

Qualia and the Nature of Persons

Wednesday, 20 August 2025, 4pm – 5.30pm

Venue: AS3-05-23

Property dualism — the view that some mental properties, such as phenomenal properties, are something over and above the physical — fits poorly with any kind of materialism that would identify human persons with ordinary objects, like bodies or brains. It can be accommodated within a materialism that treats the subject of experience as ephemeral. It also quite naturally leads to some form of substance dualism. But hasn't substance dualism been disproven? I explore varieties of substance dualism that seem more appealing than extreme forms of Cartesian dualism, and consider what can be said for and against them.



Dean Zimmerman

Dean Zimmerman (Ph.D., Brown University) has taught at the University of Notre Dame, Syracuse University, and Rutgers University, where he is a Distinguished Professor in the philosophy department and co-director of the Rutgers Center for the Philosophy of Religion. Zimmerman is

founding editor of *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics* (now co-edited with Karen Bennett), and co-editor (with Lara Buchak) of *Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion*. He has co-edited several other books, and his publications include over 60 articles. Zimmerman is U.S. Representative of The Friends of Arthur Machen.