v2.0.0

v2.0.0

A major release bridging the LinPEAS coverage gap. Adds 16 new node types, 5 new edge types, 11 new ingester modules, and a corresponding expansion of collect.sh. Existing JSON consumers continue to work; the version field in JSON output now reads 2.0.0.

New ingesters

• boot.py: login-time scripts (/etc/profile, /etc/profile.d/*, /etc/bash.bashrc, /etc/skel/*), library-loading control (/etc/ld.so.preload, /etc/ld.so.conf, /etc/ld.so.conf.d/*), polkit rules (/etc/polkit-1/rules.d/*, /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d/*). Each script and config file becomes a node; writability emits CAN_WRITE from the appropriate principals and the script emits EXECUTED_AT_LOGIN or INFLUENCES_EXEC to root, so the graph traversal can find chains like unprivileged user -> CAN_WRITE -> /etc/profile.d/foo.sh -> EXECUTED_AT_LOGIN -> root.
• auth.py: doas configuration (/etc/doas.conf) with full rule parsing and nopass flag detection; sudo version capture (no CVE matching, just the version string); sudoers file permissions (writable /etc/sudoers or /etc/sudoers.d/* is its own immediate path to root); /etc/security/* (PAM-adjacent limits and access controls).
• ssh.py: sshd_config risky-setting detection (PermitRootLogin yes, PasswordAuthentication yes, PermitEmptyPasswords yes); host key file permissions (/etc/ssh/ssh_host_*_key should be 0600 root:root); per-user ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and id_* keys with writability flagged as INFLUENCES_EXEC to that user.
• network.py: NFS exports (/etc/exports) with no_root_squash / no_all_squash detection; fstab (/etc/fstab) nosuid-missing on /tmp//home and no_root_squash on NFS mounts; r-command host trust (/etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts); /etc/hosts writability; listening TCP/UDP ports parsed from /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6} with inode-to-pid resolution in live mode.
• container.py: detects whether the analyzed system is running inside a container (Docker, Podman, LXC, Kubernetes) via /.dockerenv, /run/.containerenv, /proc/1/cgroup patterns. Flags container-breakout artifacts (Docker socket inside the container, full effective capabilities on PID 1).
• secrets.py: scans /proc/[pid]/environ for processes exposing credentials via standard env-var keys (PASSWORD, TOKEN, API_KEY, AWS_SECRET, DATABASE_URL, etc.) and emits a SECRET_FINDING node with an EXPOSES edge from the owning process.
• path_abuse.py: parses $PATH from /etc/environment and /etc/login.defs. Each PATH directory becomes a PATH_DIR node; the walker flags writable shell scripts on PATH, broken symlinks on PATH, and PATH dirs writable by non-root.
• pam.py: parses /etc/pam.d/* and flags pam_rootok.so on services other than su/sudo, pam_permit.so, nullok on pam_unix.so, and pam_wheel.so without explicit group= restriction. Writability of PAM files is also flagged.

Graph model

• 12 new NodeType values: PROFILE_SCRIPT, LDPRELOAD_FILE, POLKIT_RULE, PAM_FILE, SSH_KEY, NFS_EXPORT, CONTAINER_MARKER, NETWORK_LISTENER, PATH_DIR, LOGIN_HOOK, DOAS_RULE, SECRET_FINDING.
• 5 new EdgeType values: EXECUTED_AT_LOGIN, INFLUENCES_EXEC, LISTENS_ON, TRUSTS, EXPOSES.
• Sinks now include DOAS_RULE with target=root, and CONTAINER_MARKER with breakout artifacts present.

Filesystem detection

• Group-writable files are now first-class. The walk emits CAN_WRITE from each user in the file's group, with proper sticky-bit suppression. This closes the most common privmap blind spot (e.g. a logrotate config owned root:adm mode 0664 with wwwdev in the adm group is now correctly flagged).
• New snapshot inputs: suid/group_writable_files.txt and suid/group_writable_dirs.txt (format: mode owner group path). The new collect.sh produces these.

Execution-arg semantics

• Cron and systemd command parsers now emit INFLUENCES_EXEC edges from config-file path arguments back to the running cron/unit. A cron entry like /usr/sbin/logrotate /etc/logrotate.d/myapp now produces an edge file:/etc/logrotate.d/myapp -INFLUENCES_EXEC-> cron:... so a writable config in /etc/*.d/ chains correctly through the privileged execution.
• Cron periodic-dir parser (/etc/cron.{daily,hourly,weekly,monthly}/*) now reads each script's content for the same analysis, so chains like the v1 demo (wwwdev -> adm -> /etc/logrotate.d/myapp -> /etc/cron.daily/myapp-logs -> root) close end-to-end.

Collector

• collect.sh v2 gathers group-writable files, login-time scripts, ld.so configuration, polkit rules, doas config, sudo version, PAM files, /etc/security, sshd_config + host key metadata, NFS exports, fstab, host-trust files, /etc/hosts, /proc/net/tcp[6] and /proc/net/udp[6], container markers, /proc/1/cgroup, and per-process environ at /proc/[pid]/environ.txt. All files land at their natural target-system paths under OUTDIR/, so ingesters work identically in live and snapshot mode.

Scoring and remediation

• Scoring axes extended with EXECUTED_AT_LOGIN (waiting penalty similar to cron) and INFLUENCES_EXEC (small situational penalty) factors. Doas nopass treated like sudo nopasswd.
• Remediation now emits specific commands for group-writable, owner-writable, EXECUTED_AT_LOGIN, INFLUENCES_EXEC, TRUSTS, and EXPOSES findings.

Expansion (Batches K-R)

• Sudo tokens: enumerates /var/run/sudo/ts/ and /var/db/sudo/ts/. Active timestamps are recorded as active_sudo_token property on the corresponding user node.
• Kerberos ticket files: scans /tmp/krb5cc_* and /var/tmp/krb5cc_*. Overly-readable cache files emit INFLUENCES_EXEC to the ticket's owner.
• /etc/profile PATH manipulation detection: flags login scripts that prepend ., ~, or an empty entry to $PATH.
• D-Bus policy analysis (dbus.py): parses XML in /etc/dbus-1/system.d/*.conf and /usr/share/dbus-1/system.d/*.conf. Flags policies that grant <allow send_destination="..."/> without a method restriction, or own="..." to a non-root principal. Emits INFLUENCES_EXEC for over-permissive policies.
• Systemd PATH overrides: extracts Environment="PATH=..." from unit files. When the unit runs as root and invokes binaries by unqualified name, the override is part of the chain.
• Wildcard injection detection: flags cron and systemd commands invoking tar, rsync, chmod, chown, 7z, zip, scp with an unquoted * in argv. Property wildcard_injection_risk lands on the CRON_JOB / SYSTEMD_UNIT node.
• Inetd / xinetd services (inetd.py): parses /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/xinetd.d/*. Each enabled service becomes an INETD_SERVICE node with RUNS_AS and EXECUTES edges, same shape as systemd units.
• AppArmor profiles (apparmor.py): enumerates /etc/apparmor.d/*, captures profile state from /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/profiles. Flags profiles in complain mode and writable profile files.
• Container writable bind mounts: extends container.py to parse /proc/mounts and flag writable bind mounts on /host, /mnt, /var/lib, or / that lack nosuid. Emits MOUNT nodes with INFLUENCES_EXEC to root.

Chain wiring for previously-orphan node types

• PATH_DIR integration: when a cron job or systemd unit invokes a binary by unqualified name, every PATH_DIR node now emits INFLUENCES_EXEC to that cron/unit. Combined with the existing CAN_WRITE machinery, a writable /usr/local/bin becomes a real escalation chain to any root cron using unqualified commands.
• PATH_DIR writability: path_abuse.py now emits its own CAN_WRITE edges from the appropriate principals when a PATH directory is world- or group-writable, instead of relying solely on the filesystem ingester (which doesn't know about PATH semantics).
• SSH_KEY authorized_keys chain: writability of root's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys now closes a chain from writer → key file → root via the existing INFLUENCES_EXEC to target user. (The edge was emitted in the initial v2 batch, but no test verified the chain closed end-to-end. There is now a test for that.)

New node types (16)

PROFILE_SCRIPT, LDPRELOAD_FILE, POLKIT_RULE, PAM_FILE, SSH_KEY, NFS_EXPORT, CONTAINER_MARKER, NETWORK_LISTENER, PATH_DIR, LOGIN_HOOK, DOAS_RULE, SECRET_FINDING, DBUS_POLICY, INETD_SERVICE, APPARMOR_PROFILE, MOUNT.

Tests

• 39 new tests across tests/test_v2_ingesters.py (20) and tests/test_v2_expansion.py (19), covering every new ingester plus chain-wiring integration tests. The full demo chain (group-writable logrotate config + root cron invoking logrotate against it) now has a dedicated end-to-end test that verifies find_escalation_paths produces at least one path. Total test count: 141 (was 102 in v1.0.8).

Known gaps (deliberately out of scope)

• Application-specific config-file secret scanning (100+ check categories in LinPEAS). Use gitleaks, trufflehog, or similar.
• Cloud metadata enumeration (AWS IMDS, GCP metadata, Azure IMDS). Requires network egress, which privmap does not do.
• CVE matching against captured binary versions. Pair with trivy, grype, or a CVE-aware scanner.
• Browser data, mail spools, password searches in shell history. Out of scope.
• Deep D-Bus method semantics, full sudoers grammar, full PAM stack evaluation. All best-effort.

Full Changelog: v1.0.8...v2.0.0

v1.0.8

v1.0.8

Documentation

• Fixed broken README hero image. The v1.0.7 README pointed at main/logo/logo.png, but the logo/ directory was removed before the v1.0.7 commit and the image only ships under docs/assets/. The README and PyPI project page now resolve the hero from main/docs/assets/logo.png.
• Added the logo as a hero image on the docs site landing page (docs/index.md), matching the README placement.

No code changes in this release.

Full Changelog: v1.0.7...v1.0.8

v1.0.7

v1.0.7

Branding

• Added project logo. Rendered as a hero image at the top of the README (via absolute raw.githubusercontent.com URL so it also displays on the PyPI page), as the nav-bar logo on the MkDocs Material docs site, and as the browser-tab favicon. Source kept at logo/logo.png; downsized 192x192 favicon staged at docs/assets/favicon.png.

Testing

• Added 90 new tests across four files, lifting coverage of security-critical and recently-changed code from minimal to substantive:
  • tests/test_safe_extract.py (14 tests) pins down the tarfile path-traversal defenses in cli._safe_extract_tar: absolute path rejection, parent-directory traversal, escaping symlinks and hardlinks, special-file refusal, member-count and byte-size limits.
  • tests/test_command_parsing.py (23 tests) covers cron and systemd command extraction, including env-var stripping, shell-segment splitting (&&, ||, ;, |), and that path arguments like /etc are not treated as executables.
  • tests/test_sudoers_parsing.py (15 tests) regression-locks the v1.0.1 fixes: NOPASSWD: detected at tag position rather than substring, locked accounts (!, !!, *) not misclassified as empty-password, and correct runas resolution.
  • tests/test_traversal_filters.py (38 tests) parametrizes over the AUTH_REQUIRED_SUID, GTFOBINS_SUID, and KNOWN_SAFE_CAP_BINARIES allowlists to lock in current filter behavior, plus sink and source predicate coverage.
• Total test count is now 102 (was 12).

Full Changelog: v1.0.6...v1.0.7

v1.0.6

v1.0.6

Packaging

• Added PyPI trove classifiers (Development Status, Intended Audience, License, Operating System, Python versions 3.8 to 3.13, Topic). These power PyPI's sidebar filters and search, and unblock the pyversions shield on the README which previously displayed "missing" because shields.io reads classifiers, not requires-python.
• Added keywords to package metadata (security, linux, privilege-escalation, graph, pentesting, hardening) to improve PyPI search discoverability.

No code changes in this release.

Full Changelog: v1.0.5...v1.0.6

v1.0.5

v1.0.5

Documentation

• Added a full documentation site built with MkDocs Material, hosted on Read the Docs at https://privmap.readthedocs.io/. Covers installation, quickstart, live and snapshot analysis modes, CI/CD integration, output formats, graph model, scoring, path validation, CLI reference, architecture, Python API, known limitations, FAQ, security policy, and contributing.
• README rewritten as a focused project hook (badges, one-line description, install, quickstart, links to the docs site) rather than as the primary manual. Deep content lives in the docs.
• Reworded the package short description from "Linux privilege graph engine - model effective access, trace escalation paths." to "Find Linux privilege escalation paths by modeling permissions as a graph."

Packaging

• Added a docs extras group: pip install -e ".[docs]" installs mkdocs, mkdocs-material, mkdocs-include-markdown-plugin, and pymdown-extensions.
• Added [project.urls] metadata for Homepage, Documentation, Repository, Issues, and Changelog. These surface as clickable links on the PyPI page.
• Added a .readthedocs.yaml build config so RTD builds are reproducible and the docs deps stay in sync with the project.

Python API

• privmap/__init__.py now re-exports the stable public API: GraphBuilder, PrivilegeGraph, Node, NodeType, Edge, EdgeType, EscalationPath, Severity, analyze_paths, export_json, export_markdown, __version__. Programmatic users can now write from privmap import GraphBuilder, analyze_paths.

v1.0.4

v1.0.4

Correctness

• Auth-required SUID binaries (su, pkexec, sudo, doas, passwd, chsh, mount, ssh-agent, etc.) are no longer reported as free escalation paths. They are SUID by design and gate access behind a credential prompt; flagging them produced a critical-severity finding for every user on every system. Specific CVEs against these binaries (e.g. PwnKit) are out of scope — privmap does not do version-based CVE matching.
• An unreadable /var/spool/cron/crontabs (mode 0730 root:crontab on Debian-family systems) no longer crashes the run. Now logs a warning and continues with a partial scan.

UX

• Added a live progress spinner during ingestion and analysis so the tool no longer appears frozen on long scans. Reports the active phase (identity, filesystem walk, execution contexts, capabilities, processes, path tracing) and a periodic file count during the filesystem walk. Renders to stderr so it does not pollute --output json / --output markdown redirects, and is suppressed automatically with -v/-vv, --quiet, or in non-TTY environments.
• Added --quiet / -q to suppress the progress spinner unconditionally.

Full Changelog: v1.0.3...v1.0.4

v1.0.3

v1.0.3

Correctness

• Handling for SUID_EXEC edges (reduced false flags)

v1.0.2

v1.0.2

Hygiene

• Minor version control reconfiguration

Full Changelog: v1.0.1...v1.0.2

v1.0.1

Changelog

v1.0.1

Security

• Fixed path traversal vulnerability in snapshot extraction (CVE-2007-4559 class). Tar extraction now rejects absolute paths, parent-directory traversal, escaping symlinks and hardlinks, and special files, and enforces 2 GiB / 200k member limits against tar bombs.

Correctness

• getcap -r now honors the configured root path instead of always scanning /. Snapshot mode no longer leaks to the host filesystem.
• _user_can_execute now fails closed on stat errors instead of fabricating CAN_EXEC edges.
• Snapshot mode now performs real per-user execute checks against captured permissions instead of emitting CAN_EXEC for every non-root user.
• World-writable files inside sticky directories (e.g. /tmp/*) no longer produce CAN_WRITE edges, since users cannot replace files they do not own.
• getfacl timeouts now log at WARNING with actionable advice instead of being silently swallowed.
• ACL parsing now handles group:NAME:rw- entries and expands them into per-member CAN_WRITE edges.
• Shadow file parsing no longer misclassifies locked accounts (!, *) as having empty passwords.
• NOPASSWD: / PASSWD: sudoers tags are now parsed via anchored regex, so path arguments containing the literal string no longer flip the flag.
• Cron and systemd command parsing now extracts only the actual binary head per shell segment, skipping env-var assignments and splitting on &&, ||, ;, |. Commands like find /etc -name foo no longer create bogus FILE nodes for /etc.

Hygiene

• Removed duplicated KNOWN_SAFE_CAP_BINARIES set; canonical version now lives in the capabilities module.
• JSON export version field now sources from privmap.__version__ instead of a hardcoded duplicate.

v1.0.0

Changelog

v1.0.0 --- Initial release

• Graph-based privilege escalation analysis for Linux
• Ingestion modules: identity (passwd, group, shadow, sudoers with alias support), filesystem (SUID/SGID, world-writable, ACLs, symlinks), execution (cron, systemd, init.d), capabilities, processes
• DFS reachability traversal with edge-semantic filtering
• Dual-axis scoring (exploitability × impact) with severity ratings
• Output formats: rich CLI, JSON, Markdown
• Snapshot mode with POSIX-compliant collector script
• Allowlist for known-safe capability binaries (snap-confine, ping, mtr, etc.)
• Permission-aware CAN_EXEC edge creation
• Argument-restricted sudo rule scoring