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Migrations in Kazakhstan: Past and Present

Gulnar Kendirbaeva

Kazakhstan has experienced more powerful pressures of migration unlike any other republic of the former Soviet Union. An especially great number of immigrants came to Kazakhstan during the Soviet period. Many peoples of the former Soviet Union, often against their wishes, took up residence in the republic. The recent situation in Kazakhstan is characterized by a further intensification of migratory processes. Their complicated character, both in the past and today, has, in many aspects, influenced the present-day problems of the republic.

Migratory Processes in the Time of Russian Colonization Before 1917

Russian migration to Kazakhstan began soon after the annexation of the region (The Younger Horde) by Russia in 1731. There were two large groups of Russian immigrants to Kazakhstan, namely, the Russian Cossacks and the Russian *muzhiks* (peasants). The "Provisional Regulations" of the Russian government of 21 October 1868 ("Vremennoe Polozhenie ob Upravlenii v Ural'skoi, Turgaiskoi i Semipalatinskoi Oblastiakh") declared: "The nomadic lands of the Kazakhs are considered state lands given to the Kazakhs for collective use." The Cossacks built fortresses in the Kazakh steppe and occupied the land around them. These fortresses were officially declared a means of protecting the Kazakhs from outside enemies and of establishing peaceful relations among the Kazakhs themselves; in fact, they secured control over the nomads and served as a means of further entry into the steppe. In the "Steppe Regulations," promulgated on 25 March 1891, the lands were declared to be "state property." By these "Regulations" the tsarist government favored the mass migration of Russian peasants to Kazakhstan. The "Steppe Regulations" of 1891 gave Russian peasants the right to keep the lands they had occupied as their private property (Suleimenov, 1963, pp. 96–97). With these "Regulations" the tsarist government strove both to rid itself of the restless sections of its own population (the Cossacks) and to solve Russia's most important problem—the "land question" (*i.e.*, the clamor of landless peasants for land reform), thereby lessening social tensions.

The migration of the Russian muzhiks became especially intensive at the time of the First Russian revolution (1905–1907). Incitement to migration was the most important part of the agrarian reform of Stolypin, the Prime Minister of the Imperial Russian government. Stolypin's agrarian reform was aimed at the destruction of the Russian rural community (*obshchina*) and the creation of strong and independent family farms as in the U.S. The Russian government allowed the sale and purchase

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of land, favoring by this policy the concentration of land in the hands of the *kulaks* (*i.e.*, the prosperous peasants) and stimulating the emigration of poor peasants to other provinces of the Russian Empire, in particular to Central Asia and Siberia. The Russian state supported the migrants: they were released from all taxes (for 15 years) and all duties (for 25 years); each family received 100 rubles as a loan and each man 30 dessiatinas of land. (One *dessiatin* was c. 2.7 acres) The historian N. E. Bekmakhanova wrote that in the beginning of the twentieth century about 1.3 million Russian peasants migrated to Kazakhstan and Kirgizia (Bekmakhanova, 1989, p. 160). They received in all 45,000,000 dessiatinas of the best lands (Nurpeisov, 1990, p. 70). The demographer M. Tatimov counted 1,150,000 migrants to Kazakhstan in the beginning of the twentieth century. He also mentioned 150,000 Baptists and the so-called Old-Believers (*starovertsy*), who, on account of religious repression, fled to Kazakhstan at the end of the nineteenth/beginning of the twentieth centuries (Tatimov, 1994, p. 1). Since the 1870s the Dungans and the Uigurs also migrated to Kazakhstan. At the beginning of the twentieth century the number of Kazakhs consisted of five million people. According to the general census of the population of 1897, they formed 82% of the population of the modern territory of Kazakhstan (Tatimov, 1993, p. 132).

Migrations During the Soviet Period (1917–1991)

Kazakhstan experienced the strongest pressure of migration during the Soviet period (1917–1991). M. Tatimov has distinguished the following groups of migrants: (1) the victims of collectivization, dispossessed kulaks, during the first years of Soviet power (about 250,000); (2) First World War refugees and from Siberia, the Urals and the Volga provinces during the Civil War (about 100,000); (3) recruited industrial workers sent to Kazakhstan in the 1930s to render "proletarian assistance" in the industrialization of the republic (about 1,300,000); (4) deportees of the so-called "unreliable peoples" during the Second World War, 1941–1945 (about 1,300,000); (5) forced evacuees from the occupied territories during the Second World War (about 350,000); (6) the so-called "volunteers" who came to Kazakhstan to develop virgin and unused lands in 1954–1958 (about 1,450,000); (7) spontaneous migratory streams of different groups of Soviet citizens until the beginning of the 1970s (about 1,000,000); (8) secret military settlements of "strategic importance" in 1946–1991 (about 250,000); (9) different groups of laborers sent to develop the republic's major enterprises until 1990 (about 200,000); (10) workers to develop the new lands between 1986 and 1991 (about 50,000); and 11) war and ethnic refugees from places where national conflicts were especially intense (the Caucasus and Central Asia) and civilian immigrants from the Baltic republics and Moldavia in 1992–1993 (about 50,000). In all, about 6,200,000 people immigrated to Kazakhstan during the Soviet period (Tatimov, 1994, pp. 1–3). If before the establishment of Soviet power there

were no more than 1.5 million Europeans in Kazakhstan, in the middle of 1991 there were already 8.9 million European migrants in the republic (Tatimov, 1993, p. 135).

The Kazakhs lost a considerable part of their population in the time of the national-liberation revolution of 1916 and the Civil War of 1917–1920. M. Shokaev estimated that about 1,114,000 people died in Central Asia as a result of the riots of 1916, from hunger and loss of private property, especially cattle and lands (Shokaev, 1925, p. 45). The Civil War, along with the establishment of Soviet power in Kazakhstan, also led to considerable deaths by hunger and emigration of the Kazakhs beyond the borders of the republic. The general number of human losses among the Kazakhs living in Soviet territory during 1917–1920 added up to about 800,000 (Tatimov, 1993, p. 133). The collectivization of agriculture carried out by the Soviet government in the 1930s resulted in yet one more national catastrophe. As a result of collectivization, accompanied by the forced settlement of the Kazakhs and Stalin's political repressions, 1,750,000 Kazakhs (42% of the whole population) died from hunger and epidemics. One-third of the remaining Kazakh population fled abroad, mainly to China, Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. Ultimately, 414,000 of them came back to Kazakhstan and 616,000 continue to live outside the republic. As a result of political repression in 1929–1937, another 5,551 Kazakh peasants were arrested and 883 of them were shot (Qozybaev *et al.*, 1992, pp. 29, 31, 33). According to the 1930 census the Kazakhs numbered 4,120,000; according to the census of 1937, they numbered only 2,862,458. Other inhabitants of Kazakhstan were also lost during mass collectivization: the Ukrainians were reduced from 859,400 to 658,100, while the number of Uzbeks dropped from 228,200 to 36,600.

The first deportees to Kazakhstan during the Soviet period were the victims of the so-called "kulak deportation" (*kulatskaia ssylka*), that is, the deportation of prosperous Russian peasants. According to the documentation of the KGB, 1,803,392 were deported in 1930–1931. Until 1934 the deported peasants were called "special migrants" (*spetspereselentsy*). Between 1934 and 1944 they were renamed "working settlers" (*trudposelentsy*), and since 1944 they have been called the "special settlers" (*spetsposelentsy*) (Zemskov, 1990, pp. 3–4). All kulaks were divided into three categories: (1) the counter-revolutionary group actively opposing the organization of *kolkhozes* (collective farms)—this group of kulaks left their permanent places of residence and went underground; (2) the richest kulaks, whom the authorities considered antagonistic to the Soviet power, simply on account of their wealth; and (3) other kulaks. In practice, not only the rich, but also the middle and even poor peasants opposing Soviet power were evicted, followed by confiscation of their property. The kulaks of the first two groups were subjected to arrest and exile in remote provinces. The kulaks of the third group were deported within the limits of their own province (Zemskov, 1991, p. 3).

As a rule, people were brought to inhabited places and left there without any assistance. In 1932, the number of dead among the migrants was three times larger than the number of new-born children. Infant mortality was especially high. The

deported kulaks were widely employed in various branches of heavy (metallurgy, mechanical, engineering, coal, timber) and light (food processing) industries. They were also employed in establishing new farms.

The civil rights of the "special settlers" were severely limited. It was strictly forbidden to leave the new places of settlement. Persons who tried to flee were arrested and brought back to their places of banishment. In the 1930s the "special settlers" could not even be drafted into the Soviet Red Army. From 1938 to 1944 onward, many deported, former kulaks were restored some of their civil rights, and, under certain circumstances, could leave their assigned places of settlement. But even so, between 1949 and 1952 only 200,000 were released from exile. The number of the deported by 1 January 1953 had increased to 2,753,356. The number of deportees had, thereby, reached its highest point in the entire history of the Soviet Union, due to the massive deportation of the so-called "unreliable peoples." This group also was called "anti-Soviet elements" (1940–1941, from the Baltic republics, West Byelorussia and Moldavia); the "socially dangerous elements" (1937, Greeks and Finns); and the "suspicious peoples" (from the border areas of Iran and Afghanistan) (Zemskov, 1990, p. 16).

In addition, on 21 August 1937, the Soviet government and Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party passed the decree on the deportation of Koreans from the Soviet Far East to Central Asia. On the one hand, the foreign policy situation of that time and, on the other, the scarcity of labor in Central Asia as a result of Stalinist repression of the 1930s are considered the main reasons for the deportation of the Koreans. Among the most important foreign policy events of that time were the following determining events: (1) the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 and the proclamation of the Japanese protectorate; (2) the Japanese intervention in the Far East (1918–1922); (3) the signing of the Japanese–German Anti-Comintern Pact in July 1936; and (4) the adoption by the Japanese government of the "Directives Concerning the Empire's National Defense," in which both the Soviet Union and the U.S. were regarded as Japan's arch-enemies.

The Korean population, living in compact groups in the Far East, numbered 200,000 before the deportation of 1937. The deportation of the Koreans was aimed at the dispersion of their compact settlements by relocating them in the vast territory of Kazakhstan. The Koreans were mainly settled in the southern provinces and in the Uzbek province of Tashkent.

By 1 December 1938, 57 independent Korean kolkhozes (collective farms) with 6,905 Korean families were founded in Kazakhstan. An additional 3,784 Korean families were settled in the already existing kolkhozes (Kim, 1991, p. 291). Altogether 18,526 Korean families (more then 100,000) came to Kazakhstan in 1937 (Kozybaev, 1990, p. 11). From the very beginning, the Koreans engaged in their traditional agricultural pursuits, namely, rice and vegetable cultivation. Even though the Koreans were supported by the Soviet state during their deportation (state loans, foodstuffs, building materials, *etc.*) repressive treatment by local authorities, harsh

climatic conditions, as well as mistakes in the organization of kolkhozes and agricultural work, forced many Koreans to move from Kazakhstan into Uzbekistan (about 10,000).

In 1940, a new group of deportees arrived, namely, the former Polish military employees (*pol'skie osadniki i bezhentsy*) who, because of their activities in the Polish–Soviet war in 1920 had received land in the western provinces of Ukraine and Byelorussia (Zemskov, 1990, p. 5). The Polish population also exercised certain police functions over the local population of these territories. In 1939, the western provinces of Ukraine and Byelorussia became part of the Soviet Union. The Polish population of these territories was declared the worst enemy of the working masses. Together with their families many were sent into exile to Siberia, Kazakhstan, the Volga region, the Urals and the Russian European North of the USSR. Military employees and Polish refugees from the Polish territories occupied by the Germans—together about 380,000—were sent into exile in 1940–1941. Of these, about 102,000 Poles came to Kazakhstan. At the same time (1939–1940) the deportation of Baltic peoples (the Lithuanians, the Latvians, the Estonians) to Kazakhstan began. The total of the deportees banished from the annexed western provinces of the USSR amounted to 532,505 by 1 July 1943 (Kozybaev, 1991, p. 293).

At the end of 1937 about 10,000 Kurds, Armenians, Turks, Azerbaijanies, Khemshils and Iranians were sent from Transcaucasia to Kazakhstan. Among the other groups of immigrants of that time one must also mention more than 100,000 workers, who were sent by the government to develop the republic's major enterprises: Turksib, Balkhash and Zhezkazgan. However, the civil rights of this category of migrants were not curtailed.

On 28 August 1941, shortly after the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed the decree "About the Deportation of the Germans Living in the Volga Region." By this decree the Soviet Germans were charged with complicity in Germany's aggressive policies. The Autonomous German republic (established in 1924) was abolished and the whole German population forcibly resettled in Siberia and Central Asia. By 1 December 1941, the overall number of Soviet-Germans sent into exile to the Kazakh republic was 441,713 (Kozybaev, 1991, p. 238). The Germans worked in so-called labor armies, mainly in the mines, in the construction of defense enterprises and in the felling of forests. The Germans were first rehabilitated in 1964, but only in 1972 did they receive permission to return to their native places.

After the battle of Stalingrad (1943) the advance of the Soviet Red Army began. At this time the Kalmyk Autonomous republic was abolished, and the Kalmyks were deported to the Urals and Siberia. About 5,000 Kalmyks were sent into exile to Kazakhstan. In 1943, the Karachai-Cherkess, the Checheno-Ingush, and the Kabardino-Balkarsk Autonomous Republics in the north Caucasus were also abolished. The main reason for these measures was the instability of Soviet power in these republics. At that time the Soviet Army was engaged in serious fighting against

the Germans in the north Caucasus. The Chechen and the Ingush peoples possessed heavy artillery and mortars. And, according to their Soviet accusers, some tried to get into closer contact with the German forces. As a result about 400,000 Chechen and Ingush, 10,000 Karachai and 8,000 Balkarian people were deported to Kazakhstan in 1943–1944.

The deportation of the Crimean Tatars and other nationalities of the region (the Greeks, the Karaites, *etc.*) began after the liberation of the Crimea (summer 1944). Altogether about 15,000 from the Crimea region were banished to Kazakhstan. In summer 1944 the deportation of the Meskhet Turks from the Georgian border districts was also undertaken. More then 20,000 Meskhet Turks were sent to Kazakhstan. Earlier they had been deported only from the territories formerly occupied by the Germans, but, in summer 1944, they were expelled from their entire territory. (The statistics on the deportation of the above-mentioned peoples were provided by Zh. B. Abylkhozhin in private conversation.)

On 26 November 1948, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued the order "About Criminal Responsibility of the Deportees from the Places of Obligatory and Permanent Residence." According to this order, all peoples deported during the Second World War (the Germans, the Karachai, the Chechens, the Ingush, the Balkars, the Kalmyks, the Crimean Tatars, the Crimean Greeks, the Crimean Bulgarians, the Crimean Armenians, the Turks, the Kurds, the Chemshils and the Baltic peoples (Latvians, Estonians, and Lithuanians) and others, except for the Koreans) belonged to the category of "special settlers," who were evicted from their places of settlement forever. In case of escape from the obligatory and permanent places of residence, they were to be punished with 20 years of hard labor. Persons who helped the deportees to escape or enabled them to settle in their former homes were to be punished with five years of imprisonment (Zemskov, 1990, p. 9).

In 1941–1942 more than 500,000 people came to Kazakhstan as civilian evacuees from the regions occupied by the Germans. After the liberation of their former territories of residence, they returned, often before the end of the war. In 1957–1965, after the restoration of the north Caucasus Autonomous Republics (the Karachai-Cherkess, the Checheno-Ingush, the Kabardino-Balkarsk and the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic), the deported nationals of these republics also returned to their native lands.

The Modern Migratory Situation in Kazakhstan

Today more than a hundred nationalities live in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhs and the Russians form the largest national groups of the republic. By the beginning of 1993, the Kazakhs numbered 7,297,000 (43.2%) and the Russians 6,169,000 (36.4%). According to the 1989 census, 956,000 Germans, 896,000 Ukrainians, 332,000 Koreans, 60,000 Poles, 49,000 Meskhetian Turks, 38,000 Chechens, 29,000

Dungans, and other nationalities were resident in Kazakhstan (Suzhikov, 1993, pp. 51, 53, 55).

The recent demographic situation in the republic has been characterized by a rapid increase of out-migration, especially among non-Kazakhs (primarily Russians, Ukrainians, and Germans). This process began in the 1980s with the exit of people deported during the Second World War, and also of the recruited specialists sent by the Soviet government to develop and cultivate the new lands and to help in the further industrialization of the republic. If between 1970 and 1989 about 50,000 left Kazakhstan annually, in the period 1983–1986, 82,000–93,000 people emigrated every year.

Especially intensive is Kazhak migration from the countryside from where an average of 70,000 migrate to urban centers every year. At the same time, about 15,000 immigrants from other CIS republics and abroad come annually into the cities of Kazakhstan (Tatimov, 1993, p. 137). The latter immigrate mainly from the territories of national conflicts, such as from the Nagorno-Karabakh Region in Azerbaijan, the Pridnestrov'e Region in Moldavia, from Tadjikistan in Central Asia, and from the Chechen republic in the north Caucasus.

Germans, Greeks, Poles and Jews who decided to emigrate from the Soviet Union continue to leave the CIS territories. In 1988 about 100,000, in 1989 about 47,000, and in 1990 about 95,000 left Kazakhstan to go abroad. Their proportion of migration abroad grew from 12% in 1988, to 55% in 1989 and 70% in 1990 (Tatimov, 1993, p. 138).

Among the reasons for migration, respondents have named their desire to live in their historic homelands, material and financial difficulties (low wages, unfavorable living conditions, *etc.*), as well as the deterioration of the ecological situation in the republic. Migrants also mention their apprehensions of growing ethnic Kazakh nationalism.

At this juncture, it is important to stress that nationalism, like any other form of extremism, has its main roots in economic and social conditions. At the moment, Kazakhstan is undergoing harsh times, due to the introduction of economic reforms and the start of a free market system. This process occurs against the background of the colonial heritage inherited by the republic from its socialist past. The Soviet centralized economic command system favored, first of all, the extractive branches of the republic's industry. During the Soviet period, as a result of this one-sided development, Kazakhstan occupied only 12th place in the production of consumer goods.

Consequently, today, Kazakhstan is compelled to import more than 20,000 types of consumer goods. During the Soviet period, the largest part of the republic's national riches were exported in the form of cheap raw materials: ten million tons of wheat, up to 60% of the raw leather, and two-thirds of the washed wool produced in Kazakhstan had to be exported to other parts of the Soviet Union (Suzhikov, 1993, p. 27). The losses from the import of non-ferrous metals and minerals came to

millions of rubles, to say nothing of the loss of hard currency. In fact, Kazakhstan played the role of a raw materials producing appendage of the centralized planned economic system designed in Moscow. This economic policy determined the low level of living standards of the population and caused a shortage of material and cultural goods. Hospitals, schools, apartments and cultural institutions were insufficient both in quantity and quality. In the recent transitional period of economic reforms, all these problems have become more serious causing further sinking of the population's living standards.

Growing nationalism among certain groups of the Kazakh population may be explained by the fact that, during the Soviet period, every kind of expression of national origin and particularity was regarded as a manifestation of (bourgeois) nationalism and, as such, strongly condemned. Impersonal Socialist Internationalism was proclaimed the most progressive ideology of a new Soviet man (homo sovieticus). Therefore, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 immediately re-activated the national feelings of all peoples of the former USSR. The foundation of a sovereign state—the most acute problem of all CIS republics today—is inevitably connected with the awakening of national consciousness and interest in local history and culture. Against the deteriorating background of economic and social conditions, this activation of national feelings may take on an extremist character.

Thus, for example, the clashes between Kazakhs and Chechens in 1989 in Novyi Uzen' in the Mangyshlak province (west Kazakhstan) were caused by growing unemployment among the local Kazakh population. Although Kazakhs made up the majority of the population of this region (more than 50% overall and in some areas up to 95%), only 4–12% were engaged in local industrial production. As a result, 18,500 able-bodied Kazakhs became unemployed as a consequence of reforms (Suzhikov, 1993, p. 32). The overwhelming majority of workers were made up of provisional workers brought from other regions of the former USSR, especially from the north Caucasus. By means of this policy the ministries rid themselves of the need to develop local social infrastructures, including the building of hospitals, cultural and educational institutions, as well as those expenses necessary to protect the ecology of the region. The dramatically deteriorated ecological and criminal situation, together with the decline in the system of healthcare, aggravated the tense situation and provoked the clashes.

The collapse of the Soviet Union further increased the mobility and social activity of the immigrants from the north Caucasus. Chechens, Ingush and Meskhetian Turks tried to establish their own ethnically controlled social network in Kazakhstan; they occupied leading positions in the organization of private enterprises and local trade. In contrast to the indigenous Kazakh population, these immigrants possessed a stronger purchasing capacity, allowing them not only to buy houses from those emigrating but also to establish and extend their private businesses. In the atmosphere of growing social and economic insecurity and competition caused by the new market economy, these activities were regarded as ethnic challenges and, as such,

immediately provoked resentment and protests from the indigenous population. The clashes with Chechens took place in 1990 in the province of Zhambyl (south Kazakhstan). In 1992 protests against Chechens and Ingush were registered in the province of Taldy-Kurgan (south Kazakhstan) and against Chechens in Ust'-Kamenogorsk (east Kazakhstan) (*Nezavisimaia gazeta*, 4 February 1992). In 1991 there were also protests against Meskhetian Turks in the Enbekshi-Kazakhskii district of the Taldy-Kurgan province. Ethnic parties and organizations such as "Azat," "Alash," "Kazak tili," and "Zheltoksan" often initiated these protests and demonstrations. The immigration of Kazakhs from abroad (Mongolia, Iran, Afghanistan, Turkey) and from other CIS republics, as well as the immigration of Russians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Turks, Kurds, Georgians, Dagestanis and others to Kazakhstan, also caused new problems, particularly since the mechanisms meant to cope with them are poorly developed.

According to data of the State Committee for Statistics and Analysis of the Kazakh Republic, by 1 January 1993, non-Kazakh workers made up 75.8% of the total work force of the republic. Russians, Ukrainians and Germans form the largest and the most skilled and educated group of these non-Kazakh workers. Therefore, the emigration of this group has caused a sharp reduction in the republic's highly qualified labor force; immigrating Kazakhs as well as other ethnic groups are too poor to substitute for them, lacking sufficient training. Besides, the Kazakhs immigrating from abroad are often not able to buy or build houses on their own. It does not help matters that promised state support has become irregular for lack of funds. The absence of international agreements with the states in which the Kazakh diaspora lives creates still more problems. For example, the Kazakhs from Mongolia have been faced with the problem of driving their cattle from Mongolia to their new locations.

The adaptation of the non-Kazakh immigrants also becomes problematic, especially because so many of them (in particular refugees from territories suffering from ethnic conflicts and ecological disasters) consider Kazakhstan a temporary place of refuge. The bureaucratic passport system inherited from the Soviet period makes the adaptation of both the Kazakh and non-Kazakh immigrants even more complicated. As a rule, persons without permanent registration (*propiska*) cannot get a job. The "Law of Immigration" accepted on 26 June 1992, introduced for immigrants the so-called provisional residence permit lasting for a period of three years, which, in case of need can be extended for another two years. According to this "Law of Immigration" the immigrants can study or work only after receiving individual permission from the Ministries of Education and Labor (Galiev; 1993, p. 4).

The most recent data of the State Committee for Statistics and Analyses of the Kazakh Republic show the following situation: from the beginning of 1993 to September 1993, 330,000 immigrants came to Kazakhstan and 492,000 people left the republic. The losses from migration are 162,000. Most of the emigrants left for

Russia—144,000—and 11,000 for the Ukraine. A total of 184,000 Russians (37%), 74,000 Germans (15%), 28,000 Ukrainians (6%) and 10,000 Tatars (2%) left the republic during the above-mentioned time. Among the new-comers to the republic we find Russians (41%), Kazakhs (39%), Ukrainians (9%), Germans (4%) and other nationalities (7%) (Daurenbekov, 1993).

Recently, internal migration from the countryside to the cities and towns of the republic has also increased. While in the 1920s only 2% of Kazakhs lived in cities, by 1989 they made up 38.3% of the urban population of the republic (Masanov, 1992, p. 111). By the beginning of the next century, the number of Kazakhs migrating to cities is expected to reach 1.8 million (Tatimov, 1993, p. 141). According to the available statistical data, 3.5 million able-bodied men and women of the total population (38%) lived in the countryside in 1991, namely in kolkhozes and sovkhozes (Amanzholov, 1993, p. 31). The Kazakhs, who make up 60% of the rural population, are the main migrants to the cities. The migration of the country-dwellers is being supplemented by the migration of the so-called ecological refugees from the regions of Semipalatinsk, Baikonur and the Aral Sea (Kazakhstan), as well as by CIS refugees from the areas of intensive national conflicts.

Russians traditionally make up the majority of the city-dwellers in Kazakhstan. This fact, together with the material and psychological difficulties in adapting to a new social environment on the part of the new city-dwellers, may turn into a potential source of national tension. As a rule, the Kazakhs migrating to the cities from the countryside are not sufficiently skilled and "socially mature." Therefore, they form a new group of unemployed citizens and, as such, a new source of national extremism. Some of these Kazakhs serve as a reserve force for the "dark" economy, which inevitably accompanies each period of transition. Thus, in the eyes of non-Kazakh city-dwellers, they give rise to the stereotype of the small speculator and representative of the Black Market economy.

Growing unemployment in Kazakhstan as a consequence of industrial reconstruction forms another potential source of ethnic tension. As a result of the manner in which the national working class was constituted, the number of Kazakh workers in the last 50 years has never exceeded one-third of the republic's industrial workers (except some branches such as the oil-extracting industry, *etc.*). In addition, the Kazakh workers belong to the poorly skilled groups, who, under modern conditions of economic development, will be the first to lose their jobs. The Soviet government, in order to supply the missing labor, organized regular recruitment of skilled specialists from other Soviet republics (mainly Russians). The last circumstance led to the visible prevalence of Russian workers among the industrial workers of the entire republic. Present mass unemployment will effect both the poorly skilled Kazakh and Russian workers, the two largest ethnic groups, and, in turn, may cause new social and ethnic conflicts within the republic.

In conclusion, it is necessary to stress that success of basic economic reforms is a major prerequisite for the effective solution of the problems related to migration

and growing unemployment. The difficulties arising from different kinds of social and political extremism also can be solved only if, and when, the economic situation improves.

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