

Domain Name System (DNS)

Outline

- Ecosystem and overview
 - You'll notice multiple occurrences of “\$”
- DNS protocol (Olaf's “Block_01” slides)
- DNSSEC (Olaf's “Block_03” slides)
- DNSSEC deployment
- DNS privacy

What's the DNS?

- **The** single world-wide distributed naming system/database that essentially replaced the host file because that got too big
 - There's also the DNS protocol, which is how clients and servers interact
- Main purpose is to map names to IP addresses so that applications and humans can deal with names rather than addresses
 - tcd.ie is easier to type/remember than something within 134.226/16 or 2001:770:10::/48
 - IPv4 addresses use A resource record (RR) type
 - IPv6 addresses use AAAA resource record (RR) type
- The DNS is also used for many other purposes
 - Mail address right-hand-side to mail server name(s) via MX RR
 - DNS block lists of spam sources (and other block lists)
 - “Passive DNS” monitoring for various security purposes
 - Telling lies (RPZ) to help people avoid “bad” domains
 - State- or enterprise-level censorship
 - ...

DNS names

- We know that tcd.ie is a DNS name, right?
 - tcd.ie is a domain
- www.tcd.ie and down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie are also DNS names
 - Those are Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs)
- tcd.ie is the parent of cs.tcd.ie, cs.tcd.ie is a child of tcd.ie
- TCD internally (modulo cloudiness) manage the names below tcd.ie within their “zone,” often spoken about as if managed via a “zone file”
- Reality: most zone data is probably in databases, but tiny domains can keep all their data in one file and there’s a standard format for zone files that’s supported by most DNS tools

Zone file fragments

```
responsible.ie.      3600      IN SOA  ns.my-own.net. hostmaster.responsible.ie. (
2018013228 ; serial
86400       ; refresh (1 day)
7200       ; retry (2 hours)
3600000    ; expire (5 weeks 6 days 16 hours)
3600       ; minimum (1 hour)
)
86399      NS   ns.my-own.net.
86399      NS   ns1.frobbit.se.
86399      NS   ns2.frobbit.se.
3600      A    185.24.233.211
3600      AAAA  2a04:2e00:1:67::a
3600      MX   10 vps.responsible.ie.
3600      TXT  "v=spf1 mx -all"
3600      CAA  128 issue "letsencrypt.org"
www.responsible.ie.  3600      IN CNAME vps.responsible.ie.
imap.responsible.ie. 3600      IN CNAME vps.responsible.ie.
mail.responsible.ie. 3600      IN CNAME vps.responsible.ie.
smtp.responsible.ie. 3600      IN CNAME vps.responsible.ie.
vps.responsible.ie.  3600      IN A    185.24.233.211
                   3600      AAAA  2a04:2e00:1:67::a
```

Notes:

- 1) The trailing “.” characters (e.g. in “vps.responsible.ie.”) matter!
- 2) The real zone file for this domain has lots of other security cruft to do with DNSSEC, the WebPKI and DANE (SMTP/TLS) – maybe pop that up to show it, ‘cause it won’t fit on a slide:-)

DNS Ecosystem

- The root: “.”
- Top Level Domains (TLDs)
 - Country-code TLDs (ccTLDs): .ie, .uk, .is,...
 - Each more or less do what they want
 - IEDR manage .ie zone, CZ.nic manage .cz, ...
 - Generic TLDs (gTLDs): .com, .org, .net,...
 - Run under ICANN's oversight (<https://icann.org>)
 - There are ~1000 of those now (because \$\$\$)
- Second level domains (2LDs), or effective Top Level Domains (eTLD)
 - Comply with parental controls (to some extent)
 - Examples: example.com, tcd.ie, amazon.com
 - .com zone has ~150M names, .ie has ~200k, .org has ~10M
- Third level and below: controlled by 2LD/eTLD
 - E.g. down.dsg.cs.tcd.ie

Public Suffix List (PSL)

- Some TLDs don't have all 2LDs directly below the TLD, e.g. .co.uk, .com.au etc.
- Causes a problem for browsers, when deciding whether to re-tx cookies in HTTP
- Ickky “solution” is the PSL
 - <https://publicsuffix.org/> maintained by Mozilla and others
 - A text file with 13,085 lines! (as of 20200218)
- PSL ideally would be maintained via information in the DNS, but is not, and attempts to do that (IETF DBOUND wg) have all failed so far
 - I'm involved in another related effort (RDBD) that looks like it'll also fail;-(
 - RDBD doesn't try replace the PSL but could eventually feed into it
 - Spec: <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-brotman-rdbd>
 - Code: <https://github.com/sftcd/rdbd-deebeedeerrr/>
- Indicative of how DNS can be messy but works despite all

Registry/Registrar/Registrant

- Top Level Domains (TLDs) are operated by registries,
 - IEDR for .ie
 - Affilias operate a whole bunch of ccTLDs and gTLDs
 - <https://afilias.info/global-registry-services>
 - Public Interest Registry (PIR) operate .org (and feed \$\$\$ to Internet Society, which feeds \$\$ to IETF and RFC editor – notwithstanding current controversy about sale of PIR)
- Registrars are accredited by registries and deal with registration of names (and transfer and de-registration)
- Registrant is the entity that wants/has a name registered
 - Per-registry rules may apply, e.g. “connection to Ireland” for .ie
- Registries handle name conflicts, e.g. when trademark issues arise via some dispute resolution process (can involve \$\$\$)
- Registration costs to registrants from registrars vary from “free” to ~\$1000, but mostly ~\$10 per year
 - Some money flows up from registrar to registry (ccTLD or gTLD) and to ICANN (for gTLDs)
- ICANN auction new gTLDs now and then
 - Costs ~\$1M+ to play that game, ICANN have ~\$150M resting in an account as a result

Registry/Registrar

- Registrar <-> registry protocols vary a lot
 - IEDR have a web console and an “API” that accredited registrars can use
 - Extended Provisionin Protocol (EPP)
 - Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)
- whois
 - “Legacy” protocol where registry publishes some registrant data
 - May contain personally identifying information (PII)
 - You can install “whois” on you machine or use via the web
 - Lots of fun with ICANN and whois and GDPR

DNS Servers

- A (logical) zone file for a domain is served by an Authoritative DNS server
- Mostly, TLDs will (almost) insist that 2 or 3 authoritative servers are serving each of their 2LDs for redundancy (the 2LD picks the servers, but the TLD may check)
 - The DNS protocol has “zone transfer” commands (e.g. AXFR) that help syncing multiple servers
- Recursive DNS servers query the Authoritatives to resolve names, e.g. starting at “.” ask “where is .ie”; get answer; at “.ie” ask “where is tcd.ie”; at “tcd.ie” ask “what is the IP for www.tcd.ie”
- Clients (your laptop/phone) ask Recursive servers to resolve names e.g. “where is tcd.ie” and if it doesn’t already know the answer (or if earlier answers have timed out) the Recursive will do as much of the dance above as needs (re-)doing
- The protocol spoken between clients, Recursives and Authoritatives is the DNS protocol
- On linuxes, the “dig” tool allows you to explore the DNS (“nslookup” on windoze)

The root zone

- The root zone “.” is special – it’s content is (carefully) managed by IANA and handed over to the root server operators...
 - <https://www.iana.org/domains/root/servers>
- The root server operators serve the root zone – about 1000 instances worldwide in about 130 countries, with subsets of those managed each of by 12 organisations via 13 named root servers (there was one merge in the last couple of decades)
- Most root zone instances are accessed using anycast IP routing
 - Other public authoritative and even recursive servers (e.g. QuadN’s such as 8.8.8.8 or 1.1.1.1 or 9.9.9.9) also use anycast for better performance
- The root zone is pretty stable – and the Internet really needs that to be the case
- Every Recursive needs at least one root server IP to start

Olaf's DNS intro

Olaf's DNSSEC intro

DNSSEC Deployment

- Dependency on parent (for DS record) makes DNSSEC hard to deploy
 - Should registrar or registrant contact parent?
 - If registrar, how does zone get signed, or, how does DS/KSK get to registrar? (usually via a crappy web form)
 - If registrant, how does registry know it's dealing with the right party (registrant has a/c at registrar, not registry)
- Early DNSSEC deployments broke things (and still can)
 - DNSSEC adds a new thing to manage (RRSIG expiry) that you can muck up
 - But many zones these days are likely fairly dynamic (VMs) so maybe this is lessening as a downside
- There are reported issues with stubs and recursives that don't handle DNSSEC well, or who even strip DNSSEC RRs (typical middlebox issue!)
 - Browsers are quite intolerant of >1% additional failures
- There was also lots of delay getting the root zone signed (only happened in 2010)
- Some zone maintainers (say they) cannot sign their zones due to lack of control over names
- Some zone maintainers claim that DNSSEC isn't worthwhile for them

DNSSEC Deployment

- CDS/CDNSKEY (RFC 8078) provides a way for zone maintainer to publish a “new” DS (CDS) or new KSK (CDKSKEY) in their zone
 - Parent scans children (who are known to do this) and can pick up new DS value that can be used to populate parent zone file (if various conditions met)
 - Hasn’t seen much deployment yet, but should help with ongoing maintainance, allowing much easier changes to KSKs
- I know of one pentester who like to see DNSSEC as it tells him that his customers have asserted control over their DNS
- DNSSEC does offer real protection though, e.g. the DNSpoinage attack would likely have been detected and some aspects of those attacks may have been prevented
 - <https://krebsonsecurity.com/2019/02/a-deep-dive-on-the-recent-widespread-dns-hijacking-attacks/>
- Some big Registrars are starting to include DNSSEC in a bundle
 - <https://ie.godaddy.com/hosting/premium-dns>
- Some TLDs are incentivising registrars (via discounts of maybe 10% of \$) to deploy DNSSEC for new domains
 - Leads to more deployment, not clear if more security

DNSSEC Deployment

- Result: ~1% of 2LDs signed, maybe 3% of names covered
- Some stats: <https://www.statdns.com/>
 - Shows about 1% of .com signed but 82% of .se
- More stats: <https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/>
 - Shows similar numbers but sloooooowly increasing
- Some major web properties/CDNs are not signed, others are
 - Not sure why – maybe something to do with internal systems
- “Economic incentives on DNSSEC deployment: time to move from quantity to quality”
 - <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8406223/>
 - <https://research.tue.nl/en/publications/economic-incentives-on-dnssec-deployment-time-to-move-from-quantity-to-quality>

DNS Privacy

- All data published in DNS is public, so historically there was little/no interest in confidentiality when DNSSEC was defined
- But the fact of access to DNS data can be sensitive, e.g. if you access <https://www.aa.org/> that may say something about your life
- RFC7626 is a problem statement for DNS privacy
 - Names, timing, IP addresses (e.g. if local recursive), client-subnet
- Mitigations:
 - Use Tor browser
 - QNAME minimisation (RFC7816)
 - Define ways to provide confidentiality for DNS traffic
 - Don't (always) send EDNS(0) client subnet

DNS over TLS (DoT)

- IETF “DPRIVE” working group has defined how to run DNS over TLS (DoT, RFC7858)
- DoT is usable today between stub and recursive
- Generally, you replace your system stub resolver (e.g. systemd, dnsmasq) with something that can do DoT (e.g. stubby+unbound – I do that)
 - <https://dnsprivacy.org/wiki/display/DP/DNS+Privacy+Daemon+-+Stubby>
- There are public recursives now who offer that kind of “DNS privacy service”, e.g. 9.9.9.9, 1.1.1.1, ...

DoT with padding

- DNS query or answer lengths may leak information about names
- RFC 7830 describes an EDNS(0) padding option
- Responders **MUST** pad if requesters do (and **MAY** in any case)
- RFC 8467 describes ways in which one might use padding and recommends:
 - Pad queries to block lengths of $N \times 128$ octets
 - Pad responses to block lengths of $N \times 468$ octets
 - Don't do random stuff (signal leaks), maximal-length is wasteful (esp if we go $>$ MTU)

Recursive <-> Authoritative

- Today, DoT is usable for stub <-> recursive
- Would like to also secure recursive <-> authoritative
- Can't amortise TLS state so much so needs lots of performance testing, esp., if done near root
- Not clear if/how to authenticate authoritative (various proposal being considered)
- Might get deployed in medium term, but not clear

DNS over HTTPS (DoH)

- Browsers and some JS code however can't easily tell if DoT is being used – there's no portable OS API to use for that today (some OSes may add such a thing, not sure)
- So DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484) describes how to encapsulate DNS traffic in HTTPS
- Supported today in FF with their “Trusted Recursive Resolver” (TRR) concept, with currently two built-in TRR instances (Cloudflare, NextDNS) in FF nightly
 - I have my own DoH recursive server I've been using with FF since Feb 2020, seems to work ok
- Google, Microsoft and Apple have all made announcements about their plans for DoH. They differ in various ways.
- DoH has lead to a **major** fuss – the move from a system/OS stub, to an in-browser stub causes many changes and people fear/dislike such changes

Anti-DoH!

- Various operator-like folks have described issues with DoH (or more correctly with the mozilla/CF deployment that may eventually happen)
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bertola-bcp-doh-clients>
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reid-doh-operator>
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-livingood-doh-implementation-risks-issues>
- Some of the above folks even started an industry association, with an apparent goal of encouraging deployment of DNS privacy, but possibly in a flavour that better suits ISPs who traditionally operated the DNS recursives
 - <https://www.encrypted-dns.org/>
- None of the above are objective analyses, but work will likely happen to do that analysis, because there are some real issues (if DoH gets widely deployed in applications):
 - Split horizon
 - Loss of enterprise control for BYOD and/or parental control @ home
 - Passive DNS

IETF has chartered a working group to look at some of the less controversial aspects of all this:

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/add/about/>

DNS Privacy enables ESNi

- Once/if we get deployment of DNS privacy (whether via DoT or DoH) then we can try to tackle SNI encryption as part of the TLS handshake
 - <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-esni>
- Idea: publish a new DH public share in DNS and use that to encrypt SNI in the TLS ClientHello
- Issue: multi-CDN switching causes possible mismatch between A/AAAA and ESNiKeys
 - Needs more testing to find out how big a deal this may be (currently: seems a non-deal for clients, but a sometimes-major deal for web sites when/if switching CDN)
- Still in-flux, but it works!
 - Using FF nightly to <https://rte.ie> benefits from draft-02 ESNi thanks to cloudflare's trial deployment
- Maybe more to say on this later, after we've covered TLSv1.3
 - I'm working on code for it: <https://github.com/sftcd/openssl>

My DNS client setups

- Laptop OS: unbound+stubby
 - Unbound caches, stubby does DoT; config prefers my DNS recursive
 - QNAME minimisation/padding turned on
 - Stubby config has to include DoT servers on port 443 because of firewalls
 - Occasional glitches require “sudo service stubby restart” maybe one/month
- DoT testing: kdig tool
- Within FF: DoH to my “custom” TRR == my DNS recursive (no fallback at present)
- Phone: haven’t played with that yet, plan to
- At home: my home router (Turris) does DoT to my DNS recursive server (fallback to Cloudflare) using knot-resolver (as stub)
 - Clients at home use Turris as their DNS recursive via Do53
 - Recursive distribution via DHCP/RA as normal
- Anyone could do all that (but you’d wonder why they’d bother;-) client stuff ought be much more out-of-the-box and likely will become so

My DNS recursive setup

- Runs on a small VPS rented from a local hoster (as of 20200225)
- DoH: Apache handles port 443 DoH queries, hands those to dnsmdist which en/decapsulates DNS in/from HTTP, and uses a local unbound as the real caching, validating recursive
- DoT: knot resolver (as recursive) directly handles port 853 traffic
 - dnsmdist could/can also do that, just not today's setup
- QNAME minimisation turned on in upstream queries (note to self: check that!)
- Padding turned on for stubs
- Server side problem: above means me, those in my home, and ~two buddies “hiding” in a very tiny crowd – would be better with a bigger (local) crowd but without involving mega-company services like Google or Cloudflare
- A setup like this is never going to be as fast/reliable as a mega-company one
- Net effect: moves DNS surveillance/poisoning risk from any of ISP, TCD or visited-networks mostly to my chosen hoster or someone attacking his network – but he's a chap who lives in Sligo and is hence much closer to me accountability-wise, compared to Cloudflare or Google

DNS Conclusions

- DNS is sort-of critical infrastructure that (sometimes amazingly) works well
- DNSSEC deployment is currently woeful
 - We'll contrast that with DKIM in a bit
- DNS privacy is starting to be addressed, and represents a real change, but one that will happen in the presence of significant tussles