

## Assignment - 1 ( Theory )

①

(2) For my entry number,  $T_1 T_2 = 99$

$$T_3 T_4 = 19$$

So, the question becomes,

out of 118 Rounds what is the probability that Alice wins 99 rounds and Bob wins 19 given they both play aggressively only.

Assuming that Alice wins the first round and Bob wins the second, we can have all possible combinations of choosing 98 games (in which Alice wins) out of the remaining 116 games.

BUT! The probability of Alice winning any game is dependent on the number of games Bob has won, so we can only apply brute force in this part to calculate the required probability via all possible paths.

g have used the recursive algorithm given as :

$$dp[a][b] = \left( \frac{b}{a+b-1} \right)^* dp[a-1][b] + \left( \frac{a}{a+b-1} \right)^* dp[a][b-1]$$

↓

No. of wins of Alice

No. of wins of Bob

Probability of Bob winning when Alice has won 'a' times and Bob has won 'b-1' times

Probability of Alice winning when she has won (a-1) and Bob has won (b) rounds.

Here  $dp[n][y]$  represents the probability that Alice has won 'n' rounds and Bob has won 'y' rounds out of n+y rounds.

We are given  $dp[1][1] = 1$  (given)

$$dp[i][0] = 0 \neq i \quad \left( \begin{array}{l} \text{It is given Alice \& Bob} \\ \text{have won one game each} \end{array} \right)$$

$$dp[0][j] = 0 \neq j$$

Now we calculate  $dp[99][19]$  iteratively.


(b) Expectation:

For a given ' $t$ ', the required expectation becomes,

$$E(X_1 + X_2 + \dots + X_t) = E(X_1) + E(X_2) + \dots + E(X_t)$$

(Using Linearity of Expectation)

Now we need to calculate expectation of  $X_i$ , to compute  $E(X_i)$  let's look at the dp matrix we made earlier,



For each  $x_k$  we look at all elements

$d_p[i][j]$  s.t.  $i + j = k$ .

Note that they all lie along a diagonal.

So, we are required to calculate (for  $x_k$ )

$$\begin{aligned} & 1 \times \text{Prob of } k\text{th round being won by Alice} \\ & + 0 \times \text{Prob of } k\text{th round being a draw} \\ & - 1 \times \text{Prob of } k\text{th round being won by Bob} \end{aligned}$$

So, for each element, we calculate prob of reaching it from above (Alice wins) and from the left (Bob Wins), and then calculate the required probability iteratively.

NOTE:  $E(\sum_i x_i)$  comes out to be '0' for all values of  $t$  because probability of Alice & Bob winning is uniform s.t. they cancel out each other.

Variance: For a given  $T$ , we know

$E(\frac{1}{T} \sum_i x_i) = 0$  from above, so

$$\text{Var}(\frac{1}{T} \sum_i x_i) = E((\frac{1}{T} \sum_i x_i)^2)$$

$$\text{Let } \gamma = \frac{\sum x_i}{T}$$

Lets take an example,  $T = 10$

Now Possibilities after 10th round are :

<del>(10, 0)</del>	(9, 1)	(8, 2)	(7, 3)	(6, 4)	(5, 5)
<del>(4, 6)</del>	(3, 7)	(2, 8)	(1, 9)	(0, 10)	X not Possible

∴ The general representation will be

$$(\tau-i, i) \quad \text{s.t. } (1 \leq i \leq \tau-1) \quad i \in \mathbb{N}$$

So, to reach this round, Alice needs  $(\tau-i)$

wins and Bob needs  $i$  wins,

$$\begin{aligned} \therefore \gamma(\tau-i, i) &= (x_1 + x_2 + \dots + x_{\tau}) \\ &= (\underbrace{\tau-i}_{\downarrow} - \underbrace{i}_{\substack{\text{Alice won} \\ \text{Bob won}}}) \end{aligned}$$

$$\gamma(\tau-i, i) = (\tau - 2i)$$

$$\therefore E(\gamma^2) = \sum y^2 \times P(\gamma = y)$$

$$1 \leq y \leq \tau-1 \rightarrow \text{Alice wins } \tau-i$$

$$\Rightarrow E(\gamma^2) = (\tau - 2i)^2 \times P(\underbrace{\tau-i, i}_{\text{and Bob wins } i})$$

$$= (\tau-2)^2 \times P(\tau-1, 1) +$$

$$(\tau-4)^2 \times P(\tau-2, 2) +$$

$$\vdots$$

$$(2-\tau)^2 \times P(1, \tau-1)$$

We calculate this value iteratively

to get the answer for  $T = 19$

(2) (a)

As we know how Bob will play, we will apply greedy algorithm in order to try to minimize points scored by Alice in each round.

Case 1: Bob drew the last game  $\Rightarrow$  He opts balanced strategy

Balanced (Bob)	
Attack	$(\frac{7}{10}, 0, \frac{3}{10})$
Alice	Balanced $(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3})$
Defense	$(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{10})$

The points scored on an average from each strategy of Alice will be :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(i) Attack : } & \frac{7}{10} + \frac{1}{2}(0) + 0 \times \frac{3}{10} \\ & = \frac{7}{10} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(ii) Balanced : } & \frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{3} \right) + 0 \left( \frac{1}{3} \right) \\ & = \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{(iii) Defense : } & \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) + 0 \left( \frac{1}{3} \right) \\ & = \frac{9}{20} \end{aligned}$$

$\therefore$  ATTACK IS THE BEST OPTION

Case 2: Bob lost the last game  $\Rightarrow$  He opts aggressive strategy

Aggressive (Bob)	
Alice	
Attack	$\left(\frac{n_B}{n_A+n_B}, 0, \frac{n_A}{n_A+n_B}\right)$
Balanced	$\left(\frac{3}{10}, 0, \frac{7}{10}\right)$
Defense	$\left(\frac{6}{11}, 0, \frac{5}{11}\right)$

The points scored on an average from each strategy of Alice will be :

$$(i) \text{ Attack : } \frac{n_B}{n_A+n_B} + \frac{1}{2}(0) + 0\left(\frac{n_A}{n_A+n_B}\right)$$

$$(ii) \text{ Balanced : } \frac{3}{10} + \frac{1}{2}(0) + 0\left(\frac{7}{10}\right) \\ = \frac{3}{10}$$

$$(iii) \text{ Defense : } \frac{6}{11} + \frac{1}{2}(0) + 0\left(\frac{5}{11}\right) \\ = \frac{6}{11}$$

$\therefore$  ATTACK OR DEFENSE IS THE BEST OPTION

Attack will be better when  $\frac{n_B}{n_A+n_B} > \frac{6}{11}$

otherwise defense is better

Case 3: Bob won the last game  $\Rightarrow$  He opts

### Defensive strategy

Defense (Bob)

Attack

$(\frac{5}{11}, 0, \frac{6}{11})$
$(\frac{3}{10}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{5})$
$(\frac{1}{10}, \frac{4}{5}, \frac{1}{10})$

Alice

Balanced

Defense

The points scored on an average from each strategy of Alice will be :

$$\text{(i) Attack : } \frac{5}{11} + \frac{1}{2}(0) + 0\left(\frac{6}{11}\right) = \frac{5}{11}$$

$$\text{(ii) Balanced : } \frac{3}{10} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{5}(0) = \frac{11}{20}$$

$$\text{(iii) Defense : } \frac{1}{10} + \frac{2}{5} + 0\left(\frac{1}{10}\right) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$\therefore$  BALANCED IS THE BEST OPTION

Thus, we choose the strategy of Alice accordingly and after performing Monte Carlo Simulations for  $\sim 10^5$  times, we get  $\sim 57000$  wins for Alice &  $\sim 43000$  wins for Bob.

②(c)

For the above mentioned greedy strategy, to calculate the expected value for Alice to win ' $T$ ' rounds, we perform Monte-Carlo Simulations for  $\sim 10^5$  times to calculate various values of number of rounds required for Alice to get  $T$  wins and then take their mean.

③(a)

For Alice to maximize the number of points gained in the current round, we again apply greedy.

There is a uniform probability that Bob chooses to play Attack, Balanced or Defense.

Suppose in 3 Rounds, Bob play Attack, defense and Balanced once. We will calculate the expectation of total points Alice scores via any single strategy.

Bob

	Attack	Balanced	Defence
Attack	$\left( \frac{n_B}{n_A+n_B}, 0, \frac{n_A}{n_A+n_B} \right)$	$\left( \frac{7}{10}, 0, \frac{3}{10} \right)$	$\left( \frac{5}{11}, 0, \frac{6}{11} \right)$
Balanced	$\left( \frac{3}{10}, 0, \frac{7}{10} \right)$	$\left( \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3} \right)$	$\left( \frac{3}{10}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{5} \right)$
Defense	$\left( \frac{6}{11}, 0, \frac{5}{11} \right)$	$\left( \frac{1}{5}, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{3}{10} \right)$	$\left( \frac{1}{10}, \frac{4}{5}, \frac{1}{10} \right)$

Case 1: Alice attacks,

$$\text{Average Points} = \frac{n_B}{n_A+n_B} + \frac{7}{10} + \frac{5}{11}$$

Case 2: Alice plays balanced

$$\text{Average Points} = \frac{3}{10} + \frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{6} + \frac{3}{10} + \frac{1}{4} = 1.35$$

Case 3: Alice defends,

$$\text{Average Points} = \frac{6}{11} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{10} + \frac{2}{5} = 1.495$$

As Defending is better than playing balanced, we only compare Attacking and Defending.

Attacking is better if

$$\frac{n_B}{n_A + n_B} > \frac{15}{44}$$

otherwise Defending is better

So, Accordingly, I have chosen Attacking or Defending, depending on whichever is better.

To test the correctness, we run Monte Carlo simulations for  $\sim 10^5$  times and get roughly  $(53 - 54) \times 1000$  wins for Alice and  $(46 - 47) \times 1000$  wins for Bob,

② (b)

There does not exist any other strategy for Alice other than the greedy implemented in part (a) of question ②.

This can be verified as I have performed extensive testing trying various greedy strategies, for various initial conditions and also tested the code via applying dynamic programming (3-D) and none of the mentioned algorithms yielded better results.

③ (b)

In this part, we are applying dynamic programming where my dp array looks as follows:

We fill ( $i=1$ ) row manually with greedy approach

And then we calculate  $dp[i][j]$

using  $\text{dp}[i-1][j+2] \rightarrow \text{Alice wins}$

$\text{dp}[i-1][j] \rightarrow \text{Alice loses}$

$\text{dp}[i][j+1] \rightarrow \text{Draw}$

our  $dp[i][j]$  is a tuple of 2 elements, where first is the strategy Alice uses to maximize the expectation of it's points and second element is the minimum expectation before 'i' rounds are left

$\therefore$  We calculate the value of  $dp[\text{total rounds}][0]$  iteratively and report the corresponding answer.