# Lecture 02

#### Market Failures

Ivan Rudik AEM 4510

# Roadmap

- What are market failures?
- When do they happen?
- What are the consequences?

# Market failures and the environment

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
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
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Consumer surplus is the difference between willingness to pay (demand) and price


Producer surplus is the difference between price and marginal cost (supply)

Total surplus is the sum of CS and PS




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What does this mean about the market allocation?



The market allocation is **efficient** because SMC = SMB


Why?



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Why?

Consider deviating from  $(P^*, Q^*)$ 



Cost of next unit after  $Q^*$  > benefit

Benefit of last unit  $\geq$  cost of last unit before  $Q^*$ 

Competitive market allocations are efficient for private goods

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That's not the case in the real world

In the real world we have externalities

An externality exists whenever an individual or firm undertakes an action that impacts another individual or firm in an unintended way for which the latter is not compensated (a negative externality), or for which the latter does not pay (a positive externality)

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The central problem is that there are goods that are **not priced**, why is this a problem?

Markets rely on prices to reflect value and have people make good decisions

We can classify externalities in a few ways:

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**Production externalities:** 

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
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Negative externalities: imposes external costs (e.g. pollution)

Positive externalities: imposes external benefits (e.g. vaccination)

# Negative externalities: what is this?



# Negative externalities: DDT, shockingly bad for you

DDT is a chemical that was was widely used as an insecticide in the early-mid 1900s

Widely used to eradicate Typhus and Malaria


Used to treat lice

#### Negative externalities: DDT, gives you cancer

A relationship between **DDT** exposure and reproductive effects in humans is suspected, based on studies in animals. In addition, some animals exposed to DDT in studies developed liver tumors. As a result, today, DDT is classified as a probable human carcinogen.


#### The birth of the environmental movement





Social marginal cost (SMC) is the sum of private marginal cost (PMC) and the external marginal cost (EMC)


Where is the SMC?




Social marginal cost (SMC) is the sum of private marginal cost (PMC) and the external marginal cost (EMC)

The PMC curve only reflects the **private costs** of making the DDT

It does not account for the external health and wildlife costs




Adding the private and external marginal costs together gives us the SMC, what we care about from the social planner or regulator's perspective



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
The unregulated market gives us  $(P^u,Q^u)$  as an outcome when we want  $(P^*,Q^*)$ 




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
What's the social cost of this market failure?



Negative externalities generate deadweight loss equal to...




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This is the difference in SMC and SMB for units bought/sold where SMC > SMB:


Total SMC - SMB from  $Q^*$  to  $Q^u$ 




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This is the difference in SMC and SMB for units bought/sold where SMC > SMB

This is the loss to society caused by the externality in the unregulated private market




Key takeaway:



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The private actors are not accounting for the external costs they are imposing on people who are not in the DDT transaction (e.g. third parties whose health is being affected)


#### Estimating marginal damages with EZ-Pass



#### Positive externalities

#### Visualizing herd immunity

If enough people have immunity, the virus is less likely to spread because the few who aren't immune are less likely to come in contact with someone who is infected.




#### Positive externalities




Vaccines and masks are examples of good with positive externalities

You getting or using them has benefits for other people not involved in your vaccine or mask transaction




Social marginal benefit (SMB) is the sum of private marginal benefit (PMB) and the external marginal benefit (EMB)

Where does the SMB curve lie?




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
The PMB curve only reflects the **private benefits** of getting a vaccine




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It does not account for the external herd immunity benefits




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


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
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
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
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
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# COVID and positive externalities



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  - Who owns the right to the air?

## Why do externalities arise?

Typically one of two reasons:

- 1. Poorly defined property rights
  - Who owns the right to the air?
- 2. High transactions costs
  - Hard to bargain over desired air quality with millions of people

Lets conceptualize a model of efficient bargaining using an Edgeworth Box

# Why do externalities arise? Edgeworth Box

- Two individuals: A and B
- Two private goods: X and Y


Each individual begins with an initial endowment of each good:


- ullet  $A:w_X^A,w_Y^A$
- ullet  $B: w_X^B, w_Y^B$

This gives us a total endowment:

- $ullet W_X = w_X^A + w_X^B$
- $ullet \ W_Y = w_Y^A + w_Y^B$

# Why do externalities arise? Edgeworth Box






Total vertical distance is  $W_Y$ 

Total horizontal distance is  $W_X$ 


Initial endowment is given by the empty circle


Initial indifference curves for A and B are UA(0) and UB(0)



Is there a possible Pareto improvement?

e.g. can we make both A and B better off?





Yes!

If we move anywhere in the lens of their initial indifference curves we have a Pareto improvement

If we move to an allocation where their indifference curves are tangent to one another (e.g. the filled-in point), we have a Pareto optimum

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The endowment point is well-established

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
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- A and B can trade X and Y to some Pareto improving point
- They continue trading until they achieve a Pareto optimal allocation
- This allocation lies on the contract curve: the line consisting of all Pareto efficient allocations



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Suppose that A likes Y, but B does not


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
Suppose both start off with the same quantity of X




Depending on who has property rights, we either start at:

- W1 (B has property rights)
- W2 (A has property rights)

Think about why these are where we must start




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
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Therefore, A has to pay B to get more Y




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
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A pays B in units of X, move to Z1, Pareto optimum




Suppose we start at W2, what happens?



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
B wants to have less Y, but this imposes a cost on A



Suppose we start at W2, what happens?

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Suppose we start at W2, what happens?

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Therefore, B has to pay A to get less Y

B pays A in units of X, move to Z2, Pareto optimum

In the previous example we were able to achieve the Pareto optimum even with a public good / externality

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Why?

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Why?

1. Property rights were assigned to either A or B

In the previous example we were able to achieve the Pareto optimum even with a public good / externality

#### Why?

- 1. Property rights were assigned to either A or B
- 2. Transactions costs were low (didn't have to pay a fee to trade X)

# Property rights and externalities

A solution to many externalities is to just assign property rights and let the market do its thing

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A solution to many externalities is to just assign property rights and let the market do its thing

We'll talk about a few ways that we can assign property rights

Now suppose there were many non-smokers

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Even if they were assigned the property rights, it might be hard for them to bargain

- Takes a lot of time to find something that works for everyone
- Negotiating over how much X each person gets

Now suppose there were many non-smokers

Even if they were assigned the property rights, it might be hard for them to bargain

- Takes a lot of time to find something that works for everyone
- Negotiating over how much X each person gets

The costs of bargaining may exceed the benefits and we end up stuck at W2

Road noise: drivers implicitly have property rights to noise around roads

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Even if you prefer quiet, you can't negotiate a payment with every loud car that might pass pay

#### The free-rider problem

Externalities and public goods/bads often exhibit many of the same features

Both are subject to the Free-Rider Problem

A type of market failure that occurs when those who benefit from resources, public goods (such as public roads or hospitals), or services of a communal nature do not pay for them[1] or under-pay

e.g.

- people don't pay their taxes for publicly-provided services
- non-smokers will wait for others to pay in order to reduce smoke

# The provision of public goods

How do we efficiently provide public goods?

#### We know:

- Private goods: PMB = PMC ↔ SMB = SMC
- Goods with negative externalities: PMB = SMC ↔ SMB = SMC
- goods with positive externalities: SMB = PMC ↔ SMB = SMC

How do we efficiently provide public goods?

#### We know:

- Private goods: PMB = PMC ↔ SMB = SMC
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- goods with positive externalities: SMB = PMC ↔ SMB = SMC

Suppose we have a public good, e.g. depth of a river for public use

How do we decide the socially efficient depth?

Optimal provision is always given by: SMB = SMC

What are the SMB and SMC for a public good?

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What are the SMB and SMC for a public good?

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Non-rival: multiple people can use the same unit of a good (one person using the river doesn't 'use up' its depth)

This means multiple people can derive benefits from the provision of 1 unit of the good

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e.g. the free market underprovides clean air, national defense, etc

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
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
Public goods: we add demand curves vertically



3 different groups: boaters (B), anglers (A), and hikers (H)

Each has a different marginal benefit for water depth:


- Boaters: MB = 12-Q
- Anglers: MB = 10-Q
- Hikers: MB = 6-Q
- MC of provision: MC = Q



Now we need to aggregate them to get the social marginal benefit

We do so by adding up the demand curves vertically:


At each Q, sum the MBs



Why is the aggregate demand curve kinked?

Because at each quantity/depth, only certain groups are willing to use the river


#### Positive externalities: graphical



At quantities > 10, only boaters are willing to pay

At quantities > 6 and <= 10, only boaters and anglers are willing to pay

At quantities =< 6 all groups are willing to pay to use the river



The optimal provision of the public good is where the MC curve crosses the SMB curve

The optimal quantity of 22/3 is greater than the quantity any individual group would be willing to purchase

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If the government is able to provide the good, how does it finance the cost raising the river depth above zero?

It charges each group a share of this price

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Anglers pay: 8/3

Hikers: free

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Since the good is non-rival, this is enough to finance the cost

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It requires perfect information on behalf of the regulator