

NetID : iv447

UniID : N17385760

LAB 4 : SNORT

Snort is free and open source network intrusion prevention system (IPS) and network intrusion detection system (NIDS).

Snort can be run in three modes:

1. Sniffer mode: which simply reads the packets off of the network and displays them for you in a continuous stream on the console.
2. Packet logged mode: which logs the packets to disk.
3. Network Intrusion Detection system (NIDS): which performs detection and analysis on network traffic. This is the most complex and configurable mode.

The snort configuration file for this lab is located at : /etc/conf/etc

An example command line for snort used in NIDS mode is shown below:

```
snort -dev -A test -c -i eth0
```

(-dev instructs packet to display the packet data as well as headers.)

This configuration file will include the rules configured for each packet to decide if an action should be triggered based on the rule type. The output is stored in the alert file (if you use -A test) which is located at /var/log/snort and also displayed on the screen in the following format:

```
[**] [116:56:1] (snort_decoder): T/TCP Detected [**]
```

The first number is the Generator ID; this tells the user what component of Snort generated this alert. For a list of GIDs, please read etc/generators in the Snort source. In this case, we know that this event came from the “decode” (116) component of Snort.

The second number is the Snort ID (sometimes referred to as Signature ID). To learn about preprocessor SIDs, please see https://www.snort.org/rule_docs. Rule-based SIDs are written directly into the rules with the sid option.

The third number is the revision ID. This number is primarily used when writing signatures, as each rendition of the rule should increment this number with the rev option.

There are a number of alert modes which can be used using '-A' to append it to the command. We will be making use of the **fast, full and test**.

The pcap file used for this lab is located at :
/home/student/snort_src/InfectedPcaps/infected.pcap.

To read a pcap file using Snort, we can use one of the following options:

```
$ sudo snort -r <file>
$ sudo snort --pcap-single= <file>
```

Wait for the message "Snort exiting" before reading the results.

Answer the following questions using the alert log file provided. Please provide screenshots wherever necessary.

1. List the alerts (from the alerts) and list the corresponding Generator ID, Snort ID and Revision ID of each alert and their significance. If an alert ID repeats multiple times only include it once. (20 points)

There are three alert modes :

1. test mode

Command :

```
sudo snort -dev -A test -c /etc/snort/etc/snort.conf -r
/home/student/snort_src/InfectedPcaps/infected.pcap
```

Screenshot while snort is running :

```
Connected (unencrypted) to: QEMU (344_13_21)
Applications Places System
student@int-rtr: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
Gzip Decompressed Data Processed: 6278.00
Http/2 Rebuilt Packets: 0
Total packets processed: 157
=====
SMTP Preprocessor Statistics
Total sessions : 0
Max concurrent sessions : 0
=====
dcerpc2 Preprocessor Statistics
Total sessions: 0
=====
SSL Preprocessor:
SSL packets decoded: 14
Client Hello: 2
Server Hello: 2
Certificate: 2
Server Done: 5
Client Key Exchange: 2
Server Key Exchange: 0
Change Cipher: 4
Finished: 0
Client Application: 2
Server Application: 1
Alert: 0
Unrecognized records: 5
Completed handshakes: 0
Bad handshakes: 0
Sessions ignored: 1
Detection disabled: 0
=====
SIP Preprocessor Statistics
Total sessions: 0
=====
Reputation Preprocessor Statistics
Total Memory Allocated: 0
=====
Snort exiting
```

Now the alerts are logged in alert file which is located at following location :
/var/log/snort

The three alerts logged in the file are :

[1:25042:4]

- Generator ID: 1 -> snort general alert


- Snort ID: 16669 -> This event is generated when an attempt is made to exploit a known vulnerability in jdk.

- Revision ID: 4 -> This denotes the number of times an alert is revised. Here it is 4.

[1:25042:4] Same as above

[1:16669:5]

- Generator ID: 1 -> snort general alert
- Snort ID: 16669 -> This event is generated when a spyware application related activity is detected such as application like "Spyeye bot".
- Revision ID: 5 -> This denotes the number of times an alert is revised. Here it is 5.



2. full mode


Command:

```
sudo snort -dev -A full -c /etc/snort/etc/snort.conf -r /home/student/snort_src/InfectedPcaps/infected.pcap
```

When snort is running :

```
Connected (unencrypted) to: QEMU (344_13_21)
Applications Places System
student@int-rtr: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
Other: 0 ( 0.000%)
Bad Chk Sum: 0 ( 0.000%)
Bad TTL: 0 ( 0.000%)
SS G 1: 0 ( 0.000%)
SS G 2: 0 ( 0.000%)
Total: 303
=====
Action Stats:
Alerts: 3 ( 0.990%)
Logged: 3 ( 0.990%)
Passed: 0 ( 0.000%)
Limits:
Match: 0
Queue: 0
Log: 0
Event: 0
Alert: 0
Verdicts:
Allow: 299 ( 98.680%)
Block: 0 ( 0.000%)
Replace: 0 ( 0.000%)
Whitelist: 4 ( 1.320%)
Blacklist: 0 ( 0.000%)
Ignore: 0 ( 0.000%)
Retry: 0 ( 0.000%)
=====
Frag3 statistics:
Total Fragments: 0
Frag3 Reassembled: 0
Discards: 0
Memory Faults: 0
Timeouts: 0
Overlaps: 0
Anomalies: 0
Alerts: 0
Drops: 0
FragTrackers Added: 0
FragTrackers Dumped: 0
[Software Updater] student@int-rtr: ~
```

Results are logged in alert file :



Results are logged in alert file :

Connected (unencrypted) to: QEMU (344_13_21)

Applications Places System

student@int-rtr: /var/log/snort

File	Edit	View	Search	Terminal	Help
------	------	------	--------	----------	------

```
155 1 25042 4
183 1 25042 4
294 1 16669 5

[**] [1:25042:4] EXPLOIT-KIT Java User-Agent downloading Portable Executable - Possible exploit kit [**]
[Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1]
03/16-12:50:54.901880 00:50:56:F5:48:D4 -> 00:0C:29:CA:2A:F2 type:0x800 len:0x4232
59.53.91.102:80 -> 192.168.23.129:1067 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:371 IpLen:20 DgmLen:16932 DF
***A**** Seq: 0x7BDA5466 Ack: 0x56F4B43 Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/11/cve-2012-5076-massively-adopted.html][Xref => http://cve.mit
re.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2012-5076]

[**] [1:25042:4] EXPLOIT-KIT Java User-Agent downloading Portable Executable - Possible exploit kit [**]
[Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1]
03/16-12:50:50.702668 00:50:56:F5:48:D4 -> 00:0C:29:CA:2A:F2 type:0x800 len:0x44A6
59.53.91.102:80 -> 192.168.23.129:1066 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:380 IpLen:20 DgmLen:17560 DF
***A**** Seq: 0x2908299D Ack: 0xEB81D38D Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/11/cve-2012-5076-massively-adopted.html][Xref => http://cve.mit
re.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2012-5076]

[**] [1:16669:5] MALWARE-CNC Spyeye bot variant outbound connection [**]
[Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1]
03/16-12:51:05.397195 00:0C:29:CA:2A:F2 -> 00:50:56:F5:48:D4 type:0x800 len:0x131
192.168.23.129:1069 -> 212.252.32.20:80 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:221 IpLen:20 DgmLen:291
***A**** Seq: 0xC6100DB0 Ack: 0x595D1660 Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 20
[Xref => http://www.threatexpert.com/report.aspx?md5=84714c100d2dfc88629531f6456b8276]

03/16-12:50:54.901880 [**] [1:25042:4] EXPLOIT-KIT Java User-Agent downloading Portable Executable - Possible
exploit kit [**] [Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1] {TCP} 59.53.91.102:80 -> 192.168
.23.129:1067
03/16-12:50:50.702668 [**] [1:25042:4] EXPLOIT-KIT Java User-Agent downloading Portable Executable - Possible
exploit kit [**] [Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1] {TCP} 59.53.91.102:80 -> 192.168
.23.129:1066
03/16-12:51:05.397195 [**] [1:16669:5] MALWARE-CNC Spyeye bot variant outbound connection [**] [Classification
: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1] {TCP} 192.168.23.129:1069 -> 212.252.32.20:80
~
~
~
1,1 All
```

[Software Updater] student@int-rtr: /var/l...

2. The alert file contains the output when the file was run using the “-A test” option. This will display the packet numbers of the corresponding packets that triggered alerts. Use Wireshark and locate these packets. List the source and destination IP address, source and destination port numbers and protocol used for each packet. (15 points)

Answer) 1. Packet : 155

Connected (unencrypted) to: QEMU (344_13_21)

Applications Places System

Wed Apr 25, 17:03

infected.pcap (as superuser)

Wireshark · Packet 155 · infected (as superuser)

▶ Frame 155: 60 bytes on wire (480 bits), 60 bytes captured (480 bits)
▶ Ethernet II, Src: Vmware ca:2a:f2 (00:0c:29:ca:2a:f2), Dst: Vmware f5:48:d4 (00:50:56:f5:48:d4)
▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.23.129, Dst: 59.53.91.102
▼ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1067, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 200, Ack: 20442, Len: 0

- Source Port: 1067
- Destination Port: 80
- [Stream index: 6]
- [TCP Segment Len: 0]
- Sequence number: 200 (relative sequence number)
- Acknowledgment number: 20442 (relative ack number)
- Header Length: 20 bytes
- Flags: 0x010 (ACK)
- Window size value: 64240
- [Calculated window size: 64240]
- [Window size scaling factor: -2 (no window scaling used)]
- Checksum: 8vd0d8 [unverified]


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
155	41.986480	192.168.23.129	59.53.91.102	TCP	60	1067 → 80 [ACK] Seq=200 Ack=20442 Win=64240 Len=0

0000 00 50 56 f5 48 d4 00 0c 29 ca 2a f2 08 00 45 00 .PV.H...).*...E.
0010 00 28 01 73 40 00 00 06 8a 98 c0 a8 17 81 3b 35 .(.s@...;5
0020 5b 66 04 2b 00 50 05 6f 4b 43 7b da a4 3e 50 10 [f.+P.o KC{..>P.
0030 fa f0 d0 d8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

infected

Packets: 303 · Displayed: 303 (100.0%) · Load time: 0:0.13 · Profile: Default

student@int-rt: ~ infected.pcap (as supe... Wireshark · Packet 155...



Source IP : 192.168.23.129
 Destination IP : 59.53.91.102
 Source Port : 1067
 Destination Port : 80
 Protocol : Transmission Control protocol (TCP)

2. Packet : 183

Connected (unencrypted) to: QEMU (344_13_21)

ApplicationsPlacesSystem

infected.pcap (as superuser)

FileEditViewGoCaptureAnalyzeStatisticsTelephonyWirelessToolsHelp

Start capturing packets

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

Expression... +

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
173	43.028651	192.168.23.129	59.53.91.102	TCP	60	1067 → 80 [ACK] Seq=200 Ack=35874 Win=64240 Len=0
174	43.029136	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	1514	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
175	43.029377	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	886	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
176	43.030415	192.168.23.129	59.53.91.102	TCP	60	1067 → 80 [ACK] Seq=200 Ack=38166 Win=64240 Len=0
177	43.056182	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	1514	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
178	43.056547	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	1514	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
179	43.056786	192.168.23.129	59.53.91.102	TCP	60	1067 → 80 [ACK] Seq=200 Ack=41086 Win=64240 Len=0
180	43.057005	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	886	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
181	43.086947	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	1514	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
182	43.087242	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	1514	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
183	43.088151	192.168.23.129	59.53.91.102	TCP	60	1066 → 80 [ACK] Seq=212 Ack=17521 Win=64240 Len=0
184	43.090073	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	1514	[TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]

▶ Frame 183: 60 bytes on wire (480 bits), 60 bytes captured (480 bits)

▶ Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_ca:2a:f2 (00:0c:29:ca:2a:f2), Dst: Vmware_f5:48:d4 (00:50:56:f5:48:d4)

▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.23.129, Dst: 59.53.91.102

▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1066, Dst Port: 80, Seq: 212, Ack: 17521, Len: 0

0000 00 50 56 f5 48 d4 00 0c 29 ca 2a f2 08 00 45 00 .PV.H...).*...E.

0010 00 28 01 7c 40 00 80 06 8a 8f c0 a8 17 81 3b 35 .(.|@...;5

0020 5b 66 04 2a 00 50 eb 81 d3 8d 29 08 6e 0d 50 10 [f.*.P.. ..).n.P.

0030 fa f0 eb 7f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00


infected

Packets: 303 · Displayed: 303 (100.0%) · Load time: 0:0.8 · Profile: Default

student@intrtr: ~

[Software Updater]

infected.pcap (as supe...



Source IP : 192.168.23.129
Destination IP : 59.53.91.102
Source Port : 1066
Destination Port : 80
Protocol : Transmission Control protocol (TCP)

3. Packet : 294

Connected (unencrypted) to: QEMU (344_13_21)

Applications Places System

infected.pcap (as superuser)

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/> Expression...


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
284	48.518240	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	60	80 → 1067 [FIN, PSH, ACK] Seq=68372 Ack=200 Win=64240 ...
285	48.518257	192.168.23.129	59.53.91.102	TCP	60	1067 → 80 [ACK] Seq=200 Ack=68373 Win=64240 Len=0
286	49.108743	192.168.23.129	59.53.91.102	TCP	60	1067 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=200 Ack=68373 Win=64240 Len=0
287	49.108759	59.53.91.102	192.168.23.129	TCP	60	80 → 1067 [ACK] Seq=68373 Ack=201 Win=64239 Len=0
288	50.210596	192.168.23.129	192.168.23.2	DNS	71	Standard query 0xbca3 A freeways.in
289	50.310134	192.168.23.2	192.168.23.129	DNS	235	Standard query response 0xbca3 A freeways.in A 212.252...
290	50.326299	192.168.23.129	212.252.32.20	TCP	62	1069 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK PE...
291	50.604889	212.252.32.20	192.168.23.129	TCP	60	80 → 1069 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1...
292	50.604921	192.168.23.129	212.252.32.20	TCP	60	1069 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
293	50.609172	192.168.23.129	212.252.32.20	HTTP	305	GET /11111/gate.php?guid=ADMINISTRATOR!TICKLABS-LZ!1C7...
294	50.609189	212.252.32.20	192.168.23.129	TCP	60	80 → 1069 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=252 Win=64240 Len=0
295	50.857613	212.252.32.20	192.168.23.129	HTTP	940	HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)

Frame 294: 60 bytes on wire (480 bits), 60 bytes captured (480 bits)
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_f5:48:d4 (00:50:56:f5:48:d4), Dst: Vmware_ca:2a:f2 (00:0c:29:ca:2a:f2)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 212.252.32.20, Dst: 192.168.23.129
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 80, Dst Port: 1069, Seq: 1, Ack: 252, Len: 0

```
0000  00 0c 29 ca 2a f2 00 50 56 f5 48 d4 08 00 45 00  ..).*.P V.H...E.
0010  00 28 00 dd 00 00 80 06 6c b9 d4 fc 20 14 c0 a8  .(.....l... ..
0020  17 81 00 50 04 2d 59 5d 16 60 c6 10 0e ab 50 10  ...P.-Y]  ....P.
0030  fa f0 9e b3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .... ..
```

infected Packets: 303 · Displayed: 303 (100.0%) · Load time: 0:0.18 Profile: Default

student@int-rt: ~ [Software Updater] infected.pcap (as supe...



Source IP : 212.252.32.20

Destination IP : 192.168.23.129

Source Port : 80

Destination Port : 1069

Protocol : Transmission Control protocol (TCP)

3. Look up the meaning of the alerts and explain which alert you think is actually the one that identifies a likely malware installation attempt. [15 points]

Answer : The alert which identifies malware installation is :

[1:25042:4]

[Classification: A Network Trojan was Detected] [Priority: 1]

03/16-12:50:50.702668 00:50:56:F5:48:D4 -> 00:0C:29:CA:2A:F2 type:0x800
len:0x44A6

59.53.91.102:80 -> 192.168.23.129:1066 TCP TTL:128 TOS:0x0 ID:380 IpLen:20
DgmLen:17560 DF

**A* Seq: 0x2908299D Ack: 0xEB81D38D Win: 0xFAF0 TcpLen: 20

[Xref =>
<http://malware.dontneedcoffee.com/2012/11/cve-2012-5076-massively-adopted.html>][Xr
ef => <http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=2012-5076>]

Here we can see that some portable executable is being downloaded.

4. There were likely many likely false positive alerts that repeat many times and consumed time in your analysis. Describe your recommendation for reducing these false positives so that they would not consume analysis time in the future. Also include any potential dangers in your proposed method. [10 points]

Answer) Network based intrusion detection systems (NIDS) perform in-depth packet analysis in order to enumerate attackers who are attempting to expose network and service vulnerabilities. A false positive state is when the NIDS identifies an activity as an attack but the activity in actual is benign (it's acceptable behavior). We can implement certain methods to reduce these false positives so that NIDS will not consume analysis time in future such as :

For properly analysing false positive alarms reduction strategies we need to quantify risk and role of NIDS in this risk reduction. There are different formulas to quantify risk. Potential dangers that this method might face is that these formula implemented might not be full proof, mathematics behind these is dubious. Other methods can be placing NIDS behind firewall, Tuning NIDS signature, Network Analysis (this is going to be a laborious task) etc.

Wireshark Exercises :

5. Use a filter and list all the DNS queries and the resolved IP addresses. Include the filter in the lab write up. (15 points)

We can use dns filter to list all the DNS queries and the resolved IP addresses.

dns

Connected (unencrypted) to: QEMU (344_13_21)

Applications Places System

Browse and run installed applications

infected.pcap (as superuser)

File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Telephony Wireless Tools Help

dns

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	192.168.23.129	192.168.23.2	DNS	68	Standard query 0xfalc A nrtjo.eu
2	0.988900	192.168.23.129	192.168.23.2	DNS	68	Standard query 0xfalc A nrtjo.eu
3	1.987301	192.168.23.129	192.168.23.2	DNS	68	Standard query 0xfalc A nrtjo.eu
4	2.909144	192.168.23.2	192.168.23.129	DNS	162	Standard query response 0xfalc A nrtjo.eu A 59.53.91.102 NS ...
6	2.929185	192.168.23.2	192.168.23.129	DNS	162	Standard query response 0xfalc A nrtjo.eu A 59.53.91.102 NS ...
7	2.930238	192.168.23.2	192.168.23.129	DNS	162	Standard query response 0xfalc A nrtjo.eu A 59.53.91.102 NS ...
43	19.900252	192.168.23.129	192.168.23.2	DNS	68	Standard query 0x5b1d A nrtjo.eu
44	19.971014	192.168.23.2	192.168.23.129	DNS	162	Standard query response 0x5b1d A nrtjo.eu A 59.53.91.102 NS ...
90	29.821145	192.168.23.129	192.168.23.2	DNS	85	Standard query 0xe78a PTR 102.91.53.59.in-addr.arpa
93	30.666108	192.168.23.2	192.168.23.129	DNS	143	Standard query response 0xe78a No such name PTR 102.91.53.59...
288	50.210596	192.168.23.129	192.168.23.2	DNS	71	Standard query 0xbca3 A freeways.in
289	50.310134	192.168.23.2	192.168.23.129	DNS	235	Standard query response 0xbca3 A freeways.in A 212.252.32.20...

0000 00 50 56 f5 48 d4 00 0c 29 ca 2a f2 08 00 45 00 .PV.H...).*...E.
0010 00 36 01 28 00 00 00 11 89 bb c0 a8 17 81 c0 a8 .6.(.....
0020 17 02 fb 23 00 35 00 22 ff a5 fa 1c 01 00 00 01 ...#.5."
0030 00 00 00 00 00 05 6e 72 74 6a 6f 02 65 75 00n rtjo.eu.
0040 00 01 00 01

Domain Name System: Protocol


Packets: 303 · Displayed: 12 (4.0%) · Load time: 0:0.14 · Profile: Default

student@int-rt: ~ infected.pcap (as supe...

6. There were HTTP sessions established to download 2 java applets. What were the names of the two .jar files that implemented these applets? (10 points)

The names of the two .jar files that implemented these applets were :

1. q.jar
2. sdfg.jar



7. As part of the infection, a malicious executable file was downloaded onto the client's computer. What was the file's MD5 hash? Hint: It ends on "91ed". (10 points)

Answer) MD5 hash of the file was : 5942ba36cf732097479c51986eee91ed

Browser being used by the client is : Microsoft Internet Explorer

Browser being used by the client is : Microsoft Internet Explorer

