B42F-C9BA7ED623BB
U2F Service Revision	<b>u2fServiceRevision</b>	Read	Defined by Vendor (20-512 bytes)	0x2A28
U2F Service Revision Bitfield	<b>u2fServiceRevisionBitfield</b>	Read/Write	See below, at least 1 byte	F1D0FFF4-DEAA-ECEE-B42F-C9BA7ED623BB

**u2fControlPoint** is a write-only command buffer.

**u2fStatus** is a notify-only response attribute. The Authenticator will send a series of notifications on this attribute with a maximum length of (ATT\_MTU-3) using the response frames defined above. This mechanism is used because this results in a faster transfer speed compared to a notify-read combination.

**u2fControlPointLength** defines the maximum size in bytes of a single write request to **u2fControlPoint**. This value **shall** be between 20 and 512.

**u2fServiceRevision** defines the revision of the U2F Service. The value is a UTF-8 string. For version 1.0 of the specification, the value **u2fServiceRevision** **shall** be **1.0** or in raw bytes: **0x312e30**. This field **shall** be omitted if protocol version 1.0 is not supported.

**u2fServiceRevisionBitfield** defines the revision of the U2F Service. The value is a bit field. Each bit represents the Authenticator's support of a particular protocol version. A bit value of 1 indicates support, while value 0 indicates lack of support. The length of the bitfield is 1 or more bytes. All bytes that are 0 are omitted if all the following bytes are 0 too. The bit field is big endian encoded with the most significant bit representing version 1.1 support, the next most significant bit, representing the next protocol version,

etc. If only version 1.0 is supported, this characteristic **shall** be omitted. If the `u2fServiceRevision` characteristic is present or more than 1 bit in this `u2fServiceRevisionBitfield` characteristic is 1, the client **shall** write the value of the requested protocol version to be used for the lifetime of this connection. If `u2fServiceRevision` characteristic is not present and only one bit in `u2fServiceRevisionBitfield` is set, the version that bit represents **shall** be the default.

Byte (left to right)	Bit	Version
0	7	1.1

For example, a device that only supports 1.1 will only have a `u2fServiceRevisionBitfield` characteristic of length 1 with value 0x80.

The `u2fServiceRevision` Characteristic **may** include a Characteristic Presentation Format descriptor with format value 0x19, **UTF-8 String**.

## 6.2 Device Information Service

An Authenticator **shall** implement the Device Information Service [[BTDIS](#)] with the following characteristics:

- Manufacturer Name String
- Model Number String
- Firmware Revision String

All values for the Device Information Service are left to the vendors. However, vendors should not create uniquely identifiable values so that Authenticators do not become a method of tracking users.

## 6.3 Generic Access Service

Every Authenticator **shall** implement the Generic Access Service [[BTGAS](#)] with the following characteristics:

- Device Name
- Appearance

## 7. Protocol Overview

The general overview of the communication protocol follows:

1. Authenticator advertises the FIDO U2F service.
2. Client scans for Authenticator advertising the FIDO U2F service.
3. Client performs characteristic discovery on the Authenticator.
4. If not already paired, the Client and Authenticator **shall** perform BLE pairing and create a LTK. Authenticator **shall** only allow connections from previously bonded Clients without user intervention.
5. Client reads the `u2fControlPointLength` characteristic.
6. Client registers for notifications on the `u2fStatus` characteristic.
7. Client writes a request (e.g., an enroll request) into the `u2fControlPoint` characteristic.
8. Authenticator evaluates the request and responds by sending notifications over `u2fStatus` characteristic.
9. The protocol completes when either:
  - The Client unregisters for notifications on the `u2fStatus` characteristic, or:
  - The connection times out and is closed by the Authenticator.



## 8. Authenticator Advertising Format

When advertising, the Authenticator **shall** advertise the FIDO U2F service UUID.

When advertising, the Authenticator **may** include the TxPower value in the advertisement (see [\[BTXPLAD\]](#)).

When advertising in pairing mode, the Authenticator **shall** either: (1) set the LE Limited Mode bit to zero and the LE General Discoverable bit to one OR (2) set the LE Limited Mode bit to one and the LE General Discoverable bit to zero. When advertising in non-pairing mode, the Authenticator **shall** set both the LE Limited Mode bit and the LE General Discoverable Mode bit to zero in the Advertising Data Flags.

The advertisement **may** also carry a device name which is distinctive and user-identifiable. For example, "ACME Key" would be an appropriate name, while "XJS4" would not be.

The Authenticator **shall** also implement the Generic Access Profile [\[BTGAP\]](#) and Device Information Service [\[BTDIS\]](#), both of which also provide a user friendly name for the device which could be used by the Client. The BTDIS **shall** contain the PnP ID field [\[BTPNPID\]](#).

It is not specified when or how often an Authenticator should advertise, instead that flexibility is left to manufacturers.

## 9. Requests

Clients **should** make requests by connecting to the Authenticator and performing a write into the `u2fControlPoint` characteristic.

## 10. Responses

Authenticators **should** respond to Clients by sending notifications on the `u2fStatus` characteristic.

Some Authenticators might alert users or prompt them to complete the test of user presence (e.g., via sound, light, vibration) Upon receiving any request, the Authenticators **shall** send KEEPALIVE commands every `kKeepAliveMillis` milliseconds until completing processing the commands. While the Authenticator is processing the request the KEEPALIVE command will contain status `PROCESSING`. If the Authenticator is waiting to complete the Test of User Presence, the KEEPALIVE command will contain status `TUP_NEEDED`. While waiting to complete the Test of User Presence, the Authenticator **may** alert the user (e.g., by flashing) in order to prompt the user to complete the test of user presence. As soon the Authenticator has completed processing and confirmed user presence, it **shall** stop sending KEEPALIVE commands, and send the reply.

Upon receiving a KEEPALIVE command, the Client **shall** assume the Authenticator is still processing the command; the Client **shall** not resend the command. The Authenticator **shall** continue sending KEEPALIVE messages at least every `kKeepAliveMillis` to indicate that it is still handling the request. Until a client-defined timeout occurs, the Client **shall not** move on to other devices when it receives a KEEPALIVE with `TUP_NEEDED` status, as it knows this is a device that can satisfy its request.

## 11. Framing fragmentation

A single request/response sent over BLE **may** be split over multiple writes and notifications, due to the inherent limitations of BLE which is not currently meant for large messages. Frames are fragmented in the following way:

A frame is divided into an *initialization fragment* and one or more *continuation*

fragments.

An initialization fragment is defined as:

Offset	Length	Mnemonic	Description
0	1	CMD	Command identifier
1	1	HLEN	High part of data length
2	1	LLEN	Low part of data length
3	0 to (maxLen - 3)	DATA	Data

where **maxLen** is the maximum packet size supported by the characteristic or notification.

In other words, the start of an initialization fragment is indicated by setting the high bit in the first byte. The subsequent two bytes indicate the total length of the frame, in big-endian order. The first **maxLen** - 3 bytes of data follow.

Continuation fragments are defined as:

Offset	Length	Mnemonic	Description
0	1	SEQ	Packet sequence 0x00..0x7f (high bit always cleared)
1	0 to (maxLen - 1)	DATA	Data

where **maxLen** is the maximum packet size supported by the characteristic or notification.

In other words, continuation fragments begin with a sequence number, beginning at 0, implicitly with the high bit cleared. The sequence number must wrap around to 0 after reaching the maximum sequence number of 0x7f.

Example for sending a **PING** command with 40 bytes of data with a **maxLen** of 20 bytes:

Frame	Bytes
0	[810028] [17 bytes of data]
1	[00] [19 bytes of data]
2	[01] [4 bytes of data]

Example for sending a ping command with 400 bytes of data with a **maxLen** of 512 bytes:

Frame	Bytes
0	[810190] [400 bytes of data]

## 12. Implementation Considerations

### 12.1 Bluetooth pairing: Client considerations

As noted in the Pairing section, a disadvantage of using standard Bluetooth pairing is that the pairing is "system-wide" on most operating systems. That is, if an Authenticator is paired to a FIDO Client which resides on an operating system where Bluetooth pairing

is "system-wide", then any application on that device might be able to interact with an Authenticator. This poses both security and privacy risks to users.

While Client operating system security is partly out of FIDO's scope, further revisions of this specification **may** propose mitigations for this issue.

## 12.2 Bluetooth pairing: Authenticator considerations

The method to put the Authenticator into Pairing Mode should be such that it is not easy for the user to do accidentally **especially** if the pairing method is Just Works. For example, the action could be pressing a physically recessed button or pressing multiple buttons. A visible or audible cue that the Authenticator is in Pairing Mode should be considered. As a counter example, a silent, long press of a single non-recessed button is not advised as some users naturally hold buttons down during regular operation.

Note that at times, Authenticators may legitimately receive communication from an unpaired device. For example, a user attempts to use an Authenticator for the first time with a new Client: he turns it on, but forgets to put the Authenticator into pairing mode. In this situation, after connecting to the Authenticator, the Client will notify the user that he needs to pair his Authenticator. The Authenticator should make it easy for the user to do so, e.g., by not requiring the user to wait for a timeout before being able to enable pairing mode.

Some Client platforms (most notably iOS) do not expose the AD Flag LE Limited and General Discoverable Mode bits to applications. For this reason, Authenticators are also strongly recommended to include the Service Data field [BTSD] in the Scan Response. The Service Data field field is 3 or more octets long. This allows the Flags field to be extended while using the minimum number of octets within the data packet. All octets that are 0x00 are not transmitted as long as all other octets after that octet are also 0x00 and it is not the first octet after the service UUID. The first 2 bytes contain the FIDO Service UUID, the following bytes are flag bytes.

To help Clients show the correct UX, Authenticators can use the Service Data field to specify whether or not Authenticators will require a Passkey (PIN) during pairing.

Service Data Bit	Meaning (if set)
7	Device is in pairing mode.
6	Device requires Passkey Entry [BTPESTK].

## 12.3 Handling command completion

It is important for low-power devices to be able to conserve power by shutting down or switching to a lower-power state when they have satisfied a Client's requests. However, the U2F protocol makes this hard as it typically includes more than one command/response. This is especially true if a user has more than one key handle associated with an account or identity, multiple key handles may need to be tried before getting a successful outcome. Furthermore, Clients that fail to send followup commands in a timely fashion may cause the Authenticator to drain its battery by staying powered up anticipating more commands.

A further consideration is to ensure that a user is not confused about which command she is confirming by completing the test of user presence. That is, if a user performs the test of user presence, that action should perform exactly one operation.

We combine these considerations into the following series of recommendations:

- Upon initial connection to an Authenticator, and upon receipt of a response from an Authenticator, if a Client has more commands to issue, the Client **must** transmit the next command or fragment within `kMaxCommandTransmitDelayMillis` milliseconds.

- Upon final response from an Authenticator, if the Client decides it has no more commands to send it should indicate this by disabling notifications on the `u2fStatus` characteristic. When the notifications are disabled the Authenticator may enter a low power state or disconnect and shut down.
- Any time the Client wishes to send a U2F APDU, it must have first enabled notifications on the `u2fStatus` characteristic and wait for the ATT acknowledgment to be sure the Authenticator is ready to process APDU messages.
- Upon successful completion of a command which required a test of user presence, e.g. upon a successful authentication or registration command, the Authenticator can assume the Client is satisfied, and **may** reset its state or power down.
- Upon sending a command response that did not consume a test of user presence, the Authenticator **must** assume that the Client may wish to initiate another command, and leave the connection open until the Client closes it or until a timeout of at least `kErrorWaitMillis` elapses. Examples of command responses that do not consume user presence include failed authenticate or register commands, as well as get version responses, whether successful or not. After `kErrorWaitMillis` milliseconds have elapsed without further commands from a Client, an Authenticator **may** reset its state or power down.

Constant	Value
<code>kMaxCommandTransmitDelayMillis</code>	1500 milliseconds
<code>kErrorWaitMillis</code>	2000 milliseconds
<code>kKeepAliveMillis</code>	500 milliseconds

## 12.4 Data throughput

BLE does not have particularly high throughput, this can cause noticeable latency to the user if request/responses are large. Some ways that implementers can reduce latency are:

- Support the maximum MTU size allowable by hardware (up to the 512 bytes max from the BLE specifications).
- Make the attestation certificate as small as possible, do not include unnecessary extensions.

## 12.5 Advertising

Though the standard doesn't appear to mandate it (in any way that we've found thus far), advertising and device discovery seems to work better when the Authenticators advertise on all 3 advertising channels and not just one.

## 12.6 Authenticator Address Type

In order to enhance the user's privacy and specifically to guard against tracking, it is recommended that Authenticators use Resolvable Private Addresses (RPAs) instead of static addresses.

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