Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
2002, Vol. 82, No. 3, 359–378

0022-3514/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.82.3.359

Social Norms and the Expression and Suppression of Prejudice: The Struggle for Internalization

Christian S. Crandall, Amy Eshleman, and Laurie O'Brien
University of Kansas

The authors studied social norms and prejudice using M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif's (1953) group norm theory of attitudes. In 7 studies ($N = 1,504$), social norms were measured and manipulated to examine their effects on prejudice; both normatively proscribed and normatively prescribed forms of prejudice were included. The public expression of prejudice toward 105 social groups was very highly correlated with social approval of that expression. Participants closely adhere to social norms when expressing prejudice, evaluating scenarios of discrimination, and reacting to hostile jokes. The authors reconceptualized the source of motivation to suppress prejudice in terms of identifying with new reference groups and adapting oneself to fit new norms. Suppression scales seem to measure patterns of concern about group norms rather than personal commitments to reducing prejudice; high suppressors are strong norm followers. Compared with low suppressors, high suppressors follow normative rules more closely and are more strongly influenced by shifts in local social norms. There is much value in continuing the study of normative influence and self-adaptation to social norms, particularly in terms of the group norm theory of attitudes.

> Most of the bigoted remarks I have heard and prejudice I have experienced came from people who were trying to be popular, not despised. They were following what they believed to be acceptable behavior in their group or sub-group, not deviating from it.
>
> —Clarence Page (1999, p. B5)

Psychological research on prejudice has focused on three basic areas: personality and attitude systems, cognitive dynamics, and social norms (Pettigrew, 1991). Each area paints a part of the psychological picture of prejudice, and each area is incomplete by itself. In the last several decades, research on the cognitive dynamics has enjoyed a remarkable success in illuminating the basic cognitive processes of prejudice, and research in personality and attitude systems has been the object of sustained attention over many years (Pettigrew, 1999). With few exceptions, research and theory in the area of social norms have languished.

In this article, we revisit social norms and prejudice and try to illuminate the value of applying traditional theoretical perspectives to develop broader understandings of psychological phenomena (e.g., Sherif, 1936, 1948). Research on the social psychology of prejudice has largely been focused on individual prejudices (e.g., racism, anti-Semitism, antifat prejudice). When studying a particular prejudice, researchers study a phenomenon surrounded by a context of social history, power relations, legal history, and economic and political repression, which goes too often unacknowledged (Pettigrew, 1991). Although all of these contextual factors are important to understanding individual prejudices, they often contaminate phenomena and limit the generality of data and theory. Sherif (1948) argued that

> [It] is safe to assume that there cannot be separate psychologies of prejudice in relation to this or that group, but that they are specific cases of the general picture of prejudice. This general picture of prejudice is, in turn, part and parcel of the psychology of social attitudes and of identifications. (p. 64)

In the present program of research, we use a social normative approach to study how social norms affect the expression of prejudices across a wide range of possible targets.

Definition of Prejudice

We define *prejudice* as a negative evaluation of a group or of an individual on the basis of group membership. This definition does not differentiate between prejudices that are based on an erstwhile "accurate" perception of a group and does not depend on whether such a prejudice can be justified according to some moral code. Unlike Allport (1954), we do not require that a prejudice be inaccurate, unjustified, or overgeneralized (a standard that Allport acknowledged was virtually impossible to satisfy). Instead, we focus on the processes that are common across all group-based negative evaluations—whether some psychological authority determines such a negative evaluation is earned or not is irrelevant to understanding the underlying psychological phenomena. Racial prejudice has apparently declined over the decades. Angus Campbell (1947), writing just after World War II, described openly expressed prejudice as "old-fashioned" and socially unacceptable. People's willingness to express prejudice has continued to decrease (Dowden & Robinson, 1993); attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities as measured in surveys are becoming increas-

Christian S. Crandall, Amy Eshleman, and Laurie O'Brien, Department of Psychology, University of Kansas.

Amy Eshleman is now at the Department of Psychology, Wagner College, Staten Island, New York.

We thank Eileen DelCore, Jessica Stites, and Stacy Johnson for their hard work in developing extensive lists of groups and Jennifer Ma and Chuck Stangor for comments on an earlier version of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Christian S. Crandall, Department of Psychology, 1145 Jayhawk Boulevard, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 66045. E-mail: crandall@ku.edu

ingly positive and less prejudiced (Case & Greeley, 1990; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). Many sociologists and psychologists interpret these trends as evidence that the broad normative climate had turned against racial prejudice (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Rokeach & Ball-Rokeach, 1989). To what extent does the measured decrease in expressions of prejudice reflect genuine changes in attitude? To what extent does it reflect internalization of prevailing social norms? Or, to what extent does it reflect conformity without internalization? Although expressions have clearly changed, we cannot be sure whether genuine belief has fallen in line with the prevailing antiprejudice norms or whether respondents are merely cutting their conscience to fit the current fashion.

Although it may be encouraging that survey reports of prejudice are on the decline, these reports may reflect conformity to social rules regarding appropriate behavior rather than personal values and beliefs. Researchers must examine the (lack of) implications of these declining reports of prejudice. In the case of racism, Weitz (1972) found that "Extremely favorable verbal attitudes were coupled with subtle signs of rejection of blacks" (p. 20). Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe (1980) reviewed extensive evidence that racial prejudice and discriminatory behavior appear low in prevalence when measured overtly but that prejudice and discrimination are much more extensive when prejudice is measured unobtrusively. Hurwitz and Peffley (1992) noted, "While there has been a dramatic increase in support for the *principles* of equality and integration, this positive trend has clearly not been extended to support for policies designed to *implement* these goals" (p. 396, emphasis in original). Americans may claim to want to end inequality, but they are not generally willing to support affirmative action or busing programs, actions that would lead toward such a goal. The evidence suggests that a substantial amount of the reduction in prejudice reports is based on conformity pressures and not on fundamental changes in people's hearts and minds.

Allport's (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice* has served for nearly 50 years as a guide to prejudice researchers (Ruggiero & Kelman, 1999). In recent decades, researchers have focused on the cognitive aspects of prejudice that Allport reviewed, but Allport focused even more on normative approaches. The best specified psychological theory of social norms during Allport's time—and still useful in ours—is Sherif and Sherif's group norm theory (GNT; e.g., Sherif, 1936; Sherif & Sherif, 1953, 1964).

Sherif and Sherif's Group Norm Theory

Sherif and Sherif's (1953) GNT describes the development of prejudice-related norms within social groups and the pressures placed on individuals to conform to group norms. In GNT, attitudes toward particular objects are formed by simply adopting the attitudes of a valued group.

> Social norms are formed in group situations and subsequently serve as standards for the individual's perception and judgment when he is not in the group situation. The individual's major social attitudes are formed in relation to group norms. (Sherif & Sherif, 1953, pp. 202–203)

According to this theory, attitudes, values, beliefs, and prejudices are all acquired as part of the socialization process; "the attitude of prejudice is a product of group membership" (Sherif, 1948, p. 66). According to Sherif (1936), attitudes, values, and prejudice "are not the product of individual preferences acquired over the lifetime of this or that individual. They are the products of contact with members of a group; they are standardized and become common property within a group" (p. 124). Individual ideologies and belief systems are based on the social norms of groups with which a person identifies. Sherif argued that individual points of view are the socially accepted norms of one's group(s) (Sherif, 1936).

> Attitudes toward members of other groups, as well as attitudes toward one's own group, are learned. But attitudes toward members of other groups are not determined so much by experiences while in contact with the groups in question as by contact with the attitudes toward these groups prevailing among the older members of the groups in which they develop. (Sherif & Sherif, 1953, pp. 94–95)

This process develops through a mixture of internal and external conflict, with its resolution based on the internalization of external norms. Sherif (1936) wrote that

> A social value is first external to the individual. Being external to the individual, it has for each individual who first confronts it, an objective reality . . . we come to realize acutely the reality of social values when we violate them and thereupon find ourselves in an embarrassing situation, or punished in varying degree according to the nature of the offense; and no less so when we find internal conflict, a war within ourselves . . . this is, to a great extent, the social in him. (p. 125)

In the GNT, internalization—and conscious awareness of it—comes from group identification with new groups with different norms and values.

> Increasingly with age comes an awareness of one's own group and other groups and their relative positions in the existing scheme of social relationships. It is no coincidence that this increasing awareness and increasingly consistent manifestation of a scale of prejudice occurs during the stage when the child is beginning to participate actively in group activities—that is, when he can psychologically become a member of a group . . . [prejudices] become so much a part of himself—of his ego—that the individual usually becomes unaware of their derivations but considers them his own. (Sherif, 1948, p. 66)

In his classic study of the racial attitudes of children, Lasker (1929) found that racial attitudes did not come from actual contact with racial groups. As Sherif (1936) described, racial attitudes are "a matter of adopting the established values of the group. . . . Th e child's attitude toward the Negro is the result not of contact with the Negro but of contact with the prevailing attitude toward Negroes" (p. 140; see also Horowitz, 1936). In short, to be a good group member, one must adopt the prejudices that the group holds and abstain from those prejudices that the group frowns upon.[1]

Norms and Attitude Change

The GNT of prejudice predicts that, because an attitude's true starting place is the group rather than the individual, changing

[1] This formulation is also a central aspect of a more recent approach: self-categorization theory. As Terry, Hogg, and White (2000) described it, a "norm is subjectively represented as a group prototype that describes and prescribes beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that minimize ingroup differences and maximize outgroup differences . . . th e process of self-categorization also meant that there is an assimilation of self to the prototype and thus the self is transformed" (p. 72).

group attitudes will be more efficient than changing individual attitudes. Allport (1954) reviewed this research, concluding that "in certain studies whole communities, whole housing projects, whole factories, or whole school systems have been made the target of change. . . . New norms are created, and when this is accomplished, it is found that individual attitudes tend to conform to the new group norm" (p. 40; see also Bolton, 1935; Marrow & French, 1945).

Several classic studies have been based on the demonstration of the power of social norms to affect the expression of prejudice. Minard (1952) found that when miners in the Pocahontas coal field were working below the ground, integration between Black and White miners was complete and relatively conflict-free. However, when the miners were above ground and off the job, segregation in housing and social lives was almost total. Workers easily adopted highly racist or highly egalitarian norms and moved between the two settings easily—the inconsistency between their behavior in the two settings was based on the inconsistent social norms between the two settings, not in the consistent way in which people comfortably follow the prevailing social norms (Pettigrew, 1991). Pettigrew (1958) showed that racial prejudice among White South Africans was due more to conformity to norms than to authoritarian personality. In a country where discriminative racial policy was encoded in federal law and public policy, the tendency to conform was associated more with racial prejudice than with child-rearing patterns or personality type. Pettigrew found much the same effect in the Jim Crow American south of the 1950s (Pettigrew, 1959).

Norms and the Expression of Prejudice

Changing the norm about the expression of prejudice can have a strong effect on people's tolerance for prejudice. Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, and Vaughan (1994) found that a single confederate expressing antiracist views could dramatically reduce tolerance for racist acts among experimental participants. Conversely, when the same confederate expressed benign acceptance of racist acts, participants also recommended acceptance. The manipulated social norm affected attitudes when measured publicly and privately, suggesting that the single confederate effected private acceptance (see Monteith, Deneen, & Tooman, 1996, for similar effects on gay-related attitudes).

Stangor, Sechrist, and Jost (2001) have shown that merely changing the apparent consensus about a group is enough to change prejudiced expression. When Stangor et al. led people to believe that their view of African Americans was more stereotypic than their peers, their participants reduced endorsement of African American stereotypes, and when they were led to believe their view was less stereotypic than their peers, they increased stereotyping. A high degree of consensus, indicating that the person's belief was normatively appropriate, also led to greater resistance to persuasion. One's perception of the stereotyping norms directly affects willingness to endorse stereotypes (see also Sechrist & Stangor, 2001).

Social norms are still important to theories of prejudice. In regressive racism (Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981), egalitarian social norms proscribe prejudice. By holding Whites' prejudice toward Blacks in check, prejudice is masked by egalitarian norms for appropriate interracial behavior. In aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), when social norms are ambiguous and do not overtly sanction prejudice, discrimination is significantly more prevalent. In the subtle and blatant prejudice model (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), subtle prejudice is a combination of hostile prejudice and social norms that proscribe blatant expressions of prejudice; subtle prejudice arises from compliance with new egalitarian norms without the internalization of these norms. Regressive racism, aversive racism, and subtle prejudice theories are all concerned with how social norms can prevent expression of prejudice and how, under ambiguous circumstances, social norms allow for prejudice to be expressed in a masked or "covered" fashion. Some models of norms and influence take this even further; in social identity theory "norms and stereotypes are treated as being conceptually identical" (Hogg & Abrams, 1988, p. 185).

Expanding the Domain of Prejudice

Much of the research on prejudice has focused on a small number of target groups. Although negative evaluations of social groups are widespread and various, social psychologists have primarily studied prejudice on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation, or generic social categorization. In general, social psychologists have tended to study target groups for which (a) these psychologists believe prejudice exists and (b) these psychologists personally feel this form of prejudice is inappropriate. Social psychologists rarely study the prejudices they openly share.

We believe that this is unnecessarily limiting and suggest that much can be learned about the structure of prejudice by refocusing research on prejudice as a general process (and on social norms in particular) rather than on studying particular prejudices (which are subject to a variety of historical and normative idiosyncrasies). Understanding prejudice requires that psychologists study prejudices that they abhor but also those that they endorse. One must presume that a core of psychological states and processes are common to a White person's anti-Black racism and an average American's attitude toward members of the American Nazi Party. The difference between these two prejudices lies in an outside perceiver's sense of the justification of the prejudices but not in the psychological structure and experience of the persons holding these prejudices.

The critical difference between these two prejudices is that the American Nazi Party is a normatively acceptable target of prejudice and Blacks are not. The justifications of the prejudice against Nazis are widely accepted; the justifications of the prejudice against Blacks are not (for discussions of the justification of prejudice, see Crandall, 2000; Crandall & Eshleman, 2000). Nevertheless, prejudices against both groups are accompanied by a ready anger, stereotypes that can nullify individuating information, and a willingness to discriminate against group members. The study of how social norms affect the experience and expression of prejudice can help delineate these similarities and differences among prejudices.

Outline

In this article, we report the results of a research program on the social appropriateness of prejudices and how the appropriateness determines which prejudices are publicly stated and which are suppressed. There are three sections of the article. In the first

section, a population of 105 prejudices is developed, and we compare how much of each prejudice people say they have with how normatively acceptable it is. In the second section, we look at how people evaluate overt forms of discrimination toward groups that differ in the normativeness of prejudice. In the third section, we consider individual differences in attempts to suppress prejudice and the comparison of internal motivation to suppress prejudice with conformity to perceived social norms. In this third section, we consider the hypothesis that a report of internal motivation to suppress prejudice is a sign of the struggle to internalize group norms.

I. Measuring Social Norms About Expressing Prejudice

Study 1: One Hundred Five Prejudices

In our first study, we developed a list of targets of prejudice and ascertained the normative appropriateness for expressing prejudice toward these groups. We then compared the normative appropriateness for the expression of prejudice with the degree of prejudice expressed toward these groups. We predicted that the normative appropriateness of a given prejudice would substantially correlate with the amount of prejudice people are willing to publicly report on a questionnaire.

Method

Developing the list. The first step to broad sampling of prejudices was to create a list of groups (see Crandall, Preisler, & Aussprung, 1992). We first surveyed the literature and listed many targets of prejudice that had been used in previous research. In addition, we detailed several undergraduate students to make a list of groups that were discussed in newspapers, magazines, and on television over a 2-week period. Finally, we conducted a series of discussions with graduate and undergraduate students, who nominated modern targets of prejudice. From this, we generated a list of over 500 potential targets of prejudice, which we winnowed down by removing redundancies, striving to represent as wide as possible a range of prejudices. In a final committee meeting of Christian S. Crandall and Amy Eshleman and three undergraduates, we selected a final list of 105 targets. The list includes people toward whom American social norms proscribe prejudice (e.g., racial groups, the physically challenged) and people toward whom American social norms prescribe prejudice (e.g., rapists, child abusers), and several groups somewhere in-between. The list of groups is presented in Table 1.

Acceptability of prejudice. With the list of groups in hand, we recruited 150 undergraduates (43% women; 91% White) from the introductory psychology pool at the University of Kansas, who received course credit. Participation took place in groups of up to 20.

To rate the normative acceptability of prejudice, each of 105 group names was printed on a small slip of paper. The slips were jumbled randomly and put into a large manila envelope. One manila envelope was given to each participant, and participants were told to sort the slips into three piles, according to the labels on three No. 10 envelopes that were placed in front of the participant. The three business-sized envelopes read "Definitely OK to have negative feelings about this group," "Maybe it's OK to have negative feelings about this group," and "Definitely not OK to have negative feelings about this group." The categories were later assigned values of 2 for *definitely OK*, 1 for *maybe OK*, and 0 for *definitely not OK*. The verbal instructions made clear that participants were rating

Table 1
Mean Prejudice Acceptability Score for 105 Potential Prejudice Targets

1.967 Rapists	0.900 Guests on Ricki Lake	0.227 People with AIDS
1.967 Child abusers	0.887 Iraqi soldiers	0.227 High school cheerleaders
1.933 Child molesters	0.824 Politicians	0.220 Cat owners
1.932 Wife beaters	0.764 People who smell bad	0.215 Interracial couples
1.907 Terrorists	0.733 Gamblers	0.207 Auto mechanics
1.840 Racists	0.733 Feminists	0.196 People who put their kids in daycare
1.827 Members of the Ku Klux Klan	0.725 Rednecks	0.193 Ugly people
1.820 Drunk drivers	0.653 People who go to Kansas State University	0.167 People on Medicare
1.793 Members of the American Nazi Party	0.620 Welfare recipients	0.167 Accountants
1.780 Pregnant women who drink alcohol	0.607 Homosexuals who raise children	0.148 Canadians
1.779 Men who refuse to pay child support	0.600 People who smoke	0.147 Trash collectors
1.713 Negligent parents	0.573 Members of National Rifle Association	0.147 Local residents of Lawrence, KS (non-college)
1.644 People who cheat on their spouses	0.560 People who got a job due to Affirmative Action	0.147 Asian Americans
1.540 Kids who steal other kids' lunch money	0.560 People who call the Psychic Hotline	0.141 Hispanics
1.533 Men who leave their families	0.553 Police officers	0.140 Whites
1.513 Gang members	0.547 IRS agents	0.140 Students who attend community college
1.487 Liars	0.541 British punks	0.133 Doctors
1.336 Male prostitutes	0.520 Gay soldiers	0.128 Catholics
1.307 Men who go to prostitutes	0.510 People with open sores	0.127 Spelling bee champions
1.253 People who cheat on exams	0.460 Lawyers	0.120 Manual laborers
1.235 Female prostitutes	0.453 Students who rarely study	0.120 Jews
1.227 Careless drivers	0.430 Country music fans	0.120 Business women
1.213 Drug users	0.427 Waif fashion models	0.120 Black Americans
1.188 People who litter	0.407 Mentally unstable people	0.114 Native Americans
1.141 People who cut in line	0.407 Hare Krishnas	0.114 Elderly people
1.134 Members of religious cults	0.367 Jehovah's Witnesses	0.114 Dog owners
1.133 Illegal immigrants	0.356 FBI agents	0.113 Members of a bowling league
1.127 Juvenile delinquents	0.347 Homeless people	0.107 Librarians
1.080 People who sell marijuana	0.329 People who are illiterate	0.100 Male nurses
0.993 Lazy people	0.313 Traveling salesmen	0.093 Farmers
0.980 Ex-convicts	0.313 Environmentalists	0.081 Family men
0.980 Alcoholics	0.275 Rap music fans	0.053 Mentally retarded people
0.967 Porn stars	0.247 Beauty contestants	0.053 Deaf people
0.947 College teachers with poor English skills	0.235 White Southerners	0.047 Women who stay home to raise kids
0.927 Tele-evangelists	0.228 Fat people	0.047 Blind people

Note. The mean ratings reported above are based on the following scale: 2 = *OK to feel negatively toward these people,* 1 = *Maybe OK to feel negatively toward these people,* and 0 = *Not OK to feel negatively toward these people.*

their perceptions of the predominant social norm and not their own specific attitudes.

Expressions of prejudice. A separate group of 121 University of Kansas undergraduate students was recruited in the same fashion as the first sample (in a later semester). This sample rated their own personal attitudes toward the 105 groups on 0–100 "feeling thermometer" scales, in 5-point increments; 0 was labeled *cold/not positive*, 50 was labeled *medium warm/average*, and 100 was labeled *hot/very positive*. Target groups were presented in alphabetical order.

Results and Discussion

Table 1 is arranged in the descending order of the normative acceptability of prejudice. Although Table 1 has some amusing juxtapositions of particular prejudices, the groups at the extreme ends of the normative acceptability of prejudice are mostly not surprising; prejudice against rapists, child abusers, and thieves is quite acceptable, whereas prejudice against racial groups and the physically challenged is not.

The list in Table 1 ranges from near complete agreement that it is OK to have negative feelings (e.g., toward rapists) to near complete agreement that negative feelings are not acceptable (e.g., toward blind people). Between these extremes, the groups ranged across the entire spectrum of acceptability.

The mean ratings collapsed across participants on the feeling thermometer were normally distributed, but the normative acceptability distribution was positively skewed ($\gamma_2 = .77$, $p < .001$). A square-root transformation of the acceptability ratings resulted in a more nearly normal distribution ($\gamma_2 = .32$, $p > .19$). In subsequent statistical analyses, we use the square-root transformed version.

To what extent are reports of prejudice a function of perceived normative acceptability? To test this, we reversed the feeling thermometer rating for each group (so that high scores corresponded to low liking) and calculated the mean ratings. We then treated the 105 groups as individual observations and correlated the mean (square-root transformed) normative acceptability scores with the mean feeling thermometer ratings (with $N = 105$). The results are displayed in Figure 1; the two variables correlate at $r = .96$.

This is a high correlation. When two different scales correlate so highly, it suggests that both scales measure the same thing. This is usually understood as a flaw in methodology. However, in this case, it is almost exactly the argument: People will report their own prejudice according to how much it is socially acceptable. We hypothesize that expressed prejudice is a direct function of its social acceptability, and when collapsing across individuals, the fit between how much people report and how much people feel is appropriate to have is nearly perfect. Because ratings are collapsed over individuals, we have highly reliable estimates of prejudice and normativeness, without any need to correct for correlated error or biases between samples or ratings.

These data are purely correlational, and we cannot determine the causal ordering of social norms and prejudice. Nevertheless, the fit between the two is so close that it is very difficult to imagine that the two do not stem from the same source or that one (norms) causes the other (reports of prejudice).



Figure 1. Prejudice reports predicted by normative appropriateness, $r = .96$.

II. The Pervasiveness of Social Norms in Controlling Prejudice Expression

Study 2: The Acceptability of Discrimination

If the high correlation between reports of prejudice and norms about their expression is caused by social norms determining prejudice reports, then the social norms should determine which kinds of discrimination are considered acceptable and which kinds elicit a negative reaction. In Study 2, we predicted that the acceptability of discrimination would be closely related to the acceptability of prejudice. We examined the acceptability of discriminating against a number of social groups in the areas of dating, housing, and employment.

Method

Participants were 104 introductory psychology students (73% women, all born in the United States) from the University of Kansas, who received partial course credit for participation. Participation occurred in groups of up to seven.

Participants each read a series of three discrimination scenarios. The first scenario depicted discrimination in the area of dating (Jamie refused to date Chris because of Chris' group membership). The second scenario depicted discrimination in the area of housing (an apartment manager tells Terry that an apartment is not available to rent because of Terry's group membership). The third scenario depicted discrimination in the area of employment (a business manager fails to consider Pat for a job because of Pat's group membership). Each of the three scenarios presented a different, randomly selected target of discrimination. Ten target groups, representing different levels of acceptability of prejudice, were used across the three scenarios. In order of acceptability, these groups were racists, drug users, ex-convicts, rednecks, welfare recipients, environmentalists, fat people, Hispanics, Black Americans, and Native Americans.

Each group was paired with each scenario across participants; and each participant read scenarios that described discrimination against three of the groups (one in dating, a second in housing, a third in employment). The scenarios were written to be ambiguous with regard to sex of the characters. (See Appendix A for complete text of scenarios.)

Following each scenario were two items; the first inquired about the personal acceptability of the act of discrimination, the second asked how likely the participant would be to discriminate against the target in the same way. Response options ranged from 1 (*very unacceptable or extremely unlikely*) to 7 (*very acceptable or extremely likely*).

Results and Discussion

The hypothesis that the acceptability of discrimination would be predicted by the acceptability of prejudice was strongly supported (see Table 2). To calculate how closely the acceptability of discrimination fit the normative appropriateness scores from Table 1, we collapsed across participants and calculated the correlation between the (square-root transformed) scores in Table 1 and the average acceptability scores displayed in Table 2. The correlations are displayed in the last row of the table. For each domain, the acceptability of discrimination was substantially and significantly correlated with the normative appropriateness of prejudice.

In the final column, the three domains are combined into a single "prejudice acceptability" measure; across the 10 target groups, the acceptability of prejudice predicted the acceptability of discrimination with $r = .86$. This correlation is somewhat lower than .96, perhaps because we estimated the correlation with only 10 groups rather than with the 105 groups in Study 1. Discrimination is acceptable to the extent that prejudice is; if it's OK to express prejudice against a group, then it's OK to discriminate against it.

Discrimination was rated as more acceptable in dating than in housing or employment (both p's $< .005$), consistent with the finding that prejudice is more tolerated in intimate relationships (Anant, 1975; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Triandis & Davis, 1965). In this study, as in the others, we cannot be sure what the source of the social norm is. The norms of rejection may be rooted in safety concerns, value threat, and social history, among many others. Whatever their source, norms can be independently measured, and their effects are detectable and considerable.

Table 2
Discrimination Acceptability Ratings for 10 Potential Prejudice Targets

		Acceptability of discrimination			
Group	Acceptability of prejudice	Dating	Housing	Employment	Overall
Racists	1.840	5.17	2.33	3.17	3.56
Drug users	1.213	6.08	4.67	4.17	4.97
Ex-convicts	0.980	5.09	2.09	3.64	3.61
Rednecks	0.725	3.50	1.92	2.08	2.50
Welfare recipients	0.620	1.83	2.83	1.58	2.50
Environmentalists	0.313	2.17	1.50	1.27	1.65
Fat people	0.228	2.36	1.27	1.33	1.66
Hispanics	0.141	2.42	1.42	1.25	1.70
Black Americans	0.120	2.67	1.00	1.00	1.56
Native Americans	0.114	2.27	1.00	1.17	1.48
r with acceptability		.82**	.71*	.87**	.86**

Note. Acceptability of prejudice scores are from Study 1. The acceptability of discrimination scores are the mean scores across participants. The overall acceptability of discrimination score equals the mean acceptability of discrimination over dating, housing, and employment.
* $p < .025$. ** $p < .005$.

Study 3: The Acceptability of Prejudiced-Based Humor

Jokes are a way of expressing prejudice and hostility. Several studies have looked at the expression of prejudice through humor and found that jokes are an indirect way of establishing hierarchy (e.g., Burma, 1946; Cantor, 1976; La Fave & Mannell, 1976), in part by establishing local social norms that favor prejudice and discrimination (e.g., LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998). We predicted that people's reactions to jokes that denigrate groups would reflect the social norms measured in Table 1.

We developed three specific hypotheses. First, we predicted that people would take offense at jokes to the extent that it is normatively inappropriate to express prejudice toward the joke's target group. Second, we predicted that jokes that denigrate acceptable targets of prejudice would be considered funnier than jokes that denigrate inappropriate targets of prejudice. Third, we suggested that if the offensiveness of a joke is a way of expressing hostility, then when the expression of prejudice is normatively appropriate, offensiveness will contribute to the funniness of a joke. However, when the expression of prejudice is normatively condemned, offensiveness will detract from the humor inherent in the joke.

Method

Participants were 239 introductory psychology students (57% women, 79% White) from the University of Kansas, who each read a selection of 10 different jokes, each joke targeting 1 of 10 different groups. After reading each joke, participants rated it on two qualities—offensiveness and humor—on scales ranging from 1 (*not at all offensive* or *not at all funny*) to 7 (*very offensive* or *very funny*). Each person read all 10 jokes, and each group was paired with only 1 joke.

As in Study 2, the 10 groups were selected to cover a range of normative acceptability of prejudice. The groups chosen, in order of acceptability, were racists, drug users, ex-convicts, rednecks, welfare recipients, people who are illiterate, fat people, Hispanics, Black people, and people who are mentally retarded.

The 10 jokes were selected from the on-line archives of the Usenet newsgroup, rec.humor.funny, and needed to be generic enough to apply to the different targets. (Appendix B has the joke texts.)

Each of the 10 jokes was matched with each of the 10 target groups in 1 of 10 different combinations. The order of the jokes was maintained across all participants, and the order of target groups varied across forms.

Results and Discussion

Our first hypothesis was that offensiveness would vary by group in accordance with Table 1 normativeness scores.[2] On offensiveness, there was a significant main effect of target group, $F(9, 2097) = 57.76$, $p < .0001$. As predicted, the offensiveness of a joke targeting a specific group was closely related to Table 1 scores, with $r = -.82$ ($N = 10$, $p < .01$; see Figure 2). The less normatively appropriate it was to express prejudice, the more offensive the joke was rated. There was also a significant effect of joke, $F(9, 2097) = 14.49$, $p < .0001$; some jokes (collapsed across target groups) were rated more offensive than others (an unsurprising result).

Our second hypothesis was that the funniness of the joke would be affected by the normative appropriateness of expressing prejudice. There was a significant main effect of target group, $F(9, 2097) = 6.60$, $p < .001$—jokes are funnier when used against some groups than against others. However, which groups were the funniest targets was uncorrelated with the normative appropriateness of expressing prejudice ($r = -.12$, $N = 10$, *ns*). Thus, we did not find support for the second hypothesis. A significant effect of joke on funniness, $F(9, 2097) = 24.69$, $p < .001$, indicated that some jokes were funnier than others.

Our third hypothesis was that offensiveness would make a joke funnier when prejudice was acceptable to express, but that it would make a joke less funny when that prejudice was unacceptable. To test this, we calculated a correlation between the offensiveness and funniness ratings (collapsed across jokes) for the 10 target groups. These correlations were then treated as a new variable, which was in turn correlated with the Table 1 scores for each group (see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows the support for the third hypothesis ($r = .87$, $N = 10$, $p < .001$). When it is normatively appropriate to express prejudice against a group, offensiveness and funniness are positively correlated (e.g., racists; $r = .23$, $N = 239$, $p < .001$). When it is not normatively appropriate to express prejudice, offensiveness and funniness were negatively correlated (e.g., mentally retarded people; $r = -.17$, $N = 239$, $p < .01$).

This experiment shows that the expression of prejudice and hostility through humor follows normative lines. Although jokes may serve as indirect expressions of prejudice, they are tolerated only to the extent that the prejudice they express is normatively appropriate; when norms suppress expression of prejudice against a group, jokes were considered offensive.

The funniness of jokes against targets was uncorrelated with normative appropriateness, which is inconsistent with our second hypothesis. It may be that our hypothesis is simply wrong, or it may be that, even when the joke's target should not be openly derogated, the release of suppressed prejudice makes the joke funnier (see O'Brien, Eshleman, & Crandall, 1999), and these two effects cancel each other out. Or it may be that the judgment of humor may bypass some of the conscious controls that determine open reports of prejudice. At this point, one cannot be sure why the funniness of the joke and social norms are empirically unrelated.

Supporting our third hypothesis, we found that offensiveness potentiates the normative effects. When the joke targets a normatively appropriate group, offensiveness enhances the humor. When the joke's target is normatively inappropriate, offensiveness negates its humor.

This experiment, and the two that precede it, suggest that the expression of prejudice and the tolerance of discrimination closely follow normative strictures. It is not in any way surprising that we found the correlations we did. Not only are the findings common sensical and intuitive, but many theories predict the finding (e.g., Newcomb, 1943; Sherif, 1936; Turner, 1991).

However, what is remarkable is the very high level of fit between social norms and the various expressions of, and tolerance for, prejudice. In most of the cases demonstrated above, the fit of individual expression–tolerance for discrimination to social norms is quite close, ranging from $r = .96$ for prejudice and norms, to $r = .86$ between acceptance of discrimination and norms, to $r = .82$

[2] Because of the structure of the questionnaire, with only 10 different forms, we can analyze the effect of joke and the effect of target in separate orthogonal one-way repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs), but we cannot calculate an interaction term.



Figure 2. Offensiveness and funniness of jokes by normative appropriateness.

between offensiveness of humor and norms. These appear to be pervasive and strong effects.

III. Compliance and Internalization of Social Norms About Prejudice

Knowledge about norms must be acquired. Social norms about the expression of prejudice vary from group to group, and as a person moves from one group to another, identification with the new group involves taking on that group's frame of reference (Cantril, 1941; Sherif & Sherif, 1964). There is a period during which people learn what the norms are and begin the process of adaptation and internalization (Kelman, 1958, 1961). This process can be challenging, and may require some amount of cognitive and emotional work. The period of adaptation and identification is a period when the norms are salient (Hogg & Abrams, 1988), and people are aware of their deviance (Turner, 1991).

The first three studies in this article present conformity to norms as a fait accompli. And, of course, the prevailing norm at any given moment tends to represent the majority's view. As Sherif and Sherif (1953) pointed out, "When we speak of a social-distance scale or of prejudice over a time span, it can be seen that the classifications and definitions which come to prevail are those of the majority, and not those of minority groups" (p. 115).

However, in the case of prejudices, social norms are constantly changing, and the individual who wishes to be in sympathy with his or her reference group's norms must be vigilant for changes in who is an acceptable target of prejudice, and who is not. Sherif (1936) suggested that during times of social change and social mobility

> the strength of norms incorporated in the individuals becomes uncertain and liable to break down. Such a delicate, unstable situation is the fertile soil for the rise of doubts concerning the existing norms, and a challenge to their authority. . . . Th etransition is not simply from the orderliness of one set of norms to chaos, but from one set of norms to a new set of norms, perhaps through a stage of uncertainty, confusion . . . as a result of the strain and stress, of the confusion and uncertainty and feelings of insecurity, apparent stability followed by fresh instability. The outcome is the final emergence or establishment of a stable set of norms having the status of standards . . . this new set of norms supplants the old ones and becomes the regulator of social life. (p. 86)

What is the process by which people adapt themselves to social norms? In the case of prejudice or attitudes of any sort, the initial response will be hesitancy, characterized by the suppression of potentially inappropriate responses. This first suppression of prejudice is externally motivated; it represents compliance (Kelman,



Figure 3. Correlation between offensiveness and funniness by normative appropriateness.

1958). However, when a person begins to identify with the group and take on its norms, compliance turns to identification and internalization.

We suggest that people's adaptation to norms—from compliance to identification and internalization—is not always accurately reported. Identification and internalization are often subjectively experienced as individual processes of self-motivated change, at least by members of individualistic societies (see Kim, Triandis, Kagitcibasi, Choi, & Yoon, 1994). As people feel pressure to adapt to norms that they wish to resist, they may accurately report external pressure to change. However, when group identification and self-categorization lead to a feeling of attraction to group norms (or to group prototypes; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), people will report a willingness and desire to change, that is, when identification with a new group has begun, people will report an internal motivation to change.

The next set of studies focus on the process by which people come to follow the prejudice norms of their social groups. The transition from conformity to acceptance, from suppression to internationalization, requires substantial motivation, and we hypothesize that people who report an internal motivation to suppress their prejudices are in the midst of a struggle to internalize the values and norms of the groups with which they identify.

Suppression, Identification, and the Expression of Prejudice

Previous researchers have suggested that the suppression of prejudice is motivated by egalitarian or humanitarian motives (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Katz & Hass, 1988). This is particularly true of the suppression of prejudice that is "internally motivated" (e.g., Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998; Plant & Devine, 1998). There is clear evidence that suppression of prejudice is motivated, and that failures to suppress when desired can lead to guilt and shame (Monteith, 1993, 1996; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993; Plant & Devine, 1998).

However, we suggest that the report of motivation to suppress prejudice is not always motivated by some inner hunger for justice or equality. Rather, we hypothesize that the suppression of prejudice is often motivated by an attempt to conform to perceived social norms regarding the appropriateness of expressing prejudice. As cultural norms become increasingly negative toward straightforward prejudices toward ethnic, racial, and religious groups (Dowden & Robinson, 1993), and as people mature, they become motivated and skilled at suppressing inappropriate forms of prejudice. We argue that when people report the motivation to suppress prejudice, whether internal or external, what they are primarily reporting is their awareness of pressures to change their attitudes to fit a prevailing group norm.

There are two well-known and previously published scales measuring the suppression of prejudice, from two different research labs. These scales, published by Dunton and Fazio (1997) and by Plant and Devine (1998) are both two-scale inventories that measure motivation to suppress prejudice. The first scale in Dunton and Fazio's inventory measures motivation to suppress prejudice; the second scale measures a desire to avoid open conflict. The first scale in Plant and Devine's inventory measures internal motivation to suppress prejudice; the second scale measures a sense of pressure to conform to external expectations. Both scales have proved useful as predictors of how people will respond in prejudice-relevant settings (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Plant & Devine, 1998). Despite their face validity and usefulness in research, in the next set of studies, we suggest another possible meaning for the measured constructs.

The Natural History of Prejudice Suppression

In his book, *The Moral Judgment of the Child*, Piaget (1965) argued that the development of moral reasoning follows two stages. First, the child's moral reasoning is *heteronomous*; it is "subject to another's authority," from outside or above. Moral reasoning at this stage is characterized by a sense that external rules are sacred, and if something brings about punishment, then it's wrong. The moral rules may appear arbitrary, but they have the power of punishment and reward. Later moral reasoning is *autonomous*; it is "subject to one's own law," when the child internalizes fundamental basic moral norms and makes them her or his own. This process of internalization is accompanied by cognitive effort, and it requires cognitive and social abilities such as empathy, perspective-taking, and logical and counterfactual reasoning.

The logic of Piaget's (1965) argument can apply directly to acquisition of morally tinged norms, such as those that control the expression of prejudice. When an individual first encounters moral norms, they appear arbitrary, and subject to the caprices of influential group leaders. But identification with the group leads to an increased desirability of the group's point of view (Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). Identification with the group begins the processes of internalization.

We use Plant and Devine's (1998) two-dimensional model (of internal and external motivations to suppress prejudice) as a way of illuminating the connections between Piaget's (1965) model and that of the norms and influence models of Sherif and Sherif (1953; Sherif, 1936) and Kelman (1958, 1961). We suggest that, in the earliest stages, a person will report very low levels of internal or external motivation to suppress, as they will be successfully adapted to their current groups (e.g., family, neighborhood, or school norms). Then, this person will encounter a group with norms that do not tolerate a particular prejudice, such as moving from a rural homogeneous high school to a heterogeneous university with an antiracial prejudice climate. At first, the external sanctions for deviance will lead to a perception of pressure, and this will be reflected in high external motivation to suppress prejudice. The perception of external pressure will occur only if the new group is seen as attractive, and high external pressure should be perceived in the early stages of identification. As the student begins to identify with the university, and his or her friends within it, an elevated internal motivation will also grow, leading to a high internal and external motivation to suppress. As internalization begins to succeed, external pressure to conform will no longer be salient, and so reports of external motivation will shrink, leaving only a high report of internal motivation. Ultimately, should the student once again fully obtain an internal representation of group norms, very low reports of internal and external motivation would be reported. (Of course, full internal representation of group norms is only possible when these norms are themselves stable and unambivalent and when a person does not move among groups—a state very unlikely to occur in our example.)

In the next four studies, we consider this approach. First, we test the notion that the quality of identification with the college peer group is associated with different kinds of suppression of prejudice toward Blacks (Study 4). We then report our development of another internally motivated measure of suppression (Study 5), and then use it along with Dunton and Fazio's (1997) measure to investigate whether the report of the suppression of prejudice is associated with (a) the overall levels of prejudice people report and (b) conforming to social norms about which prejudices are condemned, and which are condoned (Study 6). Finally, in Study 7, we create a situation that pits the internal motivation to suppress prejudice directly against conformity to the group, and we predict that, when the norm tolerates prejudice, people who score high in internal motivation to suppress prejudice will respond with greater tolerance for discriminatory acts than will those who score low in internal motivation.

Study 4: Identification With College and the Suppression of Prejudice

To test the idea that identification with college is associated with reporting internally motivated attempts to suppress prejudice, we carried out a study in which students filled out the Plant and Devine (1998) scales (which measure suppression of prejudice toward Blacks), along with a questionnaire that we developed to measure identification with college. We predicted that (a) scores on the Internal Motivation Scale (IMS) will increase as identification with college increases. However, this was qualified by the prediction that, (b) as identification proceeds to its highest level and discrepancies between the group norm and individual attitudes diminish, the salience of self-motivated change will shrink, students will become well-adjusted to the new group's norms, and so scores on the IMS will begin to decrease.

The perception of external pressure to suppress prejudice against Blacks, without internalization of that attitude, should lead to high scores on the External Motivation Scale (EMS). During the very first days or weeks of being at college, one should expect low EMS scores, which begin to rise quite soon, when students discover their deviation from the college attitude norms. However, because we carried out our identification study in the spring semester, we assumed that the vast majority of our students were beyond this earliest stage. Thus, we predicted that (c) low levels of college identification would be associated with high scores on the EMS.

Method

Participants were 251 White American students (56% women) in a psychology class, who were given credit for participation. Most partici-

pants were in their first year at the University of Kansas (88%); 81% of participants were in their second semester. Because of the race-specific nature of the IMS–EMS, we selected only participants who indicated "White" on an ethnicity question (80% of the original sample).

A short questionnaire was passed out in class, one page of which contained questions about college identification and one page of which contained a measure of suppression. The participants were given about 7 min to complete the questionnaire. The order of the questionnaires was counterbalanced.

To measure suppression, we included Plant and Devine's (1998) IMS and EMS scales, measured on 0–9 scales. To measure college identification, we asked a series of questions about identification with college, a sense that it has had an impact on them, and the sense that they identify more with their college selves than with their high school selves. The items had a 1–7 scale, and are displayed in Table 3. The six-item scale had an $\alpha = .52$, a principal components analysis showed that a single factor accounted for 40.4% of the total variance.

Results

To score the College Identification Scale, items were reversed appropriately and averaged. The mean score was 5.57 ($SD = 0.81$). Women reported a significantly higher level of college identification ($M = 5.71$) than did men ($M = 5.36$), $t(249) = 3.54$, $p < .001$, $d = 44$. This was not based on their different amounts of time at the university, $t(160) = 1.16$, $p > .25$.

The average score on the IMS was 7.12 ($SD = 1.58$), and on the EMS it was 5.15 ($SD = 1.64$). Gender differences also emerged on these scales, with women scoring higher than men on both the IMS ($M = 7.58$ for women; $M = 6.54$ for men), $t(246) = 5.51$, $p < .001$, $d = .66$, and the EMS ($M = 5.34$ for women; $M = 4.92$ for men), $t(244) = 2.01$, $p < .05$, $d = .26$. The sex difference was more than twice as large for internal motivation as for external motivation, and the interaction was significant, $F(1, 240) = 5.69$, $p < .02$. Because of the gender difference on both scales, which indicate that women are more identified with college and thus should show a different pattern of suppression from the less-identified males, we analyzed the results both together and separately by sex.

Overall, college identification was moderately correlated with IMS ($r = .25$, $p < .001$). The correlation was slightly higher for men ($r = .24$, $N = 104$, $p < .02$) than for women ($r = .16$, $N = 135$, $p < .06$). These results support Hypothesis 1, although the relationship does not appear to be large.

EMS was not directly correlated with college identification ($r = .06$), but an interesting sex difference emerged. For women, EMS was slightly negatively correlated with college identification ($r = -.12$, $p < .15$), but for men, EMS was positively correlated ($r = .21$, $p < .05$), which was significant ($Z = 2.59$, $p < .01$). Because males scored lower on college identification and EMS, these data are consistent with the view that men are in a fairly early stage of adoption of the college's antiprejudice norms.

Because women are more "advanced" in their identification with college, we expected a curvilinear relationship between IMS and identification: Women at the high end of identification will report lower self-perceived motivation to change their attitudes. To test this, we regressed IMS on both a linear and quadratic college identification term. Both the linear term ($\beta = 2.36$, $p < .01$) and the quadratic term ($\beta = 2.21$, $p < .02$) were significant; the pattern of results is displayed in Figure 4, $F(2, 134) = 4.86$, $p < .009$, Multiple $R = .26$. These results conform quite nicely to Hypothesis 2, that at the highest levels of group identification, internalization be associated with lower IMS scores. A similar regression calculated for men showed the linear effect ($\beta = .24$, $p < .02$), but no quadratic effect ($p > .50$), consistent with the interpretation of men's lower college identification scores indicating substantially less internalization.

College identification increased with length of tenure at the university ($r = .21$, $N = 250$, $p < .001$). Although IMS was not correlated with tenure ($r = -.01$, *ns*), EMS was significantly negatively correlated with tenure ($r = .16$, $N = 250$, $p < .01$; $r = -.19$ for men, $r = -.14$ for women). These data suggest that as length of stay at the university increases, the perception of external pressure to conform on racial issues diminishes. Counterbalancing order of scales had no significant effect.

Discussion

We found that internally motivated suppression was higher for women than for men (see also Plant & Devine, 1998) and that identification with college as a reference group was also higher for women. We suggest that it is the identification with a group that has a high antiracist norm that accounts for this covariation; women were better identified, and they conformed better to the prevailing norm.

Furthermore, women showed the predicted curvilinear relationship between identification and internal motivation. We suggest that the drop-off in IMS as identification reaches its highest levels suggests that these women feel less internal motivation to change, because they are well-adjusted to the group's norms. The fact that IMS does not drop down to zero suggests that this process is not complete (an eventuality we doubt is possible among the typical college sophomore).

Men, however, showed only a linear relationship between identification and internally motivated suppression. We suggest that this is because our cross-sectional method provides only a snapshot of the group in time—not enough of the men identified sufficiently with the group to provide the curvilinear relationship. This picture of the men as "less advanced" is supported by the fact that identification was correlated with the report of external motivation for men, suggesting that they, as a group, are in transition from seeing external pressures to conform to the antiracist norm of the group as undue and unwelcome pressure from the outside to adopting the group norm as their own.

Overall, the subtle pattern of relationships among the variables is consistent with all three hypotheses. Motives to suppress prejudice reflect the natural history of group identification. External

Table 3
The College Identification Scale

1. I tend to identify more with my friends from high school than I do with people at KU. (R)
2. The best times of my life were in high school, not while in college. (R)
3. I've found that college is not really for me. (R)
4. I expect that after 4 years, KU will have changed me.
5. I didn't want to come to college. (R)
6. College has been a time of change for me.

Note. R indicates item is reverse-scored. KU = University of Kansas.



Figure 4. Intrinsic motivation to suppress prejudice as a function of identification with college. IMS = Internal Motivation Scale.

motivation is associated with the early stages of adaptation to a group and predates internal motivation to conform to group attitudinal norms. Internal motivation to suppress prejudice is associated with a later, self-motivated transformation of attitudes to fall in line with group norms. Our data suggest that women at the University of Kansas have gone further in this process of adaptation than have comparable men. By contrast, men in their second semester of college are less identified as college students and not highly conforming to the antiracist norms of that group.

Although they report lower levels of internal and external motivation, the gender difference is more than twice as large for internal as for external motivation, suggesting that they lag behind women in the natural history of their identification with college peers and their values, and consequently the suppression of prejudice. Still, one must keep in mind that the phenomena we are theorizing are developmental and longitudinal, these data are cross-sectional.

One limiting factor of the Plant and Devine (1998) scale is that it is specific to African American targets. A more general scale might be useful to measure responses to other groups whose prejudice varies with specific group norms, such as homosexuals, political or religious minorities, and so on. If the suppression of many different prejudices results from shifting group norms and identification with new groups and subsequent internalization, then creating a scale to measure an internally motivated suppression that applies more broadly could prove quite useful. Although the Dunton and Fazio (1997) scale is not specific as to which prejudice is being suppressed (3 of the 17 items that do mention a target group mention "Black[/s]"), the mixing of internal and external motivation in their Concern scale (see Plant & Devine, 1998) suggests that there is still room for a nonspecific scale measuring the perception of internal motivation to suppress prejudice. This is the focus of Study 5.

Study 5: The Suppression of Prejudice Scale

We developed a scale measuring individual differences on internally motivated inhibition. We wanted to tap individual differences in the desire to appear nonprejudiced, primarily to the self, and to a lesser extent to others as well. Our work on the scale predated our learning of similar scales by Dunton and Fazio (1997) and Plant and Devine (1998), and so we did not sample from their initial item pool. This scale was designed to account for a desire to suppress prejudice against multiple outgroups.

Method

Four hundred fifty-five introductory psychology students (52% women, 88% White) from the University of Kansas received course credit for completing our Suppression of Prejudice Scale (SPS; response options

ranged from 0 to 9); 288 of these participants (56% women, 90% White) also completed McConahay, Hardee, and Batts' (1981) Modern Racism Scale (response options ranged from 1 to 5). Participation occurred in large groups.

Results and Discussion

Seven of the original 15 items loaded substantially onto a single, theoretically meaningful factor (eigenvalue = 2.64) accounting for 38% of the variance, $\alpha = .64$ for the SPS (see Table 4). The item content suggests that the SPS has face validity as a measure of interest in avoiding appearing prejudiced to oneself or others. The scale has a mean of 4.35 ($SD = 1.00$). On average, women ($M = 4.54$) reported more suppression than men ($M = 4.10$), $t(276) = 3.73$, $p < .001$, $d = .44$. The SPS correlated with the Modern Racism Scale at $r = -.35$ ($N = 282$, $p < .001$).

In an initial validity test, we examined the SPS's relationships with the Modern Racism Scale and gender. Men routinely score higher on the Modern Racism Scale than women (Biernat & Crandall, 1999); in this case, *M*s = 2.11 for men and 1.93 for women, $t(284) = 2.24$, $p < .03$, $d = .26$. However, as we have seen, men suppress less often than women. To what extent is the difference in racism merely a function of difference in suppression? To test this, we calculated an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), comparing Modern Racism Scale scores and covarying out SPS scores. SPS was a significant covariate, $F(1, 275) = 31.07$, $p < .001$, and the gender difference was no longer significant, $F(1, 275) = 1.61$, $p > .20$, $d = .15$. This suggests that a significant portion of gender differences in racial prejudice may be attributed to a difference in the amount of suppression of prejudice between the two genders, and not because of a difference in the genuine underlying attitudes.

The SPS has face validity, modest internal consistency, and explains a portion of the gender differences in reported racial prejudice. It is short, straightforward, and seems to measure what it purports to measure. We further establish its validity in subsequent studies in this article. In Studies 6 and 7, we return to the hypothesis that suppression scales measure people's concerns with the pressures to conform to group norms.

Table 4
The Suppression of Prejudice Scale (SPS)

1. When I meet a person of another race or ethnicity, I try to avoid thinking about their race.
2. When describing someone I know to a friend, I might avoid mentioning his or her race.
3. When other people are telling funny ethnic or sexist jokes, I might laugh and join in. (R)
4. I don't want to appear racist or sexist, even to myself.
5. I won't use an ethnic slur, even if it's the word that pops into my head.
6. If someone was ugly, overweight, or had bad skin, I wouldn't mention this fact to anyone.
7. I don't laugh at jokes that are cruel toward some group of people, even if they are funny.

Note. R indicates item is reverse-scored.

Study 6: Suppression and the Normative Appropriateness of Prejudices

What exactly do suppression scales measure? Certainly, people who score high on these measures of suppression report less prejudice toward traditionally studied targets of prejudice. Plant and Devine (1998) reported correlations with the IMS (internal motivation) and the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay et al., 1981) of −.57, with the Anti-Black Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988) of −.48, and with the Attitudes Toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993, with higher scores representing more positive attitudes) of .79. Dunton and Fazio (1997) observed a correlation between their Suppression scale and the Modern Racism Scale of −.18. When we expand our study of prejudice to include the 105 social groups examined in Study 1, will measures of the suppression of prejudice represent the constructs described by Dunton and Fazio (1997) and Plant and Devine (1998)?

If high suppressors are people who suppress negative thoughts, feelings, and communications toward all outgroups, then we would expect Suppression scales to be negatively correlated with all 105 outgroups. However, if the internal measures of generalized suppression are actually indicators of a struggle for the internalization of group norms, then we would predict that suppressors will report lower levels of normatively inappropriate prejudice (e.g., toward racial, ethnic, and religious groups) but would report *higher* levels of prejudice toward socially appropriate targets (criminals, social deviants, people whose behavior is politically incorrect). If high suppression scores are an outward reflection of the inward struggle to adapt to new social norms, then high suppression scores should be associated with high levels of socially appropriate prejudice.

We used both the SPS and the Dunton and Fazio (1997) Concern scale to measure suppression, which provides another opportunity to test the validity of the SPS. Because we know from Study 1 what the normatively appropriate level of prejudice expression is for the 105 target groups, we can also compare the fit-to-prejudice norms for high and low suppressors.

Method

Participants were 127 introductory psychology students (50% women, 85% White) from the University of Kansas, who received partial course credit for participation. Participation occurred in groups of up to seven. Participants completed the feeling thermometer measure of prejudice of 105 groups (described in Study 1), an unrelated filler task, the SPS, and Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Concern scale (response options ranged from 1 to 7 on the SPS and Concern scale).

Results

The SPS and Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Concern scale were substantially correlated ($r = .62$). The correlation was less than perfect, indicating that the scales may not be identical, although they certainly cover some of the same ground.

Suppression or conformity? If these scales simply measure internal drive to suppress prejudice, we should find negative correlations between all 105 targets and the suppression scales. However, if internal Suppression scales measure motivation to conform to group prejudice norms, then we should expect a negative correlation between measured suppression and expressions of a prejudice when that prejudice is normatively inappropriate, but a

positive correlation between measured suppression and a prejudice when that prejudice is normatively appropriate. The feeling thermometer was once again reversed, so that higher scores represent greater prejudice. Table 5 displays the pattern of correlations (these correlations represent a sampling from the first and last thirds of targets from Table 1).

For traditional, normatively inappropriate targets of prejudice (displayed in the right-hand half of Table 5), suppression is negatively correlated with expressions of prejudice. However, a very different picture emerges from the left-hand half of Table 5. When it is normatively appropriate to express a prejudice, we found that high suppressors report more prejudice. These data are substantially consistent with the internalization hypothesis; suppressors are acute norm followers.

To create an overall statistical test of this hypothesis, we correlated the normative appropriateness scores from Table 1 (square-root transformed) for each prejudice target, with that target's correlation between suppression and prejudice measured by feeling thermometer.

A positive correlation would indicate that the more normatively appropriate a prejudice is, the more high suppressors endorse it. When a prejudice is normatively inappropriate, high suppressors report less prejudice, when it's normatively appropriate, high suppressors report more prejudice. The correlation provides an index of the extent to which people who score high in motivated suppression are "super-conformers." By contrast, if high suppressors are people who suppress all sorts of prejudice, it would not vary across normative appropriateness, and one would expect no correlation at all.

For the 105 targets, the fit between normativeness of the prejudice and the effect that suppression has on it is very good for SPS ($r = .69$) and for the Concern scale ($r = .62$, $N = 105$, both ps $< .001$). These data are quite consistent with the hypothesis that people who report high levels of internal motivation are people who are very concerned with reporting attitudes that are consistent with, or even extreme versions of, the prevailing group norm.

Comparing SPS and Concern scales. To compare the power of the SPS and Concern scales for predicting prejudice reports, we correlated both with reported prejudice and examined the relative magnitude of the two sets of 105 correlations. We discarded the 28 relatively trivial correlations, when both suppression scales correlated less than $\pm .10$ with the feeling thermometer score (see Levine, 1977). Of the remaining 77 groups, the correlation between SPS and prejudice exceeded the correlation with the Concern scale for 60 of them; the Concern scale exceeded the SPS 17 times (*binomial* $p < .005$).

Discussion

When it is unacceptable to express prejudice, high suppressors express less prejudice. But when is it acceptable to express prejudice, high suppressors express more prejudice. High suppressors are acute norm followers in expressing prejudice.

Measures of motivated suppression correspond with adherence to social norms, and we suggest that high suppressors of prejudice are hypersensitive to perceived cultural norms. This study suggests that people who score high on suppression scales are not people who attempt to suppress all kinds of prejudice. Instead, suppressors are people who enhance appropriate prejudices and attenuate inappropriate prejudices. Dispositional suppression scales appear to measure how closely an individual follows social norms for prejudice expression rather than measuring a motivation to avoid or deny all forms of prejudice. The motivation to suppress prejudice may only be a motivation to suppress certain, normatively unacceptable forms of prejudice. When only normatively inappropriate prejudices are studied, suppression appears to be no different

Table 5
Selected Correlations Between Two Suppression Scales and Expression of Prejudice Among Normatively Acceptable and Unacceptable Prejudices

Correlation with			Correlation with		
SPS	Concern	Prejudice target	SPS	Concern	Prejudice target
.04	.06	Rapists	−.29	−.13	Fat people
.17	.13	Child abusers	−.24	−.01	People with AIDS
−.03	.05	Child molesters	−.21	−.19	Interracial couples
.11	.03	Wife beaters	−.22	−.19	Canadians
.22	.13	Racists	−.19	−.10	Asian Americans
.18	.06	Drunk drivers	−.22	−.13	Hispanics
.11	.09	American Nazi Party members	−.18	−.15	Whites
.14	.09	Pregnant women who drink alcohol	−.13	.04	Community college students
.20	.11	Men who don't pay child support	−.18	−.11	Catholics
.14	.05	People who cheat on spouses	−.08	−.01	Jews
.17	−.03	Kids who steal lunch money	−.22	−.20	Business women
.24	.21	Men who leave their families	−.25	−.18	Black Americans
.16	.17	Gang members	−.25	−.07	Native Americans
.15	.19	Liars	−.32	−.19	Elderly people
.28	.15	Men who go to prostitutes	−.20	−.14	Male nurses
.23	.04	People who cheat on exams	−.27	−.03	Mentally retarded people
.12	.21	Lazy people	−.26	−.21	Deaf people
.24	.14	People who sell marijuana	−.35	−.32	Blind people
.32	.04	Porn stars			

Note. SPS = Suppression of Prejudice Scale; Concern = Concern scale from Dunton and Fazio (1997).

from norm following. It is only when socially appropriate prejudice is included that the difference between the two can be uncovered.

When the target of prejudice is normatively appropriate, people with high levels of suppression actually report higher levels of prejudice. Study 6 points to the strength of thinking broadly about prejudice to understand it as a general psychological process. It was only by sampling from acceptable prejudices that we found people who report high levels of prejudice suppression are people who also report high levels of prejudice—of a certain kind.

These data help bring the modern work on the suppression of prejudice and stereotyping (e.g., Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Monteith et al., 1998) in line with Sherif and Sherif's (1953; Sherif, 1936) group norm theory of attitudes. Having attitudes that are discrepant from a valued group creates an internal pressure to change oneself to fit the group's attitudes. Festinger, Schachter, and Back (1950) wrote, "If a person wants to stay in a group he [sic] will be susceptible to influence coming from the group, and he will be willing to conform to the rules which the group sets up" (p. 91). Although one might argue that adaptation to group norms are in fact an external motivation, we suggest that the experience of this adaptation is primarily in the form of inner strivings to internalize a valued reference group's attitude. Changing one's attitude to fit the group's is the hallmark of group membership. "The presence or absence of change of attitude and the degree thereof is a function of the degree of the individual's assimilation to the atmosphere of the new community" (Sherif, 1948, p. 67).

Sherif and Sherif (1953) argued that the socialization, identification, and internalization combine to create a feeling that external social pressures are experienced as an internal choice made with free will:

> Concepts and ideas concerning social relations become, for the individual member, "his own" concepts and ideas. Concerning as they do the characteristics and relations of individuals to other individuals and groups, such concepts, ideas, and approaches to problem situations in every age become part of the individual's personal identity. Once learned—at the time of their development, or later, through books, or from the lips of parents or teachers—they seem as "natural" to the individual as breathing. (pp. 16–17)

And later,

> In short, attitudes of prejudice, learned chiefly through contact with the norms of social distance prevailing in the group . . . come to constitute a part of the individual's very self-identity, of his ego. . . . It is small wonder that they come to be experienced as a "natural" part of oneself—almost as natural as one's name. (p. 99)

Following Sherif and Sherif (1953), we suggest that the distinction between internal and external motivation is a very sensible one, but that it is not exactly what it appears to be on the surface. On one hand, external motivation measures (e.g., EMS; Plant & Devine, 1998) reflect the perception of an external, somewhat hostile environment, inhabited by people whose values you do not exactly share and with whom you do not identify, but whose social power you recognize. On the other hand, internal motivation is reported when the values of these people are admired, shared, and more intimate contact is desirable. However, both kinds of motivation to suppress prejudice come from the discrepancy between the person and his or her social situation.

In many cases, it is very difficult for relatively new members to know which attitudes are normative. Norms can be remarkably malleable, and in certain circumstances the expression of prejudice toward inappropriate targets is tolerated—in the locker room, at the poker table, or among close friends from the neighborhood where certain prejudices are tolerated. How will high suppressors act when social norms point to tolerance of the vocal racial prejudice? If local social norms are at odds with the overarching societal norms for prejudice, will high suppressors follow their hearts or follow the herd?

Study 7: Suppression and Adherence to Group Norms—Conformity and Ambiguity

We investigate this question in the seventh and final study of this article. High and low prejudice suppressors were presented with situations that suggested either condemning or condoning racist speech and confidentially recommended responses to racist conduct. If suppression is based on egalitarian convictions, then social influence should play a small role. If suppression is based on a desire to conform to an important reference group, high suppressors will not only condemn racist speech more vigorously, but they will also condone racist speech more tolerantly than low suppressors, depending on the immediate norm of the situation.

Fletcher Blanchard and his colleagues (Blanchard et al., 1991, 1994) provided a means by which norms for the expression of prejudice may be experimentally manipulated. They found that a single confederate condemning or condoning racism could dramatically alter tolerance for racist acts. When the confederate condemned racist speech, so too did subjects. When the confederate condoned racist speech, subjects showed great tolerance for it. By using a norm manipulation, we explored whether high suppressors report less overall tolerance of racial prejudice, regardless of the norm of the situation, or whether high suppressors pay more attention to the manipulated social norm and exhibit heightened tolerance of prejudice when the social norm points in that direction. We predicted that (a) when participants see others condemning or condoning prejudice, they will do likewise, and that (b) if high suppressors are more conformist on prejudice-relevant issues than low suppressors, this conformity will be heightened among high suppressors.

Method

Participants were 58 psychology students (52% women, 98% White) from the University of Kansas, who received course credit. They were selected from a group (N = 471; 42% men, 87% White) who volunteered for a mass testing session including multiple questionnaires from different researchers. During this mass testing session, participants completed the SPS, Dunton and Fazio's (1997) Concern scale, and Plant and Devine's (1998) IMS. Response options for the three scales ranged from 0 to 9, with higher numbers indicating greater suppression.

Individuals scoring in the upper third (high suppressors) and lower third (low suppressors) of a composite scale created from scores on all three suppression scales (overall α = .85, with each scale representing a single item) were solicited for participation. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: condemning racism, condoning racism, or a control condition. On average, 11 weeks passed between participation in the mass testing session and the experimental session (range = 8–13 weeks).

In all three conditions, participants responded to Blanchard et al.'s (1991) Acceptance of Racist Conduct scale (ARC; see Table 6). The response options for this scale ranged from 1 to 9, with higher numbers indicating greater acceptance of racist conduct, and appeared in a petition-like form of Blanchard et al.'s scale, with each question appearing on a new page. In the condemn racism condition, "four previous participants" had all marked responses highly condemning racist conduct ($M = 1.25$). In the condone racism condition, the 4 participants had all marked responses highly condoning racist conduct ($M = 8.75$). In the control condition, participants were exposed to an unmarked petition. Participants were asked to fill in their responses in the space provided. After completing the scale, participants were debriefed.

Results and Discussion

The first hypothesis is clearly borne out; participants in the condemn racism condition were more condemning of racist conduct (ARC; $M = 2.75$), whereas participants in the condone racism condition were more willing to condone racist conduct ($M = 6.04$), with participants in the control condition falling in-between ($M = 4.04$), $F(2, 55) = 29.78$, $p < .001$, $\eta = .79$.

To test the second hypothesis, we analyzed the ARC with an ANCOVA, with condition as an independent variable and suppression as a covariate. The proper test of the hypothesis is the interaction between condition and covariate—the test for equal slopes. The correlations between suppression and ARC differed significantly by condition, $F(2, 53) = 4.60$, $p < .015$. In Table 7, we report the correlations between the various suppression scales and the ARC scale. In the control and condemn conditions, the correlation between suppression of prejudice and tolerance for racist conduct is negative and strong (mean rs $= -.65$ and $-.47$, respectively). However, in the condone condition, the correlation between suppression and tolerance completely reverses (mean $r = .34$). In each case, the reversal is statistically significant. When faced with a normative situation in which peers establish a norm of tolerance for racist speech, the high suppressors are more influenced by the manipulation than the low suppressors, and they express substantial tolerance of prejudice.

General Discussion

Normative theory provides rich descriptions of prejudice phenomena; suggests strong predictions across cultures, forms of prejudice, and historical contexts; proposes explanations for greater understanding of prejudice phenomena; and recommends courses of action for the alteration of prejudice. It is essential to recognize the value of multiple perspectives for the broadest understanding of prejudice. We assert that the explicit study of social norms is one essential perspective. Social norms can be described, independently measured, and are influential in determining the expression of prejudice and the acceptability of discrimination.

Social norms are remarkably strong predictors of expressed prejudice—to ask about the norms regarding prejudice is, in practical terms, the same as asking people how they personally feel. Study 1 showed that people adhere firmly to social norms when asked to express prejudice; the difference between a correlation of .96 and unity is well within the range of measurement error.

The acceptability of discriminatory acts and expressions of hostility also closely follow social norms. The tolerance of discrimination in employment, housing, and dating closely fits normative expectations. When jokes provide a means by which groups can be denigrated, norms determine which jokes will offend and which will delight. The story told by the first three studies is that social norms are strong predictors of expressions of prejudice-related attitudes. Knowledge of social norms allows us to predict expressions of prejudice, reactions to discrimination, and reactions to expressions of hostility.

These data can be easily predicted, in broad strokes, from many different social psychological theories, in addition to plain common sense. People reflect the social milieu in which they live, and prejudices are simply part of that world. What is most compelling is just how closely the norms apply— individual tolerances solidly reflect group tolerances.

Much has been made of the apparent decline of certain forms of prejudice in recent decades (e.g., Whites' anti-Black racism; Case & Greeley, 1990; Dowden & Robinson, 1993; Firebaugh & Davis, 1988). But when one uses unobtrusive measures (Crosby et al., 1980) or assesses attitudes in normatively ambiguous situations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), personal attitudes do not seem quite so transformed. In most prejudice research, prejudice is measured by self-report, and thus is a mixture of attitudes and display rules. The current research is in this long tradition, and because what gets expressed sets the normative context for future stereotyping and prejudice (Schaller & Conway, 1999; Sechrist & Stangor, 2001), it is a sensible strategy. However, if we make a distinction between the genuine–heartfelt–true attitude and overt expressions, we must consider the possibility that it may not be hearts and minds that change, but rather the normative acceptability of certain prejudices. The public unwillingness to express prejudice may be more determined by normative influence than by personal attitudes. In the long run, according to the GNT of attitudes, external norms become internal attitudes.

One must not lose sight of the fact that a great many prejudices were widely socially acceptable. It is sometimes expressed that one form of group-based antipathy or another is "the last acceptable prejudice." Our data show that many groups are the targets of unalloyed, unabashed negative affect (e.g., gang members, male and female prostitutes, members of the Ku Klux Klan, illegal immigrants, members of religious cults, ex-convicts, and porn stars). The reader may object to our characterization of certain kinds of group-based antipathy as prejudice per se, as many of these targets scoring high in prejudice acceptability (Table 1) are

Table 6
Blanchard, Lilly, and Vaughn's (1991) Acceptance of Racist Conduct Scale

1. Any student who commits a flagrant act of racism should be expelled (R).
2. Schools have been making too big an issue of racist incidents, thereby causing divisiveness on campus.
3. We need to have more diversity programs at the University of Kansas (R).
4. Whenever a White person does something mean to a Black person, everyone seems to assume it's racism.
5. Investigators should be allowed to do everything they can to conduct an official inquiry of a racist act and everyone should cooperate completely (R).

Note. R indicates item is reverse-scored.

Table 7
Correlations Between Acceptance of Racist Conduct and the Various Suppression Scales by Experimental Condition

Condition	*N*	Suppression of Prejudice Scale	Dunton & Fazio's (1997) Concern scale	Plant & Devine's (1998) IMS	Overall combined
Condemn	19	−.36	−.54	−.51	−.44
Control	13	−.74	−.58	−.62	−.42
Condone	20	.41	.49	.13	.36

Note. For all four versions of the scales, condemn and condone correlations are different according to Fisher's *z* test (all *p*s $< .05$). IMS = Internal Motivation Scale.

people who certainly deserve this hostility. However, we argue that deservingness is not a necessary or even useful disqualifier as a part of a definition of prejudice, in part because deservingness is itself under social normative control. Furthermore, the same psychological processes seem to apply in both cases.

The study of multiple targets of prejudice permits a broader picture of prejudice. Including multiple forms of prejudice will also allow us to avoid idiosyncrasies associated with a particular form of prejudice (or a particular researcher's agenda). When we limit the scope of our targets, we also limit our perspective of the phenomena. If we are to understand prejudice as a general psychological phenomenon, we must study it as a general phenomenon. When we do not temper our biases in the study of prejudice, our data might only reflect a limited scope of a complex mosaic. Psychologists will profit from studying the prejudices they uphold as well as those they abhor; we must study normative forms of prejudice as well as counter-normative forms.

We have defined prejudice as a negative evaluation of a group or of an individual on the basis of group membership. We propose that all forms of prejudice are essentially alike in psychological structure and experience, regardless of how various forms of prejudice may differ in external justification. People justify their prejudices to themselves (Crandall & Eshleman, 2000), whether an external audience approves of this justification is not a psychological issue. This definition allows us to examine White anti-Black racism simultaneously with an average American's attitude toward members of the American Nazi Party. Although a social historian, politician, or college lecturer may keep these attitudes quite separate (which makes terrific sense to us), a social psychologist should recognize when they rely on the same psychological mechanisms.

An important advantage to using normative theory to understand prejudice is how it highlights the struggle for internalization. As a person moves from one social group to another, the process of identification with the new group involves taking on the new group's frame of reference (Cantril, 1941; Sherif & Sherif, 1964). The person learns the new group's norms and begins to adapt to and internalize them (Kelman, 1958, 1961; Sherif, 1948). During this struggle for internalization, norms will be salient (Hogg & Abrams, 1988), and the individual will be aware of any deviance from the norms (Turner, 1991). It is this deviance from a reference group's norms, we argue, that provokes internal and external motivations to suppress prejudice. We have used normative theory to conceptualize the roots of suppression, a phenomenon widely studied and reported (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Plant & Devine, 1998; Sears, 1998).

We propose a developmental model of internalization of group norms. When a person breaks a social norm as a new member of a group, the initial response will be either a rejection of the group or, if the group is valued, a hesitancy characterized by the suppression of potentially inappropriate responses. This initial suppression is externally motivated compliance (Kelman, 1958), and it can be captured with measures of externally motivated behavior (e.g., the EMS). Compliance will be followed by identification and internalization as the individual comes to identify with the group and take on its norms. These changes can be captured with measures of internally motivated behavior (e.g., the IMS).

When only normatively inappropriate targets of prejudice are included in social psychological studies, the struggle for internalization may be taken for an individual commitment to reducing prejudice. In an individualistic society, people may interpret their strivings to become a good member as changes in personal attitudes. On first entering a group, an individual will accurately identify external pressures from the group to conform. The changes that result from identification with the group and the struggle toward internalization of the group's norms may be experienced as internal attitudes and commitments. We suggest that the basis of the motivation for suppression is a concern with one's relationships to group norms.

When suppression scales measure attitudes toward normatively inappropriate forms of prejudice (e.g., the SPS; Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998), individuals of various levels of identification with their groups may appear to differ in their commitments to reducing prejudice. The present studies suggest that suppression scales measure awareness of one's group's norms, and one's attitude toward them, more than they measure personal attitudes toward prejudice (see Piaget, 1965; Turner, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). When the study of prejudice is expanded to include normatively appropriate prejudice (either as acceptable groups in Study 6 or when the norm itself is manipulated, as in Study 7), we find that suppression scales seem to measure one's patterns of concerns about our relationships with the group's norms better than one's commitments to reducing prejudice.

Plant and Devine (1998) found that people high in internal motivation to suppress prejudice "reported the campus standards to be somewhat less prejudiced than their low IMS counterparts" (p. 821), despite the fact that all participants perceived their campus to be strongly nonprejudiced. They argued that this was due to differential contact; high internal suppressors "are more likely to spend time with other low-prejudice people" (p. 821), and subsequently judge the campus as less prejudiced. We suggest a slightly different interpretation—those high in internal motivation to sup-

press are actually more ambivalent, more concerned, anxious, apprehensive, motivated, and delicate in their sense that they fit the social norms. Their experience in the initial discovery that racial and ethnic prejudice is not tolerated on campus is taken to heart, and their identification with the group leads to a vigorous and powerful self-directed attempt at conformity, which extremitizes the perception of social norms (see Turner, 1991).

It is important to point out that, although we suggest a new approach to the source of motivations to suppress prejudice, our account is largely consistent with Plant and Devine's (1998) approach. We endorse the internal–external distinction, and we agree that the correlates and consequences of motivation and suppression failures should look much as Plant and Devine have shown. Our description of the process speaks to one important factor in changing reported motivations—identifying with new groups and internalizing their attitude norms. However, we expect that violations of internal motivations would lead to guilt and self-criticism, and that violations of external motivations would lead to feelings of external threat, anger, and frustration, or that people high in external motivation will adapt readily to external audiences while those primarily high in internal motivation will not—as Plant and Devine (1998) have shown. We trace the source of the feelings of internal and external motivation to suppress, but we do not question the presence of these motives.

Normative theory may have fallen out of vogue in recent decades, but these findings demonstrate the value of this traditional theoretical perspective. Social norms are powerful predictors of attitudes and behaviors, and prejudice and discrimination are no exception. One advantage of the normative approach is it allows for a pragmatic optimism. Rather than facing the daunting task of changing the ingrained attitudes of millions of individuals, a norms approach suggests that changing the normative climate can be an efficient and effective approach to attitude change (see Bem, 1970). The more desirable the group, the more people will wish to follow its lead. And when people identify with attractive groups that condemn a prejudice, they are likely to win the struggle for internalization.

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(*Appendixes follow*)

Appendix A

Discrimination Scenarios

Dating

Jamie is a first year KU student who enjoys going to concerts, dating, and hanging out with friends at coffee shops. Jamie's friend Dana recently suggested that Jamie should meet Dana's friend Chris, who lives upstairs from Jamie in the residence hall. Jamie agreed to go out on a blind date with Chris, and Dana started making plans with Chris about where they should go on their date. A few days later, Jamie discovered that Chris is (African American) and called off the date because Chris is (African American).

Housing

Terry has been looking forward to renting an apartment in Lawrence. Terry found a perfect place on the bus route, near shopping, and close enough to campus to walk on nice days. Terry was shown the apartment by the manager's assistant. Terry called the apartment manager the next day to set up an appointment to sign the lease. While the manager was searching for the appointment book, the manager's assistant mentioned that Terry is (Hispanic). Because Terry is (Hispanic), the manager told Terry that the apartment was no longer available.

Employment

Pat saw an advertisement for a data entry position at a local business. The next day Pat stopped by the business, filled out an application, and chatted with the receptionist for several minutes. The receptionist gave Pat's application to the business manager in charge of hiring and mentioned that Pat is (fat). The business manager filed away Pat's application because Pat is (fat), without any intention of seriously considering Pat for the job.

Appendix B

Jokes

1. Q. Why did the racist die in a pie-eating contest?
   A. A cow stepped on his head.
2. Q. How do you save a drowning drug user?
   A. Throw him a rock.
3. A ventriloquist in a nightclub is telling a series of jokes about ex-convicts. He plays straight man while the little dummy on his knee poses the riddles and answers the questions. After many of these, an ex-convict in the audience gets up and shouts, "Will you knock it off? I'm just sick and tired of all these idiotic ex-convict jokes that try to make us look stupid. Just stop it, because we ex-convicts are proud of our contributions to civilization and many great intellects have been ex-convicts." The ventriloquist says, "I'm really sorry to cause such offense. Will you accept my apology?" The ex-convict exclaims, "It's not you I'm talking to, you fool, it's that little bastard on your knee!"
4. Two rednecks were driving a semi-truck down a road when they came to a viaduct. The sign said 10 feet 0 inches, so they got out to measure their truck. Unfortunately, the truck was just over 12 feet high. They didn't know what to do, when finally one of them looked in both directions and said, "I don't see any cops, let's go for it."
5. Q. Why did the woman on welfare climb up to the roof of the bar?
   A. She heard that the drinks were on the house.
6. Q. Why don't fat people have elevator jobs?
   A. They don't know the route.
7. Q. What are the worst six years in a Black person's life?
   A. Third grade.
8. Q. What do UFOs and smart Hispanics have in common?
   A. You keep hearing about them, but never see any.
9. Q. What is the definition of gross ignorance?
   A. 144 illiterate people.
10. Two guys are sitting in a bar swapping jokes about mentally retarded people. A mentally retarded person comes in, and after listening for a bit contributes one of his own: "How do you get a mentally retarded girl pregnant?" he asks. The two guys are stumped. "I dunno," they reply. The mentally retarded person responds, "Gee, and you say the mentally retarded are stupid."

Received December 29, 2000
Revision received July 20, 2001
Accepted July 24, 2001 ■