

$$\text{oder} \quad p_{da}^b g_i^{\sim b} - p_{da}^s g_i^{\sim s} + \sum_{t \in T} p^t [p_{rt}^b g_i^{\sim b} - p_{rt}^s g_i^{\sim s}]$$

$$\begin{aligned} L_i &= p_{da}^b g_i^{\sim b} - p_{da}^s g_i^{\sim s} + \sum_{t \in T} p^t [p_{rt}^b g_i^{\sim b} - p_{rt}^s g_i^{\sim s}] \\ &+ \sum_{j \in T_i} f_{ij} (g_{ij} + g_{ji}) + \sum_{j \in T_i} f_{ij} (g_{ij} - \kappa_{ij}) + \\ &+ \sum_{t \in T} d_i^t (d_i - d g_i^t - \sum_{j \in T_i} g_{ij} - g_i^{\sim b} + g_i^{\sim s} - g_i^{\sim b, t} + g_i^{\sim s, t}) \\ &- \mu_i^{\sim b} g_i^{\sim b} - \mu_i^{\sim s} g_i^{\sim s} - \mu_i^{\sim b, t} g_i^{\sim b, t} - \mu_i^{\sim s, t} g_i^{\sim s, t} \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{dL_i}{d g_i^{\sim b}} = p_{da}^b - \sum_{t \in T} d_i^t - \mu_i^{\sim b} = 0$$

$$\frac{dL_i}{d g_i^{\sim s}} = -p_{da}^s + \sum_{t \in T} d_i^t - \mu_i^{\sim s} = 0$$

$$\frac{dL_i}{d g_{ij}} = f_{ij} + f_{ji} - \sum_{t \in T} d_i^t = 0$$

$$\frac{dL_i}{d g_i^{\sim b, t}} = p_{rt}^b - d_i^t - \mu_i^{\sim b, t} = 0$$

$$\frac{dL_i}{d g_i^{\sim s, t}} = -p_{rt}^s + d_i^t - \mu_i^{\sim s, t} = 0$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 (1) \quad \frac{dL_i}{d\alpha, b} &= p_{da}^b - \sum_{t \neq i} d_i^t - \mu_i^{\alpha, b} = 0 \quad 0 \leq \mu_i^{\alpha, b} \downarrow \uparrow \geq 0 \\
 (2) \quad \frac{dL_i}{d\beta, \alpha, s} &= -p_{da}^s + \sum_{t \neq i} d_i^t - \mu_i^{\alpha, s} = 0 \quad 0 \leq \mu_i^{\alpha, s} \downarrow \uparrow \geq 0 \\
 (3) \quad \frac{dL_i}{d\beta_{ij}} &= \xi_{ij} + \bar{\xi}_{ij} - \sum_{t \neq i} d_i^t = 0 \\
 (4) \quad \frac{dL_i}{d\beta_{i, rt, b, t}} &= p_{rt}^b - d_i^t - \mu_i^{rt, b, t} = 0 \\
 (5) \quad \frac{dL_i}{d\beta_{i, rt, s, t}} &= -p_{rt}^s p_{i, rt}^t + d_i^t - \mu_i^{rt, s, t} = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

$\xi_{ij}$  → congestion price  
 if  $\xi_{ij}$  is included, then  $\xi_{ij}$  should account for it

(1) + (3) →  $\xi_{ij} + \bar{\xi}_{ij} = p_{da}^b - \mu_i^{\alpha, b}$   
 $\xi_{ij} = p_{da}^b - \mu_i^{\alpha, b} - \bar{\xi}_{ij}$

Can be non 0 only if  $\alpha, b = 0$ , so when  $i$  is not trading with the grid "motivation"

Why  $\xi_{ij} = p_{da}^b$ ?  
 Proof:  $i \rightarrow j$  is it prohibitive to sell for  $p_{da}^b - \epsilon$ ?  
 Yes, then  $\epsilon \rightarrow 0$

$\mu_i^{\alpha, b} + \bar{\xi}_{ij} = 0$   
 $\mu_i \rightarrow 0$   
 why? what means?

$\parallel s(r_{i1}, w) > s(r_{i2}, w)$   
we can measure it

$\parallel U > 0$   
we can't measure it

What we can do is:

have a fixed payoff

$p(r)$  reputation

imagine  $\rightarrow$   $p(r) \uparrow$  if  $s(r_{i1}, w) > s(r_{i2}, w)$   
 $p(r) \downarrow$  otherwise

$p(r)$  should have some connection with

$$d_i = p_{da}^{b, da, b} g_i^{da, b} - p_{da}^{s, da, s} g_i^{da, s} + \sum_{t \in T} p^t [p_{rt}^{b, rt, b} g_i^{rt, b} - p_{rt}^{s, rt, s} g_i^{rt, s}] + \sum_{j \in T_i} p_{da}^{b, g_{ij}} g_{ij}^{b, g_{ij}}$$

$$g_i^{rt, b} = \left[ d_i - dg_i - g_i^{da, b} + g_i^{da, s} - \sum_{j \in T_i} g_{ij}^b \right] \text{ if } S_i > 0$$

due  $g_i^{rt, s} = S_i$

$$\text{Cost}_i = p_{da}^{b, da, b} g_i^{da, b} - p_{da}^{s, da, s} g_i^{da, s} + p^{rt, b} \cdot S_i \cdot \mathbb{1}_{S_i > 0} - p^{rt, s} S_i \cdot \mathbb{1}_{S_i < 0} + \sum_{j \in T_i} p_{da}^{b, g_{ij}} g_{ij}^b$$

$$p_{da}^{b, da, b} g_1^{da, b} - p_{da}^{s, da, s} g_1^{da, s} + S_1 (p^{rt, b} \mathbb{1}_{S_1 > 0} - p^{rt, s} \mathbb{1}_{S_1 < 0}) + \sum_{j \in T_1} p_{da}^{b, g_{1j}} g_{1j}^b - p_{da}^{b, da, b} g_2^{da, b} + p_{da}^{s, da, s} g_2^{da, s} - S_2 (\dots) - \sum_{j \in T_1} p_{da}^{b, g_{1j}} g_{1j}^2$$

$$p_{da}^{b, da, b} (g_1^{da, b} - g_2^{da, b} + \sum_{j \in T_1} g_{1j}^b - \sum_{j \in T_1} g_{1j}^2)$$