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| Ilana M. Salant  isalant@g.harvard.edu  [isalant.github.io](https://isalant.github.io/) | A picture containing font, logo, text, graphics  Description automatically generated |

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| Harvard Ph.D. Program in Health Policy  8 Story St, Cambridge MA 02138 | Placement Director: David Grabowski  Placement Director: Haiden Huskamp  Administrative Contact: Deborah Whitney | [grabowski@hcp.med.harvard.edu](mailto:grabowski@hcp.med.harvard.edu)  [huskamp@hcp.med.harvard.edu](mailto:huskamp@hcp.med.harvard.edu)  [deborah.whitney@harvard.edu](mailto:colleen_yout@harvard.edu) |

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| **Education** | **Harvard University** | | |
|  |  | Ph.D. Health Policy (Economics Track), 2020 to 2026 (expected) | |
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|  | **Toulouse School of Economics** | | |
|  |  | | MSc, Economics, *Summa Cum Laude,* 2019 |
|  | **Barnard College of Columbia University** | | |
|  |  | B.A, Economics, *Cum Laude*, 2016 | |

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| **Fields** | Health Economics  Industrial Organization  Public Economics |

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| **References** | Professor Nicole Maestas (Chair)  [maestas@hcp.med.harvard.edu](mailto:maestas@hcp.med.harvard.edu) | Professor David Grabowski  [grabowski@hcp.med.harvard.edu](mailto:grabowski@hcp.med.harvard.edu) |
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|  | Professor Tim Layton  [timothyjlayton@virginia.edu](mailto:timothyjlayton@virginia.edu) | Professor Mark Shepard  [mark\_shepard@hks.harvard.edu](mailto:mark_shepard@hks.harvard.edu) |

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| **Fellowships**  **& Awards** | Harvard University Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2025-2026  Pre-Doctoral Fellowship in Aging and Health Economics, National Bureau of Economics Research (NBER), 2022-2024  Valedictorian, Economics of Markets and Organization Track, Toulouse School of Economics, 2019 |
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| **Teaching** | Research in Health Economics, Harvard University  Teaching fellow for Professor Mark Shepard (Fall 2024)  Why is There No Cure For Health?, Harvard University  Teaching fellow for Professor David Cutler (Fall 2023) |
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| **Employment** | Cornerstone Research, Summer Associate, 2025  E.CA Economics (Brussels), Summer Intern, 2017  Federal Trade Commission (Bureau of Economics), Summer Intern, 2014 and 2015 |
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| **Research** | Graduate Research Assistant, Harvard University, 2021-2022  Professors Tim Layton and Mark Shepard  Pre-Doctoral Research Fellow, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, 2019  Professor Maria Polyakova |
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| **Job Market Paper** | **“The Impacts of Privatization in Home Health Care: Evidence from Arkansas”**  *Abstract:* In many sectors, privatization is pursued to improve efficiency but raises concerns about cost-cutting and under provision. In health care, however, the dominant margin of response may be overprovision—higher spending driven by billing and coding efforts rather than by increased value. I study this mechanism in the context of Arkansas’s 2016 sale of its statewide public home health agency network to a national for-profit chain. A stylized model predicts that privatization shifts managerial attention toward billing effort—resources devoted to documentation, coding, and service mix decisions—that raise the effective reimbursement per episode and expand care along an upward-sloping cost curve. Consistent with these predictions, difference-in-differences estimates using Medicare data from 2010–2021 show that privatization increased effective reimbursement per episode by 27 percent and statewide home health use by roughly 10 percent, with no evidence of reduced access for high-cost or rural populations. Spending rose substantially, but measurable quality and outcomes remained flat. These findings suggest that when payment is endogenous to provider behavior, privatization may reshape the trade-offs typically associated with ownership change, increasing spending and access without necessarily increasing the value of care. |

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| **Submitted Papers** | **“Beyond Post-Acute Care: Characterizing Community-Admitted Medicare Home Health Users and Associated Spending”** (with Mark Shepard, Nicole Maestas, Tim Layton, and David Grabowski). Accepted at *Health Affairs*.  **“Home Health Specialization and Post-Acute Outcomes”** (with Amanda Chen and David Grabowski) |

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| **Working Papers** |
|  | **“Supply-Driven Home Health Care Use in Medicare: Evidence from Agency Entry and Exit”**  Home health care has long been characterized as highly responsive to supply-side factors. Despite this widespread perception, there is limited direct evidence on how supply affects patterns of use. This study leverages variation in home health agency entry and exit across time and local areas to examine the supply sensitivity of home health care and its downstream consequences. Analyzing how changes in home health supply differentially affect post-acute versus community-entry patients reveals stark differences in responsiveness: although changes in supply have minimal effects on post-acute care use, they substantially increase community-entry use . Beyond these direct effects on use, expanded access generates complex shifts in broader healthcare use. These effects operate through both substitution and complementarity channels: expanded access reduces hospitalizations and Medicaid-funded nursing homes, but also increases prescription drug use and hospice use. The increase in total Medicare spending suggests that expanded home health access represents a net addition to Medicare services rather than pure substitution. Together, these two sets of results - the differential supply sensitivity between care pathways and the complex healthcare use patterns that result from expanded access - challenge the conventional view of home health care as primarily a substitute for institutional post-acute care. |

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|  | **"What Determines the Supply of Medicare Home Health Agencies?"**  *Abstract:* This paper examines how Medicare payment policy influences the supply of home health agencies (HHAs). I exploit a 2006 reform that redefined the geographic boundaries used to calculate Medicare’s home health wage index, creating plausibly exogenous variation in episode-based payment rates across local markets. Using national provider data from 2002–2022 and an event study design, I find that HHAs respond to negative payment shocks by reducing employment and slowing entry, while responses to positive shocks are more muted—consistent with already-high Medicare margins reducing the incentive to expand. A case study of California suggests that these supply-side changes do not translate into short-run changes in utilization. These findings shed light on how regulated prices shape firm behavior and market structure in a low-fixed-cost segment of the health care sector. |

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| **Seminars & Conferences** | ASHEcon June 2025 (Nashville, TN); Harvard Health Economics Seminar (April 2025); Harvard Health Policy Seminar (November 2024); T32 Training Seminar/NBER (September 2024) |

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| **Academic Service** | Referee service: *Journal of Health Economics*, *JAMA Health Forum*, *Health Affairs*  Organizer: National Institute of Health T32 Training Seminar (*Academic Year 2023*) |

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| **Research Grants** | National Institute on Aging, Grant Number T32-AG000186 |

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| **Languages** | English (native); French (fluent) |
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| **Software skills** | Stata, Matlab, R, SQL |
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