

Modeling and Simulating Social Systems with MATLAB

Lecture 7 – Game Theory / Agent-Based Modeling

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Computational Social Science





Repetition: Cellular Automata

- Cellular automata are abstract representations of dynamics in discrete space and time
- Reduction of complexity to simple microscopic interaction rules based on neighborhoods in a grid
- Their simplicity is also a limitation of cellular automata: system dynamics cannot always be reduced to neighborbased interaction rules in a grid
- Can be test beds for complex systems: for example comparison of results of cellular automata and dynamical systems



Microscopic modeling

- Some real world processes can be reduced to simple local interaction rules (e.g. swarm intelligence)
- Microscopic modeling requires that dynamic components of a system are 'atomizable' in the given context (e.g. pedestrians behave like particles)
- Represents a reductionist (or mechanistic) point of view in contrast to a systemic (or holistic) approach
- In line with methods that have fueled the success of natural science research in the past 200 years
- Game theory provides a powerful framework to formalize and reduce complex (strategic) interactions




Game Theory

- Mathematical framework for strategic interactions of individuals
- Formalizes the notion of finding a 'best strategy' (Nash equilibrium) when facing a well-defined decision situation
- Definition and study of 'games'
- Underlying assumption is that individuals optimize their 'payoffs' (or more precisely: 'utility') when faced with strategic decisions
- Repeated interactions are interesting for simulations (results can be completely different from one-shot games)

Game Theory - Human Cooperation

Prisoner's dilemma



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0,20	19,19

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Game Theory: Assumptions


- Rationality: alignment between preferences, belief, and actions
- Players want to maximize their payoff
- A player's belief is something like:
 - "I am rational, you are rational. I know that you are rational, and you know that I know that you rational. Everybody knows that I know that you are rational, and you know ..."
- Players act accordingly: best response

Nash Equilibrium

- Is the strategy that players always play with no regrets: best response
- No player has an incentive to deviate from a Nash equilibrium
- In many circumstances, there is more than one Nash equilibrium

Some questions

- Is Nash an optimal strategy?
- What is the difference between a Paretoefficient equilibrium and a Nash Equilibrium?
- Why do players play Nash? Do they?








The Evolution of Cooperation (Axelrod, 1984)

- Often a very good strategy: Tit for tat
 - be nice: cooperate first
 - then do whatever your opponent did in the last round (punish defection; reward cooperation)
- Other possible strategies:
 - Always cooperate / always defect
 - Tit for tat, but defect on first round
 - Win–Stay, Lose–Shift: repeat behavior if successful
- Shadow of the future
 - probability that there will be a next round



Game Theory - Coordination Games



1,1	0,0
0,0	1,1

Game Examples:

- Stag-hunt / assurance game
- Chicken / hawk-dove game



Evolutionary Game Theory

- Classical game theory has its limitations too: assumption of hyper-rational players; strategy selection problem; static theory
- Evolutionary game theory introduces evolutionary dynamics for strategy selection, i.e. the evolutionary most stable strategy dominates the system dynamics
- Very suited for agent-based modeling of social phenomena as it allows agents to learn and adapt



Evolutionary Learning

The main assumption underlying evolutionary thinking is that the entities which are more successful at a particular time will have the best chance of being present in the future

- Selection
- Replication
- Mutation



Evolutionary Learning

- Selection is a discriminating force that favors successful agents
- Replication produces new agents based on the properties of existing ones ("inheritance")
- Selection and replication work closely together, and in general tend to reduce diversity
- The generation of new diversity is the job of the mutation mechanism



How agents can learn

- Imitation: Agents copy the behavior of others, especially behavior that is popular or appears to yield high payoffs
- Reinforcement: Agents tend to adopt actions that yielded a high payoff in the past, and to avoid actions that yielded a low payoff
- Best reply: Agents adopt actions that optimize their expected payoff given what they expect others to do (choosing best replies to the empirical frequency distribution of their opponents' previous actions: "fictitious play")

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From Factors to Actors (Macy, 2002)


- Simple and predictable local interactions can generate complex and sometimes surprising global patterns
- Examples: diffusion of information, emergence of norms, coordination of conventions, or participation in collective action
- Simulation of individual actors instead of modeling based on aggregated factors (e.g. dynamical systems)

From Factors to Actors (Macy, 2002)

- Agents are autonomous
- Agents are interdependent
- Agents follow simple rules
- Agents are adaptive and backward-looking

Swarm Intelligence


- Ant colonies, bird flocking, animal herding, bacterial growth, fish schooling
- Key Concepts:
 - decentralized control
 - interaction and learning
 - self-organization






Boids (Reynolds, 1986)

 Boids (bird-like objects) as simulated individual objects moving in a 3-dimensional virtual space







More information: http://www.red3d.com/cwr/boids/



Separation: steer to avoid crowding local flockmates



Alignment: steer towards the average heading of local flockmates




Cohesion: steer to move toward the average position of local flockmates

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


Programming Agent-Based Simulations






Programming Agent-Based Simulations





- Programming an agent-based simulator often goes in five steps
 - Initialization
 - Initial state; parameters; environment
 - Time loop
 - Processing each time steps
 - Agents loop
 - Processing each agents
 - Update
 - Updating agent *i* at time *t*
 - Save data
 - For further analysis





Efficient Structure

- Define and initialize all variables in the very beginning of your program
- Execute the actual simulation as a function with the most important variables as inputs and the most important result values as outputs
- Automated analysis, visualization, etc. of the simulation results after retrieving the output of the main function

Step 1: Defining the initial state & parameters

```
% Initial state
t0 = 0; % begining of the time line
dt = 1; % time step
T = 100; % number of time steps
% Initial state of the agents
State1 = [0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0];
State2 = [1 1 1 1];
% etc...
```

Step 1: Defining the initial state & parameters

```
% Initial state
t0 = 0; % begining of the time line
dt = 1; % time step
T = 100; % number of time steps
% Initial state of the agents
State1 = zeros(1,50);
State2 = rand(1,50);
```

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Step 2: Covering each time step

```
% Time loop
for t=t0:dt:T
     % What happens at each time step?
     % - Update environment
     % - Update agents
end
```

Step 3: Covering each agent

```
% Agent loop
for i=1:length(States)
     % What happens for each agent?
end
```

Step 4: Updating agent i at time t

```
% Update
%
% Example: Each agent has 60% chance to
% switch to state 1
randomValue = rand();
if (randomValue < 0.6)
    State(i)=1;
else
    State(i)=0;
end
```

Step 4: Updating agent i at time t

```
% Update
%
% Example: Each agent has chance 'probsw'
% to switch to state 1
randomValue = rand();
if (randomValue < probsw)</pre>
    State(i)=1;
                    define in first part
else
    State(i)=0;
end
```

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Step 4: Updating agent i at time t

```
% Initial state
      % begining of the time line
t0 = 0;
dt = 1; % time step
T = 100; % number of time steps
probsw = 0.6; % probability to switch state
```

Step 5: Final processing

```
% Outputs and final processing
propAlive = sum(states)/length(states);
% propAlive is the main output of the
% simulation
```

Encapsulating main part in a function:

```
% simulation function
% input: probsw
% output: propAlive
function [propAlive] = simulation(probsw)
  propAlive = sum(states)/length(states);
end
```

Running the simulation:

```
>> p=simulation(0.6)
0.54
>> p=simulation(0.6)
0.72
```

Automatically run a large number of simulations:


```
% Running N simulations
N = 1000; % number of simulations
probsw = 0.6; % probability to switch state
for n=1:N
    p(n) = simulation(probsw);
end
```

Global variables:

```
global alpha beta % mark as global
alpha = 0.1;
beta = 0.9;
for n=1:N
    p(n) = simulation(probsw);
end
function [propAlive] = simulation(probsw)
  % mark as global with the function too:
  global alpha beta
end
```

Alternatively:

>> hist(p)



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Object-oriented Programming in MATLAB

- MATLAB has support for object-oriented programming
- However, we do not encourage to use this feature, as it is not an efficient way of programming in MATLAB
- Use of vectors and matrices instead of objects

If you still want to have a look at how object-oriented programming works in MATLAB: http://www.mathworks.com/company/newsletters/articles/introduction-to-object-oriented-programming-in-matlab.html



Exercise 1

- There is some additional material on the iterated prisoner's dilemma available in the directory 'prisoner' of
 - https://github.com/msssm/lecture_files
- Experiment with the code and try to find out what it does and how to interpret the results



Exercise 2

- Start thinking about how to adapt the general simulation engine shown today for your project
- Problems:
 - Workspace organization (files, functions, data)
 - Parameters initialization
 - Number of agents
 - Organization of loops
 - Which data to save, how frequently, in which format
 - What kind of interactions are relevant

• ...

References

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 Edition (2009)
- Uhrmacher, Weyns (Editors), Multi-Agent Systems Simulation and Applications, CRC Press (2009)
- A step by step guide to compute the Nash equilibrium: http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/Shogren/jaysho/NashNotes.pdf
- https://github.com/Sandermatt/ETHAxelrodNoise