### Notes for Operations Research & More

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# Part I Preliminary Topics

## Review of Linear Algebra

## Convex Sets

## Convex Functions and Generalizations

# Part II Linear Programming

### **Formulation**

#### 4.1 Typical Problems

#### 4.2 Formulation Skills

#### 4.2.1 Absolute Value

**Description:** Consider the following model statement:

min 
$$\sum_{j \in J} c_j |x_j|, \quad c_j > 0$$
  
s.t.  $\sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} x_j \gtrsim b_i, \quad \forall i \in I$   
 $x_j$  unrestricted,  $\forall j \in J$ 

Modeling:

$$\min \sum_{j \in J} c_j (x_j^+ + x_j^-), \quad c_j > 0$$
s.t. 
$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} (x_j^+ - x_j^-) \gtrsim b_i, \quad \forall i \in I$$

$$x_j^+, x_j^- \ge 0, \quad \forall j \in J$$

#### 4.2.2 A Minimax Objective

**Description:** Consider the following model statement:

$$\min \quad \max_{k \in K} \sum_{j \in J} c_{kj} x_j$$
s.t. 
$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} x_j \gtrsim b_i, \quad \forall i \in I$$

$$x_j \geq 0, \quad \forall j \in J$$

Modeling:

$$\min \quad z$$
s.t. 
$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} x_j \gtrsim b_i, \quad \forall i \in I$$

$$\sum_{j \in J} c_{kj} x_j \leq z, \quad \forall k \in K$$

$$x_j \geq 0, \quad \forall j \in J$$

#### 4.2.3 A fractional Objective

**Description:** Consider the following model statement:

$$\min \quad \frac{\sum_{j \in J} c_j x_j + \alpha}{\sum_{j \in J} d_j x_j + \beta}$$
s.t. 
$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} x_j \gtrsim b_i, \quad \forall i \in I$$

$$x_j \geq 0, \quad \forall j \in J$$

Modeling:

$$\min \sum_{j \in J} c_j x_j t + \alpha t$$

$$\text{s.t.} \sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} x_j \gtrsim b_i, \quad \forall i \in I$$

$$\sum_{j \in J} d_j x_j t + \beta t = 1$$

$$t > 0$$

$$x_j \ge 0, \quad \forall j \in J$$

$$(t = \frac{1}{\sum_{j \in J} d_j x_j + \beta})$$

#### 4.2.4 A range Constraint

**Description:** Consider the following model statement:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{min} & & \sum_{j \in J} c_j x_j \\ & \text{s.t.} & & d_i \leq \sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} x_j \leq e_i, \quad \forall i \in I \\ & & & x_j \geq 0, \quad \forall j \in J \end{aligned}$$

Modeling:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{min} & & \sum_{j \in J} c_j x_j, \quad c_j > 0 \\ & \text{s.t.} & & u_i + \sum_{j \in J} a_{ij} x_j = e_i, \quad \forall i \in I \\ & & x_j \geq 0, \quad \forall j \in J \\ & & & 0 \leq u_i \leq e_i - d_i, \quad \forall i \in I \end{aligned}$$

Lexicographic Rule

Successive Ratio Rule

Bland's Rule

## Simplex Method

5.1	Basic Feasible Solutions and Extreme Points
5.2	Simplex Method
5.2.1	Simplex Method Algorithm
5.2.2	Simplex Method Tableau
5.2.3	Simplex Method as a Search Algorithm
5.3	Revised Simplex Method
5.4	Simplex Method with Bounded Variables
5.5	Artificial Variable
5.5.1	Two-Phase Method
5.5.2	Big-M Method
5.5.3	Single Artificial Variable Technique
5.6	Degeneracy and Cycling
5.6.1	Degeneracy
5.6.2	Cycling
5.6.3	Cycling Prevention Rules

Duality Theory and Sensitivity Analysis

## Decomposition Principle

## Ellipsoid Algorithm

## Projective Algorithm

## Interior-Point Algorithm

# Part III Graph and Network Theory

Paths, Trees, and Cycles

## Shortest-Path Problem

# Minimum Spanning Tree Problem

## Maximum Flow Problem

## Minimum Cost Flow Problem


# Assignment and Matching Problem

# Graph Algorithms

## Polygon Triangulation

#### Types of Polygons 18.1

**Def:** A **simple polygon** is a closed polygonal curve without self-intersection.




Simple Polygon Non-simple Polygon

Polygons are basic building blocks in most geometric applications. It can model arbitrarily complex shapes, and apply simple algorithms and algebraic representation/manipulation.

#### 18.2 Triangulation

**Def:** Triangulation is to partition polygon P into non-overlapping triangles using diagonals only. It reduces complex shapes to collection of simpler shapes. Every simple n-gon admits a triangulation which has n-2 triangles.



Triangulation

**Lemma:** Every polygon with more than three vertices has a diagonal.

**Proof:** (by Meisters, 1975) Let P be a polygon with more than three vertices. Every vertex of a P is either convex or concave. W.L.O.G. (any polygon must has convex vertex) Assume p is a convex vertex. Denote the neighbors of p as q and r. If  $\bar{q}r$  is a diagonal, done, and we call  $\triangle pqr$  is an ear. If  $\triangle pqr$  is not an ear, it means at least one vertex is inside  $\triangle pqr$ , assume among those vertexes inside  $\triangle pqr$ , s is a vertex closest to p, then  $\bar{p}s$  is a diagonal.

#### 18.3 Art Gallery Theorem

**Problem:** The floor plan of an art gallery modeled as a simple polygon with n vertices, there are guards which is stationed at fixed positions with 360 degree vision but cannot see through the walls. How many guards does the art gallery need for the security? (Fun fact: This problem was posted to Vasek Chvatal by Victor Klee in 1973)

**Theorem:** Every *n*-gon can be guarded with  $\lfloor \frac{n}{3} \rfloor$  vertex guards

**Lemma:** Triangulation graph can be 3-colored.

#### **Proof:**

- P plus triangulation is a planar graph
- 3-coloring means there exist a 3-partition for vertices that no edge or diagonal has both endpoints within the same set of vertices.
- Proof by Induction: Remove an ear (there will always exist ear)
  - Inductively 3-color the rest
  - Put ear back, coloring new vertex with the label not used by the boundary diagonal.

#### 18.4 Triangulation Algorithms

## Part IV

Integer and Combinatorial Programming

## **Formulation**

#### 19.1 Typical Problems

#### 19.2 Integer Programming Formulation Skills

#### 19.2.1 A Variable Taking Discontinuous Values

**Description:** In algebraic notation:

$$x = 0$$
, or  $l \le x \le u$ 

Modeling:

$$x \le uy$$
$$x \ge ly$$
$$y \in \{0, 1\}$$

where

$$y = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x = 0\\ 1, & \text{if } l \le x \le u \end{cases}$$

#### 19.2.2 Fixed Costs

**Description:** In algebraic notation:

$$C(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{for } x = 0\\ k + cx & \text{for } x > 0 \end{cases}$$

Modeling:

$$C^*(x, y) = ky + cx$$
$$x \le My$$
$$x \ge 0$$
$$y \in \{0, 1\}$$

where

$$y = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } x = 0 \\ 1, & \text{if } x \ge 0 \end{cases}$$

#### 19.2.3 Either-or Constraints

**Description:** In algebraic notation:

$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{1j} x_j \le b_1 \text{ or } \sum_{j \in J} a_{2j} x_j \le b_2$$

Modeling:

$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{1j} x_j \le b_1 + M_1 y$$

$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{2j} x_j \le b_2 + M_1 (1 - y)$$

$$y \in \{0, 1\}$$

where

$$y = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \sum_{j \in J} a_{1j} x_j \le b_1 \\ 1, & \text{if } \sum_{j \in J} a_{2j} x_j \le b_2 \end{cases}$$

Notice that the sign before M is determined by the inequality  $\geq$  or  $\leq$ , if it is " $\geq$ ", use "-", if it " $\leq$ ", use "+".

#### 19.2.4 Conditional Constraints

**Description:** If constraint A is satisfied, then constraint B must also be satisfied

If 
$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{1j} x_j \le b_1$$
 then  $\sum_{j \in J} a_{2j} x_j \le b_2$ 

The key part is to find the opposite of the first condition. We are using  $A \Rightarrow B \Leftrightarrow \neg B \Rightarrow \neg A$ Therefore it is equivalent to

$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{1j} x_j > b_1 \text{ or } \sum_{j \in J} a_{2j} x_j \le b_2$$

Furthermore, it is equivalent to

$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{1j} x_j \ge b_1 + \epsilon \text{ or } \sum_{j \in J} a_{2j} x_j \le b_2$$

Where  $\epsilon$  is a very small positive number.

Modeling:

$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{1j} x_j \ge b_1 + \epsilon - M_2 y$$
$$\sum_{j \in J} a_{2j} x_j \le b_2 + M_2 (1 - y)$$
$$y \in \{0, 1\}$$

#### 19.2.5 Special Ordered Sets

**SOS1 Description** Out of a set of yes-no decisions, at most one decision variable can be yes.

$$x_1 = 1, x_2 = x_3 = \dots = x_n = 0$$
or
 $x_2 = 1, x_1 = x_3 = \dots = x_n = 0$ 

Modeling:

$$\sum_{i} x_i = 1, \quad i \in N$$

SOS2 Description 1 Out of a set of binary variables, at most two variables can be nonzero. In addition, the two variables must be adjacent to each other in a fixed order list.

**Modeling:** If  $x_1, x_2, ..., x_n$  is a SOS2, then

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \le 2$$

$$x_i + x_j \le 1, \forall i \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}, j \in \{i + 2, i + 3, ..., n\}$$

$$x_i \in \{0, 1\}$$

SOS2 Description 2 There is another type of definition, that is out of a set of nonnegative variables **not binary here**, at most two variables can be nonzero. In addition, the two variables must be adjacent to each other in a fixed order list. All variables summing to 1.

This definition of SOS2 is used in the following section Piecewise Linear Formulations

#### 19.2.6 Piecewise Linear Formulations

**Description:** The objective function is a sequence of line segments, e.g. y = f(x), consists k - 1 linear segments going through k given points  $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2), ..., (x_k, y_k)$ .

Denote

$$d_i = \begin{cases} 1, & x \in (x_i, x_{i+1}) \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then the objective function is

$$\sum_{i \in \{1,2,\dots,k-1\}} y = d_i f_i(x)$$

Modeling: Given that objective function as a piecewise linear formulation, we can have these constraints

$$\begin{split} &\sum_{i \in \{1,2,...,k-1\}} d_i = 1 \\ d_i \in \{0,1\}, i \in \{1,2,...,k-1\} \\ &x = \sum_{i \in \{1,2,...,k\}} w_i x_i \\ &y = \sum_{i \in \{1,2,...,k\}} w_i y_i \\ &w_1 \leq d_1 \\ &w_i \leq d_{i-1} + di, i \in \{2,3,...,k-1\} \\ &w_k \leq d_{k-1} \end{split}$$

In this case,  $w_i \in SOS2$  (second definition)

#### 19.2.7 Conditional Binary Variables

**Description:** Choose at most n binary variable to be 1 out of  $x_1, x_2, ...x_m, m \ge n$ . If n = 1 then it is SOS1.

Modeling:

$$\sum_{k \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}} x_k \le n$$

**Description:** Choose exactly n binary variable to be 1 out of  $x_1, x_2, ... x_m, m \ge n$ 

Modeling:

$$\sum_{k \in \{1, 2, \dots, m\}} x_k = n$$

**Description:** Choose  $x_j$  only if  $x_k = 1$ 

Modeling:

$$x_i = x_k$$

**Description:** "and" condition, iff  $x_1, x_2, ..., x_m = 1$  then y = 1

Modeling:

$$y \le x_i, i \in \{1, 2, ..., m\}$$
  
 $y \ge \sum_{i \in \{1, 2, ..., m\}} x_i - (m - 1)$ 

#### 19.2.8 Elimination of Products of Variables

**Description:** For variables  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ ,

$$y = x_1 x_2$$

**Modeling:** If  $x_1, x_2$  are binary, it is the same as "and" condition of binary variables.

If  $x_1$  is binary, while  $x_2$  is continuous and  $0 \le x_2 \le u$ , then

$$y \le ux_1$$

$$y \le x_2$$

$$y \ge x_2 - u(1 - x_1)$$

$$u > 0$$

If both  $x_1$  and  $x_2$  are continuous, it is non-linear, we can use Piecewise linear formulation to simulate.

## Branch and Bound

## **Branch and Cut**

# Packing and Matching

Traveling Salesman Problem

# Knapsack Problem

# ${\bf Part~V}$ ${\bf Nonlinear~Programming}$

# **KKT Optimality Conditions**

Lagrangian Duality

# **Unconstrained Optimization**

#### Penalty and Barrier Functions

## Part VI Algorithms and Computational Complexity

#### **Computational Complexity**

#### Sorting

30.1	Elementary Sorting Algorithms
30.2	Heap-sort
30.3	Quick-sort
30.4	Sorting in Linear Time
30.5	Medians and Order Statistics

#### **Data Structures**

- 31.1 Elementary Data Structures
- 31.2 Hash Tables
- 31.3 Binary Search Trees
- 31.4 Red-Black Trees
- 31.5 B-Trees
- 31.6 Fibonacci Heaps
- 31.7 van Emde Boas Trees

#### Design and Analysis Techniques

32.1	Dynamic Programming
32.2	Greedy Algorithms
32.3	Amortized Analysis
32.4	Multi-threaded Algorithms
32.5	Matrix Operations
32.6	Polynomials and the FFT
32.7	${\bf Number-Theoretic\ Algorithms}$
32.8	String Matching
32.9	Computational Geometry
32.10	NP-Completeness
32.11	Approximation Algorithms

### Part VII Heuristics ans Meta-heuristics

### Part VIII Game Theory

#### Games with Ordinal Payoffs

- 33.1 Ordinal Games in Strategic Form
- 33.2 Perfect-information Games
- 33.3 General Dynamic Games

#### Games with Cardinal Payoffs

- 34.1 Expected Utility Theory
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#### Knowledge, Common Knowledge, Beliefs

- 35.1 Common Knowledge
- 35.2 Adding Beliefs to Knowledge
- 35.3 Rationality

#### Refinements of Subgame-perfect Equilibrium

- 36.1 Weak Sequential Equilibrium
- 36.2 Sequential Equilibrium
- 36.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

#### **Incomplete Information**

- 37.1 Static Games
- 37.2 Dynamic Games
- 37.3 The Type-Space Approach

#### Part IX

#### Probability, Stochastic Processes and Markov Chains

#### Probability

#### Random Variables

#### 39.1 Relationship between Some Random Variables




Figure 39.1: Relationship between Some Random Variables

## 39.2 Discrete Random Variables

Table 39.1: Discrete Random Variables

MGF	$M(t) = \frac{e^{at} - e^{(b+1)t}}{(b-a+1)(1-e^t)}$ $t \in \mathbb{R}$	$M(t) = 1 - p + pe^t$ $t \in \mathbb{R}$	$M(t) = (1 - p + pe^t)^n$ $t \in \mathbb{R}$	$M(t) = e^{\mu(e^t - 1)}$ $t \in \mathbb{R}$	$M(t) = \frac{p}{1 - (1 - p)e^t}$ $t < -\ln(1 - p)$	$M(t) = (\frac{p}{1 - (1 - p)e^t})^n$ $t < -\ln(1 - p)$
Variance	$D[X] = \frac{(b-a+1)^2 - 1}{12}$	D[X] = p(1-p)	D[X] = np(1-p)	$D[X] = \mu$	$D[X] = \frac{1-p}{p^2}$	$D[X] = \frac{n(1-p)}{p^2}$
Expectation	$E[X] = \frac{b - a}{2}$	E[X] = p	E[X] = np	$E[X] = \mu$	$E[X] = \frac{1-p}{p}$	$E[X] = \frac{n(1-p)}{p}$
CDF	$F(x) = \frac{x - a + 1}{b - a + 1}$ $x = a, a + 1,, b$	$F(x) = \begin{cases} 0, & x < 0 \\ 1 - p, & 0 \le x \le 1 \\ 1, & x > 1 \end{cases}$	$F(x) = \sum_{k=0}^{x} \binom{n}{k} p^{k} (1-p)^{n-k}$ $x = 0, 1,, n$	$f(x) = \frac{\Gamma(x+1,\mu)}{\Gamma(x+1)}$ $x = 0, 1,, n,$	$F(x) = 1 - (1 - p)^{x+1}$ $x = 0, 1,, n,$	$F(x) = 1 - I_p(k+1, n)$ x = 0, 1, 2,, n,
PMF	$f(x) = \frac{1}{b-a+1}$ x = a, a+1,, b	$f(x) = p^{x} (1 - p)^{1 - x}$ $x \in \{0, 1\}$	$f(x) = \binom{n}{x} p^x (1-p)^{n-x}$ $x = 0, 1,, n$	$f(x) = \frac{\mu^x e^{\mu}}{x!}$ x = 0, 1,, n,	$f(x) = p(1-p)^x$ x = 0, 1,, n,	$f(x) = \binom{n-1+x}{x} p^n (1-p)^x$ $x = 0, 1, 2,, n,$
Distribution	Discrete Uniform $(a,b)$	$\mathrm{Bernoulli}(p)$	$\operatorname{Binomial}(n,p)$	$Poisson(\mu)$	$\mathrm{Geometric}(p)$	$\operatorname{Pascal}(n,p)$

# 39.3 Continuous Random Variables

Table 39.2: Continuous Random Variables

MGF	M(t) =	$e^{\frac{t(t\sigma^2+2\mu)}{2}}$ $t \in \mathbb{R}$	$rac{1}{1-rac{t}{\lambda}}$	$rac{1}{(1-rac{1}{\chi})^n}$ $t<\lambda$
Variance	$D[X] = \frac{(b-a)^2}{12}$	$D[X] = \sigma^2$	$D[X] = \frac{1}{\lambda^2}$	$D[X] = \frac{n}{\lambda^2}$
Expectation Variance	$E[X] = \frac{b - a}{2}$	$E[X] = \mu$	$E[X] = \frac{1}{\lambda}$	$E[X] = \frac{n}{\lambda}$
CDF	$F(x) = \frac{x - a}{b - a}$ $x = [a, b]$	$F(x) = \int_{-\infty}^{x} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}$ $x \in \mathbb{R}$	$F(x) = 1 - e^{\lambda x}$ $x > 0$	$F(x) = 1 - \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \frac{\lambda^n x^n e^{-\lambda x}}{n!}$ x > 0
PDF	$f(x) = \frac{1}{b-a}$ $x = [a, b]$	f(	$f(x) = \lambda e^{-\lambda x}$ $x > 0$	$f(x) = \frac{\lambda^n x^{n-1} e^{-\lambda x}}{(n-1)!}$ $x > 0$
Distribution	$\operatorname{Uniform}(a,b)$	$\mathrm{Normal}(\mu,\sigma)$	Exponential $\lambda$ )	$\mathrm{Erlang}(n,\lambda)$

#### Limit Theorems

#### The Bernoulli and Poisson Process

### Discrete-Time Markov Chains

### Continuous-Time Markov Chains

# Part X Queuing Theory

## Queuing Model

Birth-and-Death Queuing Models

## Multidimensional Birth-and-Death Queuing Models

Phase-Type Queue

Bulk Queue

## Imbedded-Markov-Chain Queuing Models

## Queuing Network

## Part XI Inventory Theory

## Part XII Reliability Theory

Part XIII

Statistic

## Part XIV Simulation