Department of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy



DASD Counternarcotics & Global Threats

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#### THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy

This memorandum serves to promulgate the new Department of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy. It is the result of a deliberative process in which activities to counter the threats to U.S. National Security posed by drug smuggling and other illicit activities are balanced against limited resources and DoD authorities to support efforts against transnational organized crime.

This document is the responsibility of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics & Global Threats, and will be reviewed and updated as needed. Please ensure the widest distribution within your respective organizations.

Michèle A. Flournoy

Attachment:

Department of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preamble	3
Strategic Context	7
Mission Statement	11
DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS & GLOBAL THREATS MISSION STATEMENT	11
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR COUNTERNARCOTICS & GLOBAL THREATS MISSION STATEMENT	11
Vision	11
DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS & GLOBAL THREATS VISION STATEMENT	
STRATEGIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES	13
NEXT STEPS FOR DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS STRATEGY	17
Metrics Guidance	19
ANNEX A: DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS AUTHORITIES	21
ANNEX B: LIST OF ACRONYMS	23

#### **PREAMBLE**

The global security environment is in a state of dramatic change. Propelled by the forces of globalization, technology, and connectivity, the contemporary security environment is distinct from any time in the past. The chief characteristic of this environment is *complexity*: a growing density of linkages among people, organizations, and challenges. New synergies stemming from widespread and rapid dissemination of information and technology enable nefarious actors to collaborate at a speed, scope, and scale never previously seen, generating a new array of threats to U.S. national security.

The mission of the Department of Defense (DoD) is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country. As the security threats facing the United States, its allies, and its partner nations have evolved, so too has DoD. The imperative to adapt remains, given the types of new threats we face.

The emergence of amorphous, adaptable, and networked threats has far-reaching implications for the U.S. national security community. These threats affect DoD priorities and war fighting strategies, driving greater integration with other departments and agencies performing national security missions, and create the need for new organizational concepts and decision making paradigms. The impacts are likely to influence defense planning for years to come.

#### Consider:

- An adversary using the proceeds from illicit trafficking to finance the development and use of IEDs to kill U.S. soldiers;
- An adversary seizing control of critical energy production or transportation infrastructure, resulting in a transient global price shock;
- An adversary destabilizing a friendly country with intent to penetrate our sovereign borders to fuel illicit trafficking activities; and
- An adversary on the high seas armed with AK-47s and RPGs threatening commercial vessels and taking advantage of ungoverned spaces.

These are real world examples of transnational criminal organizations that present a growing threat to U.S. national security and U.S. interests around the world.

# Thus, today we see:

- The Taliban in Afghanistan partially funding its insurgency through trade in illicit drugs;
- The price of oil on global markets spiking because of militants threatening oil production in Nigeria;
- Transnational criminal cartels and gangs in Mexico impeding the rule of law, violently challenging government, and exporting violence and illicit activity into the United States.
- Pirates expanding their area of operations across vast distances, such as the Indian Ocean, holding an increasing number of vessels and crew for ransom and threatening the economic interests of all nations.

Transnational organized crime represents a significant, multilayered, and asymmetric threat to our national security. It often directly and indirectly enables, supports, and facilitates insurgencies and terrorism; undermines state stability, security, and sovereignty; and corrupts legitimate global financial and trade networks. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) can

shift among a wide range of illicit activities as the situation dictates and profit motives arise: they traffic in specific commodities from drugs to weapons, and are involved in illegal financial transactions and trade-based money laundering, often blurring the lines between licit and illicit activity. It is not viable for DoD to continue to examine this complex threat through the single lens of the drug trade. We need a wider understanding of the challenges transnational organized crime represents to mitigate the national security threats posed by these groups and their illicit trafficking activities.

Transnational organized crime and transnational criminal organizations refer to a network or networks structured to conduct illicit activities across international boundaries in order to obtain financial or material benefit. Transnational organized crime harms citizen safety, subverts government institutions, and can destabilize nations.

The confluence of dispersed and decentralized global networks of criminals and terrorists enables both to fulfill their objectives by leveraging each other's strengths. These networks, composed largely of individuals and groups that receive occasional support from corrupt government officials, are loosely organized and ever-evolving, pragmatically appearing and disappearing for political-criminal gain. Criminal activity can fund terrorism and terrorism reciprocates by eroding state legitimacy and the rule of law. Weak or ungoverned spaces provide TCOs, including pirates, sanctuary from which to operate. This DoD Counternarcotics and Global Threats (CN&GT) Strategy is one contribution to disrupting and degrading the threats emanating from places where the state lacks authority.


The illegal drug issue that we are chartered to address is one manifestation of the overall problem of illicit trafficking. The overarching threat to our national security, of which illegal drugs are one *part*, is a continuum of illicit commodities and traffickers. Over the past decade, due at least in part to successful campaigns by the U.S. government and its partner nations to counter the flow of drugs, TCOs have diversified their portfolios and adapted their approaches. TCOs have expanded to other illicit commodities such as small arms and explosives (including improvised explosive devices), precursor chemicals, people, and illicitly-gained and laundered money. The exchange of these illegal commodities – *illicit trafficking* – presents us with a common thread that points to an adversary exhibiting all the hallmarks of a threat to U.S. national security.

The statutes listed in Annex A, and the annual Defense Appropriation Act, identify the purposes for which DoD may expend funds appropriated for DoD Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities. These statutes do not recognize or presume a general "nexus of illegal narcotics, trafficking, piracy, and threat finance networks." Each use of these authorities or funds, therefore, requires a determination, based on the facts specific to that proposed use, that the funds will be expended for the purpose of "counter drug activities." These activities include measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail any activity reasonably related to drug trafficking. This includes, but is not limited to, measures taken to detect, interdict, disrupt, or curtail activities related to substances, material, weapons, or resources used to finance, support, secure, cultivate, process, and/or transport illegal drugs. Once the determination is made, the activity may proceed, and the legality of the activity will not be affected should it result in an

incidental benefit to another DoD or law enforcement mission.

While remaining cognizant of current authorities, we must take a broader view of an adversary and mission area that is growing in complexity. Within the bounds of these authorities, DoD conducts activities reasonably related to its counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts, which includes support to other agencies and Departments, as well as partner nations.

The Illicit Exchange Continuum, depicted in Figure 1, shows a range of commodities subject to illicit trafficking – from counterfeit products to weapons of mass destruction. The diversification of commodities and the complexity of the illicit relationships they spawn and nurture exacerbates the threat posed to U.S. national security. The DoD CN&GT Strategy focuses on the traffickers and trafficking of commodities bracketed by counterfeit products, people, and weapons of mass destruction: drugs, small arms and explosives, precursor chemicals, and illicitly-gained and laundered money.



At the same time traffickers are diversifying across the Illicit Exchange Continuum, the potential nexus among illegal traffickers, terrorists, and insurgents is becoming a commonly recognized national security threat. Terrorist and militant organizations can tap into the transnational illicit marketplace – predominated by illicit drug proceeds – to underwrite their activities and acquire arms and other supplies to conduct operations. Networks of adversaries collide, integrate, and disperse again, coalescing and disbanding for pragmatic purposes. The individual focus of each actor – drugs, small arms and explosives, precursor chemicals, and illicitly-gained and laundered money – is the manifestation of a larger problem: the impact of illicit trafficking on our national security posture.

Illicitly gained and laundered money is a particularly insidious enabler and corruptive influence across these networks. Not only is it a trafficked commodity, but when it reaches its destination it enables the broader spectrum of transnational criminal activities, and can fuel political violence (terrorism and insurgency). Threat finance is thus a key national security issue. The DoD CN&GT Strategy addresses the threat posed by illicit trafficking in all its manifestations: drugs, small arms and explosives, precursor chemicals, and illicitly-gained and laundered money. It

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According to DoD Directive 5205.14, "DoD Counter Threat Finance Policy" (August 19, 2010), "DoD Counter Threat Finance efforts target financing used to engage in terrorist activities and illicit networks that traffic narcotics, weapons of mass destruction, improvised explosive devices, other weapons, persons, precursor chemicals, and related activities that support an adversary's ability to negatively affect U.S. interests."

provides a frame of reference to more clearly understand and inform how DoD can rapidly deploy resources in support of U.S. and partner law enforcement organizations to disrupt and degrade an ever-changing and adaptive threat. Figure 2 depicts the range of intersecting global threats DoD faces.




FIGURE 2 – INTERSECTING GLOBAL THREATS

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> According to 10 U.S.C. 124, "In the case of detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, DoD serves as the single lead agency of the Federal Government. Otherwise, DoD CN and CNT operations are conducted at the request of and in support of U.S. or partner nation law enforcement agencies."

#### STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The DoD CN&GT Strategy responds to direction from White House documents: the President's 2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy, as well as the DoD 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The 2010 National Security Strategy acknowledges the challenge these threats pose and that combating transnational criminal and trafficking networks will require a "multidimensional strategy that safeguards citizens, breaks the financial strength of criminal and terrorist networks, disrupts illicit trafficking networks, defeats transnational criminal organizations, fights government corruption, strengthens the rule of law, bolsters judicial systems, and improves transparency." Moreover, the 2010 National Drug Control Strategy dedicates a chapter to disrupting drug trafficking and production, noting that "Drug-trafficking organizations move large quantities of illicit drugs into the United States. These same groups, at times working through street and prison gangs, employ criminal networks that return the illicit proceeds of the drug trade – along with an array of weapons – across our borders." The National Drug Control Strategy also identifies strengthening international partnerships as a key objective, holding that "Our international drug policies are designed to protect the public health and safety of our citizens by disrupting and dismantling violent criminal enterprises that transit drugs to our shores, while at the same time reducing the dangerous and destabilizing impact of these organizations wherever they operate."

In establishing DoD's mission and vision in an area of growing importance, the DoD CN&GT Strategy also supports the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review's four priority objectives:

- Prevail in Today's Wars
- Prevent and Deter Conflict
- Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies
- Preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.<sup>6</sup>

The DoD CN&GT Strategy presents a mission and vision derived from national guidance, and establishes an integrated set of strategic goals and objectives that will enable DoD to limit substantially and sustainably the impact of illegal drugs and other illicit trafficking organizations or networks in the near term and consolidate successes seen to date. The strategic goals and accompanying objectives establish an agenda to drive actions and activities across all components that focuses on specific, measurable, and attainable outcomes for implementation across DoD, and in support of other Departments and agencies as well as partner nations. The DoD CN&GT Strategy will facilitate the development of adaptive and sustainable methods to counter the threats transnational organized crime pose to U.S. national security.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> National Security Strategy, May 2010, p 49.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> National Drug Control Strategy, 2010, p 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> National Drug Control Strategy, 2010, p 77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Quadrennial Defense Review, 2010, p. v-vi.

Illicit trafficking by transnational criminal organizations represents a growing U.S. national security concern that warrants the capabilities of the Department of Defense to be brought to bear in support of a whole-of-government approach.

In a resource-constrained era, it is essential that DoD operate more efficiently. A primary purpose of the DoD CN&GT Strategy is to move DoD counternarcotics efforts to a more deliberate and structured engagement approach. Moreover, the updated DoD CN&GT Strategy reflects a growing recognition that the challenges presented in countering the flow and impact of illegal drugs is part of a larger issue that has direct, corrosive effects on U.S. national security interests, and those of its allies and partners.

Given the dynamic environment within which these challenges exist, the DoD CN&GT Strategy is a living document, to be modified regularly on a schedule determined by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats (DASD CN&GT).

The DoD CN&GT Strategy provides the insight and direction necessary for all affected parts of DoD (i.e. Services, Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, National Guard Bureau, and Defense Agencies) to prioritize the programs and activities they implement using Central Transfer Account funding, including those in support of other government Departments and agencies under a whole-of-government framework. Figure 3 on the following page presents a summary of the framework in which the DoD CN&GT Strategy is set and serves as the basis for DoD's CN&GT program.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The DoD Counternarcotics Central Transfer Account is a single budget line item that funds all counternarcotics requirements in DoD (except Active Duty military pay and Service operations tempo). The Central Transfer Account was established as the result of Congress providing funds in the FY1989 DoD Appropriations Act for a new appropriation, "Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense". This account was set up to centrally manage the resources and to ensure compliance with congressional intent. DASD CN&GT reprograms those funds to the Military Services and/or Defense Agencies on behalf of the Secretary of Defense for counternarcotics activities.




FIGURE 3 – STRATEGIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK

#### MISSION STATEMENT

# **DoD Counternarcotics & Global Threats Mission Statement**

(Provides mission direction for all of the Department of Defense)

The Department of Defense, as the single lead agency for detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illicit drugs into the United States and an important contributor to national efforts to counter transnational organized crime, conducts operations and activities to disrupt and degrade the national security threats posed by drug trafficking, piracy, transnational organized crime, and threat finance networks reasonably related to illicit drug trafficking activities. The Department of Defense supports government agencies and Departments, and partner nations' anti-trafficking and counter threat finance efforts worldwide.

# Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics & Global Threats Mission Statement

(Provides mission direction specifically for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the DASD CN&GT)

The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats provides oversight and guidance on policy, resource allocation, and effects measurement for DoD's efforts to disrupt and degrade the national security threats posed by illegal drugs, trafficking, piracy, and threat finance networks, and any potential nexus among these activities.

#### VISION

#### DoD Counternarcotics & Global Threats Vision Statement

The DoD Counternarcotics and Global Threats program is a capabilities-based, mission-focused, fully integrated effort that provides a comprehensive structure to support those U.S. government agencies principally responsible for securing the health and safety of U.S. citizens. These agencies strive to effectively disrupt and degrade the national security threats posed by drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, threat finance networks, piracy, and any potential nexus among these activities. Ensuring a sustained, effective program requires four guiding tenets:

- 1) to anticipate threat evolution and create adaptive mechanisms to contend with changes in the global security environment;
- 2) to identify and exploit transnational criminal organizations' vulnerabilities;
- 3) to promote higher-performing interagency networks to galvanize productivity and deliver results; and,
- 4) to prioritize, act, and adjust within statutory authorities

#### STRATEGIC GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Strategic Goal 1 - To disrupt and, to the degree possible disable, not only the <u>nexus</u> of actors and activities but also the individual <u>activities</u> of trafficking, insurgency, corruption, threat finance, terrorism and distribution of precursor chemicals in Afghanistan/Pakistan such that material support for the insurgency and terrorists is significantly reduced, the Afghan National Police and other law enforcement agencies are strengthened, and the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan are reinforced.

Objective 1: Support the establishment of a whole-of-government concept of operations to promote the integration of counternarcotics into the overall counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan such that mission and roles (U.S. military, U.S. Government Departments and agencies, and partner nations) are clearly articulated and military forces deploying to Afghanistan receive clear operational guidance on: the nexus among the drug trade, illicit trafficking and the insurgency; integrating counternarcotics into military operations; how to conduct counternarcotics operations; and how to identify and balance resources for conducting counternarcotics operations.

Objective 2: Increase support for military and law enforcement operations in the Afghanistan Combined Joint Operating Area that target the nexus among the drug trade/illicit trafficking, related to the insurgency, and corrupt government officials, with a focus on disrupting high value networks and reducing the resources the insurgency receives from illicit activities.

Objective 3: Create and transition to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan accountable, effective, and self-reliant Afghan counternarcotics security forces capable of containing the illicit drugs trade, including by strengthening U.S. and foreign law enforcement support capabilities (through the provision of training, equipment, infrastructure, intelligence support, and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence systems) to sustain counternarcotics efforts as U.S. military forces draw down.

Objective 4: Identify threat finance activities impacting U.S. national security interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan that form the nexus among illicit drug traffickers, terrorists, and insurgents so that the financial and economic infrastructures can be targeted and dismantled; sustain threat finance activities in Afghanistan until requirements change; and meet emerging requirements as requested by the appropriate partner U.S. Government Departments and agencies.

<u>Strategic Goal 2</u> - Illicit drug and drug precursor trafficking and related transnational organized criminal threats to U.S. national security interests in the Western Hemisphere – particularly in Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and Peru – are reduced sharply in a manner sustained by partner nations.

Objective 1: Support U.S. Government efforts to reduce the quantity of illicit drugs entering the United States from Mexico and Central and South America; support the Office of National Drug Control Policy goal of interdicting 40 percent of the cocaine moving through the Western Hemisphere transit zone by 2015.

<u>Objective 2:</u> Support the establishment of a whole-of-government concept of operations, synchronized with transit zone interdiction efforts, for interdicting bulk cash and illicit weapons exiting the United States to Mexico.

Objective 3: Support the disruption of illicit drug trafficking and TCOs in Mexico, Central America, Colombia, and Peru; assist Western Hemisphere partner nations' Ministries of Defense efforts to limit the ability of illicit drug traffickers and TCOs to traffic from South America through Central America and Mexico into the United States. Support U.S. Government efforts to improve the capacity of Mexico and other illicit drug transiting countries to secure their borders and enforce the rule of law within their territory. For Mexico, at the request of its government, support interagency efforts to surge support to meet the growing emergency. Over the mid-term, apply lessons from Colombia and Afghanistan, where appropriate given the different circumstances in Mexico and at the request of the Mexican government, to assist Mexican law enforcement and judicial institutions in building rule of law capacity. For Colombia, sustain and consolidate *Plan Colombia* successes, carefully transferring responsibilities to ever more capable Colombian authorities so U.S. assistance can focus on other challenges.

Objective 4: Support the efforts of U.S. Federal, state, and tribal law enforcement organizations to interdict the flow of illegal drugs and combat trafficking from Mexico and Canada, in accordance with 32 USC § 112, by enhancing National Guard support to border areas and using its capabilities in intelligence analysis, transportation support, linguistics, and detection and monitoring. When feasible, the National Guard also supports U.S. Federal, state, and tribal law enforcement organizations by expanding its community outreach and education programs regarding the dangers of illegal drugs and transnational organized crime.

<u>Objective 5</u>: Work with other government agencies and Departments to build the capacity of Western Hemisphere partners to deny TCO's the use of their territory, airspace, and surrounding sea lines of communication.

<u>Strategic Goal 3</u> - The size, scope, and influence of targeted TCOs and trafficking networks are mitigated such that these groups pose only limited, isolated threats to U.S. national security and international security. The United States and partner nations have developed layered, coordinated approaches that regularly disrupt the operations of these organizations and networks, limit their access to funding, reduce their assets, and raise their costs of doing business.

Objective 1: By FY 2015, enhance or develop cooperative mechanisms within CN&GT programs to address illicit activities that cross Geographic Combatant Command seams, such that Geographic Combatant Command counternarcotics program offices actively collaborate to disrupt transnational illicit trafficking and consider success in another area of responsibility as part of their own success. This approach enables DoD to match the competitive adaptation and agility of the TCOs.

# **Regional Objectives**

Objective 2: Work with government agencies and Departments engaged in other U.S.

Government programs to build the capacity of African partner nations to disrupt activities of TCOs through border control, interdiction, and law enforcement activities conducted by effective and accountable security and law enforcement services that reinforce state legitimacy and stability. Focus efforts on partner nations that have exhibited the political will to engage in combating illicit trafficking as an issue of national importance (e.g., Senegal, Ghana, Cape Verde, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) such that these partners measurably disrupt the activities of TCOs. (*Africa*)

Objective 3: Work with other government agencies and Departments to build the capacity of Asian partners (with a focus on the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia) to disrupt and degrade the nexus among TCOs, illicit drug trafficking, foreign terrorist organizations, and militant movements. (*Asia-Pacific*)

Objective 4: Support efforts to disrupt the flow of precursor chemicals and materials from and through Asia (especially India and China), which fuels drug production and violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mexico, and Central America, to reduce the production of methamphetamine and cocaine destined for the United States. (*Asia-Pacific*)

Objective 5: Work with other government agencies and Departments to build the capacity of Asian partners (with particular focus on the Philippines and Indonesia) to deny the use of their territories and surrounding sea lines of communication for illicit drug trafficking and transnational criminal activities. (*Asia-Pacific*)

Objective 6: Work with other government agencies and Departments and local counternarcotics and law enforcement agencies to engage with and build the capacity of European partners (with a particular focus on Turkey, Bulgaria, the Balkans, and other Mediterranean countries) to secure their borders, deny the use of air, land, and coastal waters for illicit drug trafficking and transnational criminal activities, and prevent illicit drugs from entering and ill-gotten proceeds from exiting the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility. (*Europe, Eurasia*)

Objective 7: Establish mechanisms to increase engagement with Russia, and among Russia and its neighbors, to establish long-term, collaborative relationships regarding illicit drugtrafficking that benefit the entire region. (*Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia*)

Objective 8: Identify threat finance activities impacting U.S. national security interests in Iraq and the Gulf region. (*Middle East*)

Objective 9: Work with other government agencies and Departments to build the capacity of Central Asian partners to secure their borders, deny the use of air, land, and waterways for illicit trafficking and transnational criminal activities, and prevent illicit drugs from entering and ill-gotten proceeds from exiting the Central Asia Region. (*Central Asia*)

Objective 10: By 2015, with existing funding, disrupt the nexus between illicit drugs and foreign terrorist organizations operating in and from South and Central America, focusing on linkages with the Middle East and Africa. (Western Hemisphere)

# **Global Objectives**

Objective 11: Develop and deploy technologies in support of a whole-of-government approach (including Federal, state, local, tribal, and partner nations) to disrupt and degrade the national security threats posed by transnational organized crime, narcotics traffickers, threat finance networks, and piracy.

Objective 12: Support efforts to disrupt the global flow of precursor chemicals, materials, and associated illicit finance activities that support illegal drug production, including through synchronization of efforts across the Geographic Combatant Commands.

Objective 13: Work with partners to disrupt and dismantle critical networks (financial, transportation, human capital, and supply chain) in the transatlantic and transpacific drug trafficking vectors that run from Central and South America to Africa, Pakistan, and Asia, en route to Europe and the United States.

Objective 14: By FY 2015, enhance or develop cooperative mechanisms with law enforcement agencies to maximize both the impact and the efficiency of DoD contributions to combating drug trafficking and TCOs that pose a national security threat.

Objective 15: Continue to support Department of State efforts to mitigate the global threat of small arms and man-portable air defense systems through State Department's weapons removal and abatement programs such that the threat posed by the trafficking and proliferation of illegal weapons around the world is minimized.

Objective 16: Within existing DoD authorities, reduce the number of pirate attacks, disrupt acts of piracy such that piracy decreases over the next five years (FY 2011-FY 2016). Work with U.S. interagency and foreign partners to develop policies and procedures to discourage piracy and to build the counter piracy capacity of partner nations (with a particular focus on Kenya; the Seychelles; the Strait of Malacca and Singapore; and the Tri-Border region of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia).

Objective 17: By FY 2015, within existing DoD authorities, and in cooperation with interagency partners, incorporate counter threat finance capabilities into DoD-wide strategic, operational, and tactical planning and operations to undermine threats and terrorist actions that are contrary to U.S. interests. By FY 2015, support interagency incorporation and synchronization of counter threat finance capabilities through all elements of national power at national and theater levels of operations.

Objective 18: Build the capacity of partner nations to combat illegal drug trafficking and transnational organized criminal activity through the use of the National Guard, as authorized, consistent with the Geographic Combatant Commands' theater campaign plans and Title 10 law.

# NEXT STEPS FOR DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS AND GLOBAL THREATS STRATEGY

With the DoD CN&GT Strategy, we have identified illicit trafficking by TCOs as a growing U.S. national security concern that warrants the capabilities of DoD to be brought to bear in support of a whole-of-government approach. Achieving this will involve aligning strategy and budget to the tasks at hand.

**Strategy:** The DoD CN&GT Strategy will integrate and nest with other key documents in DoD's strategy development/strategic guidance cycle, as well as with other key overarching Executive Branch strategies. To this end, DASD CN&GT, in coordination with other DoD and, as appropriate, interagency stakeholders, will:

- deepen our understanding of the national security threats posed by transnational criminal adversaries;
- ensure that the goals and objectives of this DoD CN&GT Strategy continue to align with guidance in DoD strategies and implementation guidance documents;
- align the objectives of the DoD CN&GT Strategy with other DoD regional strategies and ensure that the objectives of strategic engagement are mutually supportive;
- work with the Geographic Combatant Commands to integrate transnational criminal
  threats conceptually and programmatically into the next versions of Geographic
  Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans, further consolidating the language and
  objectives that the Geographic Combatant Commands develop in their counternarcotics
  strategic plans; and
- ensure the DoD CN&GT Strategy remains consistent with and supports the Office of National Drug Control Policy guidance contained in the National Drug Control Strategy.

Actions and Activities: The DoD CN&GT Strategy does not include specific actions and activities. The Geographic Combatant Commands, National Guard Bureau, and Defense Agencies will generate specific functional and regional sub-strategies, or integrate their planned counternarcotics and global threats activities into the Combatant Command Theater Campaign Plans. They will be required to deliver their prioritized actions and activities, underpinned by metrics, for DASD CN&GT's review and to provide a basis for resource allocation. These prioritized actions and activities will be appended to future iterations of the DoD CN&GT Strategy. DASD CN&GT will ensure that all activities and actions funded by the Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities Appropriation support at least one strategic goal or objective in the DoD CN&GT Strategy.

**Budget:** A critical impetus for developing a strategy is to provide guidance for prioritizing programs and activities. The DoD CN&GT Strategy provides goals and objectives to which specific budget activity outlays will be mapped and prioritized. The DASD CN&GT, with input from implementing stakeholders (e.g., Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, National Guard Bureau), will prioritize counternarcotics programs to meet the goals and objectives of the DoD CN&GT Strategy.

#### **METRICS GUIDANCE**

The strategic goals and objectives articulated in the DoD CN&GT Strategy provide a framework for the development of theater level results-focused plans that will capture operational and programmatic performance measures toward at least one strategic goal or objective in the DoD CN&GT Strategy. Geographic Combatant Commands, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies will design CN&GT program frameworks that convey the implicit cause and effect linkages between Central Transfer Account-funded activities, theater-level objectives, and CN&GT strategic goals. Central Transfer Account-funded activities and theater-level objectives are required to have performance indicators used to observe progress and measure actual versus expected results.

Performance metrics underpin the execution of the DoD CN&GT Strategy by providing five key functions:

**Reporting**: DoD will employ metrics to report performance, the most fundamental function of metrics, as required using the strategic objectives in this document as the focal point for activities.

**Control**: Metrics will enable stakeholders implementing DoD CN&GT programs to control and evaluate the performance of their organizations. Metrics also enable subordinate entities to control their own activities and performance.

**Communication**: Given the diverse number of stakeholders focused on this issue and the evolving nature of the threat, communication is a critical function of CN&GT metrics. DoD uses metrics to communicate to internal and external stakeholders how Central Transfer Accountfunded results contribute to progress towards implementing the National Drug Control Strategy and the DoD CN&GT Strategy.

**Opportunities for Improvement**: Over time, CN&GT metrics will help identify gaps between performance and expectations – for example, the adequacy of resources committed to combat illicit drug trafficking. The size and nature of the gap – positive or negative – and the importance of the activity to determine the need for management to resolve the gaps.

**Expectations**: The DoD CN&GT program plays an enabling role that allows other actors and agents to fulfill their CN&GT missions. CN&GT metrics will help frame expectations for the execution of actions and activities within DoD and among other CN&GT stakeholders.

With these characteristics in mind, the DASD CN&GT, with inputs from stakeholders, will issue guidance and instructions for formulating and reporting on performance metrics that reflect theater-level operational plan CN&GT objectives and activities.

#### ANNEX A: DOD COUNTERNARCOTICS AUTHORITIES

In the DoD CN&GT Strategy, we have identified illicit trafficking by transnational criminal organizations as a growing U.S. national security threat that warrants DoD capabilities in support of a whole-of-government approach. Whereas the DoD CN&GT Strategy recognizes the dramatic change in the global security environment that calls for adapting our approaches, this document provides guidance for DoD to operate within existing statutory authorities. As we hone our understanding of the threats to U.S. national security posed by transnational criminal organizations, DoD authorities may require supplementation or amendment.

The counternarcotics authorities under which DoD operates include:

- 10 USC Ch. 18 § 371-382, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies"
- 10 USC § 124, "Detection and Monitoring of Aerial and Maritime Transit of Illegal Drugs"
- Section 1004, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (as amended), "Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities"
- Section 1021, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (as amended), "Use of Funds for Unified Counterdrug and Counterterrorism Campaign in Colombia"
- Section1022 for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Joint Task Forces (allowing DoD to support law enforcement agencies conducting counter-drug and law enforcement agencies conducting counter-terrorism activities)
- Section 1033, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (as amended),
   "Authority to Provide Additional Support for Counter-Drug Activities of Other Countries"
- 32 USC § 112: "Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities" (involvement of National Guard)

# **ANNEX B: LIST OF ACRONYMS**

CN&GT Counternarcotics and Global Threats

DASD CN&GT Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global

Threats

DoD Department of Defense

TCO Transnational Criminal Organization



Department of Defense Counternarcotics & Global Threats Strategy