

# Rational Confidence with Unknown Unknowns

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## Abstract

Overconfidence is among the most well studied behavioral biases. When graphing confidence, many have found it to be too flat, downward sloping, or even hump-shaped. In surveys, as many as 90 percent of respondents may report that they believe they are “above average” at a given skill/topic and even above the median. This paper characterizes all confidence-knowledge graphs and what fraction of the population can believe they are above the average in the presence of unknown unknowns. When learning any topic, one does not initially know how information there is on the topic to potentially learn. The unknown unknowns are the things you do not know that you do not know. I find, that in a world with unknown unknowns, there is no restriction on what confidence-knowledge graphs can be generated by fully rational Bayesian agents or what fraction of these agents can think they are above average, even when they are not. This result forces us to question if any studies documenting overconfidence are actually evidence of a behavioral bias.

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# 1 Introduction


Among the most well documented behavioral biases is overconfidence. This paper studies the limits of what a rational level of confidence can look like. Though it sounds simple, measuring confidence becomes more complicated in situations with what I will call unknown unknowns, or situations where you don't know how much information there is available to potentially learn. Before I elaborate on how I model unknown unknowns, consider the following studies of confidence that have led to two types of seemingly irrational behavior.

First, it has been frequently observed that people with a small amount of knowledge about a subject overestimate what they know relative to their peers, while people with a lot of knowledge underestimate what they know. This type of result is often understood by a graph with confidence on the y-axis and knowledge or skill on the x-axis. The most well-known study of this type is Kruger and Dunning (1999). They have all the participants in their study take a test. Then, before telling them the results of the test, they have the participants guess what score they got. This plot of guesses vs actual scores is an example of what I'll call the confidence-knowledge graph. If everyone's guess was correct, they would simply fall on the 45 degree line. Of course, not everyone will be correct. Some will guess too high. Some will guess too low. Nonetheless, one might expect that if the participants are rational, these mistakes should even out in a way. The best fit line should still be the 45 degree line. However, the 45 degree line is not what they found. Participants with low scores on the test systematically overestimated their ability. Conversely, participants with high scores underestimated their ability. The result was a knowledge-confidence graph that was significantly flatter than the 45 degree line (though still upward sloping), and shifted up. This result of people with low knowledge or ability being overconfident and people with high knowledge or ability being underconfident has been documented in many situations and dubbed the "Dunning-Kruger effect," one of the most well cited behavioral biases.

Common opinion is that the confidence-knowledge graph can look quite counter-intuitive. Charles Darwin noticed it and remarked, "Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than

does knowledge.” Mark Twain made a similar observation, “When I was a boy of 14, my father was so ignorant I could hardly stand to have the old man around. But when I got to be 21, I was astonished at how much the old man had learned in seven years.” In *As You Like It*, William Shakespeare put it clearly, “the fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool.” All these quotes seem to point to the idea that the confidence-knowledge graph can be, not only too flat, but even downward sloping.

Any quick search on the topic will lead to many confidence-knowledge graphs that look even more counter-intuitive. To illustrate, consider the journey most of us go on as we learn economics. You take ECON 101. The class was easy for you. You come out of it feeling like you are pretty smart and learned quite a bit of economics. You take the rest of the econ major. You ace this as well. You now have a degree in economics and feel like you must know nearly everything there is to know in the field. You start your PhD coursework. You realize, there’s a lot more to economics that you weren’t aware of. You know as much as you thought, but you still get through it. You start to work on your dissertation and wonder if you learned anything in all your classes. You get your first academic job and research without any supervisor. You are in the pit of despair as you realize you know nothing. This hump-shaped confidence-knowledge graph is abundant.



Are these observed confidence-knowledge graphs evidence of a behavioral bias? Does the

confidence-knowledge graph of rational Bayesian agents need to look like the 45 degree line. I show in this paper that it does not. The first objective of this paper is to bound what confidence-knowledge graphs can be generated by Bayesian updating of beliefs.

The second type of seemingly irrational behavior I want to talk about is what is known as illusory superiority, Buunk and VanYperen (1991). It is also referred to as the Lake Wobegon effect, as Lake Wobegon was referred to as a place where “all the women are strong, all the men are good looking, and all the children are above average.” We’ve all heard of the studies showing 88% of American drivers are above average Svenson (1981), or countless other similar results. This result persists whether they compare to the mean or median. Seemingly by definition, the subjects in the study must be irrational. On the flip side, in certain field the opposite of the Lake Wobegon effect is also observed. This is exemplified by the fact that nearly everyone thinks they’re a below average speller. In Kruger (1999) they show this opposite effect for juggling, riding a unicycle, and other tasks. The second objective of this paper is to bound what fraction of the population can believe they are above average. Can rational Bayesians be systematically wrong about being above average?

In some fields we observe that a majority of people think they are above average, while in other fields a majority think they are below average. We also see in many cases, people with a small amount of information are more confident than people with a large amount of information. These facts appear at first glance to be cognitive biases inconsistent with rationality. However, I will present a model with fully rational Bayesians where these facts can still arise. The key ingredient of the model is what I will call unknown unknowns. The term comes from a quote by United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. He was talking about terrorist threats when he said, “We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” The idea is that not only do we not have all the information, we don’t always know how much information is available to be learned

in the first place. An example will make the logic clear.

## 2 Example

You come up with some new research topic you want to study. Since you've never worked on this topic before, you don't know how much work has been done previously on the topic or even if anyone has studied this topic. It could be completely new. So, you learn about the topic by looking for and then reading papers written on the topic. You'll continue to read papers and learn about the topic until you are stopped for one of three reasons. First, you'll stop if no more papers have been written on the topic. You don't know *ex ante* how many papers there are on this subject. Second, you'll stop if your search fails. Even if there are more papers on the topic, there is a possibility that you don't find them. Note that these two reasons are indistinguishable from your perspective. If you don't find another paper, it could be that another paper doesn't exist or that you just failed to find it. Third, you only have a limited amount of time and don't want to be reading papers forever. So, you stop if you run out of budget, which in the example you can think of as a time budget.

This example has the known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns from the quote in the introduction. The known knowns are papers that you find and read. It's knowledge or skills that you acquired. The known unknowns are papers that you know about because you found them, but you don't know because you ran out of budget and didn't read them. This is knowledge that you don't know, but you know the knowledge exists and that you don't know it. There are also unknown unknowns. When you stop reading papers, you don't know if there are more papers out there that you didn't find. If there is such a paper, that is knowledge you don't know that you also aren't even aware of the existence of. Of course, if you're Bayesian, you realize the possibility and assign some probability to the event, but you don't know if such paper even exists.

Now let's put numbers to the example, so we can compute rational confidence levels and

get a flavor of the results. There could be zero, one, two, or three papers on the topic. You don't know ex ante how many papers there are, but your prior is that each of these are equally likely. You have a budget of two. This means that even if there are three papers, you will only read two of them. Also, your search is imperfect and modeled as a constant hazard rate of failure. So at each stage (zero, one, or two), if there is another paper, you have a  $2/3$  chance of finding it.

### 2.0.1 Confidence-knowledge graph

Let's compute the confidence-knowledge graph using Bayes' rule. We'll measure confidence as the posterior probability that you read all the papers. Knowledge will be measured by the number of papers you read. Someone who read zero papers doesn't know if there actually aren't any papers (25 percent chance ex ante) or there are papers that they just didn't find ( $1/3$  chance conditional on papers existing). Bayes' rule gives the confidence level posterior probability.

$$\pi(0) = \frac{\frac{1}{4}}{\frac{1}{4} + \frac{3}{4} \frac{1}{3}} = 50 \text{ percent}$$

In the same way you can compute that the confidence level is higher for someone who has read one paper.

$$\pi(1) = \frac{\frac{1}{3}}{\frac{1}{3} + \frac{2}{3} \frac{1}{3}} = 60 \text{ percent}$$

So more knowledge, at least initially, led to higher confidence.

When considering someone who has read two papers, there are two different approaches we could take. Both give the same result. First, since they have exhausted their budget, you could say that they will not search for a third paper. They wouldn't have time to read it anyway. Two or three papers existing were equally likely ex ante. They have received no information that helps them distinguish between the two situations. Thus, their confidence level is 50 percent. Alternatively, you could suppose that they still search for the third paper even though they won't read it. They just want to know if it's there. If they do find a third

paper, their confidence level is 0. They know for sure that they don't know everything. If they don't find a third paper, applying Bayes' rule in the same gives a confidence level of 75 percent. Now using the probability of there being a third paper and the fraction of the population that would find it, you can compute the average confidence level of people who read two papers.

$$\pi(2) = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{2}{3} (0) + \frac{1}{3} \left( \frac{3}{4} \right) \right) = 50 \text{ percent}$$

We arrived at the same average confidence-knowledge graph either way. Despite the agent being fully rational, the confidence-knowledge graph is not monotonically increasing, but hump-shaped.

### 2.0.2 Comparison statistics

Now we want to compute the fraction of the population that believes they are above average. So the question makes sense, suppose there is a unit mass of agents that had the common prior described and all learned independently according to the described process. After the learning is complete, imagine asking each agent, "Are you strictly better than average?" If the agent guesses correctly, they get a payoff of one. If they guess incorrectly, they get a payoff off zero. In other words, the agent need to pick if they think it is more likely they are above average or not.

First consider people who haven't read any papers. At best, there aren't any papers and they're tied for the average. At worst there are papers and they are strictly below average. These people would have to guess "no" they are not above average. If there actually aren't any papers, we would have 100 percent of the population guessing that they are not above average. This isn't actually very strange yet, because they are all correct.

Consider now the people who have read one paper. We computed already that there is a 60 percent chance of only one paper existing and the thus the average number read

will be strictly lower. There is only a 40 percent chance of there being more papers. Thus, people who have read one paper must guess “yes” they are above average. If there is actually one paper, these people would make up two thirds of the population. So two thirds of the population thinks they are above average, and one third thinks they are below average. Again everyone’s guess is correct.

Finally consider people who have read two papers. These people know they are above average. Even if there is another paper that they haven’t read, they know that no one will have read it because they are at the maximum of the budget constraint. If there actually are two or three papers, 33.3 percent of the population will have read zero, 22.2 percent will have read one paper, and 44.4 percent will have read two papers. This means that about 67 percent of the population will say that they believe they are above average. This one a little strange because only 44 percent of the population is actually above average. The actual average here is about 1.1 papers. This means that the people who read one paper believed they were above average but were actually below average.

### **2.0.3 Conclusion**

The example had rational agents learning in a situation with unknown unknowns. Because of the presence of unknown unknowns, the confidence-knowledge graph did not need to be the 45 degree line or something analogous. In fact the graph does not even need to be upward sloping and can be hump-shaped as is often assumed in the world. In the more general model in the next section I will show which confidence-knowledge graphs can be rationalized in this way and which are actually evidence of bias. The fraction of the population that believes they are above average did not need to be 50 percent. More tellingly, it did not even need to be equal to the fraction that are actually above average. With unknown unknowns a significant fraction of the population can appear ex post to be overconfident or underconfident. In next section we will see what bounds there are on the fraction of the population that can believe they are overconfident.



### 3 Model

The general model is still very simple and analogous to the example. The results are just a basic statistical property.

Time is continuous. There is a mass of rational agents that learn about some subject. There is some total amount of information available,  $t^I$ . The total information,  $t^I$ , is unknown, but everyone has a common prior over its distribution,  $\mathcal{I}(t)$ . Each agent has an alternative stopping time,  $t^S$ . This time is drawn independently for each agent, but from an identical distribution,  $\mathcal{S}(t)$ . This time,  $t^S$ , is also unknown.  $t^S$  represents the time at which you would stop learning due to any other reason, conditional on not having already stopped due to  $t^I$ . So  $t^S$  is the time when you would stop because your search failed, you exhausted your budget, any other reason. Simply put,  $t^S$  is the minimum of all reasons to stop other than  $t^I$ . It may seem at first odd to group them like this, particularly because your search failing is indistinguishable from  $t^I$  but exhausting your budget is not. You might know your budget from the very beginning. I show in the appendix however that it does not effect any of the results. You could separate the budget out as a different stopping time that is known to the agent and distinguishable from  $t^I$ , and it won't change anything in the end. As long as at least one of the variables is unknown, that is sufficient.

You stop learning at the minimum of the times  $t^I$  and  $t^S$ . The key point is that when you stop, you don't know which of the two stopping times stopped you. You've learned until you don't find anything else to learn. You can't tell if you've learned everything on the subject or if there is more to learn and your search was unsuccessful. This is the entirety of the model. We now want to compute the confidence-knowledge graph and the fraction of the population that believes they are above average.

Your knowledge can be measured by the amount of time you spent learning,  $\hat{t} = \min\{t^I, t_i^S\}$ . Call the distribution of  $\hat{t}$  the stopping time  $F(t)$ .  $F(t)$  is derived from  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t)$ . Your confidence level could be measured in many different ways. For now let us consider the posterior probability that you have all available information as your confidence level, but

other measures will be considered later.

**Definition 1.** Given some distributions,  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t)$ , the **confidence-knowledge graph**,  $\pi(t) : \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$ , is the average posterior probability of having all information conditional on stopping at time  $t$ .

So, the confidence-knowledge graph is just the probability that  $\hat{t} = t^I$  on average.

We want to say that an allowable function is rationalizable if it could be the confidence-knowledge graph generated by fully rational Bayesian agents with a common prior.

**Definition 2.** A function  $g : \mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+ \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is **rationalizable** if there exists some distributions  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t)$  such that  $g(t)$  is almost everywhere equal to the confidence-knowledge graph of those distributions restricted to  $\mathcal{A}$ , and  $F(t)$  has positive density over  $\mathcal{A}$ .

### 3.1 Results

The first result is about what functions are rationalizable as a confidence-knowledge graph.

**Proposition 1.** *Any function  $f : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow (0, 1)$  for any  $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$  is rationalizable.*

The posterior probability of having all information is simply the ratio of hazard rates.

$$\pi(t) = \frac{\sigma_I(t)}{\sigma_I(t) + \sigma_S(t)} \quad (1)$$

where  $\sigma_G(t) = \frac{g(t)}{1-G(t)}$  is the notation for the hazard rate of distribution  $G(t)$ . Since hazard rates are nearly unconstrained, there will always exist distributions that give the desired confidence-knowledge graph. For a given function,  $f(t)$ , all we need is to find distributions such that the hazard rates satisfy the following.

$$\sigma_I(t) = \frac{f(t)}{1-f(t)} \sigma_S(t) \quad (2)$$

There are infinitely many such distributions. The simplest is

$$\mathcal{S}(t) = 1 - e^{-t} \quad (3)$$

and

$$\mathcal{I}(t) = 1 - e^{\int_0^t \frac{f(\tau)}{1-f(\tau)} d\tau}. \quad (4)$$

Additional details needed for the proof and a slightly stronger result are given in the appendix.

This result means that flatter confidence-knowledge graphs in Kruger and Dunning (1999) are not evidence of a behavioral bias. Neither is a downward slope or a hump-shaped confidence-knowledge graph as is often believed. No results based on observed confidence-knowledge graphs can be taken as evidence of irrationality in a world of unknown unknowns.

### 3.1.1 Intuition

Consider  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t)$  both being exponential distributions. Since these are memory-less distributions, the probability that you are stopped due to having found all possible information is constant across  $t$ . This constant level can be any level between zero and one. The level is simply, the ratio of the arrival rate of  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  to the sum of the two arrival rates. If  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  has a higher arrival rate (which is equal to the hazard rate) than  $\mathcal{S}(t)$ , this level is above 50 percent. If  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  has a lower arrival rate, this level is below 50 percent. Thus a “bias” up or down in the confidence-knowledge graph or a graph that is very flat needn’t be thought of as unusual at all.

For the confidence-knowledge graph to slope up (or down) all we need is for the hazard rate of  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  to be increasing (decreasing) relative to the hazard rate of  $\mathcal{S}(t)$ . A hump-shaped confidence knowledge graph necessarily comes from distributions where the hazard rate of  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  is first increasing and then decreasing relative to the hazard rate of  $\mathcal{S}(t)$ . This was the case in the example from the introduction. The hazard rate of the total amount of

information at a given number of papers (probability of having only that number of papers conditional on having at least that many papers) increased from 25 percent at zero, to 33 percent at one, to 50 percent at two, and finally 100 percent at three. The hazard rate of stopping for other reasons was constant at 33 percent for zero or one papers, but jumped to 100 percent at two papers due to the budget. This explains the hump-shape confidence-knowledge graph in the example.

### 3.1.2 Comparison Results


The confidence-knowledge graph is about how people rate their knowledge in an absolute sense, or relative to the total amount of information available. The way people compare their knowledge level to that of their peers may also give the illusion of overconfidence, as seen in the next result.

**Proposition 2.** *For any number  $p \in [0, 1]$ , there exists distributions  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t)$  such that  $p$  fraction of the population believes they are above average.*

*Proof.* This can be proved by giving one simple example. Take  $\mathcal{I}(t) = 1 - e^{-2t}$ . Now let  $\mathcal{S}(t)$  have a mass of probability  $1 - p$  at point  $t = 0$ . Have the remaining probability distributed exponentially with an arrival rate of 1. This is  $\mathcal{S}(t) = p - pe^{-t}$  for  $t > 0$ . Everyone stopped at  $t = 0$  will know they are below average. Everyone stopped at a later point will have a two out of three chance of being stopped at  $\hat{t} = t^I$ . More likely than not, they are therefore above average. □

In the appendix, an alternative example without any mass points is given.

This result implies that 88 percent of drivers believing they are above average is not irrational. Any fraction of the population may believe they are above average, even if they are rational. Take the example where  $\mathcal{I}(t) = 1 - e^{-2t}$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t) = 1 - e^{-t}$ . Here everyone believes they are above average because there is a two thirds chance that they have all available information. This is not a mean versus median trick. A key difference is that here



a large portion of the population is wrong in their guess. Also, everyone knows that everyone thinks they are above average and many of them are wrong.

The fraction of the population that is actually above average depends on the realized value of  $t^I$ . As  $t^I$  grows, this increases the length of the tail. Thus, the average is brought up without changing anyone other than the tail. So the fraction of the population that is above the average goes down. The fraction of the population that is above average is approaching about 37 percent. The fraction of the population that believes they are above average is constant at 100 percent for any realized value of  $t^I$ .

## 4 Extensions

In this section, I extend the main results to different types of measurement. This section is to show that the results will hold generally and don't depend on how knowledge or confidence is measured.

## 4.1 Percentiles

Here I address whether the results still hold if the variables are put into percentile terms. The short answer is that they mostly hold.

First, if we measure confidence as a function of knowledge percentile rather than amount of knowledge, the results do not change at all. In other words, we showed that  $\pi(t)$  is unconstrained. I can now explain how this implies that  $\pi(p)$  is also unconstrained when  $p$  is the percentile ranking of  $t$ .  $p$  is an increasing function of  $t$ . This means that rescaling the function to be in terms of  $p$  won't change the general shape of the curve. The rescaling will only contract or expand the the curve horizontally (or potentially contract some areas and expand others). Whether the curve slopes up or down or is hump-shaped or anything like that is unchanged. Recall, that there was an extra degree of freedom in choosing the distributions to match the confidence levels. Only the ratio of hazard rates is determined.

$$\sigma_I(t) = \frac{f(t)}{1 - f(t)} \sigma_S(t) \tag{5}$$

If  $\sigma_I(t)$  and  $\sigma_S(t)$  are both doubled, this didn't change the confidence. What it does is make those levels of  $t$  for which the hazard rates are double occur more frequently. So, in percentile space is simply stretching that region of the graph horizontally. Since we're free to multiply both hazard rates by any positive values for any  $t$ , we can undo any stretching or contracting done by transforming the knowledge into percentile space in the first place.

Taking the  $y$ -variable, confidence, to be in percentile form has a bit more bite. There are two different reasonable ways to do this. You could take everyone's confidence level and just rescale them to be percentiles (percentiles of perceived confidence). This does create some restriction on the confidence-knowledge graphs that can be obtained, but I will contend that they aren't meaningful restrictions. For example, in the baseline model, it is very easy to have a constant knowledge graph at any level. Everyone in the population can have 80 percent confidence. By definition, everyone's guess cannot be in the 80th percentile of confidence.

Now if the confidence knowledge graph is flat, it means that everyone's confidence is tied for the same level. Depending on how you calculate ties, this will become a flat line at 0, 50 or 100 percentile. The problem comes from the fact that after rescaling to percentiles, apart from ties, every value is assigned only once. If there are no ties, every  $y$  value from 0 to 1, will be assigned exactly once. There can still be upward or downward slopes and weird shapes, but you can't have values that are skipped over entirely or spent too much time on. However, these restrictions do not give a way to measure irrational overconfidence, because they are simply from the definition of percentiles. When measuring the data you want to rationalize and scaling it into percentile terms, all the same restrictions still apply. So any confidence-knowledge graph that can't be rationalized by the model scaled into percentile terms, also cannot be generated by data that has been converted into percentile terms. The model is still able to rationalize any observed data measured in percentiles in this way.

## 4.2 Other Confidence Measures

As an alternative measure of confidence, let's now use the negative of the amount of available information the agent doesn't have. So now the confidence level can be expressed as,

$$\rho(t) = \mathbb{E} \left[ - (t^I - \hat{t}) \mid \hat{t} = \min\{t^I, t^S\} \right]. \quad (6)$$

The agent's confidence is now not only a function of if they know everything, but on how much information they don't know. With  $\pi(t)$  being the probability the agent knows all information, the problem can be simplified.

$$\begin{aligned} \rho &= \hat{t} - \mathbb{E} [t^I \mid \hat{t} = \min\{t^I, t^S\}] \\ &= (1 - \pi(\hat{t})) (\hat{t} - E[t^I \mid t^I > \hat{t}]) \end{aligned}$$

Let's choose  $\mathcal{I}(t) = 1 - e^{-\lambda t}$ . This choice make the term in parenthesis equal to  $-\frac{1}{\lambda}$ .

Now  $\rho(\hat{t})$  is a linear function of  $\pi(\hat{t})$ ,  $\rho(\hat{t}) = \frac{\pi(\hat{t})-1}{\lambda}$ . As shown above, by choice of  $\mathcal{S}(t)$ , we can get a  $\pi(\hat{t})$  equal to any function we want. Thus, we now see that  $\rho(\hat{t})$  is also similarly unconstrained.

## 5 Conclusion

### 5.1 Implication

This paper calls into question our ability to measure overconfidence. Unknown unknowns are virtually everywhere. In learning any subject or skill, there is an always unknown amount to be learned. We see from this paper that in the presence of unknown unknowns, overconfidence results based on confidence-knowledge graphs or conjectured comparisons to others don't work completely as imagined. While these results may reveal ex post overconfidence in the subjects, they aren't evidence of a behavioral bias or any kind of irrationality. Even a study with objective results isn't immune to this critique. Consider CEOs that hold out-of-the-money options too much. It can be shown that they lose money and ex post we see they were overconfident. However, They may view the stock price as a reflection of the market's belief of an average CEO's ability to manage the company or current projects. If the ability to run the company is learned in a world with unknown unknowns, every CEO may rationally believe they are above average. This means the company will do better than expected by the market and the stock price will go up. These CEOs turn out to be wrong, but that doesn't necessarily mean they were irrational.

Overconfidence is used to explain many phenomena, such as the no trade theorem, Milgrom and Stokey (1982). Can unknown unknowns as in this model explain information based trading? No, it cannot. While unknown unknowns lead to several facts that look like overconfidence, the model agents are still rational Bayesians. They will still work through the logic of "Why do they want to sell to me?" and "Why do they still want to sell to me knowing that I want to buy knowing that they want to sell knowing ..." and be unable to



come to a trade they strictly prefer based on information alone. Overconfidence is such a salient answer to puzzles such as this one because it is believed to be so prevalent. However, if many of our estimates of overconfidence are called into question, it's ability to solve problems loses some of that luster.

Outside the lab, these “overconfident” people see or communicate with many others like themselves. The CEO can look at what CEOs before them have done. Even rationally believes they are better than average, should that all the other CEOs were ex post overconfident change their mind? Do these overconfidence-like results go away when agents can communicate? The answer is sometimes. Take the example where  $\mathcal{I}(t) = 1 - e^{-2t}$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t) = 1 - e^{-t}$ . Here everyone believes they are above average. Since they are rational, if each agent shared their exact knowledge level,  $t$ , the results would go away. Everyone would know if they are above or below average and whether they have all information or not. In most situations your exact level of knowledge or skill in a subject is something that is difficult to communicate. If asked, I'd have a hard time describing exactly how much economics I know. From watching past CEOs, perhaps you can infer that they all believed they were above average. That information is not sufficient to change your belief at all. From the prior distributions, you knew that everyone would think they were above average. You think that everyone is weakly below you and you don't change your mind because people that are below are also going to think they're above average. If you tell the drivers in Sweden that 88 percent of them think they are above average, that doesn't need to change anyone's mind.

## 5.2 Literature Review

There are many papers that document overconfidence in a variety of settings, see Moore and Schatz (2017), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Camerer and Lovallo (1999) for a few examples. Those that most closely relate to this paper are ones that use confidence-knowledge graphs and those that use comparisons. The most well known using confidence-knowledge graphs is Kruger and Dunning (1999). For a review of related results and explanations, see Dunning

(2011). The most accepted explanation of the Dunning-Kruger effect is a “better-than-average” effect and some randomness in the test, but it is still a behavioral bias in such explanation. A few papers finding a better-than-average effect are Svenson (1981) and Buunk and VanYperen (1991). Kruger (1999) even finds a worse than average effect for some subjects.

There are several rational explanations of some overconfidence results. Benoît and Dubra (2011), Köszegi (2006), and Moore and Healy (2008) all give rationalizations of more than 50 percent of the population believing they are above average, but but none of these results apply as widely to different measures of overconfidence. There are also strategic and evolutionary explanations of overconfidence, see Zábojník (2004) and Johnson and Fowler (2011). The current paper is not attempting to provide a strategic reason for people to be overconfident, but rather to state a statistical property which may be confused with overconfidence in observations.

My talk of unknown unknowns sounds similar in motivation to unawareness papers, such as Modica and Rustichini (1999). Methodologically, there is no similarity. My agents are fully rational Bayesians. The model is more a statistical model of the distribution of information.

### **5.3 Future Work**

There are many avenues of future work in unknown unknowns that seem promising. It could potentially be interesting to endogenize the search distribution. That was not done in this paper because I wanted to emphasize the statistical properties leading to apparent overconfidence, but as a separate project studying how individuals choose to acquire information in the presence of unknown unknowns may yield interesting results. In addition to the known and unknown unknowns, it may be interesting to add known and unknown knowns. You don’t always know what you know.

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## 6 Appendix

### Budget:

*Proof.* Suppose here that we added a third stopping time to the model to represent the budget. The difference between this time,  $t^B \sim \mathcal{B}(t)$ , is that it is known. You know your value of  $t^B$  from the beginning. So,  $\mathcal{B}(t)$  represents the distribution of budgets across the population, rather than a prior belief. Let's compute your confidence again. If you are stopped by your budget, your confidence level will be zero. As long as there aren't atoms in the distribution, there is zero probability that the total amount of information coincides perfectly with your budget. If you get stopped and you aren't at your budget constraint, your confidence level is the same as in the main model. You know you were stopped by either  $t^I$  or  $t^S$ .

Now we can find the average confidence for each time  $t$  by weighting those with the fraction of the population that stops for each reason. This gives the confidence-knowledge graph.

$$\begin{aligned}\pi(t) &= 0 \frac{\sigma_B(t)}{\sigma_B(t) + \sigma_S(t) + \sigma_I(t)} + \frac{\sigma_I(t)}{\sigma_S(t) + \sigma_I(t)} \frac{\sigma_S(t) + \sigma_I(t)}{\sigma_B(t) + \sigma_S(t) + \sigma_I(t)} \\ &= \frac{\sigma_I(t)}{\sigma_B(t) + \sigma_S(t) + \sigma_I(t)}\end{aligned}$$

You'll notice that only the sum of the hazard rates for the budget and search enter the confidence formula. You can define a new distribution  $\hat{\mathcal{S}}$  with a hazard rate equal to that sum,  $\sigma_{\hat{s}}(t) = \sigma_B(t) + \sigma_S(t)$ , and the confidence formula is unchanged from the main model in the text.  $\square$

### Proposition 1:

*Proof.* Start with that formula for the probability. This formula hinges on the existence of a pdf, but we will always be able to pick distributions  $\mathcal{I}(t)$  and  $\mathcal{S}(t)$  that admit a pdf when rationalizing a function. Explain how the distributions can be modified to integrate to

infinity if needed. But actually, you don't need to modify them, because  $\sigma_{\mathcal{S}(t)}$  will already integrate to infinity and  $\sigma_{\mathcal{I}(t)}$  doesn't need to. Maybe explain why this is, and give the modification anyway, in case people want it.  $\square$

**Proposition 3.** *Any function  $f : \mathcal{A} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  for any  $\mathcal{A} \subseteq \mathbb{R}_+$  is rationalizable.*

*Proof.* I'm just adding the extreme points. Why not just write this version in the main text?  $\square$

**Proposition 2:**

*Proof.* This is a much messier example, but it doesn't have any mass points.  $\square$