

# **Trades' Unions and Strikes: Their Philosophy and Intention**

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# TRADES' UNIONS AND STRIKES



THE object of this pamphlet is to obtain a hearing on the subject of “Trades’ Unions” and “Strikes” from that class who, from their position in society, can only obtain a knowledge of it from the evidence of others. In setting forth the principle which calls Trade Societies into existence, it is not intended to defend all that has been done by Trades’ Unions, any more than an advocate of religion would attempt to defend all that has been done in its name by religious professors. Trades’ Unionists, generally, are neither writers, nor, to any great extent, able to employ writers in their behalf, nor, indeed, to the limited extent that they are able, do they at present see the necessity of doing so; while, on the contrary, those opposed to them., from their wealth and position in society, form a great part of the very class by whom writers are directly and indirectly supported;—hence, while the press—newspaper and periodical—teems with denunciations against them, scarcely a voice, directly from themselves, is heard through the press in their behalf. Indeed, it has been felt by impartial men to be the one great difficulty in the way of understanding the subject, that all they can get hold of on the matter—except the merely local statements relative to a particular strike or dispute, which may then be pending—is exclusively on one side. As far as our limited means and power will enable us, it is intended by this pamphlet to supply that deficiency, by a statement direct from a body of working men, by their accredited agent, of their views on the subject.

The principal argument against Trades’ Unions is professed to be derived from the alleged ignorance of the working classes of Political Economy. As this term is used by many without having a precise idea of what it is, and by different persons in a different sense, we will commence by very briefly stating the meaning which we attach to it: Political Economy is the science which treats of the principle of exchange in its operation in the production of wealth, and its operation and influence on civilised society.

Man is said to be an animal—in contradistinction from all others — that makes exchanges. And it is by the principle of exchange that all the transactions of civilised life are carried on, by which, indeed, civilised society exists and is held together. But if man be an animal that makes exchanges, he undoubtedly retains, in common with the carnivora to which he in part

belongs, instincts of a predatory character, and might be defined to be an animal that, besides making exchanges, also steals. The act of exchange embraces every conceivable form in which the subject can be treated, and, indeed, is that out of which the science itself is evolved. It is only necessary, therefore, by analysing this act, to illustrate what we understand by the term Political Economy. By the act of exchange, the four things essential to a civilised community are supposed, without which, indeed, it could not exist, namely. LABOUR—CAPITAL—the right of INDIVIDUAL APPROPRIATION, or PROPERTY—and SECURITY. *Labour*, to produce the thing exchanged; *Capital*, in the accumulated labour, which results in the article exchanged; the recognition of *the right of Individual Appropriation*, or property, by which the act of exchange takes place, as distinguished from the act of taking or keeping possession of the article by force; and *Security*, which ensures the peaceful continuation of a succession of exchanges to all who have anything to dispose of: the result of the whole, in civilised life, being the four great classes into which society is divided. Labour yielding *wages* giving support to all who labour (using the term in its most extensive sense); capital giving *profit*—the revenue of those who employ capital. The right of individual appropriation, or property, as applied to the land, which, without remark, we take as we find it, gives *rent*, which gives revenue to landlords. And security supposes *taxes*, which support those who defend the country, administer its laws, and tax-receivers in general. This last strongly illustrates what is very little noticed, if at all, by political economists—namely, the predatory instincts of mankind, the omission of which often leads to very great error in the application of rules of political economy, and to none more than to their application to Trades' Unions. And yet these predatory instincts are most unmistakably indicated and provided against by this element of exchange, security, in the absence of which it certainly could not go on, as in communities it requires laws with strong force to support those who administer them and enforce their execution, without which the community could not exist; and in separate nations, armies and fleets for defence, and, as a stronger illustration, for attack. On these four elements of the principle of exchange, without either of which it could not exist, it will be seen the whole system of civilised society rests. We have thus particularised each element, and its respective result, to show that those who live by labour are, by *right*, entitled to their revenue by the simple action of the principle of exchange equally with the other three great divisions of society, as opposed to the confused idea of wages being derived from the relation of master and servant, involving a sort of benevolent patronage on the one side, and obligation on the other. And it will be our object to show, that it is only by trade combinations that the *free* exercise of this principle can be secured to working men.

Our business, however, is only with the action of the principle of exchange upon wages. It is usual, with a certain class of political economists, of whom A. Black, Esq., M.P., may be considered a fair exponent, to lecture the working classes on the principles of this science. Accordingly, in his recent lecture in Edinburgh, he devotes five, out of the twenty-two pages it comprises, to the consideration of the value of commodities—labour being one in its nature like the rest—which is determined by demand and supply; the pernicious result of monopoly; of capital and labour, and of each being necessary for the employment of the other; that capital will not be employed unless a profit can be obtained by its employment; that when the profit of capital is high in any trade or manufacture, so many will be tempted to embark in it that this high profit will soon be reduced to its ordinary level; and the same with high wages, except they proceed from great skill, which, from the nature of things, must always be rare; and, lastly, if a capitalist has embarked his capital upon the supposition that he has to pay a certain sum for wages, and he is obliged to pay more, his profit will be reduced by that amount, which will be very likely to cause him to withdraw from the business in which he has engaged, and, of course, cease to pay wages, which should be a lesson to workmen not to demand too high wages.

With due respect for Mr. Black, who doubtless was actuated by a sincere desire to promote what he believed to be the true interests of the working classes, we think, if, instead of puzzling himself and his readers by elaborately explaining the above propositions, which nobody is likely to dispute, and which are, in their enunciation, like that of two and two making four, already at their plainest terms, he had endeavoured to show how it was that these things, which almost everybody knows, failed to convince the working classes that Trades' Unions are unnecessary, and Strikes always pernicious, and shown how they were in error: he would then have conferred a real benefit on the working classes. It is a great mistake, in gentlemen of Mr. Black's position, to suppose that working men are practically ignorant of the truths of political economy. With it as a science they may be ignorant; indeed, some of them may not even know that there is such a science. But these gentlemen seem to forget that political economy is only the compilation into a code of rules the practice of all men in all ages who have bought and sold; have been engaged in commercial transactions; or in any way have made use of the principle of exchange. Every costermonger is obliged to regulate what he does in buying and selling by the law of demand and supply, which if explained to him as being a part of the science of political economy, he would be as much surprised that he had, without knowing it, been practising the science all his life, as the honest gentleman in the French comedy was, on his

being taught composition, that he had been talking prose all his life without knowing it. Except in the innocent dulness of the latter, which would certainly not belong to the costermonger, the cases are exactly parallel.

We therefore will endeavour to show why the above propositions fail in convincing working men that they are doing wrong in entering into combination. Not that these propositions are doubted, but because implicit belief in them is perfectly consistent with the propriety of Trade Combinations. We shall therefore proceed to consider —

- I. —Wages, and what determines their value.
- II. —Trade Societies, for the protection of wages.
- III. —The means used by them for that purpose.



## I.— WAGES.

It is superfluous to say that the price of labour, like that of everything else, is determined by the quantity or supply of it *permanently* in the market; when the supply of it *permanently* much exceeds its demand, nothing can prevent the reduction of wages; and, conversely, when the demand for it permanently much exceeds its supply, nothing can prevent their rise. In these two extreme points all contention is hopeless. No Trade Society on the one hand, however well organised, can, or ever did, prevent the fall of wages in the first case; nor, in the other, can, or ever did, the most stringent legislative enactment, of which there have been many instances, prevent their rise. Trade Societies, however, rarely meddle with these two extremes. Leaving them, we come to the intermediate states that admit the operation of Trade Societies; and, indeed, which call them into existence.

In all exchanges, besides the adjustment which takes place in them by the operation of demand and supply, there is always, from the predatory instinct inherent in the very nature of man, noticed above, a desire, on one side or the other, to take advantage of the necessities either of the buyer or seller; and, in proportion as these necessities are immediate and pressing, to press that advantage accordingly. Take, for example, an estate for sale, of which it is known that, come what will, it must be sold in a fortnight for ready money, or what is deemed as good as ready money. If the estate be large, the seller, under these circumstances of necessity, will be sure to lose some thousands of pounds. In wages, besides the rate of wages, which results from the demand for it in proportion to its supply, there is a lower rate which may be the result of the necessities of the workman. For example, in those trades where there is what is called the “Sweating System” practised, the fair result of the demand and supply rate of wages is represented by the amount received by the “Sweater;”<sup>1</sup> perhaps, however, his demand, to enable him to get the work, may be somewhat less. He, however, gets the work done lower still; which is

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<sup>1</sup>A “Sweater” is one who takes out work to do, at the usual rate of wages, and who gets it done by others at a lower price; the difference, which is his profit, being “sweated” out of those who execute the work. Hence the term “Sweater.”

his profit, by employing those whose necessities compel them to work for his price, or starve—some of these, perhaps, may be first-rate workmen, whose habits of intemperance have reduced them to the lowest state of destitution, and who are glad to work for any price. There is, therefore, a wide difference between the demand and supply rate of wages, or the rate which the fair operation of exchange would give, if the buyer and seller of it were on equal terms, and that which is, or would be, compelled, if the employer dealt with each man “singly,” and obtained the reduction which his necessities might dictate.

The supply of labour in a trade may be greater at one time than another — indeed for a time far exceed the demand for it; and yet that state not be its permanent condition. In other words the trade might be for a good while “slack.” If a reduction of wages took place during this period, this reduction would be very likely to remain when the trade got “busy,” the supply of hands not being then greater than the demand; and yet the temporary “slackness” in itself would by no means be adequate to compel this reduction, and ought not to have produced it. The undue competition among employers, bidding each under the other, intending to make up the difference out of the wages of their men, —not from any compelling necessity in the trade, but from mere rivalry, —would inevitably cause a reduction, which, if not checked, might extend to the whole; not again from any compelling necessity arising from over-supply, but from taking advantage of the immediate necessities of their men being greater than their own. Hence the formation of Trade Societies, which become a necessity, to adjust the bargain for the sale and purchase of labour.

In all bargains, the buyer wishes to buy as cheap, and the seller to sell as dear, as he can; but their interests, all being exchangers, and each, from the highest to the lowest, depending upon this principle —exchange— for his position in life and even for his daily sustenance; all things being equal, their position is not one of opposition, but of mutual interest; and neither the one in wishing to get as much, nor the other in wishing to pay as little as possible, can injure the other. But if, as alluded to above, either party possess an advantage over the other in the bargain, this position of mutual interest is changed into one of opposition, in which the weaker party is sure to be deprived of some proportion of what is justly due to him. In this position as bargainers for the sale and purchase of labour, stand the employer and employed. Singly the employer can stand out longer in the bargain than the journeyman; and as he who can stand out longest in the bargain will be sure to command his own terms, the workmen combine to put themselves on something like an equality in the bargain for the sale of their labour with



— *WAGES*.

their employers. This is the *rationale* of Trade Societies, which is very clearly indicated by Adam Smith in his “Wealth of Nations.”

— *WAGES.*

## II.—TRADE SOCIETIES.

The object intended is carried out by providing a fund for the support of its members when out of employ, for a certain number of weeks in the year. This is the usual and regular way in which the labour of the members of a Trade Society is protected, that the man's present necessities may not compel him to take less than the wages which the demand and supply of labour in the trade have previously adjured; strikes, which we shall hereafter notice, being only resorted to on extraordinary, and, generally speaking, most unusual occasions.

As the object of combinations is thus to correct the disadvantage of position as bargainers with their employers, and as the very element of their existence is public spirit, being held together only by a principle of honour to support each other for a perfectly legitimate purpose, they always comprise not only the best workmen, but best men in a moral sense that are to be found in the trade. This is stated, simply because it is a fact, which has been acknowledged by those who are inimical to trade combinations. As the social position of workmen depends entirely upon the wages they obtain, it is felt by the majority of them to be a sacred duty to adopt this means of protecting their wages. There is no state so abject, and no tyranny so hard to be endured, as that which results from the seller being completely at the mercy of the buyer. It is to avoid this state so detrimental to themselves, and so advantageous to the employers—at least so thought by many of them,—that working men combine, and that their combinations, according to the "Edinburgh" reviewer, contain "about 600,000 members, commanding a fund of £300,000." How this fund is disposed of we shall hereafter allude to. This is the reason, at which neither he nor any man need "for the twentieth time wonder," that induces "intelligent workmen" to form themselves into Trades' Unions; and not, as stated by the same reviewer, after about four pages of vague denunciation and foolish wonder, to "intimidate," "to stint the action of superior physical strength, moral industry, or intelligent skill," or "to apply the fallacies of the protective system to labour;" their object, on the contrary, being to ensure the freedom of the principle of EXCHANGE with

regard to labour, by, as before observed, putting the workman in something like an equal position in the bargain for sale of his labour with his employer. If in doing this they sometimes—err as who does not?—such error does not invalidate the propriety of such a course.

The same reviewer, in a page which, though placed at the commencement, seems to have been written as a kind of summing-up of the whole, asks his readers: “Can it be possible, then, that in Great Britain, too, there is an *imperium* in *imperio* as oppressive to those whom it comprehends as any secret society on the Continent, enforcing mysterious laws and arbitrary obligations by the hands of irresponsible authorities, in defiance of the great natural laws of human society? Recent events have prepared our readers to take some interest in the inquiry whether the fact is so or not. When they have learned as much as can be known of the Trades’ Unions of England, they may judge for themselves whether any existing government in Europe from Constantinople to St. Petersburg or Paris would venture to exercise so stringent a rule over its subjects as a large proportion of our working men submit to from men of their own order. Under the system of irresponsible government, which strives to subject the labour market to its dominion, the characteristic freedom of the English citizen is lost. Hundreds of thousands of our countrymen are unable to say that each man’s house is his castle; that his labour and its rewards are his own property, and that ‘live and let live’ is the rule of the society in which he dwells.” —P. 528.

The sum and substance of the above, divested of its gloss, is that Trades’ Unions are, 1st, secret; 2nd, irresponsible; and 3rd, coercive.

## 1.—SECRET.

With respect to the “mysterious laws and arbitrary obligations,” we have only to say that the proceedings of Trades’ Unions are no more secret than those of any other societies, to which working men and others belong. When the reviewer talks of “Continental nations from the Mediterranean to the Volga, and from the Black Sea to the Channel, being honeycombed with secret societies,” and insinuates that it is a mistake in Englishmen to congratulate themselves that everything with them is “open and above board,” and that they have no “spies,” “enforced dumbness,” and “*surveillance*,” while Trades’ Unions exist among them; he insinuates what is false. The insinuation, for he does not venture to state it openly, without doubt, gives strength to the alleged tyranny, but it is untrue. That the proceedings of Trades’ Unions have been unknown is true, but they have only been unknown because they

have been considered by the general public, and therefore by the press, too obscure and insignificant to deserve attention. Nothing would serve the cause of the working classes more than a continual ventilation of their proceedings by the public press; it would tend to procure for them a greater meed of justice than they have hitherto found, and, what is better, it would tend greatly to preserve them from error. There is not a more salutary check to injury from your own proceedings, as well as from the proceedings of your opponents, than publicity through the press. This, however, has undergone a change for the better, during the last few years. In the “builders’ dispute,” as far as the men’s proceedings are concerned, it has ceased altogether; the secresy being entirely on the side of the Masters’ Association.

We have now before us 227 quarto pages, double columns, for the most part in the *small* newspaper type, of the reports of the proceedings of the men, leading articles, &c., on this dispute, cut from the newspapers, chiefly from the *Times*, while that paper reported them, and when it ceased to do so, from the *Morning Advertiser*, and other papers. This, in the usual type (not the largest), would make a quarto volume of 671 pages. Where, then, is the secresy? The masters’ proceedings, in their Association, have been secret, but not the men’s, in their “Trades’ Union.”

There are no “secret societies” as “Trades’ Unions.” The attempt to make them so, in 1834, was utterly abortive, from the refusal of the trades generally to become so. When it was illegal to combine, they were necessarily secret, not from any inclination, but from the force of the adverse law, which compelled secresy. This enforced secresy generated its usual train of evils, and in some cases the administration of oaths to members. When the laws against combinations were repealed, these practices, and the secresy out of which they grew, ceased, which ought to have been known to the reviewer, before he attempted to write on the subject.

The ordinary proceedings of a Trade Society are of course too uninteresting for public attention. But in disputes, which in the case of the builders, have occupied so much of the attention of the public, whose fault has it ever been that they have not obtained the same publicity? Certainly not the men’s. During the strike of the masons at the building of the two Houses of Parliament in 1841, the greatest difficulty was experienced by the men in getting their statements into the newspapers; in fact, they were obliged to resort to placards and printed bills, because the newspaper press refused to publish them. The masters found immediate publication in the first-class newspapers for their statements, but the men could not. The present writer had the greatest difficulty in getting a report of an investigation into a case

alleged by the men and denied by the masters, relative to this dispute, into a popular newspaper, that now would publish such a report immediately. He with his colleague had to wait upon the editor, who had previously refused insertion; and at last it was inserted—as he believes—through the intervention of one who was influential in the management of the paper. We go into this detail to show that it has never been the fault of Trades' Unions that their proceedings have been unpublished to the world. But it is said the Committees are secret. It is true their proceedings are not published, but does that constitute a secret Committee? If so, then all meetings of men appointed to transact business, from the Cabinet Council downwards, including all railway and parochial Committees, are secret conclaves. But these are not secret, because the names are known of those composing them; the first-named to all the nation, and the rest to all whom they concern. And, in like manner, the names of those who form Trade Committees are equally known to those who appoint them; and, therefore, are not secret.

## 2.—IRRESPONSIBLE.

The “irresponsible authorities,” by whom we suppose are meant the President, Committee-men, and Secretary, of each and every Trades' Union—if the reviewer was so ignorant of such matters as not to know it before—these are invariably elected by the Trades' Union to which they belong, to which they are responsible for what they do during their term of office, and who are not slow to find fault and censure them if they do anything displeasing to the body they represent. If he did not know this, the commonest sense of propriety and regard for truth ought to have restrained him from writing on the subject until he had obtained this information. But then there could have been no “slashing article” the dull prose of truth would have prevented it. As the responsibility of the “authorities” of Trade Societies will be further shown as we proceed, there is no need here of saying more.

As to the “characteristic freedom of the English artizan being lost” by this “system of irresponsible government,” the reviewer unconsciously, from his ignorance of the subject, has, by the *reductio ad absurdum*, refuted himself. He describes a state of things which has no existence. We should no more have believed this passage about working men, not knowing whether their “labour and its rewards were their own property,” and the rest of it, applied to ourselves as workmen, had we not been told, than we should have known that the French writer meant Shakspeare when he called him the “divine Williams.” We have shown this passage to several of the “hundreds and thousands of our

countrymen" here described, who have one and all, with much laughter, in the most expressive vernacular, and with vigorous expletives, denounced the reviewer as the "biggest of the unwise," and the greatest of the perverters of truth, that they ever heard of. When any matter, like the present, has reached its last point of absurdity, there is no more to be said. We therefore take leave of it, especially as our object is not to criticise the ignorance of the reviewer, but to state the truth; and, having disposed of the secresy and irresponsibility—two such powerful adjuncts to the alleged coercion "which strives to subject the labour market to its dominion"—we will now proceed to consider the alleged tyranny or coercion itself.

### 3.—*COERCIVE.*

As the "coercion," apart from acts of intimidation and violence, said to be exercised by Trades' Unions, has been the theme of accusation, invective, censure, or expostulation, according to the mood of the speaker or writer, with the unanimity of a chorus, from Lord Brougham down to Mr. Buxton, we hope to be excused if we enter somewhat largely into the subject. It is not only alleged to induce men to belong to the Union, but to exist everywhere, in all that Trades' Societies do, or intend to do. Now, it is the tyranny of the majority over the minority; then, it is the tyranny of the leaders; or, again, a general undefined tyranny which pervades the whole body; but always tyranny and coercion. According to the "Edinburgh Review" the tyranny is general, undefined, but pervading everywhere. The *Times*, Dec. 9, 1859, gives it to the leaders in the following terms:—

They strike at the bidding of men who deem it necessary to assert a control over the destinies of trade by making a terrible example of employers and employed as often as their secret and imperious commands are disobeyed. Nor does their fault consist in taking too much, but rather in taking too little, interest in their own affairs—in permitting themselves to be made mere tools and instruments of the will of others in matters in which it is, above all things, incumbent on them to judge for themselves, and in surrendering their natural liberty, tamely and ingloriously, into the hands of an ignorant and inquisitorial despotism.

Mr. Black, taking up the subject from the "Edinburgh Review," the said reviewer having used the word "excommunication," says:—

But it is not by illegal violence alone that personal liberty may be encroached upon; there are other means of intimidation that may be as effectual, or even more so. The Pope, by the threat of excommunication, was able to control the most powerful sovereigns. A similar threat is one of the most effective instruments in the hands of the committees of the Unions. When they order a strike, he would be a bold man who would preach the right of private judgment, and act upon it in opposition to the commands of the secret committee; he would not only be shunned by all his companions, but reproached and denounced as a snob, a nobstick, as unfair, and insulted in other opprobrious terms. By cajolery, molestation, and threatening, the combined leaders strike a general terror into the whole community.—  
P. 21.

The “Quarterly” reviewer, having more sense, does not harp so much on this string.

To Mr. Black is due the merit of being definite; he not only states what is done, but the manner of execution. And we have no doubt but that he has, in the case he has supposed, stated the true impression on his mind, as derived from the “Edinburgh Review,” and the statement of various speakers and writers on the same side, who are considered authorities on the subject. We will, therefore, analyse it. The “excommunication” is relative to a supposed strike, and he assumes it to be complete and effectual. Now, how can a man be ejected or driven from a community, with “reproaches and denunciations,” “shunned even by his friends,” unless by the active co-operation of the community itself? and how could such co-operation exist by the community, unless such “excommunication” had its full and hearty approval? No cajolery can make men, and especially working men, do what they have no mind to, and, if the community are willing to eject one of their body so vigorously as here described, with “insult” and “opprobrious” terms, there needs no “cajolery” to induce them to do so. As to the committee, who are as one to fifty, or more, attempting to intimidate the general body to do such a thing by threats, it is too preposterous for argument. Mr. Black here describes the tyranny of the majority over the minority; and not, as he states, the tyranny of its leaders over the general body. His own case proves that he is entirely mistaken in this respect. It may be, in such a case, that the leaders are compelled to act in obedience to the general voice, as has been the fact, hundreds of times, with more important bodies than Trade Societies. So far from the fact being, as the Times and Mr. Black suppose, that the Committees of Trades’ Unions are the agitators and leaders in strikes; it oftener happens than not that they prevent them, by soothing down the



angry feelings excited by what the members of their Societies have considered unjust treatment, from foremen or employers. There, however, exists some cause for this error. When men have been asked, by employers, why they have struck or have refused to work for a certain price, they too often, from the fear of compromising themselves, lay it all to “their mates,” or to “the Society,” or to its “Committee,” when perhaps some of those very men have been foremost in setting forth to the meeting of their general body, which unanimously agreed the strike should take place, the absolute necessity of so doing. But, although this cause for error does sometimes exist, it is not the less a great mistake to suppose that the working class are the mere “tools and instruments of the will of others,” or that they “surrender their natural liberty” into the hands of their leaders. Those leaders, as before observed, are in all cases elected by the general body, to carry out its views, and therefore cannot be secret. Nor can they do anything against the will of that body. If they were to attempt to do so, they would soon cease to be its leaders, and, consequently, could not exercise “despotic” rule over it.

But it may be asserted that, granting this, the rule of Trades’ Unions is nevertheless the tyranny of the majority over the minority. To which we reply, where is it that this kind of tyranny does not exist? Mr. Black tells us that there are no “Trades’ Unions” or “Strikes” in the United States of America, and we believe he is nearly correct. Where, according to M. de Tocqueville, is the tyranny of the majority over the minority greater than in those states? To come nearer home, what is the “world’s dread laugh” but the tyranny of the majority? What is “public opinion,” so potent, and so fatal to those who stand in opposition to it, but the voice of the majority against the minority? who never fail to denounce it as tyranny; and who generally get laughed at for their folly by the same “public.” If this be a crime in Trades’ Unions, it is a crime of which the *élite* of English society are equally guilty; and not only the *élite* but every grade downwards from it to the working classes. Out of many instances of the way in which it sometimes acts that might be given, we only need mention the following:—Mr. Burke, after his expression of opinion on the French Revolution, was, to use his own words, “excommunicated by his party,” lost his seat in Parliament, and for his whole life after was reduced to political insignificance. Lord Chancellor Yorke, who took office at the earnest request of the King (George III.) from being supposed by such taking of office to have betrayed his party, was proscribed by that party; which he took so much to heart, that he lost his reason, and died by his own hand.

Sir Robert Peel was considered, by the party to which he had for years belonged, to have betrayed it, though it was all the while known that he had a perfect right to change his opinion; and the event, during his life, proved

that it was most beneficial to the nation that he had done so—yet with his party he lost caste; and though he had the approbation of the general public, his public life was embittered to the end—even when the aggregate majority was with him—by the most bitter attacks that ever assailed a public man; against which the approbation of the general majority was of no avail, such approbation being expressly because he had shattered to pieces the favourite policy of his former party; or, to use its own words, betrayed it.

Messrs. Bright and Cobden, during the late war with Russia, thought proper on the peace question to express what was known previously to be their sincere convictions, and which they had an undoubted right to express, but which were opposed to what was at that time considered to be the public weal; in short, to the almost wishing success to the enemy with whom the country was at war. All their past services were forgotten, they both lost their seats in Parliament, and, during that war, their influence as public men; and would again under the same circumstances suffer the same loss, supposing they should, which is very doubtful, ever regain the confidence which the public formerly reposed in them. Pausing for a moment on this phase of the subject: do either of these reviewers, or any one else, require to be told, that a state of combination, whether it be of a political party or a Trades' Union, supposes a united action which is inconsistent with dissent?—or that there are men everywhere, who, after the whole of the fellows—themselves included—have agreed to a certain movement, have frustrated it by an opposite course of action? Have not many such been denounced in both reviews as having “betrayed their party,” and “their cause?” Without doubt such men have a right to do as they like, and to be protected from violence and insult; but it is too much to expect that their fellows should receive them with affection or regard. Do what you will, talk how you like, such men will always be considered by their party, whether it be of the highest or lowest sections of the community, as infamous, and treated accordingly by the majority, whose cause they have betrayed. If this be “tyranny,” then it will never be purged from the working or any other class of society, while men are human. When, if ever, they become angelic, it may be different; but then there will be no traitors.

But to return. What is the end and aim of the “Quarterly and Edinburgh Reviews” as far as politics are concerned, but to excite the public opinion against their opponents?—and the greatest success they hope to achieve is to obtain the general voice against those whom they denounce, or, in short, to create this “coercion” or “tyranny” of the majority against them. What is the “Edinburgh Review” now doing, but, Tight or wrong, endeavouring to excite public opinion against Trades' Unions? What is the object of Mr.

Black's lecture and Mr. Buxton's letter—both compiled from the two reviews in question—but to do the same thing? But we shall be told they all think they are doing right. Do they? We should be glad to be informed who does not when thus employed? But, if they think they are doing right in thus invoking public opinion, can there be a more profound acknowledgment of its power, and of submission to its voice, than such invocation? It is the acknowledgment of a superior power by appeals to it. If, then, all in their turn acknowledge its power by invoking it, as a rule to which all must submit, how can it be a degrading tyranny when it exercises its force among working men?

But what do they want public opinion to do, when all in their turn invoke it, but to bring its force to bear against their opponents?—to bring, if successful, what those opponents would most surely call this tyranny of the majority against them, with all its irresistible forms of coercion? And this is deemed by all parties not only legitimate and proper, but in the highest degree commendable. Is it, then, only when this formidable power produces the same result among the working classes, that, in the opinion of this reviewer and the rest, it is tyranny and coercion? Take the question as it is put by Lord St. Leonards, in his letter to the *Times* of December 13, 1859, and the same result will follow—namely, that it is by the opinion of the majority that Trades' Unions exist—who are said in these unions to coerce all the rest—that is, the minority. His lordship, as far as we can understand him, wishes to put an end to Trades' Unions, and of course describes their action as most unwise and tyrannical. He says that, "If a law were to be passed, placing the free workmen under such a rule, we might expect an insurrection; and yet vast masses voluntarily place themselves under a yoke which they would resist in the shape of authority with all their energies." What are the vast masses here alluded to, but the majority? And if they elect to place themselves under what his lordship is pleased to term a "yoke," he may rest assured that they have their own good reasons for doing so, and do not require, however well intentioned, the commiseration of anyone. Here, as in the case put by Mr. Black, to suppose that the "mandates" of the committees, &c., would for an instant be regarded by the general body comprising the Trade Society, unless those "mandates" had previously had their sanction and concurrence, is too ridiculous for argument. These officers and committees, once more, do not make laws for the general body, they are made by the general body itself in all cases; and if it assigns a discretionary power to its officers, it is because it—namely, the body at large—thinks that the best course to pursue. It seems to be forgotten that working men are not so "handy" with the pen as lawyers' clerks, and therefore the real fact—namely, that it is better to leave to the

discretion of the committee the dealing with cases that may arise, than to make rules concerning supposed cases which might, in practice, be wholly inapplicable—is not believed. But, instead, alarm is taken, or pretended to be taken, at the “irresponsible power” of the committees. Never was alarm more groundless. Only let any committee or officer act in opposition to the wish of the general body, and, as before said, they would speedily find themselves relieved from “the cares of office.” But why is all this care for the “vast masses?” They have never, as we have heard, complained of the “yoke” under which they are said to be bowed down by an “irresponsible and secret tyranny.” No complaint of theirs has evoked all this sympathy. Loud have been their complaints of the tyranny of the master builders’ “lock-out,” and large have been their contributions to resist it. But not a word against this “yoke,” so feelingly alluded to by his lordship. What is the reason of this? It cannot be because they do not complain when they see a reason:—the masters’ “dlock-out,” for instance? What can be the cause of this silence? We will tell his lordship and the chorus of commiserating reviewers, lecturers, letter-writers, and others. It is because they, that is, the “vast masses,” believe that by their organisation—“yoke” his lordship is pleased to term it—they obtain a fair exchange for their labour, which it would be impossible to secure singly as individuals: in other words, that they obtain higher wages in combination than they could if they were not; and they are right. Take the engineering trade, in illustration. In Glasgow and Newcastle the custom is, not to belong to the Engineers’ Society; in those two places the wages are low compared with their rate in those districts where the custom is to belong to it. And even in those two places the men who do belong to the society obtain a higher rate of wages than the non-society men. Such instances might be multiplied in every trade. It is, therefore, a matter of surprise that his lordship, knowing, as he does, what men will endure, what risks they will undergo, for increased remuneration, which, as he knows also, they would do for no living man,—that he should think it extraordinary that the working classes should “voluntarily place themselves under” this “yoke,” even at his own estimate of it, to secure the same thing for themselves.

But all this points with increased force to the fact, that it is the majority, the “vast masses” who determine to combine, and who in combination decide for themselves what course they shall pursue.

Does his lordship, in alluding to “tens of thousands” of men being suddenly deprived of work—as if they had been struck by paralysis—allude to the builders’ dispute? If so, he should remember that Avas the act of the master builders by their “lock-out.” To this, however, we shall refer else-

where. Having thus shown that there is no “coercion” necessary to induce men to combine, but that of the “public opinion” of the class who combine; and that trade combinations are neither secret, irresponsible, nor their rule dependent on the will of their leaders; it remains only to notice the charges that workmen “coerce” all in their trade to belong to the trade society

Whatever may have been the practice formerly, Trades’ Unions are not now generally charged with acts of physical violence—acts which we deprecate and abhor. On this point we are in perfect accord with both the “Quarterly” and “Edinburgh” reviewers, and those who have compiled speeches, lectures, and letters therefrom. Wherever such acts occur, they are a “heavy blow and great discouragement” to trade societies. Leaving these, as things which happily have now passed away, we need only say in reference to this, that there is no other coercion than that of the public opinion of the class to which workmen belong. Although we know of many instances to the contrary in our own trade, to a certain extent men in a society shop *are* expected to belong to the society, for the very natural reason, that, as it is believed wages are kept from falling below the demand and supply rate, by the contributions of men who belong to the society, those who do not belong are considered in the light of those who wish to enjoy an advantage without contributing their share to sustain it; nothing being more certain, in the minds of the workmen, that, but for the combination, the immediate necessities of the men would be immediately taken advantage of in some part of the trade, which would speedily produce the same result throughout. The predatory instinct belonging to our nature would in these circumstances ensure this result. The men, therefore, naturally expect that every man should pay his quota, for an advantage which he enjoys in common with the rest. And Ave should be glad to be informed how, in these circumstances, it is possible to be otherwise? It may be considered—and especially by those employers who find it most advantageous for their individual profit to deal with the men singly—very wrong for the workmen to act thus. But it is for this very employer’s reason that the men are anxious that all should be in combination. In fact, whatever is deemed to be the right and proper course for the welfare of all, by the majority of a community or body of men, and adopted by it in the aggregate, will be sure to be considered by that community as the duty of all to support and carry out. In fact, it is its public opinion—and how potent public opinion is need not be repeated. And if that course involves a money payment, he who refuses or attempts to shirk that payment will always be, let him be of what class of society he may, “coerced” by its public opinion. It is so everywhere. It may be very wrong, but if it be, men of every grade of intellect and position in society have always done so, and, without doubt,

will continue to do so to the end of time.

But this opinion, in most places, is so universal among working men, that in point of fact there are none to “coerce;” whether actually in the society or not, scarcely a man doubts the propriety of belonging to it. And where, as in some few districts, it is otherwise, the men do or do not belong to the society, as they please, and consequently there is no “coercion.”

In our own trade those out of the society are, for the most part, either inferior workmen, employed on inferior work at reduced wages, or those who have belonged to it, and been erased. Of these last some left because they did not wish to pay to it, or indeed to anything else that they could avoid; and the rest, by far the greatest number are those who have been erased for non-payment through their unfortunate habits of intemperance, which left them no means of paying. The first-named, from their inferior ability as workmen, seldom come to a society shop; the others, when they obtain work in a society shop, generally join, or rejoin; and, as the result of nearly twenty years’ experience as Secretary, the present writer can safely affirm that in no case have those who have so joined, or rejoined, expressed the slightest complaint of any “coercion;” on the contrary, where there has been any expression at all, it has always been that they had been out of the society so long, or had not joined it sooner. The practical fact is, the chorus of assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, that the belonging to the society is never by working men, taken generally, deemed a matter of “coercion” at all, but, as a thing for the protection of their wages from undue reduction, highly advantageous for them to do.

## UNIFORM RATE OF WAGES.

Before discussing this topic, it is necessary to state that the *men* do not contend for an “uniform” rate of wages. All they contend, or ever have contended for, is a “*minimum*” rate of wages, leaving the employer to pay for superior skill, or working ability, as much more as he pleases, or the man can obtain. Indeed, as great skill or superior working ability must, from the nature of things, be always rare, what is termed an uniform rate can only mean what is applicable to the general run of men, and in point of fact a *minimum* rate as regarded by the men, and an “uniform rate” as regarded by the masters.

To have an “uniform rate” of wages is said to give an unfair protection to the unskilled workman. The “Quarterly” reviewer states it to be “a most dangerous thing for workmen to proclaim that the idle and unskilled shall

be paid as the industrious and skilled.” This reviewer shows much candour throughout his remarks; he errs, however, in this matter, from receiving his impression from only one side of the question.

It is quite true that in most trades, where the work is paid by the day, an uniform rate of wages is paid; but the above result, which has been so much denounced, certainly is not, and never was, the intention of such uniform rate or the reason why it was established.

It should here be observed that where the work in any trade is paid for by the “piece” at so much per job—as, for example, among the compositors, the type, in London, is for the most part composed at so much per 1,000 letters—there is no uniform rate *received* by the workmen. There is generally an uniform rate, or nearly so, of the price of the various jobs; but, as workmen of different quickness and skill will do more or less work at the same price per job, their wages may very materially differ in amount.

But in work by the day there is generally an uniform rate, which is adjusted in the first instance by the principle of demand and supply, which operates like the circulation of the blood without anyone scarcely being aware of it, and the result is a settled rate of wages, which becomes recognised by both employer and employed as the standard of wages for the general run of workmen in the trade. And it must always be borne in mind that a rate of wages, in any trade, never becomes what is termed the uniform or standard rate, unless it has had the full consent—very often by special agreement—of the employers of that trade. It is quite true that some men are able to earn, and do earn, more than others. As the uniform rate is generally made for the general run of men, some men will be worth more and some worth less than its amount. Then the question returns, why not pay the one more and the other less? This is sometimes done, when, of course, the rate ceases to be uniform. But where the uniformity, as a general practice, is kept up, the reason usually is—that the employer likes to reap the benefit arising from the man being worth more, and is also afraid that if he increased this man’s wages, he would probably be called upon to raise the others; and the men, on the other hand, would be against the man who was not worth the regular rate taking less, lest the others might be reduced to it. And it must be admitted that, so prone are men to take every advantage in their own favour, the apprehension of each class respecting the other is very likely to be correct. But it will be seen in the sequel that this uniform rate operates in a way which is anything but a protection to the idle and unskilled. Employers never fail to retain in their employment the best workmen, and to discharge, at the first opportunity, those whom they consider inferior. In the course of time,

by this process, they will have in their employ few but what may be termed superior workmen, to whom they will pay by the operation of this “uniform rate” of wages only the wages of the general run of workmen. Digressing for a moment, as far as we can learn, this was actually the case with the master builders, previous to their “lock-out.” They had in their employ the *élite* as workmen of their respective trades. Hence the great loss they have sustained by their “lock-out,” which may be thus estimated. The number locked out was under 11,000,<sup>1</sup> skilled and unskilled. The master builders, when there was reason to believe they still wanted more hands, stated, in a return by their secretary to the *Weekly Mail*, of Nov. 13, 1859, the number in their employ to be upwards of 16,000 (up to Nov. 5, 1859), to whom they would certainly not be paying less per man than they were previously paying the 11,000 for doing the same quantity of work, involving a loss, if we suppose the average wages of each to be 25s. per week, of upwards of 6,000 a week in wages alone. But to return. Inferior workmen, it will be seen, by the operation of this “uniform rate” are not protected, its result being to give the employer the benefit, as described, of having superior workmen at the ordinary rate of wages. Indeed, it is very seldom that the employers complain of this; we might almost say never, except when it is intended to reduce wages by what might be termed “working the uniform-rate dodge,”—that is, assuming the rate of the general run of workmen to be that which should only be paid to the very best workmen. This is often done when wages are sought to be reduced. One instance, which will illustrate every other, we select from the Parliamentary Report on Combinations of Workmen, 1838. Mr. Carolin, master builder of Dublin, who, through his reduction of wages, was involved in serious disputes with the workmen, after evading, by a reference to piece work, the question put by Mr. O’Connell (7394), “Do you pay any man more than the minimum stipulated by the body?” “Admitted (7348) that he paid 27s. a week to his best men and so downwards.” By the evidence of Mr. Eaton, also a master builder of Dublin (7646), the regular wages of the same workmen (carpenters) were 4s. 8d. a day, or 28s. per week, which he paid, “making no difference between superior and inferior workmen,” “which he thought fair between master and man,” but he added, which illustrates what we have stated, that “he endeavoured to select the best workmen.” The one

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<sup>1</sup>This is the number stated by Mr. Potter and the Building Trades Conference. Wishing to be correct, Mr. Wales, Secretary of the Master Builders’ Association, No. 8, Great St. Helens, was written to, requesting him, as a great favour, to state his estimate of the total number of men locked out, skilled and unskilled. As Mr. Wales did not reply, we have no means of collating the above number with what that of the employers might be. However, from various circumstances, we have good reason to believe the above number to be correct, and our estimate of the loss very much understated.



who did not wish to reduce wages sought and obtained the fair advantage which the uniform rate afforded; while the other, whose only object was to reduce wages, complained of this rate, and gave it only to his best hands. And this is the usual course those who complain of the uniform rate pursue. The reduction of wages is generally their object, and the uniform rate is the mere pretence which they use to effect that object in the way described.

Indeed, so far from placing “the competent and the incompetent on the same level,” this “uniform rate” has been bitterly complained of, as excluding the incompetent altogether. At the late Bradford meeting one of the speakers gave as a reason against Trades’ Unions that as he was not able to earn the usual rate, and as the Union would not allow any of its members to work for less, while he was a member he could get no employment, and so he left it. In “Chambers’ Journal” for April, 1856, this complaint is urged with great energy; and Sir J. K. Shuttleworth, chairman, at the discussion at Bradford on “Trades’ Unions” in reference to the above statement, said, “that nothing was better attested than that Trades’ Unions did coerce their members in this matter, and that unless they purged themselves from this taint they would not meet with the sympathy of the public.” Knowing as we did that this “uniform rate of wages,” which, by the way, is never in any trade without numerous exceptions, and when the work is done “by the piece” does not exist at all; is never in practice a source of difficulty, as an employer is sure to dismiss the workman who does not suit him—and we have known excellent workmen so dismissed, as not being used to the particular kind of work the employer had to execute, though first-rate hands in their own department; and knowing, also, that this “uniform rate” is rarely complained of by employers, except they wish to reduce wages, or by workmen unless they are arrant bunglers; we were not a little surprised to hear of it as a matter of grave complaint. It becomes therefore necessary to show, in respect to workmen, as we have previously in respect to employers, how those who thus complain are affected by this uniform rate, and what kind of workmen they are.

A man may not be worth the regular wages, either because he is slow in doing his work, or because his work is inferior. In the first case, where work by the piece is the custom of the trade, there is and can be no difficulty in the matter, unless, indeed, he be so very slow that no employer will give him room in his shop. Where, however, work in a trade is done by the day, there may be a difficulty; still if the man’s work be well executed, he is sure, in the end to get employment where quantity is not so much regarded in the work as its quality. But if the man’s work be inferior, there is indeed a difficulty, but that difficulty is not in the regulation of the trade, but in the

man himself. If there were no regulation as to the rate of wages, such a man would be restricted to those shops only where inferior work was done, and, if his work were very inferior, even these would be closed against him; for what master would employ a man to spoil his materials?

This kind of incompetence may proceed from imperfect instruction, in which case the obvious course for the young man is to engage himself as an improver; in many cases, however, that we have known, even this has not been necessary. Where there is a natural aptitude to learn, the man acquires more skill at every shop he works at, and ultimately becomes as competent as the best. Where, however, the incompetence from inferior work is the result of inability to learn, and not for the want of proper teaching, there is no remedy; indeed, such an one has no right to designate himself a workman of any trade, if he is not able to work at it in the style of a workman. But here, again, the difficulty is not in the regulation, but in the man himself. These, however, are the men most likely to complain of this regulation. They will lay their being continually out of employ to any cause rather than to their own bungling execution of the work entrusted to them to do; to their not being allowed to work for less than the standard wages; or to anything but the real cause—their own thorough incompetence.

The reason why all men in a trade are supposed to be competent to earn and to receive the standard rate of wages is, because, first, the fact is, that, taken as a whole, they are all competent, the exceptions being too few to be appreciable; and, second, because, from the predatory instinct referred to above, which prevails equally among workmen as among masters, some men, being thoroughly competent, would pretend incompetence, that they might supplant their fellow workmen by offering themselves for less than the regular wages. In our own trade, however, where men from age or obvious inability are unable to earn the regular wages, there is not, nor ever has been, any objection to their receiving less.

In reference to the complaint that this uniform rate stints the action of superior skill or physical strength, such complaint applies, wherever it justly exists, to the employer as much as to the employed. Workmen who are remarkably quick are sometimes paid more, but not always, as the employer mostly likes to reap the benefit of such quickness himself; which generally results in the quick hand subsiding into the regular quantity of work. This is often made the ground of great complaint against workmen that they discourage skill and celerity in their work. The complaint, however, often should be reversed; the workman might justly reply that he gets no encouragement. If he were, from rare physical development, to do double the work of an-

other, he would be paid no more, or, if he were, it would be by no means in proportion to the additional work he got through. This is the true reason why workmen are accused of not wishing to do more than a certain quantity of work in a day, about which the master builders have been so eloquent and so denunciatory. The “Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews” have in this matter taken up their parable against the working man as advocates of the employers. But why should the workman do more than the regular quantity of work if he be not paid more? Would either of these two reviewers write two sheets for the price of one? To expect them to do more is to desire virtually a reduction of wages, which we have before shown to be at the bottom of all these complaints of the uniform rate of wages.

When a trade is unusually brisk, it may be that there are no hands to be obtained but the inferior workmen, who from this cause have, until then, remained unemployed; these receiving the usual rate does not alter the case, as it is with them a question of simple demand and supply, which, in these circumstances, would determine them to be worth it. Many complaints admit of this solution, while nothing is said, when things are exactly the reverse, of superior workmen being obtained—from the same cause reversed—at the ordinary rate of wages.

But, after all, we believe both employers and employed are generally satisfied in respect to this “uniform rate,” as it exists in their respective trades. During a strike, or dispute, each will say hard things of the other, as men in such circumstances will always do. Apart from this, if there be men, who will not do the proper quantity of work, there are exacting employers who, if their men did double the usual quantity of work, would grudge paying more; but these do not represent the great body of masters or men in any trade. They are exceptions, of whom it may justly be said, in reference to their respective demerits—to use the vernacular—that “there are six of one, and half-a-dozen of the other,” each naturally, and most surely, causing the result of which they both complain.

But, it is asked, why cannot a man sell his labour for what he likes, as a shopkeeper tickets his goods under the price of those of his neighbour? They do not interfere with each other, and why should the workman? The shopkeepers here alluded to, Ave beg to reply, are not obliged to be always together, and, therefore, the ill blood, which is often intense, does not cause interference. But, in wages, the matter assumes a very different aspect, as will be seen by putting a case. Suppose, in a shop which employed twelve or any other number of men, whose wages were 30s. per week, a man was to be engaged who thought proper, without being asked, to work for 25s. per

week; not because he was deficient in skill or quickness, but simply because he chose to do so; or, if the work were done by the piece, to offer to do each job at a corresponding reduction. Would not the rest be very likely to see, as the result of this, a near prospect of their own wages being lowered to this standard, and, in consequence, regard the underworker as a “curry-favour” and a sneak, who sought unfairly to supplant them, and treat him accordingly? It may be very true, that this man had a right to ask what wages he liked for his labour, even to half the above sum; but, while men are human, Trades’ Union or no Trades’ Union, he would not be able to do so without feeling his position to be highly disagreeable to himself. We should like to know how those who put the above question would behave if they formed the twelve, or a part of it, above supposed?

But it may be replied, this is exactly the reason why Trades’ Unions are objectionable; they unduly interfere with the natural liberty -which such a man as this, for instance, undeniably possesses to work for what he likes. Undoubtedly they do. But the cause of this interference is, not in the Trades’ Union, but in the natural repugnance which fill men feel to being supplanted, and by such means either turned out of their employment, or forced to work at a lower wage. It is this repugnance, which is found everywhere, that prompts the “undue interference,” which would be felt whether the men were in combination or not. Combination might be the effect of this feeling and make it more effectual, but it is not its cause. Its cause is in the common instincts of man’s nature, which can never be rooted out, nor is it proper that they should be. To suppose that it is the result of combination is to mistake the effect for the cause, which indeed, and the assigning of a wrong cause, are the two great mistakes made by the opponents of Trades’ Unions. The case is different when a reduction of wages proceeds from a falling market, or from what appears to be a decline in the trade or manufacture. The natural repugnance to such reduction here gives place to what is seen to be inevitable. Hence Trades’ Unions seldom interfere—indeed, never—unless through ignorance of the existing cause. This, however, can hardly happen, because, if the men were ever so inclined, no strike can take place when there is little or no work to do. For it will be at once seen, that men who are already unemployed cannot “strike” from their work. When, in the case of the “Luddites” of 1812, nearly a whole trade was thrown out of employment by the sudden introduction of machinery, the disorders which followed were not the result of any Trades’ Union combination, but were riots and violence impelled by extreme poverty and hunger coming suddenly upon a large number of people; which, at any time, is likely to recur under the same circumstances, whether produced by the introduction of machinery, or any other cause.

## PIECE WORK.

It has been alleged that workmen refuse to work by the piece. This is not correct. There does exist a prejudice against it by some, both of workmen and employers, but it is not general. The compositors of London, as a general rule, work by the piece, time-work being the exception; while those in the country work by the day, the exception being work by the piece. The shipwrights of the Port of London work by the job or piece, while those of all other ports work by the day. Indeed, the main objection in different trades to working by the piece is in the complaint that, when the men are found to earn good wages at it, the employer wishes to reduce the price of the work, and that it is so often made use of, as a means of reducing wages. There are, as we are informed, in the engineering trades three modes: first, by the piece at a settled price for the various jobs; second, the giving out a quantity of work, at a certain price, to one man, who gets others to do it for less, similar to the sweating system among the tailors; and, third, the selecting of a man who possesses superior physical strength and quickness as the principal of several workmen, and paying him an additional rate, by the quarter or otherwise, with the understanding that he is to exert himself to the utmost to induce the others, who are only paid the ordinary wages, to keep up to him, by which means is obtained the work of several men, up to the standard of a workman of superior working strength and quickness, for the payment, except in the case of the principal, of the ordinary rate of wages. Without any comment, this will go far to explain many of the complaints of “*stinting* the action, superior skill, and working power,” made by the employers against their men.

—*TRADE SOCIETIES.*

—*COERCIVE.*

### III.—STRIKES.

When a body of men stand out for a price which their employers refuse to give, while this dispute is pending, the position of the workmen is that of a strike. As strikes are the last resort, as they are always expensive, and as they engender mutual ill feeling, they should never be entered into without duly calculating the probabilities of success, nor until all means of amicably settling the difference have failed. It often happens that workmen have no alternative, but either to submit to a reduction tyrannically enforced, without any reasoning on the matter being allowed, or to cease from labour. Often has a strike thus been precipitated, and ruin inflicted on employer and employed, which might have been averted by a little calm reasoning on the matter. It is the same when a rise in wages is asked by the men. Both parties are apt to view each other as enemies, and in this jaundiced view, which prevails equally on both sides—aggravated by the unconciliatory tone which is sure to result from such a state of feeling—reasoning on the subject—as the subject, considering the important results to both parties which are then pending, should be reasoned upon—is rendered impossible. The beginning of strife is like the letting out of water that might be, at the commencement, easily stopped. But if there be one thing more than another which, in their turn, both parties in these circumstances often, to all appearance, agree in throwing aside, it is the conciliatory spirit which might prevent these ruinous disputes. But while strikes are always to be deprecated, because they are, for the time, a state of moral warfare, and, like all states of hostility, productive of mutual bitterness—and because they are carried on at a loss to both parties—we are, notwithstanding, clearly of opinion, from long experience of their results to journeymen both of success and defeat, that there is no proper alternative, in certain cases, than the position of a strike.

The following extract from a very talented article in the *Builder* of August 11, 1859, which very clearly sets forth the nature of strikes, as clearly exhibits their rationale:—

—*STRIKES*.

Suppose a question of cotton and sugar value instead of labour value—how does the seller know whether he is selling too cheap, except by refusing to sell at all below a certain higher rate? If there is but little cotton or sugar, as of course he suspects or affects to suspect there to be, he will sell what he chooses at his own figure; but if not, he must take the buyer's price for it. Now, the fixed price about which the transaction halts is the strike of the seller against the buyer—of the supplier against the demander—and provides the only practicable means of arriving at the fair value.

Against strikes it has been often urged—

1. Their great expense;
2. That they promote the introduction of machinery, and consequently leave the workmen in a tenfold worse position than they were before.

1. It is